THE  FOUNDATIONS 
OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 


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THE  FOUNDATIONS 
OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

An  Analysis  of  their  Psychological  Aspects 


BY 

JAMES  MICKEL  WILLIAMS,  B.D.,  Ph.D. 


ISlew  York         ALFRED  •  A  •  KNOPF         Mcmxx 


COPYRIGHT,  1920,  BY 
ALFRED  A.  KNOPF,  Inc. 


FBINTBD   IN   THE   UNITED   STATES   OT   AUSBXOA 


KM 


LICr^ARY 

UNIVERSITY  07  CALIFOaNiA 

SANTA  BAIIBARA 


TO 
MY  FATHER,  MOTHER,  AND  SISTER, 

WITH  WHOM  THESE  STUDIES  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY 

WERE  BEGUN  AND  CARRIED  ON  FOR  YEARS, 

THIS  BOOK  IS  DEDICATED 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  ArcJiive 

in  2007  witii  funding  from 

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PREFACE 

The  Increasing  dissatisfaction  with  the  traditional  formulations 
of  the  facts  of  history  and  social  science  has  stimulated  a  search 
for  causes  in  the  human  motives  that  make  history  and  determine 
the  phenomena  of  social  science.  How  far  causes  of  this  fundamen- 
tal kind  can,  with  strict  scientific  accuracy,  be  ascertained,  is  becom- 
ing evident  from  an  increasing  volume  of  research.  The  re- 
sults suggest  the  possibility  of  an  underlying  science  of  social 
relations,  less  objective  than  the  other  social  sciences,  but  hav- 
ing a  field  and  method  of  its  own.  The  cultivation  of  this 
science,  it  is  maintained,  will  not  only  co-ordinate  the  work 
of  social  scientists  in  different  fields  but  will  yield  a  distinct 
body  of  scientific  knowledge  and  principles.  Social  psychology 
will  justify  its  claim  to  be  recognized  as  an  accredited  science 
if  it  can  be  shown  ( i )  that  it  has  a  distinct  field  which  can  be 
dealt  with  scientifically,  and  (2)  that  the  other  sciences  which 
have  to  do  with  human  relations  assume  a  little  known  psychologi- 
cal field  from  which  are  drawn  explanations  of  phenomena  in  their 
own  fields.  Our  task  is,  therefore,  ( i )  to  indicate  what  is  the  rela- 
tion of  the  science  of  this  little  known  field  to  the  other  sciences  of 
social  relations;  (2)  to  offer  an  analysis  of  this  little  known  field. 

"  The  Foundations  of  Social  Science  "  treats  of  the  relations  of 
the  science  of  this  new  field  to  the  other  social  sciences.  If  it  can 
be  shown  that  the  analyses  of  unsolved  problems  of  the  other  social 
sciences,  as  pressed  by  the  more  earnest  scientists,  converge  toward 
this  new  field,  if  certain  conceptions  about  the  little  known  field  have 
formed  in  the  minds  of  scientists  in  other  fields,  then  we  may  assume 
that  it  demands  our  study.  The  obstacles  encountered  will  not  all 
be  intellectual.  Every  advance  in  science  has  encountered  conser- 
vatism in  high  places,  and  the  opposition  of  interests  which  thought 
their  position  and  prestige  jeopardized  thereby. 

In  addition  to  this  volume  on  the  psychological  aspects  of  social 
science,  I  have  five  others  which  will  be  published  as  business  con- 
ditions permit.     The  second  book  carries  out  the  purpose  of  the 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

first  and  explains  the  relation  of  social  psychology  to  another  field 
of  knowledge,  the  criticism  of  literature  and  art.  The  third  book 
begins  the  analysis  of  the  processes  of  social  psychology.  It 
offers  an  analysis  of  the  conflicts  of  types  of  behaviour  throughout 
social  organization, —  in  family  relations,  economic  relations,  po- 
litical relations,  professional  relations,  ecclesiastical  relations,  ar- 
tistic standards  and  educational  relations.  This  book  treats 
one  distinct  branch  of  social  psychology  —  the  conflict  of 
Interests  in  social  relations,  and  the  suppression  of  instinctive  im- 
pulses and  its  social  effects.  The  fourth  book  treats  another 
branch  —  the  processes  of  feeling  and  thought  through  which  in- 
stinctive interests  are  adjusted;  the  fifth  another  branch  —  the 
processes  of  personality  that  must  be  facilitated  for  social  adjust- 
ment; the  sixth  another  branch  —  the  processes  of  social  control. 
Each  of  these  six  books,  as  written,  is  entirely  distinct  from  the 
others.  Doubtless  it  would  have  increased  their  scientific  value  had 
it  been  possible  to  publish  them  as  originally  intended  —  as  separate 
volumes  of  one  work  —  but  business  conditions  made  this  Impos- 
sible. They  have  a  logical  connection,  but  they  are  so  written  that 
each  treats  a  distinct  branch  of  the  subject  and  Is  complete  in  itself. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  author's  work  can  be  fairly  judged 
only  by  going  through  the  series.  A  part  of  an  entirely  new  sci- 
ence can  be  understood  only  by  understanding  the  whole.  More 
than  one  of  my  critics  said  that  they  made  notes  as  they  went  along 
but  eventually  destroyed  most  of  them,  for  they  found  that  the 
points  In  question  were  later  dealt  with.  The  critics  will,  there- 
fore, want  to  go  on  through  the  series  before  passing  final  judgment 
on  any  one  book.  Nevertheless,  for  the  general  reader,  and  for 
class-room  use,  each  book  Is  Intelligible  without  the  others. 

Social  psychology  has  distinct  branches,  as  has  economics  —  con- 
sumption, production,  distribution,  value  and  exchange,  the  relation 
of  the  state  to  Industry.  And  as  there  Is  no  exact  agreement 
among  economists  on  the  main  divisions,  after  a  century  of  culti- 
vation of  the  science,  so  there  Is  no  agreement  among  social  psy- 
chologists. It  has  seemed  to  me  that  what  the  science  needs  first 
Is  a  treatise  on  each  of  the  main  divisions.  Having  thus  developed 
all  branches  of  the  science.  It  will  be  possible  to  formulate  in  one 
volume  a  more  or  less  abstract  statement  of  the  elementary  prin- 
ciples of  the  science.  But  to  attempt  to  do  so  without  having  pre- 
viously cultivated  all  its  branches  would  be  to  make  the  mistake 


PREFACE  ix 

made  by  the  deductive  formulation  of  economic  principles  from 
hedonistic  premises  before  the  branches  of  that  science  had  been 
intensively  cultivated.  A  logically  compact  body  of  principles  is 
so  seductive  that  it  may  obsess  the  mind  long  after  the  principles 
have  become  palpably  untrue.  Still  further  to  emphasize  the  need 
of  inductive  studies  instead  of  abstract  statements,  I  have  in  prepa- 
ration a  series  of  volumes  on  "  Inductive  Social  Psychology  "  which 
are  studies  of  the  psychological  processes  of  various  groups. 

In  writing  these  books  I  have  written  not  merely  as  a  student  for 
students,  but  for  that  increasing  number  of  men  and  women  v/ho 
have  a  desire  for  some  understanding  of  the  society  in  which  we  live. 
Consequently  I  have  taken  pains  to  be  clear,  to  avoid  abstraction, 
to  follow  closely  and  concretely  the  processes  which  seem  to  me 
essential  in  human  society.  Inasmuch  as  this  is  the  first  attempt 
at  an  extended  exposition  of  social  psychology,  the  treatment  must 
be  more  concrete  than  would  otherwise  be  necessary.  The  nature 
of  the  subject,  therefore,  has  encouraged  the  writer  to  ignore  the 
distinction  unusually  made  between  the  serious  student  and  the 
general  reader  and  to  write  more  concretely  than  is  usual  for  the 
serious  student,  and  with  more  numerous  citations  and  references 
than  is  usual  for  the  general  reader. 

These  books  were  not  written  under  the  influence  of  the  war 
period.  They  were  begun  long  before  and  most  of  them  were 
ready  for  publication  in  19 17,  but  business  conditions  were  then  un- 
favorable for  their  publication.  Accordingly  I  have  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  make  such  additions  as  were  suggested  by  the  great  epoch 
through  which  we  have  passed,  and  by  the  books  and  articles  whidi 
appeared  during  that  period,  so  that  the  work  may  be  assumed  to 
be  up  to  date,  so  far  as  it  has  been  in  my  power  to  make  it  so.  But 
the  underlying  processes  of  human  nature  were  not  changed  by  the 
war,  though  the  full  significance  of  the  great  events  and  their  under- 
lying currents  cannot  be  discerned  at  present.  The  science  of  social 
psychology  is  not  completed.  Long  ago  the  Greeks  were  working 
at  it,  so  are  some  of  us,  and  so  will  those  who  follow  us  to  the  end 
of  time. 

Parts  of  the  manuscript  were  submitted  to  specialists  in  those 
fields  a  knowledge  of  which  is  necessary  for  the  social  psychologist, 
and  the  author  has  had  the  benefit  of  their  criticisms.  These  spe- 
cialists are:  Dr.  Charles  A.  Beard,  Dr.  Wesley  C.  Mitchell,  Dr. 
James  H.  Robinson,  and  Dr.  Leo  Wolman,  lecturers  in  the  New 


X  PREFACE 

School  for  Social  Research,  Dr.  Henry  R.  Mussey,  managing  editor 
of  the  Searchlight,  Mr.  Henry  T.  Noyes,  a  manufacturer  and  civic 
leader  of  Rochester,  and  Professors  Franklin  H.  Giddings  and  Ed- 
ward L.  Thorndike  of  Columbia  University.  While  the  sugges- 
tions of  these  critics  have  been  carefully  followed  out,  all  but  two 
read  only  a  very  small  part  of  the  work,  and  no  one  of  them  read  it 
all  so  that  the  author  must  take  the  sole  responsibihty  for  the  ideas 
expressed.  I  think  my  critics  agree  that  social  psychology  has  an 
intimate  relation  to  their  particular  fields,  whether  or  not  they 
agree  with  my  analysis  of  the  relation,  which  constitutes  the  first 
volume;  and  that  social  psychology,  of  which  the  succeeding  volumes 
offer  a  formulation,  is  a  science  that  has  great  possibilities  and  is  a 
challenge  to  intellectual  work  that  is  eminently  worth  while. 

To  my  colleague.  Professor  Walter  S.  Gamertsfelder,  I  am  in- 
debted for  invaluable  assistance  in  the  proof-reading. 

James  Mickel  Williams. 
Geneva,  N.  Y.,  August  lo,  1920. 


CONTENTS 

Introduction  xiii 

BOOK  I 
SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

I  Psychological  Implications  of  Political  Theory  3 

II  The  Psychological  Approach  to  the  Problem  of  Sovereignty  18 

III  Sovereignty  and  the  Class  Struggle  47 

IV  Sovereignty  and  the  Class  Struggle  (concluded)   71 

V  The  Psychology  of  Nationality  91 

VI  The  Conflict  of  Political  Attitudes  and  Ideals  116 

VII  Psychological  Aspects  of  Intra-national  Relations  135 

VIII  Psychological  Aspects  of  International  Relations  166 

IX  The  Failure  of  International  Co-operation  181 

X  Psychological  Aspects  of  a  League  of  Nations  196 

BOOK  II 
SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  JURISPRUDENCE 

XI  Psychological  Aspects  of  the  Development  of  Jurisprudence  209 

XII  Psychological  Aspects  of  the  Juristic  Problem  220 

XIII  Psychological  Implications  of  the  Theory  of  Natural  Rights  236 

XIV  The  Conflict  of  Judicial  Attitudes  257 

XV    Judicial  Attitudes  and  the  Nature  of  Law  275 

XVI     Psychological  Implications  of  Interpretations  of  Private  Rights  298 

XVII     Psychological  Processes  in  the  Development  of  Private  Property  317 

XVIII     Psychological  Processes  in  the  Development  of  Private  Property 
(concluded)   330 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

BOOK  III 

SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AS  RELATED  TO  ECONOMICS, 
HISTORY  AND  SOCIOLOGY 

XIX     The  Relation  of  Social  Psychology  to  Economics  345 

XX     The  Relation  of  Social  Psychology  to  Economics  (concluded)  376 

XXI     Social  Psychology  and  History  386 

XXII    The   Relation  of   Social   Psychology  to   Sociology,   Eugenics  and 
Social  Philosophy  410 

BOOK  IV 

THE  FIELD  AND  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 

XXIII  The  Field  of  Social  Psychology  427 

XXIV  The  Methods  of  Social  Psychology  441 


INTRODUCTION 

The  history  of  the  social  sciences  shows,  in  each  science,  an 
attempt  to  reach  fundamental  psychological  assumptions.  As  one 
compares  the  work  of  the  more  strictly  legal  political  scientists  of 
recent  years  with  that  of  "  progressive"  scientists  one  might  draw 
a  distinction  between  legal  and  psychological  political  science ;  and 
this  distinction  might  be  traced  back  even  to  the  Greek  political 
philosophers.  In  jurisprudence,  also,  we  have  the  more  strictly 
legal  jurists  as  compared  with  the  psychological  trend  of  the  thought 
of  some  of  them,  for  instance,  of  Justice  OHver  Wendell  Holmes, 
who  says:  "  I  think  that  the  judges  themselves  have  failed  ade- 
quately to  recognize  their  duty  of  weighing  considerations  of  social 
advantage.  The  duty  is  inevitable,  and  the  result  of  the  often  pro- 
claimed judicial  aversion  to  deal  with  such  considerations  is  simply 
to  leave  the  very  ground  and  foundation  of  judgments  inarticulate 
and  often  unconscious."  ^  In  economics  one  may  compare  the  ex- 
treme emphasis  placed  by  some  economists  on  the  deductive  aspect 
of  the  science  with  the  emphasis  of  others  on  its  psychological  as- 
pects. In  sociology  one  may  make  a  similar  comparison  between 
sociologists  who  emphasize  the  comparative  study  of  social  rules 
and  customs  and  institutions  on  the  one  hand  and  psychological 
sociology  on  the  other.  From  this  psychological  aspect  of  each 
social  science  social  psychology  Is  to  be  clearly  distinguished.  The 
trend  of  thought  of  the  psychological  social  scientists  signifies  an 
aim  to  arrive  at  truer  assumptions,  and  to  keep  an  open  mind  toward 
the  psychological,  as  well  as  the  other  aspects  of  those  assumptions. 
Obviously  it  is  the  function  of  social  psychology  to  assist  the  politi- 
cal scientist,  the  jurist,  the  economist,  the  sociologist,  and  others  in 
the  psychological  aspect  of  this  their  search  for  truer  assumptions. 
While  the  social  psychologist,  in  the  course  of  his  own  work,  ana- 
lyses the  psychological  aspect  of  the  assumptions  of  the  various 
social  sciences,  It  is  not  his  task  to  formulate  for  any  social  science 
its  particular  assumptions.     But  true  assumptions  require  a  knowl- 

1  Holmes,  "The  Path  of  the  Law,"  Harvard  Law  Review,  X:  457,  467, 

xiii 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

edge  of  that  particular  field  which  it  is  the  task  of  the  social  psy- 
chologist to  investigate  and,  so  far  as  he  may,  "  set  in  the  order 
of  reason." 

Social  scientists  also  need  the  aid  of  the  social  psychologist  if 
they  are  to  make  interpretations  that  begin  to  realize  the  possibili- 
ties of  interpretation  in  their  particular  fields.  Prediction  in  social 
science  cannot  pretend  to  the  exactness  of  prediction  in  natural  sci- 
ence, because  the  principles  of  social  science  must  change  as  reason 
reacts  upon  instinctive  processes.  But  let  us  not,  for  that  reason, 
accept  the  view  of  those  who  would  limit  the  task  of  the  social  sci- 
entist to  merely  showing  an  orderly  development  in  past  and  present, 
through  use  of  the  formulas  of  biological  evolution.  Predictions  in 
the  mathematical  sense  can  be  made  in  economics,  for  instance,  of 
the  yield  and  price  of  products.  And  prediction  in  the  larger  sense 
of  recommendations  of  changes  in  institutions  that  are  required  for 
social  progress  can  be  made  in  all  the  social  sciences.  These  rec- 
ommendations are  not  made  by  a  scientific  man  merely  as  something 
desirable,  but  as  changes  that  appear  sure  to  come,  owing  to  ob- 
served changes  in  social-psychological  processes,  and  other  condi- 
tions, that  call  for  corresponding  changes  in  institutions.  There- 
fore the  truest  predictions,  the  wisest  recommendations,  are  those 
based  not  on  assumptions  as  to  human  nature  derived  from  tradi- 
tional social  relations,  but  on  assumptions  to  which  social  psychology 
has  contributed  adequate  conceptions. 

The  tendency  in  all  science  is  to  pay  too  little  attention  to  assump- 
tions, to  regard  them  as  verified  truths  instead  of  hypothetical  for- 
mulations. This  is  a  natural  tendency  of  the  intellect  because  the 
intellect  instinctively  seeks  clearness,  even  at  the  expense  of  thor- 
oughness. This  tendency  of  all  science  has  been  pronounced  in  the 
social  sciences  for  these  reasons:  (i)  Though  the  social  sciences 
have  to  do,  in  the  last  analysis,  with  human  nature,  its  processes 
have  been  little  understood,  and  the  effect  of  the  mystery  of  this 
hinterland  of  social  science  has  been  to  give  a  fixity  to  the  assump- 
tions of  the  contiguous  sciences.  (2)  The  social  pressure,  which 
is  felt  more  by  social  scientists  than  others,  has  given  fixity  to  as- 
sumptions that  were  in  harmony  with  the  impulses  and  beliefs  of 
the  powers  that  be,  for  instance,  the  assumption  of  the  absolutism 
of  the  state,  of  freedom  of  contract,  of  free  competition  for  profits, 
of  the  social  control  of  propertied  classes.  Social  scientists  have 
tended,  therefore,  to  accept  as  final  the  view  of  human  nature  im- 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

plied  in  the  traditional  social  relations  assumed  in  their  premises, 
and  have  failed  to  discriminate  between  a  motive  that  is  essential 
in  traditional  political  relations,  or  in  traditional  economic  relations 
and  one  that  is  essential  in  human  nature.  This  is  not  mentioned  by 
way  of  criticism  of  social  scientists,  but  to  emphasize  the  vital  rela- 
tion of  social  psychology  to  the  other  social  sciences,  and  to  point 
out  that  the  advancement  of  the  latter  has  been  impeded  by  the 
backward  development  of  social  psychology. 

Assumptions  derived  from  the  historical  view,  and  from  mass 
phenomena,  have  obscured  the  individual.  The  group  outlines  of 
conceptions  thus  derived  must  not  blind  us  to  the  fact  that  we  are 
dealing  with  groups  of  individuals;  that  it  is  only  through  the  opera- 
tion of  certain  instinctive  dispositions  of  individuals  that  they  act  as 
groups;  that  through  the  action  of  dispositions  the  individuals  of  a 
group  may  resist  discipline  as  well  as  submit  to  it;  may  create  a 
conscious  ideal  of  development  of  personality  which,  with  the  in- 
crease of  intelligence,  disengages  itself  from  ideals  imposed  by 
seemingly  inevitable  group  rivalry,  and  by  the  coercion  of  dominant 
classes  to  whose  interest  it  is  to  make  group  rivalry  seem  inevitable. 
Wherefore,  the  essential  assumptions  of  social  psychology  are  cer- 
tain instinctive  dispositions, —  for  instance,  the  dispositions  of 
acquisition,  rivalry,  domination,  submission,  sympathy,  intellect, — 
which  are  the  elementary  processes  of  social  relations.  In  "  The 
Foundations  of  Social  Science  "  these  dispositions  will  be  used  as 
assumptions  in  the  analysis  of  the  psychological  aspects  of  assump- 
tions of  the  social  sciences.  This  use  of  assumptions  may  call 
forth  objections,  for  instance,  in  analyses  of  the  "  rivalry  "  of,  or 
"  domination  "  by,  or  the  "  submission  "  of,  certain  classes.  But 
the  analysis  has  to  begin  somewhere,  and  the  assumed  dispositions 
are  later  analysed.  By  this  progressive  treatment  of  assumptions, 
these  are  finally  reduced  to  their  lowest  terms. 

The  theory  that  there  are  essential  conceptions  of  human  nature 
which  will  serve  all  social  sciences  is  not  new,  and,  indeed,  seems 
inevitable  when  we  consider  that  every  social  science  and  branch 
of  culture  has  a  human  nature  basis.  History  and  philosophy  have 
to  do  with  idea-systems  that  depend  on  human  nature,  wherefore, 
these  branches  of  culture  require  adequate  assumptions  as  to  hu- 
man nature.  Language  has  long  been  known  to  depend  for  its 
development  on  changes  in  human  nature,  hence  the  study  of  lan- 
guage requires  a  knowledge  of  social  psychology.     Literature  has 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

long  been  regarded  as  an  expression  of  human  nature,  and  literary 
criticism  as  a  mere  mechanical  procedure  without  use  of  social- 
psychological  principles  of  criticism.  Religion  and  art  are  recog- 
nized as  revelations  of  human  nature,  and  their  study  as  requir- 
ing social-psychological  principles.  All  the  social  sciences  start 
with  certain  assumptions  as  to  human  nature.  It  follows  that  the 
study  of  these  different  branches  —  history,  philosophy,  language, 
literary  and  other  art  criticism,  religion,  pohtical  science,  juris- 
prudence, economics,  sociology  —  may  be  unified  by  relating  it  to 
essential  principles  of  the  science  of  human  nature.  To  the  end 
that  we  may  give  a  scientific  trend  to  the  present  movement  to- 
ward a  more  profound  interpretation  of  human  life  and  prob- 
lems, without  which  the  movement  will  take  an  affective  trend 
and  end  in  nothing,  I  have  attempted  to  bring  to  a  focus  the  human 
nature  basis  of  the  different  fields  of  knowledge,  in  the  hope  that 
scholars  in  their  different  fields  might  take  a  renewed  interest  in 
that  aspect  of  their  subject,  and  that  colleges  might  attempt  still 
further  to  unify  their  instruction  through  relating  it  to  the  science 
of  human  nature. 


BOOK  I 
SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


CHAPTER  I 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    IMPLICATIONS    OF    POLITICAL    THEORY 

OUR  survey  of  the  relation  of  social  psychology  to  other  fields 
of  knowledge  requires,  as  a  point  of  departure,  a  provi- 
sional definition  of  social  psychology.  Without  attempt- 
ing to  frame  a  complete  definition  or  one  that  will  generally  satisfy 
students  of  the  subject,  we  may  say  that  it  is  the  science  of  the 
motives  of  the  behaviour  of  men  living  in  social  relations.  As 
such  it  is  one  of  the  sciences  of  society,  society  being  a  general  term 
for  mankind  living  in  social  relations.  Social  psychology  does  not 
cover  the  entire  field  of  social  relations  but  merely  the  motives  of 
the  behaviour  of  men  living  in  social  relations.  The  behaviour 
studied  includes  all  social  reactions,  whether  reflex  or  conscious,  that 
enter  into  motives.^  By  a  motive  is  meant  any  mental  state  which 
either  assists  or  hinders  an  act.  Social  psychology  deals,  then, 
with  a  particular  aspect  of  social  relations,  the  motives  of  human 
behaviour.  Other  social  sciences  deal  with  other  aspects.  Thus 
jurisprudence  is  the  science  of  social  relations  in  their  fundamental 
legal  aspects.  Political  science  is  the  science  of  the  relations  of  a 
people  organized  politically.^  Economics  is  a  science  of  social  re- 
lations in  their  material  welfare  aspects  in  so  far  as  welfare  can  be 
quantitatively  determined  in  terms  of  money. ^  These  sciences  deal 
primarily  with  social  relations  that  have  become  customary,  the 
more  prominent  and  authenticated  aspects  of  which  are  termed  in- 

1  See  the  chapters  entitled,  The  Field  of  Social  Psychology,  and  The  Methods  of 
Social   Psychology. 

2  Political  science  is  a  science  not  merely  of  legal  maxims,  but  of  social  relations. 
"  A  statute  may  be  on  the  books  for  an  age,  but  unless,  under  its  provisions,  a  de- 
terminate arrangement  of  human  relations  is  brought  about  or  maintained,  it  exists 
only  in  the  imagination.  Separated  from  the  social  and  economic  fabric  by  which 
it  is,  in  part,  conditioned  and  which,  in  turn,  it  helps  to  condition,  it  has  no  reality." 
(Beard,  "An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,"  12.) 

3  Mitchell,  "The  Role  of  Money  in  Economic  Theory,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  Sup- 
plement,  VI:   159.  , 

3 


4  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

stitutions.  Thus  we  speak  of  juristic  institutions,  political  institu- 
tions, economic  institutions.^  Social  psychology  deals  with  the  mo- 
tives of  the  individuals  who  participate  in  these  institutional  rela- 
tions. Because  of  the  fundamental  as  well  as  illusive  nature  of  its 
data,  social  psychology  has  developed  last  of  all  the  social  sciences. 

The  first  social  science  to  be  cultivated  was  political  science  be- 
cause the  state  was  all  important  in  the  eyes  of  the  ancient  thinkers. 
The  nearest  approach  to  social  psychology  was  ethics,  which,  as  cul- 
tivated, was  closely  allied  with  political  science.  Economics  was 
long  a  branch  of  political  science  and  was  called  political  economy. 
Consequently  we  shall  begin  our  survey  of  the  psychological  founda- 
tions of  social  science  with  political  science. 

Since  the  era  of  the  Greek  philosophers,  the  state  has  been  as- 
sumed to  be  a  consequence  of  human  nature.  Plato  found  the  state 
to  be  a  necessary  result  of  the  diversity  of  human  impulses  and  the 
necessity  of  mutual  aid  in  satisfying  them;  ^  Aristotle  found  it  to  be 
the  result  of  a  political  instinct  of  man  and  the  need  of  associated 
life  for  self-realization,®  and  he  studied  the  adaptation  of  different 
forms  of  government  to  the  needs  of  different  peoples  and  classes.'' 
With  the  conquest  by  the  Romans  of  various  peoples  and  their  sub- 
jection to  the  will  of  a  distant  ruler,  interest  in  the  human  nature 
basis  of  the  state  waned,  except  as  it  was  appealed  to  in  the  attempt 
to  rationalize  autocratic  rule.  The  rise  of  democracy,  in  which 
government  depends  on  public  opinion,  has  stimulated  the  interest 
of  students  in  the  motives  of  political  behaviour.  These  students 
refer  to  an  unknown  psychological  field  for  explanations  of  phe- 
nomena in  their  own  fields.  President  Lowell,  writing  in  1908, 
said,  "  Social  psychology  has  also  come  into  view,  and  attempts 
have  been  made  to  explain  the  psychology  of  national  traits,  .  .  . 
But  the  normal  forces  that  govern  the  ordinary  conduct  of  men  in 
their  public  relations  have  scarcely  received  any  scientific  treatment 
at  all."  ®  Professor  Jenks,  writing  In  1909,  attempted  some  analysis 
of  the  motives  of  political  behaviour  but  explicitly  limited  his  analy- 
sis to  the  motives  of  leaders  in  politics,®  while  Professor  Wallas,  in 

*  Hamilton,  "The  Institutional  Approach  to  Economic  Theory,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev., 
Supplement,  IX:  313. 

"Republic,   II:   :?68-369. 

"Aristotle,  "Politics,"  trans,  by  Welldon,  Bk.  I,  Chs,  I  and  II;  Dunning,  "Political 
Theories,  Ancient  and  Mediaeval,"  28,  55-56,  83. 

7  Aristotle,    Politics,   Bk.   II,    Chs.   IX-XII,   Bk.    Ill,    Chs.    I-V. 

8  Lowell,  "The  Government  of  England,"  I:  435;  II:  104, 
P  Jpnks,  "  Principles  of  Politics,"  24. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPLICATIONS  5 

the  same  year,  attempted  a  more  comprehensive  analysis. ^^  These 
attempts  served  to  show  the  need  of  a  science  of  social  psychology 
for  an  understanding  of  politics.  From  these  fragmentary  begin- 
nings the  problem  has  broadened  out  and  developed  new  and  fruit- 
ful lines  of  inquiry.  It  is  no  longer  confined  to  political  behaviour 
in  the  present  but  has  given  a  new  point  of  view  for  historical  re- 
search, as  we  see  in  Dr.  Charles  A.  Beard's  analysis  of  the  motives 
under  which  the  American  Constitution  was  devised,  adopted  and 
apphed  in  the  development  of  American  government  and  politics. ^^ 

Political  science,  therefore,  assumes  a  psychological  field  distinct 
from  but  closely  related  to  its  own.  Political  scientists  have  dis- 
tinguished between  the  nation  and  the  state  and  have  confined  their 
analysis  to  the  state. ^^  The  state  is  the  people  organized  politi- 
cally, while  the  nation  designates  a  people  united  by  "  ethnic  and 
other  factors  largely  sentimental  or  psychological  in  character."  ^^ 
It  is  assumed  that  the  national  character  of  a  people  is  the  deter- 
mining influence  in  shaping  the  form  of  government. 

Political  science  not  only  assumes  a  psychological  field  distinct 
from  and  closely  related  to  its  own  but  also  implies  certain  political 
attitudes  in  its  assumptions.  In  the  concept  of  sovereignty  it  as- 
sumes an  attitude  of  obedience  of  subjects  to  sovereign  and  of 
authority  of  sovereign  over  subjects.^*  The  limitation  of  this  au- 
thority, whether  self-limited  ^^  or  socially-hmited,^^  as  worked  out 
by  political  scientists  is  a  logical  problem  of  political  science,  but 
the  social-psychological  processes  of  the  relation  of  authority- 
obedience  that  is  assumed  are  not  analysed.  These  processes  are, 
in  the  last  analysis,  "  in  the  individual  mind."  ^"^  What  are  the 
motives  of  subjects  in  recognizing  authority?     Theories  of  the  mo- 

10  Wallas,  "  Human  Nature  in  Politics." 

"Beard,  "An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States"; 
"  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian  Democracy." 

12  Giddings,   "  Principles   of   Sociology,   37. 

13  Willoughby,  "The  Nature  of  the  State,"  11. 

1* Willoughby,  "The  Juristic  Conception  of  the  State,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  XII: 
196-197. 

^^Hastie,  "Kant's  Philosophy  of  Law,"  174-178,  256-258;  Dyde,  "Hegel's  Phi- 
losophy of  Right,"  329;  Ihering,  "Law  as  a  Means  to  an  End,"  trans,  by  Husik,  267. 
Jellinek,  "  Die  Lehre  von  den  Staatenverbindungen,"  29-34. 

1*  Gerber,  "  Grundziige  des  deutschen  Staatsrechts,"  1880,  31-37;  Gierke,  "Die 
Grundbegriffe  des  Staatsrechts  und  die  neuesten  Staatstheorien,"  Zeitschrift  fiir  die 
gesammte  Staatsivissenschafte,  1874,  179;  Duguit,  "  L'Etat,  le  Droit  objectif  et  le 
loi  positive,"  366,  423-424,  502;  Duguit,  "  Le  Droit  social,  le  Droit  individuel  et  la 
Transformation  de  I'fitat,'  58. 

1^  Laskij  "  Authority  in  the  Modern  State,"  30. 


6  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

tives  of  subjects  have  varied  all  the  way  from  that  of  Hobbes,  who 
asserted  that  men  obey  because  they  are  afraid  not  to,  to  the  theory 
that  men  obey  because  the  authority  of  government  relieves  from 
fear  of  violence,  and  the  theory  that  obedience  not  only  relieves 
from  fear  but  also  enables  men  to  organize  for  self-development. 
Obviously  where  the  truth  lies,  within  these  broad  limits,  is  a  ques- 
tion of  social-psychological  fact.  Its  answer  requires  social-psycho- 
logical investigations,  and  no  amount  of  learned  theorizing  will 
avoid  that  necessity. 

This  psychological  field  adjacent  to  political  science  has  been 
recognized  both  by  the  self-limited  and  the  socially-limited  sov- 
ereignty theorists.  Of  the  former  Ihering  suggested  an  inductive 
study  of  this  field  by  his  inquiry  into  the  ethical  basis  of  law;.^^  and 
JeJlinek  sought  to  estabhsh  what  he  called  a  social-psychological 
guaranty  of  the  effectiveness  of  law  and  a  social-psychological  foun- 
dation for  the  subordination  of  the  state  to  law.^^  Theories  of  this 
type  maintain  that  the  underlying  fact  in  sovereignty  is  a  belief  or 
conscious  attitude  of  men  with  regard  to  law;  that  this  attitude 
causes  laws  to  be  respected  and  obeyed  not  as  particular  reasonable 
statutes  but  as  law  with  social  force  behind  it;  that  even  if  law  be 
regarded  as  a  compromise  between  conflicting  interests,  the  com- 
promise reached  depends  on  the  relative  social  force  behind  the 
different  interests;^''  and  that  legal  recognition  in  turn  strength- 
ens the  interests  recognized. ^^  This  attitude  to  law  characterizes 
all  men,  including  the  ruler;  thus  there  is  no  absolutely  unlimited 
authority  to  compel  obedience.  Authority  is  limited  by  law.  The- 
orists who  stand  for  socially-limited  sovereignty  do  not  stop  with 
the  attitude  of  respect  for  law  with  social  force  behind  it  but  carry 
further  the  analysis  of  that  social  force  as  the  ultimate  field  for  in- 
vestigation. They,  therefore,  make  a  still  more  extensive  use  of 
social-psychological  assumptions  than  do  the  self-limited  sovereignty 
theorists.  The  most  conservative  of  them  assume  not  merely  a 
generally  prevalent  attitude  of  respect  for  law  because  of  the  force 
behind  it  but  also  a  general  exercise  of  conscience  and  common  sense 
with  reference  to  the  rightness  or  wrongness  of  a  law,  which,  there- 
fore, limits  the  power  of  enforcing  obedience  to  the  law.  Thus 
Gierke  declared  that  the  state  is  not  '*  the  ultimate  source  of  law. 

**  Ihering,  "  Law  as  a  Means  to  and  End,"  trans,  by  Husik,  Chs.  I,  III-VIII. 
!» Jellinek,   "Allgemeine   Staatslehre,"   334-360,   164-166,   180-182. 

20  Ibid.,  341. 

21  Ihering,  "  The  Struggle  for  Law,"  trans,  by  Lalor,  49-50. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPLICATIONS  7 

.  .  .  The  ultimate  source  of  law  resides  rather  in  the  common  con- 
sciousness of  a  social  being.  The  common  consciousness  that  some- 
thing is  right  needs,  for  its  external  realization,  materialization  by 
a  social  expression,  as,  for  instance,  in  a  rule  of  law."  ^^  Later  the- 
orists make  a  still  more  extensive  use  of  social-psychological  assump- 
tions, as  will  be  shown  in  a  succeeding  chapter.^^ 

Not  only  have  political  scientists  recognized  a  psychological  field 
contiguous  to  their  own  and  included  in  their  premises  social- 
psychological  assumptions;  the  direction  of  the  thinking  of  those 
political  scientists  whose  work  became  most  influential  in  their  na- 
tion was  determined  by  the  political  attitude  prevailing  in  their  own 
state.  Their  thought  in  turn  reacted  upon  the  attitude,  making  it 
more  satisfying  to  thoughtful  people  by  removing  doubts  as  to  its 
wisdom  ^^  as  compared  with  the  difi^erent  political  attitudes  of  rival 
states.  The  prevailing  political  attitude  functioned  as  the  asso- 
ciative principle  of  the  premises,  subconscious  so  far  as  its  psycho- 
logical nature  and  action  were  concerned.  That  is,  theories  of 
sovereignty  have  been  logical  rather  than  psychological.  Subcon- 
sciously they  have  been  a  functioning  of  the  political  attitude  of  the 
particular  state,  the  conscious  processes  being  those  of  the  logical 
arrangement  of  the  ideas  suggested  by  the  attitude;  analysis  of 
attitude  does  not,  therefore,  come  within  the  scope  of  the  logical 
theory  of  sovereignty. 

The  political  attitude,  then,  essentially  determines  the  course  of 
thought  out  of  which  develops  the  theory  of  sovereignty.  Thus,  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  when  feudalism  with  its  submission  of  lesser  to 
greater  lords  on  promise  of  protection  had  developed,  and  when  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  was  interested  in  weakening  the  growing 
power  of  the  state,  Thomas  Aquinas  taught  that,  while  the  author- 
ity of  the  Pope  came  directly  from  God,  that  of  the  rulers  of  states 
came  from  the  consent  of  the  people  and  the  co-operation  of  the 
church. ^^  The  Church  controlled  the  people,  wherefore  the  consent 
of  the  people  depended  on  the  consent  of  the  Church.  The  theory 
was  calculated  to  establish  the  supremacy  of  the  Church  and  to  make 
the  power  of  the  state  dependent  on  the  endorsement  of  the  ruler 

22  Gierke,  op.  cit.,  179. 

23  See   the   chapter   entitled,   Psychological  Implications    of  the    Theory    of  Natural 
Rights. 

2*  Hocking,  "Sovereignty  and  Moral  Obligation,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  Apr.,   1918, 
314;  Small,  "The  Present  Outlook  of  Social  Science,"  Amer  Jour.  Sociol.,  Jan.,  1913, 

+35-  •  .  '  \:  J.  riiia 

*"  Dunning,  "Political  Theories,  Ancient  and  Mediaeval,"  198-201. 


8  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and  his  policies  by  the  Church. ^^  The  ideas  were  a  functioning  of 
the  attitude  of  popular  submission  to  ecclesiastical  domination. 
Later,  when  the  nationalistic  state  had  developed  and  used  its  sov- 
ereignty to  limit  religious  freedom  and,  in  England,  to  deprive 
Roman  Catholics  of  political  power,  the  Roman  ecclesiastics  in 
England  declared  the  state  to  be  supreme  in  civil  matters  and  that 
they  would  not  recognize  the  temporal  power  of  the  Pope  in 
England,  nor  would  they  acknowledge  the  power  of  the  state  to 
interfere  in  the  ecclesiastical  affairs  of  the  Roman  Church  in  Eng- 
land.^'^  The  people  of  England  were  no  longer  submissive  to  the 
Roman  Church,  wherefore  the  political  attitude  of  the  Roman 
Church  in  England  had  changed  from  one  of  domination  to  one  of 
resistance  of  domination  by  the  state,  and  the  theory  of  sovereignty 
was  altered  in  accordance  with  the  change  of  attitude. 

Bodin,  the  first  systematic  writer  on  sovereignty,  was  an  adherent 
of  the  Nationalist  party  in  France.  He  lived  when  his  country  was 
passing  out  of  the  last  stages  of  feudalism  and  expressed  the  atti- 
tude of  submission  of  subjects  to  the  domination  of  a  centralized 
government  in  his  description  of  sovereignty  as  the  "  supreme  power 
over  citizens  and  subjects,  unrestrained  by  the  laws."  ^^  Bodin's 
opponents,  who  stood  for  resistance  of  a  political  absolutism,  on 
behalf  of  ecclesiastical  control,  developed  a  theory  of  resistance, 
that  the  justification  of  government  lay  In  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned.^* If  a  ruler  ruled  contrary  to  the  religious  beliefs  of  sub- 
jects, it  was  their  right  and  duty  to  resist.  Btit  neither  Bodin  nor 
his  opponents  attempted  any  analysis  of  the  political  attitude  of 
which  their  thought  was  a  functioning  and  a  justification.  These 
attitudes  were  subconsciously  assumed  and  given  the  impressiveness 
of  learning  and  logic.  The  aim  was  not  psychological  analysis  but 
to  enhance  the  control  of  the  power  to  which  each  writer  or  group  of 
writers  acknowledged  allegiance. 

Subsequent  writers  were  no  more  analytical.  Some  tried  to  rec- 
oncile opposing  theories. ^*^  Others  reasserted  the  one  or  the  other 
with  variations  in  the  ideas  as  suggested  by  the  changed  political 
conditions  of  their  time.  Each  side  used  the  Impressive  economic 
analogy  of  contract  to  render  more  plausible  the  arguments.^^     The 

2«  Ibid.,  205. 

27  Laski,  "Studies   in  the  Problem  of   Sovereignty,"   121-137. 

28  Bodin,  "  Six  Books  concerning  the  State,"  translated  by  Knolles,  Bk.  I.  Ch.  VIII. 

29  Dunning,  op.  cit.,  144-145. 

30  Merriam,  "  History  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  Since  Rousseau,"  22,  23,  28. 
^■>- Ibid..  ^6.  '  '       > 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPLICATIONS  9 

influence  of  changing  political  conditions  is  seen  in  the  theory  of 
Hobbes  who,  to  justify  the  absolutism  of  Charles  I,  stated  the  sov- 
ereignty of  absolutism  more  extremely  than  Bodin;  ^^  in  the  theory 
of  Locke  which  was  advanced  to  justify  the  English  revolution  of 
1688,  and  which  was  invoked  by  the  American  revolutionists;  ^^  in 
the  theory  of  Kant  who,  alarmed  by  the  French  revolution,  de- 
nounced the  right  of  revolution. ^^  All  these  theories  were  derived 
not  from  an  analysis  of  the  relation  between  sovereign  and  subjects 
but  from  the  poHtical  attitude  which  was  impHcitly  accepted  in  the 
premises  of  the  argument  and  which  determined  the  course  of 
thought. 

The  political  theory  of  thinkers  In  each  state  developed  along 
the  line  of  the  political  attitude  of  the  state.  Kant's  theory  of  the 
authority  of  the  state  as  limited  only  by  self-imposed  laws  was  fur- 
ther worked  out  In  the  public  law  doctrine  of  Ihering  and  Jellinek, 
who  were  influenced  by  the  autocratic  political  systems  of  Germany 
and  Austria.  The  social  limitation  theories  of  Gerber  and  Gierke 
had  little  influence  as  compared  with  the  theories  of  Ihering  and 
Jellinek,  which  logically  satisfied  thoughtful  people  of  those  states 
with  the  political  attitude  of  their  state.  In  France,  on  the  other 
hand,  from  1789  to  the  present  time,  the  effort  has  been  to  work 
out  a  theory  of  sovereignty  in  harmony  with  the  attitude  of  resist- 
ance to  autocracy,  and  the  most  Influential  theories  have  been  those 
which  assigned  to  the  Individual  certain  natural  rights  and  placed 
the  law  which  bestows  these  rights  above  the  will  of  the  sovereign 
and  above  public  law.^^  Later,  when  the  fiction  of  natural  law 
had  passed,  the  most  influential  theories  were  those  which  asserted 
for  the  individual  certain  personal  rights  with  which  he  was  en- 
dowed because  of  the  nature  of  his  personality;^^  or  were  those 
which  asserted  a  "  law  of  social  solidarity  "  ^^  which  Is  above,  and 
limits  the  authority  of,  the  sovereign.  In  England  arbitrary  rule 
was  limited  by  the  rise  of  new  propertied  classes  which  jealously 
defended  their  economic  freedom  from  autocratic  interference  and 
from  the  repression  of  older  propertied  classes.    This  individualistic 

32  Hobbes,    "Leviathan,"   Ch.   XVIII. 

S3  Locke,  "  Two  Treatises  of  Government,"  Chs.  XIII  and  XIX. 
3*  Kant,    "  Principles   of   Political   Right,"   trans,   by   Hastie,   "  Kant's   Principles   of 
Politics,"  50. 

35  Rousseau,  "The  Social  Contract,"  Bk.  L 

36  Michel,  "  L'Idee  de  L'fitat,"  60,  644-645. 

37  Duguit,  "L'fitat,   le   Droit  objectif  et  le  loi  positive,"  366,  423-424,  502;  Duguit, 
"  Le  Droit  social,  le  Drpit  indrndu?!  pt  la  Transformation  de  j'fitat,"  58. 


lo        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

political  attitude  determined  the  political  theory  of  Bentham,^^ 
whose  theory  is  logical  and  not  psychological,  except  for  its  pleasure- 
pain  premise  and  its  assumption  of  the  end  of  law  as  the  greatest 
general  happiness,  and  except  for  occasional  remarks  as  to  political 
attitudes,  for  instance  that  subjects  obey  only  because  they  find  sub- 
mission favourable  to  their  interests. ^^  Bentham's  theory  was  influ- 
ential in  England  not  because  of  his  hedonism  but  because  it  was  con- 
genial to  the  resistance  of  a  rising  propertied  class. ^"  Bentham's 
work  was  admired  by  Ihering  who,  however,  rejected  Bentham's 
individualism,  because  he  was  animated  by  the  German  attitude  of 
respect  for  political  authority  and  by  a  predilection  for  political 
authority  of  wide  scope. "^^  The  theories  of  Bentham  and  Spencer,'*^ 
which  endorsed  the  individualistic  attitude,  have  been  influential  in 
England,  especially  among  the  rising  propertied  classes.*^ 

Political  scientists,  like  other  thinkers,  have  done  their  thinking 
under  the  influence  of  the  attitudes  of  their  time  and  place;  hence 
the  traditional  emphasis  on  obedience-compelling  power,  surviving 
from  a  time  when  sovereignty  was  vested  in  a  dynasty  or  class  that 
did  compel  obedience.  The  United  States  is  the  only  great  state  of 
the  world  which,  from  the  beginning,  was  founded  on  the  principle 
of  popular  sovereignty,^^  though  this  was,  at  first,  imperfectly  real- 
ized.^^  There  lingered,  in  the  political  consciousness  of  the  people, 
on  the  one  hand  an  apprehensive  fear  of  tendencies  to  autocracy, 
and  on  the  other  hand  a  distrust,  among  certain  classes,  of  popular 
sovereignty.  These  attitudes  influenced  the  thinking  of  American 
political  scientists. ^^  Political  thinkers  are  influenced  in  their  think- 
ing by  the  powers  that  be,  or  the  powers  that  are  passing,  or  the 
powers  that  appear  to  be  coming  to  be;  distinguished  from  this 
attitudlnally-directed  thinklng,^''^  logical  in  Its  methods.  Is  that  of 
the  scientific  thinker  who  either  plays  the  part  of  critic  of  logical 

88 Pound,   "The  End  of  Law   as  Developed   in  Juristic  Thought,"  Harvard  Laiv 
Review,  XXX:  2oy. 

3»  Bentham,    "  A   Fragment   on   Government,"   Ch.   I. 

40  Ihering,  "  Law  as  a  Means  to  an  End,"  trans,  by  Husik,  Introduction  by  Geldart, . 
xlvii. 

«  Ibid.,  xlvi-1. 

42  Spencer,  "  Social  Statics,"  121-136. 

*3  Pound,  op.  cit.,  207-T209. 

44  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  86. 

45  See  the  historv  of  property  suffrage  tests  in  Porter,  "  A  History  of  Suffrage  in  the 
United  States,"  Chs.  I-IV. 

40  See  the  chapter  entitled,   Psychological  Implications   of  the    Theory   of  Natural 
Rights. 
47  However  much  the  practising  lawyer  might  affect  to  despise  philosophical  theories 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPLICATIONS  11 

theories  or  makes  a  contribution  to  the  science,^^  perhaps  little 
appreciated  at  the  time. 

An  opening  toward  the  social-psychological  point  of  view  in  an- 
alyses of  sovereignty  was  made  by  the  attempt  to  modify  Austin's 
theory  of  absolute  sovereignty.  In  order  to  understand  the  signifi- 
cance of  this  attempt  it  is  necessary  first  to  recall  the  main  points  in 
Austin's  theory.  Austin  derived  his  theory  of  sovereignty  from  his 
conception  of  law.  He  defined  law  as  a  command  given  by  a  person 
of  superior  might  to  an  inferior,*^  and  sovereignty  as  the  law- 
enforcing  or  obedience-compeUing  power  exercised  by  a  group  which 
is  independent  and  not  itself  subject  to  a  like  exercise  of  power.^^ 
Austin  wrote  with  the  primacy  of  the  legislature  in  mind  and  de- 
clared that  law  becomes  positive  law  only  when  endorsed  by  the 
legislature  as  a  command  of  the  sovereign  power.^^  Though  Aus- 
tin recognized  benevolence  in  authority,"^  he  laid  an  extreme  em- 
phasis on  obedience-compelling  power,  which  "  would  as  a  fact 
breed  simple  servihty  were  it  capable  of  practical  application."  ^^ 
As  to  the  psychological  nature  of  the  obedience-compelling  power, 
he  ventured  only  so  far  as  to  say  that  it  lay  in  the  "  might  "  of  the 
sovereign,^^  and  that  "  The  bulk  of  the  given  society  are  in  a  habit 
of  obedience  or  submission  to  a  determinate  and  common  supe- 
rior." ^^  He  admitted  that  every  government  continues  only 
through  the  "  consent  "  of  the  people,  and  interpreted  consent  as 
follows :  "  That,  in  every  society,  political  and  independent,  the 
people  are  determined  by  motives  of  some  description  or  another, 
to  obey  their  government  habitually:  and  that,  if  the  bulk  of  the 
community  ceased  to  obey  it  habitually,  the  government  would  cease 
to  exist."  ^^     The  motive  of  obedience  may  be  approbation  of  the 

of  law,  he  could  but  be  content  with  a  theory  that  put  plausible  reasons  behind  his 
traditional  habits  of  thought.     (Pound,  op.  cit.,  208.) 

*8  Beard,  "  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States." 

*^  Austin,  "Lectures  on  Jurisprudence,"   1:98-99. 

'0  "  If  a  determinate  human  superior,  not  in  a  habit  of  obedience  to  a  like  superior, 
receive  habitual  obedience  from  the  bulk  of  a  given  society,  that  determinate  superior 
is  sovereign  in  that  society,  and  the  society  (including  the  superior)  is  a  society 
political  and  independent."  {Ibid.,  1:226.)  "Every  positive  law  (or  every  law  simply 
and  strictly  so  called)  is  set,  directly  or  circuitously,  by  a  sovereign  individual  or  body, 
to  a  member  or  members  of  the  independent  political  society  wherein  its  author  is  su- 
preme."    (/^/</.,  1:339.) 

"/*fi.,  1: 100;  11:555. 

52 /iiVf.,  1:169-170. 

53  Laski,   "  Studies  in  the  Problem  of  Sovereignty,"   273. 

5*  Austin,  op.  cit.,  1 :  99. 

'^^Ibid.,  1:226. 

"/*iW.,  1:305. 


11        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

government,  but  this  is  often  not  the  case,  "  the  habitual  obedience 
of  the  people  in  most  or  many  communities,  arising  wholly  or  partly 
from  their  fear  of  the  probable  evils  which  they  might  suffer  by 
resistance."  ^'^  Austin  dismissed  questions  of  motives  with  scant 
attention,  because  the  task  he  had  set  for  himself  was  logical  and 
not  psychological  and  because  in  his  time  very  little  was  known 
about  motives.  For  instance,  we  find  remarks  Hke  this:  "For 
the  terms  '  instinctive  '  and  '  instinct '  are  merely  negative  expres- 
sions. They  merely  denote  our  own  ignorance.  They  mean  that 
the  phenomena  of  which  we  happen  to  be  talking  are  not  preceded 
by  causes  which  man  is  able  to  perceive."  ^^  Since  this  was  written 
much  progress  has  been  made  in  the  psychology  of  the  instincts. 

Austin  regarded  sovereignty  in  England  as  vested  in  the  king, 
lords  and  the  electors  of  the  House  of  Commons.^^  His  theory  of 
sovereignty  as  obedience-compelling  power  was  satisfying  to  the 
propertied  classes  which  alone  had  political  rights  and  alone  were 
represented  in  the  law-making  body.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  when  the  masses  had  been  enfranchised  and  were  be- 
ginning to  exert  an  influence  on  legislation,  there  developed  a  tend- 
ency in  English  political  thought  "  to  recognize  the  forces  which 
produce  sovereignty."  ^^  This  led  to  the  drawing  of  a  distinction 
between  legal  and  political  sovereignty.  The  legal  sovereign  is  the 
final  and  determining  authority  in  the  legal  order;  the  political  sov- 
ereign is  that  body  in  the  state,  "  the  will  of  which  is  ultimately 
obeyed  by  the  citizens  of  the  State."  *'^  Dicey  located  this  sov- 
ereignty in  the  "  body  of  electors."  ^^  Ritchie  went  further  and  de- 
clared that  it  lay  in  the  forces  of  public  opinion  —  that  "  the  ulti- 
mate political  sovereign  is  not  the  determinate  number  of  persons 
now  existing  in  the  nation,  but  the  opinions  and  feeling  of  these 
persons.  .  .  .^^  Political  sovereignty  is  thus  located  "  in  the  body 
of  public  sentiment  or  opinion  to  which  the  legal  sovereign  itself 
must  ultimately  render  obedience."  ^*  While  public  opinion  "  le- 
gally possesses  no  power,"  and  "  cannot  be  enforced  in  the  courts 

"/^,W.,  1:305. 

58  Ibid.,  1 :  149. 
69  Ibid.,  1 :  253. 
8°  Merriam,  op.  cit,  154. 
•1  Dicey,   "  Law  of  the  Constitution,"  66-67. 
62  Ibid.,  67. 

"3  Ritchie,  "  On  the  'Conception  of  Sovereignty,"  An.  Amer.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Sc, 
1:407. 
6*  Merriam,  op.  cit.,  156. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPLICATIONS  13 

of  law,"  "  politically  ...  it  is  supreme,  it  is  the  source  of  the 
legal  sovereign,  it  must  ultimately  be  obeyed.  .  .   . 

"  In  this  theory,  then,  the  Austinian  notion  Is  recognized  in  the 
legal  sovereign,  the  authority  behind  which  the  lawyer  as  lawyer 
need  not  go,"  ^^  while  the  political  sovereignty  is  the  ultimate 
sovereignty.  To  understand  it  there  is  required  a  social-psycho- 
logical analysis  of  the  relations  of  conflicting  parties  and  classes, ®® 
the  outcome  of  which  at  any  particular  time  is  the  effective  public 
opinion.®^  The  political  scientist  studies  those  aspects  of  the  class 
struggle  that  have  to  be  understood  in  order  to  understand  party 
government,  while  the  social  psychologist  analyses  the  rivalry  of 
classes  for  control  of  the  electorate  and  the  processes  which  enter 
into  that  control. 

Austin's  juristic  conception  of  sovereignty  eventually  gained 
wide  acceptance  and  is  today  the  orthodox  theory  of  sovereignty. 
This  is  not  a  psychological,  but  a  purely  logical  theory,  starting 
"  with  certain  primary  assumptions  or  definitions  from  which,  by 
deductive  reasoning,  it  determines  those  principles  which  give  a 
systematic  and  logical  character  to  constitutional  and  international 
jurisprudence."  ®®  As  to  the  assumptions  of  this  legal  conception 
of  sovereignty,  it  is  said:  "The  point  from  which  the  analytical 
political  philosopher  starts  is  that  a  politically  organized  group  of 
individuals  may  be  conceived  of  as  constituting  an  essential  unity, 
and  that  the  entity  thus  created  may  be  regarded  as  a  person  in  the 
legal  sense  of  the  word;  that  is,  as  a  being,  existing  in  idea,  possess- 
ing legal  rights  and  obligations  as  distinguished  from  those  of  the 
individuals  who,  concretely  viewed,  make  up  its  body  politic,  and 
that,  as  such  a  personality,  it  is,  through  organs  of  its  own  creation, 
capable  of  formulating  and  uttering  a  legal  will  with  reference  to 
matters  within  the  jurisdiction  conceded  to  it. 

"  Regarded  as  a  legal  person  the  prime  characteristic  of  the  state 
is  that  there  is  posited  of  it  a  will  that  is  legally  supreme.  By  its 
express  command,  or  by  its  tacit  acquiescence,  it  is  thus  viewed  as 
the  ultimate  source  of  legality  for  every  act  committed  by  its  own 
agents  or  by  any  persons  whomsoever  over  whom  it  claims  author- 
ed/^zV.,  156. 

'*  Commons,  "A  Sociological  View  of  Sovereignty,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social.,  V:i-is, 
155-171.  347-366,  5447552,  683-695,  814-825;  VI:  67-89. 

8^  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  228-229. 

«8 Willoughby,  "The  Juristic  Conception  of  the  State,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  XII; 
X93- 


14       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ity.  This  supreme  legally  legitimizing  will  is  termed  sover- 
eignty." «« 

The  legal  theory  of  sovereignty  does  not,  therefore,  require  any 
analysis  of  the  assumed  relations.  Though  disavowing  a  psycho- 
logical basis  and  affirming  a  purely  deductive  method,  it  does  im- 
plicitly assume  a  psychological  relation.  The  "  whole  structure 
rests  upon  the  assumption  that  a  law  is  a  command  to  subjects."  ^'^ 
That  is,  it  implies  a  relation  of  habitual  exercise  of  authority  of  the 
sovereign  and  habitual  obedience  of  subjects.  like  that  type  of 
economic  theory  which  disavows  psychological  assumptions,  it  does 
not  escape  them  but,  in  the  process  of  attempting  to  escape  them, 
rests  satisfied  with  traditional  and  unanalysed  assumptions.  This 
is  justified  on  the  ground  that,  while  a  science  of  social  relations  has 
to  do  with  facts  of  social  relations,  when  "  we  turn  to  the  purely 
juristic  inquiry  as  to  the  legal  relations  which  unite  the  state  and  the 
individual,  we  start  with  the  state.  .  .  ."  '^^  The  state  is  imagined 
to  be  a  unity,  a  personality,  in  order  to  give  a  logical  emphasis  to 
the  assumed  obedience-compelling  power  of  the  state.  But  the 
political  scientist  cannot  get  away  from  the  necessity  of  psycho- 
logical analysis  by  a  mere  assumption  of  such  unity  and  person- 
ality. Whether  or  not  it  exists  is  a  question  of  fact  that  cannot 
be  glossed  over  by  logical  constructions. 

The  legal  theory  assumes  that  the  people  of  the  state  are  a  unit 
whose  will  is  represented  by  the  law.  Laws  that  forbid  serious 
crimes  undoubtedly  represent  the  will  of  the  whole  people.  But 
there  is  a  body  of  law  which  represents  only  the  will  of  a  class, 
not  the  will  of  the  people  as  a  whole.  Law  as  such  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  regarded  as  the  will  of  the  people  as  a  whole.  As  will  be 
explained  in  succeeding  chapters,  the  people  of  a  state,  in  their 
economic  relations,  are  becoming  organized  Into  self-conscious,  con- 
flicting classes,  so  that  we  must  deny  that  the  state  is,  as  a  matter 
of  social-psychological  fact,  a  unity  and  that  law  represents  the  will 
of  the  people  as  a  whole.'^^ 

It  is  maintained  that  phenomena  of  class  struggle,  if  their  sig- 
nificance is  rightly  understood,  are  not  contrary  to  the  juristic  con- 
ception of  sovereignty.     It  is  said  that  the  classes  struggle  for 

69 /W.,  194. 

''"Crane,  "Discussion  of  Willoughby's  Paper,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  XII: 212. 

''^  Willoughby,  op.  cit.,  195. 

72  Laski,  "  Authority  in  the  Modern  State,  81,  65. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPLICATIONS  15 

possession  of  the  thing  which  the  old  theory  maintained  to  be  es- 
sential in  the  state,  namely,  the  power  to  enforce  obedience  inde- 
pendently of  any  restraining  power.     It  is  said  that  the  thing  ex- 
ists independently  of  the  class  which  may  use  it  for  the  time  being. 
"  But,"  reply  the  protagonists  of  the  class-struggle  theory  of  the 
state,  "  if  the  thing  is  exercised  by  a  class  as  far  as  possible  in  its 
own  interests,  what  is  the  thing  but  the  will  of  a  dominant  class?  " 
Still  further  driving  their  wedge  they  ask,  "  If  the  state  is  an  inde- 
pendent personality  with  a  legally  absolute  will,  why  does  not  it  en- 
force this  will  impartially  on  all  classes?     The  contrary  is  notori- 
ously the  case.     The  law-enforcing  organs  are  inclined  to  condone 
the  crimes  of  an  upper  class,  members  of  which  often  escape  the 
penalties  of  the  law,  while  members  of  a  lower  class,  especially  if 
they  have  incurred  the  odium  of  an  upper,  may  suffer  severe  penal- 
ties  for   crimes  of  which   they   are   innocent."      Conspicuous    ex- 
amples of  condoned  crimes  of  members  of  an  upper  class  and  of 
unjust  punishments  of  members  of  a  lower  class  who  have  incurred 
the  hatred  of  an  upper  are  adduced,'^^  and  the  conclusion  is  drawn 
that  there  is  a  class  control  of  government,  that  the  ultimate  fact 
in  sovereignty  is  the  exercise  of  the  will  of  a  dominant  class,  tem- 
pered more  or  less  by  the  requirements  for  enlisting  the  support  of 
the  people  in  the  maintenance  of  control  over  other  classes.     To 
this  the  defender  of  the  legal  theory  replies  that  sovereignty  is  not 
the  will  of  a  class  because  laws  at  least  represent  a  compromise 
between  classes,  a  compromise  worked  out  with  a  view  to  acquies- 
cence in  the  law  by  all  classes.     Furthermore,  there  are  laws  passed 
in  accordance  with  the  advice  of  expert  commissions  and  there  are 
rulings  of  commissions  that  have  the  force  of  law,  which  the  masses 
do  not  understand  but  assent  to  as  law,  which  capitalistic  interests 
have  to  obey  though  unwillingly,  and  which  assume,  therefore,  an 
obedience-compelling  power  of  the  sovereign  people.     The  argu- 
ment is  evidently  drifting  into  fields  little  investigated  as  yet;  the 
problem  requires  social-psychological  analysis. 

The   increasing   comprehension   of   the   inevitableness    of   class 
struggle  and  of  its  significance  for  the  legal  conception  of  sover- 

"Lindsey  and  O'Higgins,  "The  Beast,"  Ch.  XII;  West,  "The  Colorado  Strike" 
(Special  Report  prepared  for  the  United  States  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations), 
Ch.  I;  President  Wilson's  Mediation  Commission,  Report  on  the  Mooney  Dynamite 
Cases  in  San  Francisco,  U.  S.  Dept.  of  Labor,  Official  Bulletin,  Jan.  28,  1918,  14-15; 
Report  of  President  Wilson's  Mediation  Commission,  on  the  Bisbee,  Arizona,  Deporta- 
tions, November  6,  1917,  U.  S.  Dept.  of  Labor. 


i6       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

eignty  has  stimulated  the  ingenuity  of  the  legal  theorists  in  their 
attempts  to  represent  the  state  as  essentially  one  unified  whole. 
An  examination  of  the  origin  and  development  of  the  state  proves, 
it  is  said,  that  "  The  State  is  an  organism,"  '^^  and  "  Sovereignty 
is  the  supremacy  of  the  State  over  all  its  parts."  "^^  This  organ- 
ismic  theory  and  the  theory  of  sovereignty  it  supports,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  asserted  by  other  political  scientists  to  be  untrue.  What 
we  actually  find,  says  the  brilliant  French  political  scientist,  Duguit, 
is  "  the  man  or  the  group  of  men  who  in  fact  in  a  given  society  are 
materially  stronger  than  the  others,"  and  impose  their  will.  The 
state  is  simply  a  "  manifestation  of  force."  '^^  It  is  "  the  simple 
fact  of  the  differentiation  between  the  governors  and  the  gov- 
erned." "^"^  The  government  is  controlled  by  the  class  or  body 
which  monopolizes  the  force  in  a  given  society.'^^  This,  says 
Duguit,  may  be  done  contrary  to  the  welfare  of  the  society;  and  a 
command  of  a  government  that  is  contrary  to  welfare  is  not  a  true 
law  and  should  be  disregarded.'^^.  He  bases  this  deduction  on 
his  theory  of  a  law  of  social  solidarity  which  is  above  law  that  is 
a  command  of  a  sovereign,  a  theory  that  will  be  explained  more 
at  length  in  the  chapter  on  natural  rights.  The  essential  fact  in 
the  consciousness  of  a  group,  he  says,  is  a  consciousness  of  social 
solidarity,  a  phenomenon  that  antedates  any  development  of  the 
state.  This  consciousness  determines  the  nature  and  functioning 
of  law  and,  therefore,  the  will  of  a  sovereign  is  not  essential  to 
society  and  social  progress.  Such  a  will  is  contrary  to  social  prog- 
ress except  as  it  wills  in  conformity  with  the  law  and  requirements 
of  social  solidarity.  Duguit  therefore  denies  that  the  essential 
characteristic  of  the  state  is  a  legally  absolute  will  of  the  state  as 
a  political  organism.^^  He  declares  that  this  notion  of  sovereignty 
"  leads  fatally  to  the  absolutism  of  the  state."  ^^ 

Protagonists  of  the  organismic  theory  have  presented  a  psycho- 
logical theory  of  the  nature  of  the  personality  of  the  state;  and, 
opposed  to  it,  are  psychological  theories  denying  this  personality. 

7*  Ford,  "  The  Natural  History  of  the  State,"  174. 
f^Ibid..  176. 

T« Duguit,  "fitudes  de  droit  public."    Tome  I:    L'jStudes  de  droit  objectif  et  la  loi 
positive,  5,  19. 
'^  Ibid.,  261,  342,  350. 

'» Ibid.,  424. 

80  Ibid.,  "  Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  trans,  by  Laski,  Ch.  I. 

^^Ibid.,  "L'fitat,  le  droit  objectif  et  la  loi  positive,"  614.  *• 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPLICATIONS  17 

As  an  example  of  theories  of  state  personality,  Gierke  maintained 
that  each  person  possesses  two  capacities,  the  one  individual  and 
the  other  universal;  that,  in  virtue  of  the  universal  in  human  nature, 
individuals  form  a  state ;  that  law  ^^  and  contractual  relations  ^^  as- 
sume this  state  personality.  This  theory  was  elaborated  by  his 
successors  who  made  exhaustive  historical  studies  to  demonstrate 
their  fanciful  conception.^^  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  maintained  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  state  personality;  ^^  that  law  does  not 
assume  a  state  personality;  and  that  the  assumption  of  a  juridical 
personality  of  constituent  groups  as  the  basis  of  contractual  rela- 
tions is  a  "  purely  metaphysical  "  abstraction.^^ 

Political  scientists  are  thus  driven,  by  their  controversies  over 
the  nature  of  sovereignty,  to  admit  the  psychological  nature  of  the 
problem,  or  at  least  to  admit  that  it  cannot  be  solved  without  the 
aid  of  the  social  psychologist.  Political  science  is  thus  brought  into 
close  relation  with  social  psychology.  It  is  for  lack  of  an  induc- 
tive method  and  of  accurate  and  adequate  psychological  assump- 
tions that  interpretations  of  the  state  have  been  developed  deduc- 
tively, with  analogical,  organismic  assumptions  which  have  thrown 
no  light  on  the  nature  of  political  relations.®''^ 

82  Gierke,  "Das  deutsche  Genossenschaftsrecht,"  II:36flF. 

^^  Ibid.,  "Die  Genossenschaftstheorie,"  135. 

8*  Coker,  "  Organismic  Theories  of  the  State,"  76-79. 

85  Duguit,   "  L'Etat,   les  Gouvernants  et   les  Agents,"   65 ;   Duguit,  "  L'fitat,   le  droit 
objectif  et  la  loi  positive,"  27,  40,  65. 

86  Duguit,  "  Collective  Acts  as  Distinguished  from  Contracts,"   Yale  Law  Journal, 
XXVII:  762. 

87  Coker,  op.  cit.,  Ch.  V. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL    APPROACH    TO    THE    PROBLEM    OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 

ACCORDING  to  the  juristic  theory  of  sovereignty  the  obedi- 
ence-compelling power,  in  a  representative  government,  is 
possessed  by  the  voters  who  delegate  it  to  their  representa- 
tives.^ In  addition  to  this  purely  juristic  meaning  of  sovereignty 
there  is  another  meaning,  called  "  ethical."  "  Finally,  it  may  be 
said  that  the  term  '  sovereignty  of  the  people  '  very  often  connotes 
a  principle  that  is  not  juristic  at  all,  but  rather,  an  ethical  doctrine 
that  every  group  of  individuals  has  a  continuing  inherent  moral 
right  themselves  to  determine,  by  whatever  means  they  think  ap- 
propriate for  the  purpose,  the  form  of  government  under  which 
they  are  to  live,  what  it  shall  do  and  the  persons  into  whose  hands 
its  operations  shall  be  entrusted."  ^  The  authority  of  the  state 
depends,  then,  on  the  assent  of  moral  personality.^  The  inter- 
action between  the  exercise  of  authority  and  the  claims  of  moral 
personality  constitutes  the  social-psychological  problem  of  sover- 
eignty. 

The  exercise  of  extra-legal  sovereignty  is  seen  not  only  on  the 
rare  occasions  of  revolutionary  change  of  government,  but  also 
continually  in  determining  what  laws  and  ordinances  it  is  expedient 
to  enforce  at  a  given  time  and  what  laws  and  ordinances  shall  be 
ignored.  This  is  determined  not  by  those  who  exercise  the  dele- 
gated sovereignty  but,  in  the  last  analysis,  by  pubHc  opinion,  to 
which  those  who  exercise  the  delegated  sovereignty  are  consciously 
or  subconsciously  susceptible.  The  unorganized,  unconscious  influ- 
ence of  public  opinion  on  representatives  is  a  constant  phenomenon 
as  contrasted  with  the  more  rare  occasions  of  a  deliberate  bringing 
of  pressure  to  bear.  We  are  brought,  therefore,  to  an  analysis  of 
public  opinion  —  of  the  attitudes,  impulses  and  ideas  of  the  voting 
masses,  and  of  rival  parties,  classes,  interests.     The  problem  of 

1  Willoughby,  "The  Juristic  Conception  of  the  State,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  XII: 205. 

2  Ibid.,  205. 

*  Laski,  "  Authority  in  the  Modern  State,"  28,  32-65. 

18 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  19 

sovereignty  is,  therefore,  essentially  a  social-psychological  problem. 
In  a  political  democracy  sovereignty  is  in  the  last  analysis  vested 
in  the  people.^  The  masses  are  for  the  most  part  not  clearly  con- 
scious of  the  real  significance  of  their  political  action  —  that  their 
choice  between  political  parties  is  increasingly  a  choice  between 
class  interests.  One  of  the  functions  of  government  is  to  enable 
conflicting  classes  to  contest  one  with  another  for  political  control 
according  to  rules  that  eliminate  the  use  of  force.^  What  they 
contest  for  Is  control  over  the  masses;  sovereignty  is,  in  the  last 
analysis,  vested  in  the  masses  and  not  in  a  class.  The  social  psy- 
chologist is  interested,  therefore,  in  an  analysis  of  the  political  im- 
pulses and  attitudes  of  the  masses.  What  impulses  and  attitudes 
move  them  in  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  candidates  for  political 
control?  What  distinguishes  members  of  the  masses  from  mem- 
bers of  the  classes  that  are  rivals  for  control  of  the  masses?  Men 
who  vote  from  partisanship  year  after  year,  regardless  of  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  candidates,  regardless  of  issues,  assuredly  are  not 
moved  in  their  political  behaviour  by  class  consciousness.  Nor  are 
men  who  change  their  party  only  when  dissatisfied  because  of 
"  slack  times,"  or  because  they  happen  to  dislike  some  personal 
trait  of  a  candidate.  Class  consciousness  is  rapidly  developing 
among  farmers  and  workingmen  in  the  United  States  but  it  is  still 
in  the  incipient  stage.  Even  among  business  men  economic  con- 
siderations are  not  so  invariably  the  only  considerations  in  political 
allegiance  as  we  suppose,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  frequent  in- 
junctions to  employers,  in  the  publications  of  employers'  associa- 
tions, to  consider  their  economic  interests  more  exclusively  in  their 
political  activity  and,  from  that  point  of  view,  to  be  more  active  in 

*  Veblen,  "  Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution,"  243-244. 

5  This  function  of  government  was  emphatically  stated  by  former  Justice  Charles  E. 
Hughes  in  a  letter  condemning  the  action  of  the  New  York  Assembly  in  suspending  five 
members  of  the  Socialist  party  who  had  been  elected  to  the  Assembly:  "If  there  was 
anything  against  these  men  as  individuals,  if  they  were  deemed  to  be  guilty  of  crim- 
inal offences,  they  should  have  been  charged  accordingly.  But  I  understand  that  the 
action  is  not  directed  against  these  five  elected  members  as  individuals  but  that  the  pro- 
ceeding is  virtually  an  attempt  to  indict  a  political  party  and  to  deny  it  representation 
in  the  Legislature.     This  is  not,  in  my  judgment,  American  Government. 

"Are  Socialists,  unconvicted  of  crime,  to  be  denied  the  ballot?  If  Socialists  are  per- 
mitted to  vote,  are  they  not  permitted  to  vote  for  their  own  candidates?  If  their  candi- 
dates are  elected  and  are  men  against  whom,  as  individuals  charges  of  disqualifying 
offences  cannot  be  laid,  are  they  not  entitled  to  their  seats?  ...  If  the  Socialists  were 
denied  recourse  through  their  duly  elected  representatives  to  the  orderly  processes  of 
government,  what  resort  is  there  left  to  them?  Is  it  proposed  to  drive  the  Socialists 
to  revolution  by  denying  them  participation  in  the  means  we  have  provided  for  orderly 
discussion  of  proposed  changes  in  our  laws?  "     (Associated  Press,  Jan.  9,  1920.) 


20       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

politics.  There  is  a  great  conventional  mass  of  voters  who  ordi- 
narily vote  according  to  habit,  and,  when  they  do  not,  follow  some 
impulse  that  involves  little  intelligence  and  does  not  ally  them 
with  any  class.  Wherefore,  classes  that  seek  political  control 
usually  aim  not  too  violently  to  disturb  the  beliefs  of  the  conven- 
tionalized masses. 

The  political  phases  recently  assumed  by  the  labour  movement 
require  social-psychological  investigation  because  that  movement 
is  essentially  a  social-psychological  phenomenon.  Organized  re- 
sistance of  the  workmen  of  an  industry  or  of  a  nation  is  not  a  mere 
instinctive  movement,  though  doubtless  many  workmen  have  little 
consciousness  of  an  intelHgent  purpose.  But  labour  leaders,  and 
the  intelligent  opinion  that  directs  a  labour  movement,  have  certain 
well-defined  ideas  that  make  it  more  than  a  mere  instinctive  re- 
sistance. The  labour  movement  is  not  a  resistance  of  all  authority, 
for  the  more  intelligent  workmen  realize  the  necessity  of  subordina- 
tion to  authority  that  directs  production.  They  realize  the  neces- 
sity of  leadership  but  insist  that  it  shall  be  real  leadership,  leader- 
ship that  wins  loyalty  because  of  ability  to  lead.  Nor  is  the  labour 
movement  essentially  a  movement  for  higher  wages.  It  does  not 
spring  fundamentally  from  dire  need,  nor  from  rivalry  with  em- 
ploying classes  for  more  of  the  satisfactions  of  Hfe,  though  need 
and  rivalry  are  essential  in  it.  Those  who  regard  the  labour  move- 
ment as  merely  for  more  of  the  things  of  sense  have  not  begun  to 
understand  it.  Nor  is  it  as  yet  a  movement  for  the  fuller  develop- 
ment of  personality.  Doubtless,  when  the  economic  basis  has  been 
made  more  certain,  it  will  become  a  movement  for  a  positive  self- 
development  along  those  lines  that  are  to  an  extent  pre-determined 
by  the  original  nature  of  man.  But  today  it  is  a  movement  to 
escape  the  vicissitudinous  aspect  of  industrial  life."  Before  self- 
development  can  be  thought  of,  workmen  must  be  in  a  position  of 
greater  certainty  with  regard  to  their  future.  Today  they  are 
subject  not  only  to  the  economic  conditions  that  make  industry  un- 
certain for  manufacturers,  farmers  and  other  employers,  as  well 
as  for  workmen,  but  to  the  uncertainty  that  is  due  to  being  under 

8  Tead,  "  Instincts  in  Industry,"  48 ;  Webb,  "  Restoration  of  Trade  Union  Conditions," 
77;  Filene,  "The  Key  to  Successful  Industrial  Management,"  in  a  report  of  the  Amer. 
Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Sc.  entitled,  "Modern  Manufacturing,"  1919,  9;  Ross,  "A  Legal 
Dismissal  Wage,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX  (supplement)  :  133-134;  Commons,  "Industrial 
Goodwill,"  71-72 ;  Tannenbaum,  "  Labor  Movement  Psychology,"  New  Republic,  July 
7,  1920,  169-170. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  li 

a  boss  or  under  a  management  on  whose  will,  often  on  whose  mere 
liking  or  dislike,  depends  the  opportunity  to  earn  a  living^  Work- 
men generally  may  be  discharged  at  the  will  of  the  employer. 
Employers  often  foster  a  feehng  of  uncertainty  as  to  jobs  in  order 
to  make  workmen  more  submissive.  Their  wages  are  not  sufficient 
to  enable  them,  with  strictest  economy,  to  make  adequate  provision 
for  a  long  period  of  unemployment;  or  for  a  long  period  of  illness, 
to  wl;iich  industrial  workers  are  more  liable  than  others  owing  to 
the  occupational  diseases;^  or  for  injury  due  to  accidents;  or  for 
their  families  in  case  of  death  of  the  bread-winner;  or  for  old  age. 
In  cases  where  wages  are  sufficiently  high  to  meet  the  ordinary  con- 
tingencies there  is  the  chance  that  they  may  be  lowered  at  any  time, 
inasmuch  as,  where  workmen  are  unorganized  for  collective  bar- 
gaining, they  have  no  voice  in  determining  their  wages.  "  They 
are  often  free  to  change  their  employer,  but  a  new  employer  is  only 
a  new  master."  ^  The  workman  is  not  in  control  of  his  fate.  His 
life  and  that  of  his  family  from  day  to  day  are  in  the  highest  degree 
uncertain,  and  the  only  way  he  can  see  to  make  it  certain  is  to  exer- 
cise control  in  the  management  of  industry.  This  movement  for 
control  gains  added  impulsion  from  the  workman's  aversion  to  mo- 
notonous work  intensified  by  the  driving  of  a  boss,  his  "  instinctive 
resistance  against  suppression  of  the  freedom  for  play,  for  interest, 
for  creativeness."  ^° 

If  this  movement  is  not  to  continue  a  mere  class  movement,  a 
phenomenon  of  resistance  to  class  domination  breeding  class  an- 
tagonism and  general  disorder,  it  must  appeal  to  the  people  of  the 
state,  and,  we  might  add,  to  the  members  of  the  Christian  churches 
to  which  many  of  the  people  belong,  as  a  moral  movement.  Here 
again  we  must  consider  its  social-psychological  basis  and  the  social- 
psychological  basis  of  morality.  The  subject  requires  extended 
treatment  but  the  writer  believes  it  can  be  proved  that  an  essential 
condition  of  moral  and  therefore  of  political  progress  Is  the  intro- 
duction of  increasing  certainty  in  economic  relations  and  of  an  in- 
creasing sense  of  responsibility  of  labour.  For,  first,  the  instincts 
stirred  by  uncertainty,  for  instance,  fear,  are  contrary  to  moral 

^  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  383. 

s  U.  S.  Bureau  Labor  Statistics,  "  Preventable  Death  in  Cotton  Manufacturing  Indus- 
try," Bulletin,  No.  251. 
9  Croly,  op.  cit.,  383. 
w  Tannenbaura,  "Labor  Movement  Psychology,"  New  Republic,  July  7,  1920,  171. 


12        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

progress.  A  certain  type  of  traditional  morality  rests  on  fearful 
self-restraint,  as  does  a  certain  type  of  traditional  theology.  But 
moral  progress  requires  that  impulses  of  self-restraint,  the  duty  of 
which  has  been  so  long  preached  by  the  political  and  ecclesiastical 
representatives  of  a  dominant  class,^^  shall  give  way  to  Impulses  for 
the  attainment  of  the  positively  good  life.^^  But  the  position  of 
workmen  impedes  this  development  inasmuch  as  many  employers 
maintain  that  workmen  must  be  kept  in  uncertainty  and  fear  of 
losing  their  jobs  in  order  to  stimulate  them  to  work.  Second,  an 
uncertain  life  begets  an  impulsiveness  that  is  contrary  to  moral 
progress,  as  distinguished  from  the  forethought,  foresight,  and 
careful  planning  made  possible  by  a  reasonable  certainty  and  sta- 
bihty  of  economic  life.  The  vicissitudinous  aspect  of  man's  work- 
ing life  from  the  beginning,  his  necessary  appeal  to  chance  In  gain- 
ing a  livelihood,  has  resulted  in  appeal  to  chance  in  recreation,  for 
instance,  in  gambling,  and  in  a  predilection  for  pleasures  that  ex- 
tremely excite  strong  instincts.  Traditional  morality  merely 
preaches  the  necessity  of  self-restraint  and  the  duty  of  repressing 
these  forms  of  immorality  with  social  disapproval  or  ostracism, 
and  traditional  religion  offers  a  theology  sanctioning  this  program. 
Morality  depends  on  communal  approval  and  disapproval,  but 
moral  progress  requires  also  the  removal  of  the  causes  of  these 
immoral  pleasures,  including  the  evil  economic  conditions;  and  it 
requires  a  pubhc  education  that  will  make  communal  approval  and 
disapproval  intelHgent.  Third,  the  unsettled  state  of  the  working 
classes  as  a  result  of  their  economic  uncertainty  makes  very  difficult 
or  impossible  the  application  of  moral  sanctions  to  Individual  con- 
duct. The  constant  movement  of  peoples  through  the  great  cen- 
tres of  population  prevents  that  acquaintanceship  and  communal  life 
which  is  necessary  if  the  individual  Is  to  care  anything  about  the 
opinions  of  his  neighbours.  And  the  church  finds  it  difficult  to  form 
out  of  such  a  population  a  parish  which  can  be  made  amenable  to 
the  religious  sanctions  of  morality.  Fourth,  the  uncertain  and  un- 
settled state  of  the  working  classes  also  makes  impossible  political 
efficiency.  Municipal  government  to  be  effective  requires  that  the 
people  of  a  district  live  together  long  enough  to  be  well  enough 
acquainted  to  co-operate  in  political  action.^^     Finally,  the  unsettled 

11  Croly,  op.  cit.,  409-423. 

^^ Ibid.,  "Disordered  Christianity,"  The  New  Republic,  Dec.  31,  1919,  137. 

18  Goodnow,  "  City  Government  in  the  United  States,"  18-21. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  23 

state  of  the  working  classes  makes  impossible  educational  efficiency. 
Children  get  well  started  in  one  school  and  then  have  to  move  on 
to  another,  where  often  they  fail  to  get  adjusted  and  lose  interest. 
Teachers  just  begin  to  understand  their  pupils  and  to  be  able  to 
give  them  individual  attention  when  they  disappear.  From  the 
point  of  view,  then,  of  the  development  of  moral  personality,  and 
of  efficient  communal,  ecclesiastical,  political,  and  educational  pro- 
cedure, the  labour  movement  to  reduce  the  vicissitudinous  aspect  of 
the  life  of  the  working  masses  is  a  moral  movement.  As  such  it 
deserves  the  support  of  all  the  people  of  the  state,  and  the  sanction 
of  the  church.  If  the  church  withholds  its  sanction,  it  will  lose 
what  influence  over  the  masses  it  still  retains;  and  if  the  people  of 
the  state  who  are  not  immediately  involved  withhold  their  sanction 
the  movement  will  inevitably  develop  more  of  the  aspects  of  a  class 
conflict  for  the  control  of  governments.^* 

The  conception  of  social  class,  also,  is  a  social-psychological  con- 
ception. Professor  Hoxie  states  the  case  in  his  lucid  and  incisive 
style.  "  There  are  two  current  tests  or  modes  of  definition  of 
classes  —  the  objective  or  mechanical,  and  the  subjective  or  psycho- 
logical. From  the  objective  or  mechanical  standpoint,  classes  are 
defined  in  terms  of  wealth  or  social  position,  occupation,  .  .  .  etc. 
Thus  we  commonly  speak  of  the  rich,  the  middle  class,  and  the 
poor,  .  .  .  From  the  subjective  or  psychological  standpoint,  classes 
are  defined  in  terms  of  viewpoint,  i.e.,  in  terms  of  motive,  belief, 
attitude,   ... 

".  .  .  Thus,  from  a  psychological  standpoint,  all  those,  what- 
ever the  source  of  their  income,  who  feel  that  their  interests  are 
identical  with  those  of  the  employers,  .  .  .  belong  to  the  employ- 
ing class,  while  those  who  feel  that  their  interests  are  with  the  wage- 
workers,  or  whose  motives,  .  .  .  social  attitudes  and  sympathies 
are  in  harmony  with  the  mass  of  the  workers,  belong  to  the  labour- 
ing class. 

"  But  now  there  are  those  who  say  that  this  is  a  distinction  with- 
out a  difference ;  that  at  bottom  these  two  standpoints  are  identical, 
since  one's  view  of  his  own  interests  or  one's  motives,  .  .  .  social 
attitudes  and  sympathies  are  determined  by  his  economic  interests 
or  his  objective  environment.  .  .  . 

"  There  are,  however,  two  reasons  for  the  failure  of  coincidence 
of  the  objective  .  .  .  and  the  psychological  social  groups.     It  is 

1*  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  388-390. 


24       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

not  a  part  of  the  environment  of  the  individual,  the  economic  part, 
that  makes  him  what  he  is  spiritually,  but  the  total  social  environ- 
ment. .  ,  .  Secondly,  men  are  not  wholly  determined  in  their  atti- 
tudes, habits  of  thought  and  sympathies  by  the  immediate  environ- 
ment, but  also  by  personal  and  social  heredity  and  tradition.   .   .   . 

"  There  is,  then,  a  real  distinction  between  these  standpoints  or 
tests  for  judging  of  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  social  classes, 
and  it  will  make  a  difference  which  of  these  tests  or  standpoints  we 
adopt,  for  the  existence  of  classes  is  apparently  much  more  easily 
proved  from  the  objective  and  mechanical  standpoint  than  from 
the  subjective  or  psychological  standpoint. 

"  Which  of  these  tests  shall  we  then  apply?  The  answer  seems 
clear.  The  important  test  for  us  is  the  subjective  or  the  psycho- 
logical, because  we  are  making  a  study  of  labour  conditions  and 
problems  not  merely  to  discover  what  conditions  and  problems  exist, 
but  primarily  to  determine  what  can  and  ought  to  be  done  to  better 
conditions  and  to  solve  problems  ...  we  need  to  know  what 
causes  these  classes  to  exist,  how  they  stand  related  to  one  another 
in  Interest  and  motive,  and  what  their  quality,  organization  and 
strength  are."  ^^ 

What  we  are  Interested  In  is  the  essential  or  psychological  nature 
of  classes  and  class  relations,  for  on  this  depends  what  combina- 
tion of  classes  for  political  action  will  take  place.  For  instance,  if 
farmers  and  workmen  are  alike  animated  by  an  attitude  of  re- 
sistance against  reactionary  capitalistic  interests,^^  a  combination  of 
the  two  classes  to  win  political  control  ^'^  Is  more  likely  than  Is  a 
combination  of  capitalists  and  farmers  or  of  capitalists  and  work- 
men.    To  be  sure  the  instinctive  resistance  of  farmers  and  work- 

15  Hoxie,  "Trade  Unionism  in  the  United  States,"  350-353. 

"  Methodist  Federation  for  Social  Service,  "  The  Revolt  of  the  Farmers,"  bulletin 
for  July,  1919;  King,  "The  Prosecution  of  Mr.  Townley,"  The  Nation,  Aug.  2,  1919, 
143- 

i'^ "  Labor-Farmer  Politics,"  Survey,  Feb.  22,  1919,  733;  Sandburg,  "The  Farmer- 
Labor  Congress,"  Survey,  Feb.  21,  1920,  604-605;  Gillette,  "The  North  Dakota  Har- 
vest of  the'  Nonpartisan  League,"  Survey,  March  i,  1919,  753-760;  Johnson,  "Minne- 
sota and  the  Nonpartisan  League,"  The  New  Republic,  Oct.  8,  1919,  291;  Colcord, 
"  Labor  and  the  Farmers,"  The  Nation,  Jan.  3,  1920.  The  political  co-operation  of 
farmers  and  workmen  has  spread  to  Canada.  Up  to  1919  the  farmers  and  labourers 
of  Ontario  had  supported  the  regular  parties  on  the  strength  of  fair  promises.  In 
October,  1919,  by  co-operation,  they  elected  forty-five  Farmers  and  eleven  Labourites 
to  the  Ontario  House,  thus  getting  a  majority  over  the  other  parties  combined.  See 
Social  Welfare  (Organ  of  Social  Service  Council  of  Canada),  Toronto,  Dec.  i,  19x9, 
p.  60. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  25 

men  will  have  to  become  very  Intense  to  overcome  the  marked  dif- 
ference In  their  political  attitudes. ^^  But,  when  Instinctive  Impulses 
are  sufficiently  aroused  they  tend  to  prevail  over  attitudes  that  have 
been  formed  under  other  economic  conditions,  so  that,  when  the 
Instinctive  Impulses  suggest  a  common  purpose,  this  is  apt  eventually 
to  prevail.  Instinctive  Impulses  In  the  last  analysis  determine  what 
combinations  of  classes  will  take  place  In  the  rivalry  for  political 
control.  The  farming  class  Is  Instinctively  moved  In  two  direc- 
tions: against  the  domination  of  reactionary  capitalistic  Interests, 
and  against  a  non-propertied  class  if  the  latter  seems  to  seek  a 
too  radical  regulation  of  prices,  or  a  sweeping  away  of  property 
rights.  Whether  the  farming  class  will  ultimately  co-operate  with 
the  capitalistic  class  or  with  a  non-propertied  class  will  depend  on 
the  degree  of  domination  exercised  over  the  farming  class  by  the 
capitalistic  class  and  the  resentment  stirred  thereby,  as  compared 
with  the  degree  of  fear  inspired  by  the  attitude  of  the  non-proper- 
tied class  against  all  property. 

The  class  struggle  for  the  control  of  governments  has  not  yet 
enlisted  the  mass  of  voters  in  the  United  States.  Voters  generally 
resent  the  idea  of  a  class  openly  trying  to  control  the  government; 
at  the  same  time  they  acquiesce  in  the  traditional  political  control 
exercised  by  propertied  classes.  The  conventional  rank  and  file  of 
voters  tend,  therefore,  to  oppose  a  labour  party  as  being  an  open 
and  avowed  effort  of  the  working  classes  to  control  the  government. 
Voters  oppose  a  mass  movement  to  Influence  the  government,  which 
they  can  see,  as  against  reactionary  capitalistic  class  control  of 
government,  which  they  cannot  see.  Furthermore,  the  law  as  it 
has  developed,  is  mainly  for  the  protection  of  private  property,^^ 
wherefore  the  propertied  classes  appear  as  the  classes  to  be  pro- 
tected and  respected.  The  propertied  classes  are  not  only  the 
legally  protected  and  respected  classes  but  also  the  popularly  ad- 
mired classes,  while  the  working  classes  are  the  contemned  classes; 
wherefore  the  rank  and  file  of  voters  will  support  a  political  party 
that  represents,  primarily,  propertied  classes  when  they  would  not 
support  a  labour  party.  This  attitude  of  the  public  Is  a  more  seri- 
ous obstacle  to  a  labour  party  in  the  United  States  than  In  England 
and  Germany  where  a  larger  proportion  of  the  population  are 

18  Bernard,  "A  Theory  of  Rural  Attitudes,"  Amer.  Jour.  SocioL,  XXII :  637-647. 
1°  See  the  chapter  entitled,  Psychological  Processes  in  the  Development  of  Private 
Property  {concluded). 


26       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

wage-earners.  Until  the  wage-earners  in  the  United  States  con- 
stitute a  considerable  majority  of  the  voting  population,  as  they 
eventually  will,^°  a  labour  party  will  suffer  the  same  heavy  handi- 
cap that  a  labour  union  suffers  in  time  of  strike,  when  the  public 
tends  to  sympathize  with  employers,  just  because  they  belong  to  the 
admired  social  class,  rather  than  with  the  workmen,  because  they 
belong  to  the  contemned  social  class. 

However,  the  increasing  apprehension  of  a  reactionary  capitalis- 
tic control  of  government  has  tended  to  increase  the  number  of 
independent  voters.  The  "  independent  voter "  is  one  who  is 
breaking  away  from  the  conventionalized  mass  of  voters.  He 
votes  against  a  party  which  appears  to  have  become  a  party  com- 
mitted to  class  interests,  as  in  the  independent  support  of  Mr. 
Wilson  for  tariff  revision  downward  in  1912.  When  they  thus 
vote  against  a  class^  independent  voters  do  not  think  of  themselves 
as  thereby  constituting  an  opposing  class  but  as  voting  on  behalf 
of  the  people  against  a  privileged  class.  The  independent  vote  is 
numerically  weak  and  in  most  cases  politically  ineffective  against  a 
privileged  class,  owing  to  the  limited  education  of  the  independent 
voters  and  to  the  fact  that  they  do  not  come  into  direct  contact 
with  the  national  and  international  situations  that  require  political 
action.  They  become  acquainted  with  those  situations  through  the 
press,  which,  because  it  controls  the  sources  of  information,  is  able, 
through  social  suggestion,  to  incline  the  independent  voters  to  the 
propaganda  that  suits  the  reactionary  capitalistic  interests  that  exer- 
cise so  marked  a  control  over  the  press.  The  "  independent  vote  " 
is,  therefore,  not  the  vote  of  those  who  really  think  independently 
and  adequately  on  political  problems,  but  of  non-partisan  minds 
that  are  more  or  less  subject  to  the  social  control  exercised  through 
the  press.  He  is  a  rare  man  who  understands  sufficiently  the  arts 
of  newspaper  control  to  escape  their  influence. 

A  politically  dominant  class  that  does  not  too  violently  disturb 
the  conventional  masses  can  go'  a  long  way  in  the  use,  in  its  own 
interest,  of  the  sovereignty  vested  in  the  masses.  The  "  will  of 
the  people  "  is  a  vague  acquiescence  ^^  which  a  dominant  class  turns 
in  the  direction  of  its  own  interests.  This  acquiescence  is  rein- 
forced by  the  survival,  among  the  masses,  of  attitudes  that  charac- 

20  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  380. 

21 "  Europe's  Misery  and  America's  Complacency,"  New  Republic,  Nov,  12,  1919,  307. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  27 

terized  them  before  they  were  sovereign,  for  instance,  the  attitude 
of  subservience  to  a  ruling  class. ^^  Furthermore,  citizens  still  have 
much  respect  for  "  law  as  such,"  and  for  law  as  having  behind  it 
the  strong  arm  of  the  state.  In  the  same  way,  people  have  respect 
for  moral  law  as  such  and  because  God  is  believed  to  stand  behind 
it.^^  As  one  man  expressed  it,  "  my  religion  is  not  my  conscience 
but  what  lies  back  of  my  conscience."  God  back  of  moral  law, 
especially  if  God  is  represented  by  a  vigorous  ecclesiastical  organi- 
zation, causes  respect  for  moral  law,  and  the  sovereign  back  of 
civil  law  causes  respect  for  civil  law. 

The  attitude  of  unthinking  deference  to  law  as  such  has  been 
much  disturbed  of  late  years  by  the  critical  attitude  that  has  de- 
veloped owing  to  law  invading  the  sphere  of  personal  liberty  more 
and  more.  If  law  is  the  body  of  rules  necessary  for  a  collective 
life,  then  the  increasing  complexity  of  that  life  will  require  an  in- 
creasing invasion  of  personal  liberty.  Some  of  these  laws  are,  on 
their  face,  foolish,  because  carelessly  drawn  by  ignorant  legislators, 
or  because  passed  to  placate  public  sentiment  that  could  be  placated 
by  the  mere  passage  of  a  law.  For  the  same  reason  some  of  the 
rules  and  regulations  issued  by  governmental  commissions  and  ap- 
plying to  public  utilities,  factories,  stores,  banks  or  the  farm  are 
foolish,  and  because  they  are,  sometimes,  undoubtedly  foolish  their 
wisdom  often  is  doubted  and  they  are  ridiculed  when  they  are  not 
foolish  but  appear  to  be  so  because  the  situation  is  not  understood. 
All  this  implies  an  increasingly  critical  attitude  to  law,  for  we  are 
living  in  an  age  when  the  inefficient  law-making  and  administrative 
branches  can  hardly  keep  pace  with  the  rapidly  changing  situations 
that  demand  legislation.^^  The  attitude  to  law  is,  therefore,  com- 
ing to  be  less  an  attitude  of  blind  deference  than  heretofore.  It 
is  not  an  attitude  of  disrespect  for  all  law  but  for  laws  that  are 
thought  to  be  foolish.  So  much  for  the  changing  attitude  to  law 
as  such. 

There  is  also  an  increasingly  critical  attitude  toward  the  law  en- 
forcing power.  Respect  for  the  strong  arm  of  the  state  weakens 
when  it  comes  to  be  understood  that  that  strong  arm  is  often  moved 
by  reactionary  capitalistic  interests.     Instances  when  reactionary 

22Pillsbury,  "The  Psychology  of  Nationality  and  Internationalism,"   193-194. 
23  For  the  time  when  this  attitude  was  all  but  universal  see  Green,  "  Town  Life  in 
the  Fifteenth  Century,"  II :  8. 
2*  Laski,  "  Authority  in  the  Modern  State,"  379. 


28       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

capitalistic  interests  systematically  forced  governmental  agencies  to 
act  contrary  to  law,  and  secured  the  repeal  of  laws  that  stood  in  the 
way  of  the  exercise  of  their  will  create  a  profound  impression, ^^  be- 
cause the  strong  arm  of  the  state,  in  those  instances,  is  seen  to  obey 
the  will  of  a  class,  not  the  will  of  the  whole  people.  This  growing 
distrust  of  the  power  of  the  state  is  apparent  even  among  the  most 
conservative  part  of  the  population,  the  farmers,  who  are  ceasing 
to  be  a  part  of  a  conventional  mass  of  voters  and  to  realize  that 
they  are  a  distinct  class  which  must  federate  with  other  classes 
of  like  interests  and  seek  to  control  the  voters  against  classes  the 
interests  of  which  are  opposed  to  its  own.  Law  thus  ceases  to  be 
something  to  be  assented  to  as  having  behind  it  the  strong  arm  of 
the  state;  for  each  class  comes  to  think  of  itself  as  the  possible 
mover  of  that  strong  arm  and  of  law  as  the  expression  of  its  own 
will,  which,  however,  never  can  act  entirely  independently  because 
of  the  necessity  of  not  violating  too  far  the  beliefs  of  the  still  con- 
ventional masses,  and  because  of  the  necessity,  if  control  is  to  be 
maintained,  of  not  impressing  the  masses  as  unjust  to  other  classes. 
These  problems  as  to  the  relations  of  class  and  mass  —  as  to  the 
ultimate  nature  of  sovereignty  —  are,  as  already  indicated,  termed 
"  ethical  "  by  the  political  scientist,  who  says  that  the  studies 
broaden  out  "  into  an  examination  of  the  premises  of  a  final  politi- 
cal philosophy."  ^^  This  examination  involves  social-psychological 
investigations. 

These  investigations  have  an  historical  aspect.  In  the  early 
American  rural  community  law  had  a  twofold  psychological  basis. 
First,  it  was  an  expression  of  what  was  felt  to  be  necessary  for  the 
collective  life  of  the  community;  ^"^  enforcement  of  law  was  an  im- 
pulsive reaction  of  communal  resentment  against  the  law-breaker. 
Second,  the  law  was  that  whereby  the  self-reliant  farmer  got  his 
rights  in  a  dispute  over  property. ^^  Both  these  functions  are  vio- 
lated in  so  far  as  there  is  control  by  a  dominant  class.  First,  in- 
stead of  law  being  an  expression  of  what  is  necessary  for  the  col- 

25  Lindsey  and  O'Higgins,  "  The  Beast."  See  also,  "  Final  Report  of  the  United  States 
Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,"  1915,  53-80,  139-160;  West,  "The  Colorado 
Strike,"  Special  Report  of  U.  S.  Com.  on  Ind.  Rel.,  1915;  Shaw,  "Closed  Towns,"  Sur- 
vey, Nov.  8,  1919,  38;  Hard,  "What  the  Miners  are  Thinking,"  New  Republic,  Nov. 
12,  1919,  324;  Hard,  "A  Class  Policy  in  Coal,"  Neiu  Republic,  Nov.  19,  352-355. 

28 Willoughby,  "The  Individual  and  the  State,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  VIII:  2. 

27  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  Pt.  II,  Ch.  XL 

28  Ibid.,  Pt.  I,  Ch.  IV. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  29 

lective  life  of  the  community,  it  becomes  an  expression  of  what 
serves  the  interests  of  a  dominant  class.  Second,  instead  of  law 
being  that  whereby  a  man  maintains  himself  against  a  "  grasping  " 
man,  it  is  that  by  which  the  grasping  corporation  prevails  over  the 
citizens.  The  functioning  of  the  law  in  defence  of  the  self-reliant 
citizen  has  been  impeded  by  the  development  of  the  laws'  delays, ^^ 
and  by  the  increase  of  court  costs  and  fees  and  of  the  expense  of 
counsel. ^°  The  wealthy  and  well-to-do  classes  still  have  the  means 
to  get  legal  justice  while  the  working  masses  have  not,  so  that  they 
are  at  a  disadvantage  with,  often  at  the  mercy  of,  the  propertied 
classes  whenever  the  law  must  be  invoked  to  get  justice.^^  The 
increasing  disrespect  for  law  is  not  a  disrespect  for  law  functioning 
properly  but  for  law  when  it  functions  on  behalf  of  propertied 
classes  and  contrary  to  the  interests  of  non-propertied  classes  and 
individuals. 

The  functioning  of  a  constitutional  government  depends  in  the 
last  analysis  on  respect  for  law  as  the  instrument  of  justice,  for  the 
essential  fact  in  constitutional  government  is  that  it  is  a  government 
under  law.  President  Goodnow  makes  this  very  explicit:  "What 
is  it  now  that  we  mean  by  constitutional  government?  How  does 
it  differ  from  the  other  forms  of  government  which  the  history  of 
the  world  exhibits?  ...  By  constitutional  government  is  meant, 
in  the  first  place,  a  government  which,  as  opposed  to  what  may  be 
called  personal  government,  is  based  not  on  the  temporary  caprice 
and  whim  of  those  who  possess  political  power,  but  which,  on  the 
contrary,  is  carried  out  In  accordance  with  rules  so  clearly  defined 
and  so  generally  accepted  as  effectively  to  control  the  actions  of 
public  oflicers.  Constitutional  government  is  then.  In  the  first 
place,  a  government  of  laws  and  not  a  government  of  men."  ^^ 
What  are  the  social-psychological  facts  Implied  in  this  distinction? 
A  government  of  laws  implies  an  attitude  of  subjects  to  law  which 
the  subjects  of  a  government  of  men  do  not  possess.^^  In  a  gov- 
ernment of  men  the  authority  of  a  ruler  depends  more  on  his  per- 
sonality than  In  a  government  of  laws,  particularly  on  his  domi- 

2»  Smith,  "  Justice  and  the  Poor,"  Ch.  IV. 
so  Ibid.,  Chs.  V-VI. 

51  Ibid.,  33. 

52  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  1-2. 

ss  See  the  analysis  of  the  difference  between  the  German  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  atti- 
tudes to  law  in  the  chapter  entitled,  The  Conflict  of  Political  Attitudes  and  Ideals. 


30       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

nating  power,  and  that  of  the  men  he  controls,  in  the  interest  of  his 
domination.  If  the  state  originated  in  conquest  and  despotic  con- 
trol by  a  conquering  group,^*  domination  was  assuredly  the  essen- 
tial fact  in  the  formation  of  the  state.  In  the  ancient  despotisms, 
the  power  of  the  despot  depended  on  his  personal  dominating 
power.  If  he  was  strong  and  commanding,  his  power  was  abso- 
lute. Thus  it  is  said  of  the  Egyptian  Pharaoh,  Amenemhet  I, 
2000—1970  B.  c. :  "  He  ruled  in  absolute  power;  there  was  none 
to  offer  a  breath  of  opposition;  there  was  not  a  whisper  of  that 
modern  monitor  of  kings,  public  opinion,  an  inconvenience  with 
which  rulers  in  the  Orient  are  rarely  obliged  to  reckon,  even  at  the 
present  day.  With  a  man  of  strong  powers  on  the  throne,  all 
were  at  his  feet,  but  let  him  betray  a  single  evidence  of  weakness, 
and  he  was  quickly  made  the  puppet  of  court  coteries."  ^^  Conse- 
quently kings  exaggerated  their  dominating  powers  by  assuming 
an  extreme  expression  of  domination  and  were  pleased  by  exag- 
gerated expressions  of  submission  in  others.  A  Roman  emperor 
assumed  a  ferocious  expression  and  ordered  a  menacing  and  terri- 
fying expression  to  be  given  to  his  statues.  The  Egyptian  Pharaohs 
had  themselves  sculptured  with  the  impassive  calm  of  the  mighty 
man  who  is  far  above  the  necessity  of  seriously  considering  any 
opposition  to  his  will.^^  At  the  present  day,  under  any  form  of 
government,  an  official  with  a  personality  of  dominating  power  is 
able  to  carry  through  financial,  industrial  or  political  plans  where 
a  man  lacking  such  power  would  encounter  formidable  opposition. 
In  the  ancient  despotisms,  the  people  were  kept  in  fearful  submis- 
sion by  the  fear-inspiring  beliefs  of  a  theology  and  ritual  in  charge 
of  a  priesthood  allied  with  the  despot;  by  arbitrary  and  fearful 
punishments  meted  out  to  resisters,  causing  constant  apprehension 
among  those  tempted  to  voice  their  resentment;  and  by  a  habit  of 
submission  fostered  by  keeping  the  people  in  a  condition  of  poverty 
and  ignorance  and  servitude. 

A  government  of  laws  shows  a  similar  far-reaching  social-psycho- 
logical basis.  A  government  of  laws  is  due  essentially  to  an  atti- 
tude of  subjects  to  law  which  makes  such  a  government  possible. 
It  is  an  attitude  that  insists  on  all,  high  as  well  as  low,  obeying  the 

3*  Oppenheimer,  "  The  State,"  52-78. 
85  Breasted,  "A  History  of  Egypt,"  235. 
^^Ibid.,  120,  306,  321,  354. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  31 

law  of  the  land.  In  England  the  Constitution  developed  as  the 
result  of  efforts  to  curtail  the  autocratic  power  of  the  ruler,  and 
compel  him  to  obey  the  law  of  the  land.  Consequently  the  Eng- 
lish form  of  government  is  a  limited  monarchy;  the  Crown  is 
regarded  as  having  all  powers  not  expressly  withheld  in  the  Con- 
stitution.^^ This  form  of  government  differs  essentially  from  that 
of  the  United  States,  the  Constitution  of  which  was  "  based  squarely 
on  the  idea  of  popular  sovereignty."  ^®  The  Constitution  was 
made  by  a  people  who  had  renounced  their  ruler.  It  was  regarded 
as  an  expression  of  the  popular  will,  and  provided  that  the  organs 
of  government  should  exercise  only  the  powers  given  them  in  the 
Constitution.^^  However,  propertied  classes  were  influential  in 
the  constitutional  convention,  which  framed  certain  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  in  a  way  that  made  the  judiciary  a  bulwark  of 
propertied  classes  against  possible  control  of  the  legislature  by 
a  non-propertied  majority;^"  and  this  role  of  the  judiciary  has  in- 
volved it  in  questions  foreign  to  its  proper  function.*^ 

A  government  of  laws,  as  contrasted  with  a  government  of  men, 
diminishes  apprehension  as  to  the  behaviour  of  the  governing  body 
by  defining  the  conditions  under  which  subjects  may  exercise  free- 
dom of  speech  and  action  without  fear  of  despotic  interference, 
though  in  the  leading  constitutional  governments  this  legal  defi- 
nition of  freedom  is  not  explicit.^^  A  dominant  class  may  repress 
it  in  the  interest  of  its  dominance.  A  government  of  laws  also 
diminishes  the  need  of  the  exercise  of  dominating  power  on  the 
part  of  officials  in  order  to  maintain  their  position,  because  their 
tenure  and  duties  are  defined  by  laws  which  are  generally  respected. 
The  more  impulsive  aspects  of  political  behaviour  are  thus  elimi- 
nated by  the  legally  established  routine.  As  a  matter  of  fact  there 
were  customary  regulations  of  the  behaviour  of  rulers  long  before 
legal  regulations;  but  these  customs  were  strengthened  by  explicit 
legal  endorsement.  Thus  it  was  that  the  English  judiciary  devel- 
oped the  English  common  law  out  of  custom,  by  affirming  custom 
often  in  opposition  to  the  royal  wish,  which  made  the  judiciary  the 

^''  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  85. 
88/*iW.,  85. 
89  Ibid.,  89. 

*°  Beard,  "  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States," 
157-161;  Beard,  "The  Supreme  Court  and  the  Constitution,"  Chs.  II-IV. 
*i  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  267-268. 
*2  Ibid.,  225. 


32        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

traditional  bulwark  of  a  government  of  laws.*^  A  government  of 
laws  also  facilitates  the  adjustments  necessitated  by  the  class  con- 
flict, for  the  class  rivalry  may  take  the  form  of  a  rivalry  of  political 
parties,  under  laws  that  provide  for  the  free  action  of  such  parties. 

In  a  democracy  with  majority  rule,  the  sanction  of  law  depends 
in  the  last  analysis  on  the  might  of  the  majority.  This  might  is 
not  necessarily  intelligent;  it  means,  in  the  last  analysis,  superior 
force.  The  general  sentiment  for  majority  rule  is  due :  ( i )  to  the 
long  struggle  against  minority  rule  and  the  ultimate  replacing  of 
the  force  of  the  propertied  minority  by  the  force  of  the  majority; 
(2)  to  the  general  belief  that  while  the  action  of  the  majority  is 
not  necessarily  wise,  yet  in  a  government  of  the  people  and  for  the 
people,  it  is  more  to  be  trusted  than  a  minority,  no  matter  how 
wise;  (3)  to  the  common  man's  sense  of  the  power  of  the  majority 
and  his  willingness  to  abide  by  its  decisions.**  Majority  rule  is 
conducive  to  social  order,  wherefore  a  propertied  minority  accepts 
it  as,  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  class  Interests,  having  some 
merit,  and  aims  to  maintain  control  of  the  situation  by  controlling 
the  majority.  Because  the  majority  of  voters  are  non-propertied, 
the  propertied  minority  feels  an  apprehension  for  the  security  of  its 
property  rights  in  a  government  chosen  by  the  majority,  and  justi- 
fies the  measures  taken  to  maintain  its  traditional  control  of  gov- 
ernment on  the  ground  of  their  necessity  in  a  state  where  the  ma- 
jority rules.  It  regards  these  measures  as  necessary  for  its  pro- 
tection against  an  "  overbearing  majority,"  as  James  Madison 
called  it.*^  The  non-propertied  masses  in  the  United  States  have 
not  yet  awakened  to  the  significance  for  their  interests  of  the  rule 
of  the  majority.  For  the  most  part  they  acquiesce  in  the  tradi- 
tional political  control  of  propertied  classes. 

In  a  state  with  universal  suffrage  and  majority  rule,  and  In  which 
the  majority  is  non-propertied,  the  propertied  classes  cannot,  even 
from  the  standpoint  of  class  interests,  safely  assume  their  power 
permanently  to  control  the  non-propertied.  Business  men  of  the 
progressive  type  realize  that  the  non-propertied  majority  must  no 
longer  be  left  In  Ignorance  of  its  responsibilities  as  the  final  reposi- 

*s  See  the  chapter  entitled,  Psychological  Implications  of  Interpretations  of  Private 
Rights. 

**  De  Tocqueville,  "  The  Republic  of  the  United  States  of  America,"  II :  269,  275- 
283;  Bryce,  "The  American  Commonwealth,"  11:322. 

*5  The  Federalist,  No.  X.  Beard,  "  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,"  157. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  33 

tory  of  political  power.  One  of  these  business  men,  Edward  A. 
Filene,  Director  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States, 
writes:  "  The  formation  of  the  American  Labour  Party,  and  the 
platform  adopted  by  it  in  New  York  and  Chicago,  cannot  be  denied 
their  significance.  They  aim  to  assert  labour's  authority  in  the 
political  field,  as  in  the  economic,  and  to  make  it  prevail  there.  In 
view  of  the  heavy  majority  by  which  employes  outnumber  employ- 
ers, the  sweeping  accession  of  power  this  party  would  win,  if  the 
rank  and  file  gave  it  support  at  the  polls,  is  quite  obvious. 

"  Even  if  the  American  Labor  Party  should  appear  but  feeble 
in  votes,  one  must  remember  that  all  it  needs  to  acquire  is  a  balance 
of  power,  in  order  to  make  itself  strong  in  our  national  Con- 
gress. .  .  . 

"  Plainly  there  is  danger  in  sight  if  the  control  of  legislation 
shall  come  to  labor  with  a  feeling  still  extant  of  wrongs  endured 
and  of  grievances  undischarged,  and  yet  with  no  new  factors  of  re- 
sponsibility admitted  to  the  equation.  ... 

"  How  shall  we  set  about  to  inspire  in  labor  a  larger  sense  of 
responsibility?  I  know  of  but  one  way,  and  that  is  to  give  labor 
a  larger  actuality  of  responsibility,  to  let  employees  feel  and  know 
that  they  are  not  merely  being  '  managed  '  but  are  also  sharing  in 
the  tasks  of  management.  The  power  that  wrings  by  force  a 
concession  from  an  employer  is  seldom  followed  by  any  manifesta- 
tion on  the  employees'  part  that  they  hold  themselves  accountable 
for  the  success  of  that  concession  in  actual  practice.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  power  that  leads  to  a  sense  of  responsibility  is  the  power 
that  ...  by  being  possessed  of  reasonable  rights  of  initiation, 
acquires  by  unavoidable  sequence  a  human  interest  in,  and  a  re- 
sponsibility for,  the  success  or  failure  of  its  conclusions."  *^ 

Contrasted  with  this  progressive  attitude  is  the  reactionary  busi- 
ness attitude.  From  discussions  and  arguments  with  men  of  re- 
actionary views  the  attitude  appears  something  like  this:  In  the 
first  place,  on  the  economic  side  the  long  absorption  in  the  effort 
to  make  money  in  a  certain  business  results  in  a  mesh  of  habits  and 
attitudes  that  determine  the  business  behaviour.  Students  are  apt 
to  make  the  mistake  of  thinking  that  the  business  man  is  always 
consciously  reasoning,  in  his  business  and  political  behaviour,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  his  own  business  interests.     This  is  untrue. 

*«  Filene,  "  The  Shop  Committee,"  Current  A  if  airs,  Mar.  17,  191 9,  6. 


34       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

It  is  difficult  to  get  many  business  men  to  talk  seriously  on  business 
or  political  problems  because  it  is  difficult  to  get  them  to  think. 
In  his  own  business  he  has  fallen  into  the  habit  of  acting  without 
reasoning,  according  to  habit  (he  calls  it  a  "  second  sight  "),  and 
he  is  apt  so  to  act  in  politics.  Now  in  business  when  an  intel- 
lectually-in-earnest young  employe  proposes  any  change  in  the  busi- 
ness, the  conservative  business  man,  because  of  this  averseness  to 
thinking,  because  of  his  addiction  to  habit,  is  not  apt  to  take  the 
proposal  seriously,  and  the  same  is  true  of  his  attitude  to  a  political 
reform.  But  in  his  business  he  is  boss  and  the  proposal  of  the 
young  fellow  goes  no  further.  Without  any  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  manager  to  dominate  the  situation  the  matter  is  simply  dropped. 
It  is  dropped  in  virtue  of  his  recognized  position  of  authority,  owing 
to  which  it  is  not  usually  necessary  for  him  to  exercise  domination. 
It  is  dropped  without  any  particular  discussion  as  to  its  merits. 
But  in  politics  he  does  not  occupy  the  same  position  of  authority. 
And,  unless  he  is  indifferent  to  the  issue,  he  is  forced  to  become 
reactionary  and  to  join  in  an  attempt  to  dominate  the  political 
situation. 

What  is  his  motive  when  he  thus  becomes  reactionary?  It  is 
something  like  this.  He  realizes  that,  in  a  political  democracy 
with  nominal  majority  rule,  the  propertied  minority  has  controlled 
the  pohtical  situation  up  to  the  present  time.  He  also  reahzes  that 
the  non-propertied  majority  has  become  more  intelligent  as  to  the 
fact  of  this  minority  rule  and  as  to  what  constitutes  its  own  inter- 
ests, in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  propertied  minority  to  control  its 
political  thinking  and  action.  If  he  is  a  man  of  any  inteUigence  he 
realizes  further  that,  in  the  long  run,  the  non-propertied  majority  is 
going  to  try  to  get,  through  political  action,  the  reforms  that  it 
wants  in  economic  relations  and  gradually  will  succeed.  But  his 
impulse  is  to  dominate  the  situation  and  retard  the  success  of  this 
movement.  Reactionaries  differ  in  their  attitudes.  The  most  con- 
servative and  dominating  will  retard  the  movement  just  as  far  as 
possible  and  "  will  fight  to  the  last  ditch,"  all  the  time  planning,  if 
the  reform  appears  to  be  inevitable,  to  "  beat  the  other  side  to  it  " 
and  make  it  as  innocuous  as  possible.  This  attitude  justifies  itself 
with  the  secondary  explanation  that  "  Progress  is  an  evolution. 
We  have  been  going  too  fast.  We  must  put  the  brakes  on  now 
and  you  ought  to  help  us."     The  prestige  of  the  idea  of  evolution 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  35 

is  invoked  as  a  secondary  explanation  of  a  reaction  that  is  essen- 
tially an  instinctive  impulse  of  domination.  The  idea  follows  the 
reaction  merely  as  an  excuse  and  is  not  a  vital  part  of  the  motive, 
and  for  this  reason  is  called  a  secondary  explanation.  But  it  may 
serve  to  impress  others  that  the  motive  is  justified.  Those  who 
are  not  keen  enough,  or  who  lack  the  social-psychological  training 
that  is  necessary  to  detect  the  real  motive  of  the  reactionary  be- 
haviour may  let  the  explanation  cover  up  the  real  motive,  and  may 
assent  to  the  behaviour  because  of  the  prestige  of  the  explanation. 

The  less  conservative  and  more  intelligent  reactionary  type  is 
less  instinctive  in  its  behaviour.  In  addition  to  the  Instinctive  im- 
pulse to  dominate  the  situation,  which  does  not  carry  this  type  so 
far  as  to  fight  to  the  last  ditch,  there  Is  the  theory  that  "  if  the 
majority  Is  to  rule  let  It  show  Its  power  to  rule,  and  let  It  show  that 
it  is  Intelligent  enough."  The  contention  is  that  a  particular  act 
of  social  legislation  ought  not  to  come  until  the  majority  intelli- 
gently wants  it.  "  We  ought  not  to  let  a  few  reformers  put  this 
thing  over."  This  type  will  support  a  deceiving  propaganda  on 
the  ground  that  if  the  more  intelligent  of  the  public  who  are  the 
victims  of  such  a  propaganda  have  not  the  intelligence  not  to  be 
deceived,  they  lack  the  Intelligence  that  is  necessary  to  make  the 
law,  if  passed,  effective  for  the  public  welfare.  If  they  can  be  de- 
ceived by  propaganda,  they  can  be  deceived  by  politicians  in  ad- 
ministering the  law.  This  type  of  reactionary  at  least  Is  more  in- 
telligent than  the  other  type;  the  justifications  of  the  attitude  are 
more  than  mere  secondary  explanations.  Unlike  mere  excuses, 
they  raise  a  question  as  to  the  necessary  social-psychological  basis 
of  social  legislation.  But  the  reactionary  of  this  type  is  distin- 
guished from  the  progressive  by  the  fact  that,  though  the  reaction- 
ary urges  the  necessity  of  popular  Intelligence  as  a  basis  of  effec- 
tive legislation,  he  Is  opposed  both  to  the  perfectly  free  education 
which  is  necessary  In  order  to  increase  popular  intelligence,  and 
also  to  those  reforms  in  industrial  relations  advocated  by  a  pro- 
gressive like  Mr.  Fllene  that  look  to  the  creation  of  popular  intelli- 
gence in  the  course  of  industrial  relations.  That  is,  he  is  essen- 
tially reactionary  In  that  he  Is  opposed  to  measures  that  are  neces- 
sary in  order  to  make  men  intelligently  progressive. 

Reactionaries  generally  assume,  though  they  may  not  publicly 
admit  it,  that  property-owners  should  "  run  the  country  "  and  that 


36        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  way  for  wage-earners  to  get  political  power  Is  by  becoming 
property-owners.^"^  At  the  same  time,  they  are  conscious  of  the 
fact  that  men  do  not  become  property  owners  as  easily  as  formerly. 
They  are  less  and  less  able  to  escape  the  argument  that  the  wages 
of  labour  generally  are  such  that  workmen  could  not,  even  with 
ideal  economy  and  self-restraint,  accumulate  any  considerable  sav- 
ings. Only  the  extraordinary  workman  who  rises  to  a  superior 
position  can  become  a  property  owner.  Wherefore  the  assumption 
that  wage-earners  may  become  property-owners  is  contrary  to  the 
actual  conditions,  and  employers  are  coming  to  realize  that  work- 
men are  awakening  to  this  fact,  and  are  seeking  political  power  by 
organizing.  And  workmen  realize  that  their  political  strength,  as 
far  as  this  depends  on  numbers,  is  rapidly  on  the  Increase.  Em- 
ployers who  candidly  face  these  facts  of  the  working  class  con- 
sciousness are  uneasy  with  respect  to  the  permanency  of  their  po- 
litical control. 

The  progressive  political  attitude  of  employers  favours  govern- 
mental measures  that  facilitate  co-operation  of  classes  for  the  public 
welfare.  The  reactionary  political  attitude  seeks  the  maintenance 
by  force  of  the  control  over  the  non-propertied  majority  by  the 
propertied  minority;  and  this  Is  one  motive  for  the  hearty  support 
given  by  many  employers  in  the  United  States  to  organizations  of 
former  soldiers,  and  for  their  support  of  compulsory  military  train- 
ing. The  military  class  always  has  been  the  ready  servant  of  dom- 
inating propertied  classes.  The  alternatives  of  the  co-operation  of 
classes  for  the  public  welfare  (which  co-operation  probably  would 
eventually  so  equalize  the  distribution  of  property  as  to  do  away 
with  the  distinction  between  the  classes  as  we  now  have  it)  are  the 
development  of  a  militarism  ^^  for  the  repression  of  non-propertied 
class,  or,  if  this  Is  nipped  in  the  bud,  an  increasingly  bitter  class 
struggle. 

The  first  effect  of  a  realization  on  the  part  of  the  small-proper- 
tied and  non-propertied  classes  of  a  class  control  of  government 
that  is  against  their  interests  is  a  distrust  of  government  as  such. 

■*^  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  381-382. 

*8  Those  who  are  incredulous  as  to  the  ease  with  which  a  militarism  may  develop 
in  a  "free  country"  are  evidently  unacquainted  with  the  arbitrary,  illegal  and  often 
brutal  repression  of  legal  meetings  of  resisting  workmen  by  city  and  state  police  and 
soldiers,  in  the  United  States,  in  1919,  reference  to  which  will  herein-after  be  made. 
Instances  of  similar  ruthless  military  domination  occurred  in  the  British  Empire.  See 
"The  Peril  of  the  Military  Mind,"  in  the  London  Nation,  Dec.  20,  1919,  412. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  37 

The  distrusting  population  does  not  immediately  constitute  itself 
a  distinct  class  seeking  to  wrest  control  of  the  government  from  the 
controlling  class.  The  first  tendency  is  not  a  tendency  to  a  vigor- 
ous class  conflict  under  governmental  forms,  with  acquiescence  in 
the  control  of  the  victorious  class  for  the  legal  period,  followed  by 
another  conflict  under  legal  forms,  but  is  a  tendency  to  a  disintegra- 
tion of  government.  The  awakened  population,  inert  and  without 
leaders  as  a  distinct  class,  comes  to  distrust  government  altogether. 
It  is  this  psychological  condition  that  is  an  essential  cause  of  that 
individuahstic  attitude  toward  governmental  regulation  of  indus- 
try, of  organized  labour  and  other  awakened  sections  of  the  popu- 
lation in  the  United  States  at  the  present  time,*^  which  reformers 
find  to  be  an  obstacle  to  the  improvement  of  industrial  conditions 
by  governmental  action. ^°  Before  we  can  discuss  the  question  as 
to  what  functions  the  democratic  state  ought  to  assume,  we  must 
know  what  is  the  political  attitude  of  the  people  in  order  to  know 
whether  there  are  psychological  guarantees  that  laws  in  further- 
ance of  desirable  functions  can  be  enacted  and  enforced.^^ 

The  individualistic  attitude  of  organized  labour  in  the  United 

*8  Another  cause  is  the  traditional  individualistic  attitude  of  the  propertied  and  con- 
trolling classes  in  the  United  States,  surviving  from  England  (Pound,  "  The  End  of 
Law  as  Developed  in  Juristic  Thought,"  Harvard  Laiv  Review,  XXX:  207),  and  con- 
firmed by  the  economic  freedom  of  the  new  world. 

^o  Professor  W.  F.  Willoughby  writes :  "  It  has  now  been  a  matter  of  something 
over  twenty-five  years  that  I  have  been  earnestly  interested  in  the  great  movement  for 
the  improvement  of  industrial  conditions  and  the  betterment  of  the  conditions  of  labour. 
...  I  believe  that  progress  has  been  achieved  and  that  a  further  advance  is  inevi- 
table. ...  It  is  when,  however,  I  look  back  on  the  tremendous  efforts  that  have  been 
put  forth  to  bring  about  these  few  and  isolated  achievements  .  .  .  that  I  am  impressed 
with  the  fact  that  something  must  be  radically  wrong.  .  .  ."  He  believes  what  is 
wrong  is  that  "  Back  in  their  mind  the  American  people  are  still  dominated  by  the 
dogmas  of  laissez-faire  and  individualism  as  preached  by  the  Manchesterian  and 
utilitarian  schools  of  the  middle  nineteenth  century.  They  still  are  influenced,  though 
often  unconsciously,  by  the  doctrine  that  all  resort  to  the  state  is  to  be  deprecated." 
(Willoughby,  "The  Philosophy  of  Labor  Legislation,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  VIII:  15- 
16.)  As  far  as  I  have  studied  this  individualism,  however,  many  men  who  oppose 
labour  legislation  know  nothing  about  laissez-faire,  and  those  who  do,  use  it  merely 
as  a  justification  of  an  attitude  that  is  more  fundamental  than  the  idea  used  to  justify 
it.  Most  men  know  nothing  about  economic  doctrines  and  care  less.  From  impres- 
sions they  have  received  they  believe  that  the  state  and  national  governments  are 
extravagant  and  inefficient,  that  officials  are,  for  the  most  part,  creatures  of  political 
organizations  dominated  by  "  politicians "  who  "  are  in  it  for  what  they  can  get  out 
of  it,"  who  care  nothing  for  the  masses,  and  are  only  too  eager  to  serve  corporate  in- 
terests. Believing  as  they  do,  they  distrust  the  government's  efficiency  and  disinterest- 
edness. The  individualistic  attitude  is  based,  therefore,  not  on  doctrine  but  on  impres- 
sion and  belief. 

°i  See  the  chapter  entitled,  Psychological  Implications  of  the  Theory  of  Natural 
Rights. 


38       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

States  has  been  confirmed  by  certain  conditions  which  made  the 
progress  of  labour  through  governmental  action  extremely  difficult. 
"  American  trade  unions  are  unique  in  that,  of  the  labour  move- 
ments in  the  whole  world,  with  the  sole  exception  of  the  French 
Confederation  Generale  du  Travail,  they  make  the  least  demand 
upon  the  government  along  the  line  of  legal  protection  to  labour. 
Owing  to  the  constitutional  separation  of  powers  between  the 
executive,  the  legislature,  and  the  judiciary,  and  especially  owing  to 
the  existence  of  four  dozen  different  state  governments,  each  a  law 
unto  itself,  American  labour  leaders  have  for  the  most  part  become 
convinced,  after  long  and  discouraging  experience  with  unconsti- 
tutional and  unenforceable  labour  laws,  that  only  through  trade 
unions  can  the  wage-earner  secure  protection  worthy  of  the  name. 
.  .  .  It*  is  for  this  reason  that  it  (the  American  Federation  of 
Labor)  desires  to  have  trade  union  members  in  all  the  public 
offices  dealing  with  labour,  and,  on  the  whole,  remains  indifferent 
to  the  consideration  of  efficiency  in  the  administration  of  labour 
laws.  .  .  . 

"  When  employers  discovered  that  they  could  not  place  complete 
reliance  upon  the  executive  officers  of  the  democratically  controlled 
state,  they  turned  to  the  courts  for  protection.  The  latter  re- 
sponded by  developing  a  code  of  trade  union  law,  which,  having 
for  its  cornerstone  a  resurrected  doctrine  of  malicious  conspiracy 
as  applied  to  labour  combinations  and,  for  its  weapon,  the  injunc- 
tion, proceeded  to  outlaw  the  boycott,  to  materially  circumscribe 
the  right  to  strike,  and  even  to  turn  against  labour  the  Federal 
statutes  which  had  been  originally  directed  against  railway  and  in- 
dustrial monopoly. 

"  The  height  of  this  development,  which  had  begun  in  the 
eighties  and  continued  during  the  nineties,  was  reached  in  the  well- 
known  Danbury  Hatters'  case,  passed  upon  by  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  early  in  1908.^^  The  Sherman  anti-trust  law,  of 
1890,  had  been  applied  in  labour  cases  in  the  past,  notably  in  the 
Pullman  boycott  case,  but  never  in  a  civil  suit  for  damages  against 
the  individual  members  of  a  trade  union.  In  this  case  the  signifi- 
cant thing  was  not  that  a  few  union  leaders  were  to  be  punished 
with  short  terms  of  imprisonment,  but  that  the  life  savings  of  sev- 
eral hundreds  of  the  members  were  attached  to  satisfy  the  stagger- 

'*For  the  several  stages  of  this  case,  see  Loewe  v.  Lawlor,  208  U.  S.  274  (1908) ; 
Lawlor  v.  Loewe,  209  Fed.  721  (1913),  235  U.  S.  522  (1914). 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  39 

ing  triple  damages  awarded  the  employer  under  the  anti-trust  law. 
Close  upon  the  outlawing  of  the  boycott  in  the  Danbury  hatters' 
case,  came  the  Adair  decision,^^  which  in  effect  legalized  '  black- 
listing'  of  employes  by  employers.  A  few  months  later,  the  courts 
dealt  another  blow  to  the  boycott  in  the  Buck's  Stove  and  Range 
case,  when  Gompers,  Morrison,  and  Mitchell  were  sentenced  to 
imprisonment,  ranging  from  six  months  to  one  year,  for  disregard- 
ing the  court's  injunction  against  the  boycott  of  the  St.  Louis 
firm."  ''  ^' 

The  most  direct  action  taken  by  the  courts  in  the  protection  of 
employers  against  their  employes  is  the  use  of  the  injunction  against 
trade  unionists.^°  Consequently  organized  labour  has  sought  to 
limit  the  enjoining  power  of  the  courts,  while  employers'  associa- 
tions have  vigorously  defended  it;  ^'^  and  these  conflicts  have  devel- 
oped bitter  feeling  between  capital  and  labour  in  different  states.^^ 
The  struggle  between  organized  capital  and  organized  labour  also 
has  centred  around  the  question  whether  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust 
law  should  be  applied  to  labour  unions;  and  the  Clayton  Anti-Trust 
Act,  which  explicitly  exempted  labour  organizations  from  the  cate- 
gory of  illegal  combinations  in  restraint  of  trade,  was  hailed  by 
labour  as  giving  labour  a  new  vantage  point  in  its  struggle  against 
capital.^^ 

Labour's  distrust  of  the  government  and  the  averseness  of  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor  in  the  past  to  governmental  regu- 
lation of  industry  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  government  has  been 
largely  in  the  control  of  propertied  classes  and  the  law  therefore 
favours  those  classes.  However,  the  various  groups  into  which 
labour  is  differentiated  by  distinct  interests  are  beginning  to  realize 
that  they  have  a  common  purpose, —  the  securing  of  control  of  gov- 

53  Adair  v.  U.  S.,  208  U.  S.,  i6i   (1908). 

5*  For  the  several  stages  of  this  case  see  35  Wash.  L.  Rep.  747  (1908)  ;  36  Wash.  L. 
Rep.  828  (1908)  ;  37  Wash.  L.  Rep.  706  (1909)  ;  221  U.  S.  418  (1911)  ;  233  U.  S.  604 
(1914). 

^5  Commons  and  Associates,  "History  of  Labour  in  the  United  States,"  11:529-531. 

5^  Reports  of  the  United  States  Industrial  Commission,  1901-1902,  IV:  28,  145-147; 
V:  5,  136;  VII:  118,  6ii;  XII:  38-40,  96,  143,  250,  351,  352;  XVII:  Ch.  IX;  XIX:  885- 
890 ;  Commons  and  Associates,  op.  cit.,  II :  503-509. 

^■^  See,  for  instance,  the  resolutions  passed  by  the  National  Association  of  Manufac- 
turers of  the  United  States  at  their  Eighteenth  Annual  Convention,  Detroit,  May,  1913. 

^8  For  instance,  see  an  account  of  such  a  conflict  over  an  injunction  bill  in  Illinois 
in  an  article  entitled,  "  Plutes  see  Tools  Beat  Labor's  Bill,"  The  New  Majority.  April 
19.  1919,  I- 

5»  Gompers,  "  The  Charter  of  Industrial  Freedom,"  American  Federationift,  XXI .' 
962-972. 


40       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ernments  in  order  to  remove  the  common  obstacles  to  the  advance- 
ment of  their  distinct  interests.  This  growing  sense  of  a  common 
purpose  was  accentuated  by  the  decision  of  the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court  in  Hitchman  Coal  and  Coke  Company  v.  Mitchell 
and  others,  which  enjoined  labour  leaders  from  organizing  the 
employes  of  an  employer  against  his  will.®*'  This  decision  gave  an 
impetus  to  the  trend  toward  a  political  labour  movement,  much  as 
did  the  Taff-Vale  decision  in  England  —  which  held  a  union  liable 
for  damages  to  property  during  a  strike  by  any  person  who  can  be 
deemed  to  be  acting  as  the  agent  of  the  union.®^  This  decision 
"  led  to  the  formation  of  the  British  Labour  Party,  the  election  of 
labour  representatives  to  Parliament  and  the  passage  of  the  trades 
disputes  act,  which  protected  the  unions  from  attack  in  the 
courts."  ®2 

An  inquiry  into  the  reasons  for  the  adverse  attitude  of  the  courts 
to  labour  in  its  struggle  with  capital  takes  one  into  problems  of 
judicial  attitudes,  of  the  nature  of  law  and  of  sovereignty,  and  of 
the  relation  of  law  and  sovereignty  to  the  class  struggle.  What  is 
said  on  these  points  in  the  remainder  of  the  present  chapter  is  in- 
troductory to  what  follows  in  the  succeeding  chapters. 

The  sources  of  law,  as  the  judge  receives  and  interprets  it,  are 
statutes,  positive  rules  of  law,  analogous  decisions,  and  principles 
of  public  pohcy.^^  Statutes  are  enacted  by  the  legislature,  which  is 
more  or  less  responsive  to  the  various  phases  of  public  opinion,  in- 
cluding the  class  struggle.  Positive  rules  of  law  and  analogous 
decisions  are  less  immediately  affected  by  the  class  struggle  than 
are  statutes.  It  is  through  its  effect  on  principles  of  public  policy 
that  the  class  struggle  immediately  affects  judge-made  law.  For, 
In  making  his  decisions,  the  judge  follows  closely  the  letter  of  the 
law  where  this  is  possible ;  only  where  it  is  impossible  does  he  finally 
consider  principles  of  public  policy,  and  feel  the  influence  of  public 
opinion  and  the  class  struggle.  Of  the  method  of  judicial  thinking 
it  is  said:  "  When  a  judge  has  before  him  the  task  of  making  a 
decision  upon  particular  facts,  the  first  question  to  be  determined 
is  whether  there  is  some  statute,  positive  rule  of  law,  or  previous 

80  For  a  discussion  of  this  decision  see  the  chapter  entitled,  The  Conflict  of  Judicial 
Attitudes. 

"1  Webb,  "  Industrial  Democracy,"  xxiv-xxvii. 

«2  Fitch,  "Labor  and  Politics,"  Survey,  June  8,  1918,  289. 

83  Lincoln,  "  The  Relation  of  Judicial  Decisions  to  the  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI :  12a. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  41 

authoritative  decision  which  is  exactly  applicable.  If  so,  he  goes 
no  further,  except  in  the  rare  cases  where  a  decision  Is  overruled 
because  it  is  itself  founded  on  clear  error  or  is  opposed  to  certain 
principles  of  public  policy.  If,  however,  no  statute  or  positive  rule 
of  law  Is  exactly  applicable  and  previous  decisions  can  be  distin- 
guished, there  remain  two  sources  which  may  influence  the  judge 
in  his  decision.  These  are  analogous  decisions  and  public  policy. 
Where  the  analogy  with  a  previous  decision  is  close,  a  judge  will  be 
guided  more  by  the  analogy  and  less  by  an  independent  consideration 
of  principles  of  public  policy.  Where,  however,  there  is  no  close 
analogy,  and  especially  where  two  more  or  less  remote  analogies 
lead  to  opposite  results,  a  judge  Is  driven  to  a  consideration  of  those 
principles,  since  he  must  on  some  ground  render  a  decision. 

"  It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  there  should  be  differences 
in  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  various  jurisdictions  not  due  to 
legislative  enactment.  Wide  differences  are  to  be  found  In  the 
sources  of  law  aside  from  those  created  by  statute."  ^"^ 

When  a  case  arises  that  requires  consideration  of  principles  of 
public  policy,  whether  a  judge  will  permit  himself  such  considera- 
tion or  will  endeavour  by  superficial  analogy  to  reason  deductively 
from  positive  rules  of  law  or  previous  decisions  will  depend  on 
his  attitude.^^  Conservative  judges  regard  the  common  law  as  a 
complete  body  of  law,  and,  therefore,  emphasize  deductive  reason- 
ing and  profess  a  distrust  of  considerations  of  public  policy.  This 
attitude  implies  a  conception  of  sovereignty  as  mere  obedience- 
compelling  power  and  of  the  judicial  function  as  one  of  "  laying 
down  the  law."  Hence  the  emphasis  on  the  common  law  as  a 
perfect  law  and  the  tendency  to  belittle  statute  law  and  the  effect 
of  public  opinion  on  law.  This  view  of  the  common  law  is  thus 
stated :  "  The  commonly  accepted  view  of  .  .  .  the  common  law, 
as  an  abstract  Ideal,  is  that  it  is  a  complete  body,  existing  from  time 
Immemorial,  and  therefore  the  same  In  every  jurisdiction  except  in 
so  far  as  It  is  altered  by  statute.  This  law  Is  known  or  discovered 
by  the  judges.  They  interpret  the  law,  and  the  reports  of  their 
decisions  are  authoritative  evidence  of  It."  ®®  The  adverse  atti- 
tude of  the  courts  to  labour  described  In  preceding  paragraphs  is 

**  Ibid.,  124-125. 

8^  See  the  chapters  entitled,   The  Conflict  of  Judicial  Attitudes,  and  Judicial  Atti- 
tudes and  the  Nature  of  La^v. 
8'  Lincoln,  op.  cit.,  120. 


42       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

due  to  the  prevalence  among  judges  of  the  conservative  judicial 
attitude.  Conservative  judges  refuse  to  recognize  that,  whereas 
a  dominant  class  has  had  unquestioned  political  control  in  the  past, 
and  law  has  expressed  the  will  of  that  class,  and  sovereignty  has 
been  the  power  of  that  class  to  compel  obedience,  resisting  classes 
have  arisen,  and  a  class  struggle  has  developed,  so  that  a  dominant 
class  can  no  longer  absolutely  enforce  its  will;  wherefore  law  has 
become  an  obedience-invoking  compromise,  so  that  judges  must  give 
legislatures  authority  to  work  out  compromises,  and  must  accord 
first  importance  to  statutes,  and  must  themselves  adopt  the  induc- 
tive attitude  in  interpretations  of  law. 

The  inductive  attitude,  that  of  the  progressive  judge,  is  that 
sovereignty  is  not  mere  obedience-compelling  power,  that  there  is 
a  class  struggle  and  the  law  must  invoke  obedience,  that  the  law 
is  incomplete  and  practical,  "  everywhere  in  process  of  growth, 
and  continually  affected  and  altered  both  by  legislative  enactments 
and  by  the  making  of  judicial  decisions."  ^'^  This  progressive  atti- 
tude to  law  is  seen,  for  instance,  in  Judge  Hand's  attitude  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  in  connection  with 
statutes  limiting  the  length  of  the  working  day.  The  interpreta- 
tion, he  holds,  is  not  a  matter  of  deduction  from  a  universally  recog- 
nized legal  principle,  nor  even  from  a  universally  held  economic 
principle.  "  In  short,  the  whole  matter  is  yet  to  such  an  extent 
experimental  that  no  one  can  with  justice  apply  to  the  concrete 
problems  the  yardstick  of  abstract  economic  theory."  ®^  There- 
fore, the  attitude  of  the  judge  should  not  be  deductive  but  inductive 
and,  in  accordance  with  this  attitude,  he  should  give  legislatures  a 
free  hand  in  experimentation  with  labour  laws.  "  He  would  be  as 
rash  a  theorist  who  should  assert  with  certainty  their  beneficence,  as 
he  who  would  sweep  them  all  aside  by  virtue  of  some  pragmatical 
theory  of  '  natural  rights.'  The  only  way  in  which  the  right,  or 
the  wrong,  of  the  matter  may  be  shown,  is  by  experiment;  and  the 
legislature  with  its  paraphernalia  of  committee  and  commission,  is 
the  only  public  representative  really  fitted  to  experiment.  That  the 
legislature  may  be  moved  by  faction,  and  without  justice,  is  very 
true,  but  so  may  even  the  court.  There  is  an  inevitable  bias  upon 
such  vital  questions  in  all  men.   .  .  . 

"  It  is,  therefore,  in  no  sense  as  patrons  or  opponents  of  the  wis- 

^''  Ibid.,  121. 

«8Hand,  "Due  Process  of  Law  and  the  Eight-Uour  Day,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI:  507. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  43 

dom  of  such  efforts,  that  the  courts  may  approach  such  laws.  .  .  . 
Before  the  court  the  question  is  political,  not  economic;  it  is  the 
question  of  where  the  power  to  pass  upon  such  subjects  should 
rest,  ...  If  the  subject  be  one  already  fairly  within  the  field  of 
rational  discussion  and  interest,  it  would  seem  to  be  for  the  legis- 
lature." ^^  According  to  this  view  the  class  struggle  and  the  meas- 
ures suggested  for  adjustment  of  class  conflicts  become  the  subject 
of  "  rational  discussion  and  interest "  and  thereby  become  proper 
legislative  projects,  and  the  courts  should  interfere  as  little  as  pos- 
sible. That  is,  the  people  are  conceived  as  possessing  the  power 
intelligently  to  direct,  through  their  representatives,  the  class  con- 
flict, and  to  adjust  conflicting  interests  for  the  public  welfare,  and 
this  intelligent  directing  power  is  the  sovereignty  of  the  state. 
Wise  laws  for  the  direction  of  industry  and  for  the  health  and 
prosperity  of  all  classes  are  the  outcome  of  its  exercise. 

Nevertheless,  the  preference  for  legal  tradition,  that  is,  for  the 
common  law,  prevails  among  the  bench  and  the  bar,  with  a  con- 
tempt for  statute  law.  Dean  Pound  points  out  that  the  courts  are 
inclined  "to  ignore  important  legislation;  not  merely  deciding  it 
to  be  declaratory,  but  sometimes  assuming  silently  that  it  is  de- 
claratory without  adducing  any  reasons,  citing  prior  judicial  deci- 
sions and  making  no  mention  of  the  statute.  In  the  same  way, 
lawyers  in  the  legislature  often  conceive  it  more  expedient  to  make 
of  a  statute  the  barest  outline,  leaving  details  of  the  most  vital 
importance  to  be  filled  in  by  judicial  law-making.  ...  It  may  be 
well,  however,  for  judges  and  lawyers  to  remember  that  there  is 
coming  to  be  a  science  of  legislation  and  that  modem  statutes  are 
not  to  be  disposed  of  lightly  as  off-hand  products  of  a  crude  desire 
to  do  something,  but  represent  long  and  patient  study  by  experts, 
careful  consideration  by  conferences  or  congresses  or  associations, 
press  discussions  in  which  public  opinion  is  focussed  upon  all  impor- 
tant details,  and  hearings  before  legislative  committees.  It  may 
be  well  to  remember  also  that  while  bench  and  bar  are  never  weary 
of  pointing  out  the  deficiencies  of  legislation,  to  others  the  de- 
ficiencies of  judge-made  law  are  no  less  apparent.  To  economists 
and  sociologists,  judicial  attempts  to  force  Benthamite  conceptions 
of  freedom  of  contract  and  common  law  conceptions  of  individual- 
ism upon  the  public  of  today  are  no  less  amusing  —  or  even  irritat- 
ing —  than  legislative  attempts  to  do  away  with  or  get  away  from 

e»  Ibid.,  507-508. 


44       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

these  conceptions  are  to  bench  and  bar.  The  nullifying  of  these 
legislative  attempts  is  not  regarded  by  lay  scholars  with  the  com- 
placent satisfaction  with  which  lawyers  are  wont  to  speak  of  it. 
They  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  '  the  judicial  mind  has  not  kept 
pace  with  the  strides  of  industrial  development.'  They  express  the 
opinion  that '  belated  and  anti-social '  decisions  have  been  a  fruitful 
cause  of  strikes,  industrial  discord,  and  consequent  lawlessness. 
They  charge  that  '  the  attitude  of  the  courts  has  been  responsible 
for  much  of  our  political  immorality.'  "  "^^  It  is  evident  that  the 
point  at  issue  is  not  merely  a  question  of  the  nature  of  law  but  of 
sovereignty.  Is  the  sovereignty  really  vested  in  the  people  and 
exercised  through  their  representatives,  or  is  it  vested  in  a  bench  of 
judges  and  exercised,  regardless  of  the  class  struggle  and  other 
processes  determining  public  opinion,  as  an  obedience-compelling 
power  of  a  legal  tradition  of  past  ages?^^ 

Law  as  command,  and  sovereignty  as  obedience-compelling  power 
continue  alongside  the  new  aspect  of  sovereignty  as  an  intelligently 
directive  power.  The  former  is  seen  in  the  older  function  of  law 
as  a  means  of  settlement  of  disputes  between  property  owners. 
But  that  functioning  of  law  also  has  a  social-psychological  basis 
requiring  investigation.  It  is  seen  in  a  new  country  the  inhabitants 
of  which  do  not  recognize  a  dominant  class,  and  in  which  a  class 
struggle  has  not  developed,  where  disputes  that  require  legal  settle- 
ment are  largely  between  property  owners  among  whom  a  high 
degree  of  economic  equality  prevails,  and  where  the  law  is  within 
the  reach  of  all.  For  instance,  in  the  early  American  rural  com- 
munity there  was  constant  litigation  between  farmers.''^^  The  de- 
cisions in  these  litigations,  if  made  in  a  court  presided  over  by  a 
learned  judge,  might  be  made  strictly  according  to  precedent; 
otherwise  the  jury  was  charged  to  exercise  common  sense.  "  Thus 
a  tree  growing  on  a  boundary  line  raised  a  dispute  as  to  its  proper 
owner,"  '^^  which  was  decided  according  to  "  common  sense,"  or  ac- 
cording to  tradition,  if  the  judge  was  learned  in  legal  tradition;  and 
the  man  who  won  a  lawsuit  exclaimed,  as  he  left  the  court-room, 
"  I  tell  you  the  law  is  a  great  thing."     The  court  decision  settled  it; 

^° Pound,  "Common  Law  and  Legislation,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI:  383-384   (quoted 
without  the  footnotes). 
"  Ibid.,  406. 

72  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  57. 
''^Ibid.,  27.  '' 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  APPROACH  45 

sovereignty  was  obedience-compelling  power,  and  the  litigant  who 
won  the  help  of  the  invincible  arm  of  the  state  felt  the  law  to  be 
"  a  great  thing."  Dean  Pound  uses  this  same  illustration  of  the 
law  deciding  between  disputants  as  to  the  ownership  of  a  tree  to 
illustrate  a  functioning  of  law  not  connected  with  class  struggle, 
and  adds  that,  even  when  the  class  struggle  began  to  develop,  so 
that  "  a  new  economic  order  was  behind  the  liberalizing  of  law 
throughout  Europe  .  .  .  for  the  most  part  this  liberalizing  move- 
ment did  no  more  than  make  thoughtful  lawyers  restive  under  the 
arbitrary  rules  of  the  strict  law.  Judges  did  not  dream  of  finding 
law  otherwise  than  through  authority  or  through  legal  reason."  '^^ 
In  the  same  way  the  law  of  the  period  of  the  individualistic  prop- 
erty owner  in  the  United  States  has  survived  into  this  present  pe- 
riod of  increasing  struggle  against  a  dominant  class,  and,  as  we 
shall  see  in  a  succeeding  chapter,''^^  has  been  used  on  behalf  of  that 
class  in  its  struggle  to  maintain  its  dominating  position  over  non- 
propertied  classes,  with  the  assumption  that  the  non-propertied 
classes  are  in  a  position  of  equality  before  the  law  with  the  proper- 
tied, so  that  the  law  which  decided  disputes  between  property 
owners  in  the  early  days  is  still  adequate  justly  to  decide  disputes 
between  propertied  and  non-propertied  classes. 

Where  there  is  a  high  degree  of  equahty  of  opportunity  for 
acquiring  property,  either  among  a  population  that  is  exploiting  the 
resources  of  a  new  country,  or  among  a  class  of  property  owners 
that  has  long  exploited  the  labour  of  conventional,  submissive  work- 
ing masses,  law  is  restricted  as  far  as  possible  to  the  elemental  law 
of  community  defence  —  law  against  assault,  theft,  etc., —  and  to 
law  protecting  property  rights.  As  regards  property,  law  becomes 
the  watch-dog  of  a  man's  property.  He  wants  it  to  guard  his 
property  but  to  interfere  as  little  as  possible  with  his  acquisition 
of  more  property.  Wherefore,  the  attitude  to  law  of  the  early 
Americans  who  were  exploiting  the  natural  resources  of  the  coun- 
try was  not  so  very  different  from  that  of  English  business  men  who 
were  at  the  same  time  exploiting  the  labour  of  the  working  masses 
of  England.  In  both  cases  the  extreme  reverence  for  law  was 
equalled  only  by  the  lack  of  self-restraint  and  conscience  in  the  ex- 
ploitation practised  beyond  the  reach  of  the  law.'^^     The  reign  of 

^*  Pound,  "Juristic  Science  and  Law,"  Harvard  Laiu  Review,  XXXI:  1052. 
'^5  See  the  chapter  entitled,  T/ie  Conflict  of  Judicial  Attitudes. 
'^^  Croly,  "Progressive  Democracy,"  72,  157-158. 


46       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

law  was  so  narrowly  limited  to  the  protection  of  property  that  the 
national  resources,  material  and  human,  were  left  unprotected.  It 
was  assumed  that  it  was  to  the  property-owner's  interest  to  con- 
serve material  resources  and  protect  human  life.  But  this  was  one 
of  the  justifications  that  emanated  from  the  dominant  class  to 
protect  its  unrestrained  acquisition  from  the  criticism  of  men  who, 
because  not  obsessed  by  instinctive  impulses  to  malce  money,  could 
discern  the  actual  situation.  Thus  developed  the  conflict  between 
those  who  reverenced  law  as  that  which  protected  property  and 
maintained  the  existing  social  order,  and  those  who  would  use 
law  as  a  means  of  collective  self-development.'^'''  The  latter  were 
long  in  gaining  an  effective  hearing.  But  with  the  increasing  value 
to  nations  of  their  natural  resources,  and  with  the  increasing  in- 
telligence of  the  human  resources  and  their  rising  purpose  to  look 
after  their  own  self-development,  the  second  function  of  law  is 
gathering  force.  Law  is  ceasing  to  be  conceived  as  merely  a  means 
of  maintaining  social  order,  the  social  order,  and  is  coming  to  be 
conceived  as  the  means  of  attaining  social  justice.  For  "  while 
social  justice  depends  upon  order,  order  also  depends  upon  the 
reign  of  social  justice."  '^^ 

^"^  Ibid.,  426. 
78  Ibid.,  226. 


CHAPTER  III 

SOVEREIGNTY    AND    THE    CLASS    STRUGGLE 

POLITICAL  rivalry  is  essentially  a  rivalry  of  economic  classes 
and  interests  which  support  political  parties  for  the  sake  of 
protecting  or  advancing  their  interests,  and  of  party  or- 
ganizations the  essential  aim  of  which  is  to  defeat  the  other  party 
and  *'  keep  in  power  "  or  "  get  back  to  power."  Party  organiza- 
tions appeal  for  popular  support  by  declarations  of  policies  that 
appear  to  seek  the  public  welfare.^  The  political  control  exercised 
by  reactionary  capitalistic  interests  over  a  party  organization  may 
be  defied  by  the  "  progressive  "  section  of  a  party  leadership, 
which  would  use  the  party  for  public  welfare  interests.  There 
sometimes  results  a  division  in  the  party  and  a  struggle  between 
the  progressive  and  reactionary  factions  for  control.  If  the  re- 
actionary faction  appears  to  be  hopelessly  in  control,  a  new  party 
may  form  to  resist  the  influence  of  reactionary  propertied  interests 
over  the  government.  If  ever  a  complete  history  of  American 
politics  is  written,  it  will  show  how  a  variety  of  propertied  inter- 
ests—  the  "slave  power,"  railroads^  and  other  public  utilities,^ 
manufacturing  interests,^  mining  interests,^ —  either  directly  or,  if 
forbidden  by  law,  indirectly  gave  political  parties  their  financial 
support  in  order  "  to  establish  a  claim  on  the  gratitude  of  the  future 
administration  ";  ^  in  what  way  these  interests  were  rewarded;  and 
the  effect  of  this  mortgaging  of  the  party  organization  on  the  for- 

1  The  party  platform  is  called  "  honey  to  catch  flies."  (Reed,  "  The  Form  and  Func- 
tions of  American  Government,"  231,  252.)  See  also  Foulke,  "Fighting  the  Spoils- 
men," 295-305. 

2  Bryce,  "The  American  Commonwealth,"  11:515-516;  Stickney,  "The  Railroad 
Problem,"  14. 

3  Ostrogorski,  "Democracy  and  the  Organization  of  Political  Parties,"  II:  171;  Lind- 
sey  and  O'Higgins,  "  The  Beast,"  Chs.  II-IV,  VII-XII. 

*  Hearings  before  a  Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  on  Maintenance 
of  a  Lobby  to  Influence  Legislation.  63rd  Congress,  ist  Session,  1913;  Beard,  "Read- 
ings in  American  Government  and  Politics,"  572-577 ;  Tarbell,  "  History  of  the 
Standard  Oil  Company,"  1: 169;  II:  146-148 ;  Fitch,  "The  Steel  Workers,"  229-231. 

^W^est,  "Report  on  the  Colorado  Strike";  Final  Report  <rf  the  United  States  Cora- 
mission  on  Industrial  Relations,  116-150,  307-401. 

8  Ostrogorski,  op,  cit,  II:  353. 

47 


J 


48       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

tunes  of  the  party.  Much  of  the  political  influence  exerted  by 
propertied  interests  is  secret  and  never  recorded  and,  therefore, 
will  not  be  told  by  the  historians  except  in  a  general  way  in  the 
form  of  inferences  from  recorded  dataJ  Still  more  entirely  secret 
are  the  financial  and  other  inducements  received  and  the  services 
rendered  propertied  interests  by  individual  office-holders.  Only 
very  rarely  is  a  pubHc  investigation  forced  which  throws  light  on 
these  secret  political  processes;  and  then  the  investigation  is  rarely 
conducted  by  men  who  purpose  to  go  to  the  bottom  of  the  situ- 
ation,® but  usually  by  men  whose  questions  are  directed  by  political 
motives  and  not  by  an  honest  intent  to  ascertain  the  facts. 

Legislators  in  a  democracy  are  elected  by  the  majority  or  plural- 
ity of  voters,  but,  once  in  office,  may  fall  under  the  influence  of  a 
small  minority.  This  is  due  to  the  surpassing  influence  of  reaction- 
ary capitalistic  interests  over  legislation  and  public  opinion.  As 
an  instance  of  the  influence  that  may  be  brought  to  bear  by  capi- 
talistic interests.  Senator  Kenyon,  speaking  with  reference  to  his 
bill  to  regulate  the  meat-packing  industry  (a  group  of  monopolistic 
corporations,  which,  according  to  a  report  of  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission,  had  extended  their  monopolistic  control  over  a  great 
variety  of  food  products,  and  "  have  preyed  upon  the  people  un- 
conscionably "  ^)  declared  that  the  meat-packers  had  started  a 
propaganda  against  his  bill  "  the  like  of  which  has  never  been  seen 
in  this  country."  '^^  The  various  corporations  that  would  be  af- 
fected by  the  bill  had  sent  letters  to  their  stockholders,  in  the  case 
of  one  corporation  to  25,000  stockholders,  urging  them  to  write 
their  congressmen  against  the  bill.^^  The  influence  of  allied  indus- 
tries and  of  banking  interests  was  enlisted  against  the  bill.^^     The 

7  California  Commission  of  Immigration  and  Housing,  "  A  Report  on  Large  Land- 
holdings  in  Southern  California,"  1919,  30-31. 

8  As  an  illustration  of  the  work  of  one  of  these  rare  investigators  see  Testimony 
taken  before  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly  of  the  State  of  New 
York  to  investigate  the  affairs  of  Life  Insurance  Companies,  1905. 

®  "  Their  manipulations  of  the  market  embrace  every  device  that  is  useful  to  them 
without  regard  to  law.  Their  reward,  expressed  in  terms  of  profit,  reveals  that  four 
of  these  concerns  have  pocketed  in  1915,  1916,  1917,  $140,000,000.  However  delicate  a 
definition  is  framed  for  '  profiteering '  these  packers  have  preyed  upon  the  people  un- 
conscionably." (Federal  Trade  Commission,  Report  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States  Senate  on  Profiteering,  June  28,  1918,  3-4;  Federal  Trade  Commission,  Report 
on  the  Meat-Packing  Industry  1918,  Chs.  I-IV;  Federal  Trade  Commission,  Report  on 
the  Meat-Packing  Industry,  1919,  Pt.  I:  74,  Pt.  II:  197,  Pt.  Ill:  138;  Federal  Trade  Cora- 
mission,  Report  on  Leather  and  Shoe  Industries,  1919,  156-164.) 

1°  Congressional  Record,  Vol.  58,  No.  52,  July  23,  1919,  p.  3205. 

11  Ibid.,  3206. 

^^Ibid.,  3«o6. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  49 

meat-packers  also  aimed  to  control  public  opinion  by  "  advertise- 
ments running  into  enormous  sums  "  carried  in  many  newspapers 
throughout  the  country.^^  As  another  instance  of  the  political  ac- 
tivity of  capitalistic  interests,  here  is  an  extract  from  a  speech  made 
by  Senator  LaFollette,  showing  the  pressure  that  would  be  brought 
to  bear  on  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  by  the  railroads 
if  the  roads  were  restored  to  their  private  owners:  "  Let  me  re- 
mind Senators  that  only  three  or  four  years  ago  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  was  besieged  for  an  increase  in  rates. 
Upon  the  hearing  held  they  decided  that  the  increase  was  not  war- 
ranted; that  the  rates  were  already  reasonable.  Then  what  hap- 
pened? There  was  turned  upon  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, a  quasi-judicial  body,  such  a  campaign  of  assault  and  con- 
tumely as  was  never  before  witnessed  in  the  United  States. 

"  Think,  Sir,  of  the  chairman  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission being  called  out  of  his  bed  at  midnight  and  presented  with 
a  demand  to  grant  the  increases  that  the  railroads  wanted!  That 
commission  was  literally  swamped  with  demands  that  they  grant 
the  increase  or  resign.  I  introduced  a  resolution  on  the  floor  ask- 
ing that  communications  improperly  sent  to  the  commission  de- 
manding that  they  decide  in  favour  of  the  railroad  companies  with- 
out any  adjudication  be  transmitted  to  the  Senate.  .  .  .  On  the 
day  they  came  my  desk,  and  the  adjoining  desks  here  were  piled 
full  to  overflowing.  .  .  .  Stock  exchanges,  commercial  organiza- 
tions, bankers'  organizations,  real  estate  associations,  had  sent  these 
demands.  ...  I  put  these  infamous  documents  .  .  .  into  the  Con- 
gressional Record.  ...  It  took  175  pages  to  print  the  demands. 
.  .  .  One  of  them  was  a  full-page  advertisement  by  the  Illinois 
Manufacturers'  Association.  .  .  .  What  did  that  advertisement 
say?  It  said  substantially  this:  '  Write  your  members,  wire  your 
members  and  your  Senators,  and  demand  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  that  they  decide  the  pending  application  in  fa- 
vour of  the  railroads.'  "  "  In  these  efforts  to  control  the  govern- 
ment in  their  own  interest  and  contrary  to  the  public  welfare,  capi- 
talistic interests  may  not  be  immediately  successful  or  always  suc- 
cessful, but  their  resources  make  it  possible  for  them  to  exert  a 
surprising  influence  over  all  classes  of  officials  and  to  persist  In 

^^Ibid.,  3206. 

1*  Speech  of  Senator  La  Follette  in  IT.  S.  Senate,  Dec  20,  1919,  in  Congressional  Rec-  -,^ 
ord,  Sixty-sixth  Congress,  2nd  Sess.,  Jan.  26,  1920,  2204. 


50       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

their  efforts  until  the  opposition  weakens  ^^  and  they  have  their 
will.i« 

This  study  of  a  propaganda  to  influence  legislation  is  a  social- 
psychological  study.  Not  only  capitalistic  interests  but  all  organi- 
zations that  seek  to  influence  legislation  write  letters  to  men  of 
influence  urging  them  to  bring  their  influence  to  bear  on  congress- 
men for  or  against  legislation,  and  also  seek  to  influence  public 
opinion.  But  capitalistic  interests  have  a  surpassing  influence  over 
legislators  because  of  their  wealth  power  and  their  masterful  lead- 
ership, and  also  over  public  opinion  through  their  influence  over 
the  press.  Thus  it  is  that  legislators  and  other  oflSicials  may 
be  elected  by  a  majority  but  fall  under  the  influence  of  a  small 
minority.^^ 

The  influence  of  propertied  classes  over  legislation  in  the  United 
States  is  not  a  phenomenon  of  recent  years.  It  was  encouraged 
by  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  early 
in  our  history  and  continued  under  the  protection  of  the  decision 
in  the  Dartmouth  College  case.  "  It  is  under  the  protection  of 
the  decision  in  the  Dartmouth  College  case,"  wrote  Judge  Cooley, 
"  that  the  most  enormous  and  threatening  powers  in  our  country 
have  been  created;  some  of  the  great  and  wealthy  corporations 
actually  having  greater  influence  in  the  country  at  large,  and  upon 
the  legislation  of  the  country  than  the  states  to  which  they  owe 
their  corporate  existence."  ^^  Professor  Smith  comments  on  the 
attitude  of  the  Supreme  Court  that  developed  under  the  Dartmouth 
College  decision  as  follows:  "Any  government  framed  and  set 
up  to  guard  and  promote  the  interests  of  the  people  generally  ought 
to  have  full  power  to  modify  or  revoke  all  rights  or  privileges 
granted  in  disregard  of  the  public  welfare.  But  the  Supreme 
Court,  while  permitting  the  creation  or  extension  of  property 
rights,  has  prevented  the  subsequent  abridgment  of  such  rights, 
even  when  the  interests  of  the  general  public  demanded  it.  The 
effect  of  this  has  been  to  make  the  corporations  take  an  active  part 

i** Pound,  "Juristic  Problems  of  National  Progress,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social.,  May,  1917, 

731- 

1*  As  the  railroads  finally  had  their  will  through  the  enactment  of  the  law  passed 
in  February,  1920,  requiring  the  Interstate  Commerce  Conmiission  to  allow  them  to 
increase  their  rates. 

1^  For  instance,  see  the  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly  of 
the  State  of  New  York  appointed  to  investigate  the  affairs  of  Life  Insurance  Com- 
panies, 1906,  398-400. 

18  Cooley,  "  Constitutional  Limitations,"  6th  ed.,  335-336,  n. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  51 

in  corrupting  state  politics.  Special  legislation  was  not  prohibited. 
In  fact,  it  was  a  common  way  of  creating  property  rights.  If  a 
bank,  an  insurance  company,  or  a  railway  corporation  was  organ- 
ized, it  was  necessary  to  obtain  a  charter  from  the  legislature  which 
defined  its  powers  and  privileges.  .  .  .  The  legislature  might  re- 
fuse to  grant  a  charter,  but  having  granted  it,  it  became  a  vested 
right  which  could  not  be  revoked.  The  charter  thus  granted  by 
the  legislature  was  a  special  privilege.  In  many  instances  it  was 
secured  as  a  reward  for  political  services  by  favourites  of  the  party 
machine,  or  through  the  corrupt  expenditure  of  money  or  the 
equally  corrupt  distribution  of  stock  in  the  proposed  corporation 
among  those  who  controlled  legislation.  Not  only  did  this  system 
invite  corruption  in  the  granting  of  such  charters,  but  it  also  created 
a  motive  for  the  further  use  of  corrupt  means  to  keep  possible  com- 
petitors from  securing  like  privileges.  It  was  worth  the  while  to 
spend  money  to  secure  a  valuable  privilege  if  when  once  obtained 
the  legislature  could  not  revoke  it.  And  it  was  also  worth  the 
while  to  spend  more  money  to  keep  dangerous  competitors  out  of 
the  field  if  by  so  doing  it  could  enjoy  some  of  the  benefits  of  monop- 
oly. By  thus  holding  that  a  privilege  granted  to  an  individual  or 
a  private  corporation  by  special  act  of  the  legislature  was  a  con- 
tract which  could  not  be  revoked  by  that  body,  the  courts  in  their 
effort  to  protect  property  rights  opened  the  door  which  allowed 
corporation  funds  to  be  brought  into  our  state  legislatures  early 
in  our  history  for  purposes  of  corruption. 

"  The  power  which  the  legislatures  thus  acquired  to  grant  char- 
ters which  could  not  be  amended  or  repealed  made  it  necessary  for 
the  people  to  devise  some  new  method  of  protecting  themselves 
against  this  abuse  of  legislative  authority.  The  outcome  of  this 
movement  to  re-establish  some  effective  popular  check  on  the  legis- 
lature has  taken  the  form  in  a  majority  of  the  states  of  a  constitu- 
tional amendment  by  which  the  right  is  reserved  to  amend  or  repeal 
all  laws  conferring  corporate  powers.  Such  constitutional  changes 
provide  no  remedy,  however,  for  the  evils  resulting  from  legisla- 
tive grants  made  previous  to  their  adoption.  The  granting  of  spe- 
cial charters  is  now  also  prohibited  in  many  states,  the  constitution 
requiring  that  all  corporations  shall  be  formed  under  general  laws. 
.  .  .  But  even  our  general  corporation  laws  have  been  enacted  too 
largely  in  the  interest  of  those  who  control  our  business  undertak- 


52        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ings  and  without  due  regard  to  the  rights  of  the  general  public."  ^® 
A  great  variety  of  aggressive  special  interests  are  constantly 
active  in  politics.  This  is  true  not  only  in  the  United  States  but  in 
all  capitalistic  nations.  These  interests  constitute  the  vanguard  of 
the  dominant  political  class.  This  class  exercises  a  dominant  influ- 
ence in  the  state,  legally  and  also  extra-legally,  and  sometimes^ 
illegally.  Illegal  action  is  occasionally  exposed  and  the  guilty  busi- 
ness prosecuted  but  these  occasional  set-backs  have  comparatively 
little  effect  on  the  influence  of  the  dominant  class.  Its  influence 
is  seen  in  the  enactment  of  statutes  that  advance  its  interests,^® 
and  still  more  in  the  prevention  of  enactment  of  statutes  that  are 
required  to  protect  the  public  interest  where  this  conflicts  with  the 
interest  of  the  dominant  class.  The  fact  that  special  interests 
have  not  prevented  the  passage  of  a  law  that  is  unfavourable  to 
their  purposes  does  not  disprove  the  existence  of  a  dominant  class. 
Said  Justice  Harlan  of  the  attitude  of  combinations  to  the  Anti- 
Trust  law  of  1890,  as  interpreted  by  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  1896 :  ^^  "  But  those  who  were  in  combinations  that  were 
illegal  did  not  despair.  They  at  once  set  up  the  baseless  claim 
that  the  decision  of  1896  disturbed  the  'business  Interests  of  the 
country,'  and  let  it  be  known  that  they  would  never  be  content  until 
the  rule  was  established  that  would  permit  interstate  commerce  to 
be  subjected  to  reasonable  restraints."  ^^  And  the  ultimate  result 
of  the  opposition  of  business  Interests  to  the  law  has  been  Its  prac- 
tical abrogation.  The  opposition  was  by  a  dominant  class  pri- 
marily In  Its  own  Interest,  that  is,  for  the  sake  of  private  profits;  ^^ 
and  the  result  of  the  growth  of  monopolistic  corporations  has  been 
to  enrich  the  few,  to  diminish  the  numbers  of  the  middle  class,^* 
and  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  non-propertied. 

i    1^  Smith,  "  The  Spirit  of  American  Government,"  325-329. 

4     20  Pound,  "Juristic  Problems  of  National  Progress,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social.,  May,  1917, 
730. 

21  United  States  v.  Missouri  Freight  Association,  166  U.  S.,  290-344. 

22  Standard  Oil  Company  of  New  Jersey  v.  United  States,  31  Sup.  Ct.  Reptr.,  528. 

23  Federal  Trade  Commission,  Report  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  on  Profit- 
eering, June  28,  1918,  3-4;  Federal  Trade  Commision,  Report  on  the  Meat-Packing 
Industry,  1918,  Chs.  I,  II,  IV;  King,  "The  Wealth  and  Income  of  the  People  of  the 
United  States,"  218;  Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  the  Petroleum 
Industry,  1907,  Pt.  11:535-542;  United  States  of  America  vs.  Standard  Oil  Company  of 
New  Jersey,  Brief  of  Facts  and  Argument  for  Petitioner,  1:165-498;  Tarbell,  "The 
History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company,"  I:  Chs.  One-Eight;  II:  Chs.  Nine-Sixteen ;  Re- 
port of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  the  Steel  Industry,  1911,  Pt.  1:342-347. 

2*  King,  op.  cit.,  231. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  53 

The  hypothesis  of  a  dominant  class  was  enunciated  long  ago  by 
Harrington  ^^  in  the  dictum  that  power  goes  with  ownership.  In 
his  time  it  was  land  ownership,  today  it  is  not  usually  land  owner- 
ship and  not  strictly  ownership  but  control  of  capital.  The  finan- 
cial power  of  a  dominant  class  is  maintained  not  merely  through 
ownership  but  much  more  through  control  of  other  peoples' 
money.^^  The  "  social  order  of  the  modern  state  is  not  a  labour 
order  but  a  capitalist,  and  upon  the  broad  truth  of  Harrington's  iX^ 
hypothesis  it  must  follow  that  the  main  power  is  capitalist  also."  ^'^ 
This  capitalistic  order  is  one  in  which  the  funds  of  a  great  mass  of 
depositors  and  investors  are  controlled  and  used  by  a  comparatively 
few  men.  The  stock-holders  and  bond-holders  of  a  corporation 
have  no  voice  in  its  management.^^  They  are  scattered  through- 
out the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land  and  votes  for  directors  are 
as  formal  as  votes  for  candidates  for  minor  state  offices.  The 
mass  of  security-holders  and  depositors  never  see  the  businesses 
they  own,  or  which  have  borrowed  their  money  from  banks.  They 
never  see  the  conditions  under  which  men  are  employed  in  those 
businesses. ^^  They  have  no  interest  in  the  businesses  except  to 
receive  their  dividends  or  interest.  If  there  is  an  increase  in  divi- 
dends, they  do  not  know  how  it  Was  earned  and  it  does  not  occur 
to  them  to  inquire.  Under  these  conditions  it  is  as  easy  for  large 
stock-holders  and  for  banks  to  get  control  of  directorates,^^  as  it 
is  for  politicians  to  get  control  of  a  party  organization.  Prac- 
tically self-perpetuating  directorates  thus  become  the  inner  capi- 
talistic organization  of  society.  Furthermore,  many  directors  have 
a  great  variety  of  interests  so  that  they  cannot  give  close  attention 
to  any  one  business,  and  others  are  directors  merely  because  of 

25  Harrington,  "The  Commonwealth  of  Oceana"  (first  published  in  1656),  with 
an  Introduction  by  Morley,  15-20. 

/  26Bj.andeis,  "  Other  Peoples'  Money  and  How  the  Bankers  Use  It." 
/   27Laski,  "Authority  in  the  Modern  State,"  88,  38. 

28  Brandeis,  op.  cit.,  59-60. 

29  Burgess,  "The  Function  of  Socialization  and  Social  Evolution,"  137-174;  Dewey 
and  Tufts,  "  Ethics,"  497-503 ;  Page,  "  Trade  Morals,  Their  Origin,  Growth  and 
Province,"  128-130;  Fite,  "Moral  Valuations  and  Economic  Laws,"  Jour.  Phil.  Psy. 
Sc.  M.,  XIV:  10-16;  Veblen,  "The  Modern  Point  of  View  and  the  New  Order," 
The  Dial,  December  14,  1918,  543-547. 

30  Brandeis,  op.  cit.,  Chs.  II-V;  Moulton,  "Principles  of  Money  and  Banking,"  455; 
Mitchell,  "Business  Cycles,"  33-35;  Davenport,  "Economics  of  Enterprise,"  399-400; 
Veblen,  "The  Industrial  System  and  the  Captains  of  Industry,"  The  Dial,  May  31, 
I9i9(  557  5  Report  of  the  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Concentration  of  Control  of 
Money  and  Credit,  1913,  House  of  Rep.,  62nd  Congr.,  3rd  Sess.,  Report  No.  1593. 


54        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

large  holdings  they  have  inherited,  without  any  personal  force. 
The  result  is  a  tendency  to  shift  the  power  and  responsibility  in 
a  corporation  to  some  active  head,  usually  a  man  of  dominating 
personality,  whose  aggressiveness  is  stimulated  by  the  responsi- 
bility vested  in  him,  and  who  regards  considerations  of  the  welfare 
of  the  public,  and  humanitarian  considerations  of  workmen  as 
*'  ideahstic  "  and  impracticable.  He  knows  that  the  stock-holders 
and  directors  are  interested  solely  in  dividends  and  in  the  sound 
condition  and  development  of  the  business.  And  because  they  are 
the  ones  to  whom  he  is  responsible,  his  main  interest  is  to  run  the 
business  in  a  way  satisfactory  to  those  who  have  property  interests 
therein. 

The  management  of  a  business,  from  the  masterful  heads  down 
to  the  foremen,  tend  to  accept  the  attitude  of  the  masterful  heads. 
I  say  tend  to  because  this  process  of  social  suggestion  is  always  sub- 
ject to  deflection  owing  to  differences  in  personal  disposition.  And 
these  deflections  or  variations  are  of  importance,  as  will  be  shown 
in  a  succeeding  volume.  But  the  prevailing  aspect  of  the  system 
is  one  of  the  acceptance  by  subordinates  of  the  attitudes  of  those 
above  them  in  authority.  Now  the  mass  of  workmen  come  into 
contact  with  this  hierarchy  of  ofl^icials  and  with  the  hinterland  of 
stock-holders  and  bond-holders  only  through  the  foremen.  That 
is,  their  contact  ends  there.  If  organized,  the  oflicials  of  the  la- 
bour organization  may  on  certain  occasions  come  in  contact  with 
ofl^icials  of  the  business;  and  some  businesses  have  transferred  the 
"  hiring  and  firing  "  function  to  employment  managers.  But  the 
majority  of  workmen  are  unorganized,  and  the  main  contact  of 
workmen  with  a  management  remains  through  the  foremen.  The 
attitude  of  workmen  to  a  corporation,  and  to  the  capitalistic  or- 
ganization of  society  is  determined,  then,  more  by  the  attitude  of 
foremen  to  them  than  by  any  other  one  thing.^^  That  is  the  contact 
that  determines  what  instinctive  impulses  are  to  be  repeatedly 
stirred  in  them  in  the  course  of  their  relations  with  the  corporation 
and  what  attitude  is  to  be  developed  is  the  daily  contact  with  the 
foremen.  But,  as  a  rival  of  this  influence  of  the  masterful  head 
that  acts  through  subordinates  and  finally  through  foremen  on  the 
mass  of  workmen  and  tends  to  develop  in  them  an  attitude  of  sub- 
mission to  the  management,  there  is  the  influence  of  labour  leaders, 

81  Tead,   "  The  Importance  of  Being  a   Foreman,"   Industrial  Management,  June, 
>9X7,  354- 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  SS 

and  all  those  other  influences  of  the  labour  movement  that  awaken  in 
workmen  impulses  of  their  original  nature  that  are  suppressed  in 
the  course  of  their  contact  with  and  submission  to  foremen.^^  The 
labour  movement  thus  becomes  the  workman's  means  of  satisfaction 
of  suppressed  instinctive  impulses,  outside  the  economic  order. 

We  have,  then,  this  capitalistic  organization:  A  great  mass  of 
bank  depositors  and  another  great  mass  of  security-holders  pro- 
vide the  capital  for  employing  a  great  mass  of  workmen  whom 
they  never  saw  and  in  whom  they  have  no  interest.  The  interest 
of  depositors  and  security-holders  is  in  their  interest  and  dividends, 
hence  they  readily  acquiesce  in  the  type  of  management  which, 
without  unfavourable  publicity,  insures  the  most  satisfying  returns 
on  their  capital.  The  mass  of  workmen  are  used  for  producing 
property  income,  without  an  effective  voice  in  the  management  of 
business  and,  therefore,  without  power  to  protect  themselves  from 
evil  working  conditions  or  to  order  their  lives  for  self-development. 
Managements  are  in  a  position,  because  of  the  ignorance  and  power- 
lessness  of  bank  depositors  and  security-holders,  to  manage  busi- 
ness in  a  way  often  to  bring  large  profits,  sometimes  enormous 
profits,  to  those  on  the  inside,  at  the  expense  of  workmen  and 
consumers  and,  often,  of  investors;  to  exert  an  immense  influence 
in  politics  because  of  the  wealth  power  they  represent;  and  to  make 
themselves  the  controlling  class  in  industry  and  the  state. 

From  the  preceding  description  it  is  possible  to  gain  some  con- 
ception of  the  main  lines  of  cleavage  in  the  economic  organization. 
In  the  forefront  is  the  industrial  and  financial  leadership,  with  Its 
reactionary,  masterful  figures  and  its  progressive,  more  thoughtful 
figures,  its  clash  of  economic  interests,  which,  however,  unite  under 
the  menace  of  a  non-propertied  resistance,  or  unite,  when  occasion 
arises,  to  control  the  government  and  to  enact  legislation  that  fur- 
thers their  common  purposes.  Behind  this  vanguard  is  the  great 
mass  of  depositors  and  investors.  Here  also  is  a  clash  of  interests. 
There  are  those  who  by  disposition  and  environmental  Influence 
think  only  of  interest  and  dividends  and  support  a  reactionary 
leadership ;  others  who,  more  sympathetic  and  Intellectual,  or  more 
favourably  situated  for  learning  the  truth,  oppose  a  reactionary 
leadership.  In  addition  to  these  depositors  and  investors  that  con- 
stitute the  main  body  of  the  propertied  classes,  there  are  others 

82 Tannenbaum,  "Labor  Movement  Psychology,"  New  Republic,  July  7,  1920,  171- 
17a. 


56       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

whose  sympathies  lie  with  the  non-propertied  classes  and  who, 
therefore,  act  with  those  classes  poHtlcally.^^  Furthermore,  the 
agrarian  class,  a  small-propertied  class,  always  has  had  a  distrust 
of  aggressive  capitalistic  interests,  but,  in  its  political  action  In 
recent  years,  has  usually  confined  Itself  to  choosing  between  candi- 
dates which  represented,  from  its  point  of  view,  the  lesser  of  the 
evils  of  capitalistic  control.  What  happens  when  an  agrarian  class 
really  determines  to  wrest  political  control  from  party  organiza- 
tions that  represent  aggressive  capitalistic  Interests  Is  shown  by  the 
history  of  the  Nonpartisan  League  In  the  West.^^  The  tendency 
of  an  aggressive  movement  of  an  agrarian  class  against  capitalistic 
control  Is  to  affiliate  the  agrarian  class  for  political  action  with  the 
non-propertied  classes. 

Propertied  classes  are  differentiated  into  reactionary  and  pro- 
gressive sections,  wherefore  the  problem  of  a  dominant  class  Is,  in 
the  last  analysis,  a  social-psychological  problem.  One  of  the  most 
neglected  parts  of  the  problem  Is  that  of  the  attitude  of  the  mass  of 
depositors  and  security-holders  to  the  capitalistic  system  of  which 
they  are  a  part.  Evidently  any  progress  in  the  economic  system 
must  depend,  not  altogether  but  in  part,  on  the  attitude  of  the 
ultimate  owners  to  proposed  changes.  Yet  appeals  are  Issued  to 
these  ultimate  owners  with  little  knowledge  of  what  their  actual 
attitudes  are.  Consequently  appeals  are  aimed  at  their  ultimate 
impulses,  as  human  beings  with  an  Instinctive  capacity  for  sympa- 
thy and  intelligence,^^  but  lack  the  definlteness  and  cogency  which  a 
knowledge  of  the  actual  attitudes  of  the  ultimate  owners  would 
make  possible.  We  know  somewhat  more  about  the  attitudes  of 
industrial  and  financial  management.     But  no  part  of  the  great 

83  For  instance,  Warren  S.  Stone,  Grand  Chief  of  the  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive 
Engineers,  said  in  an  address  before  the  Ail-American  Farmer-Labor  Co-operative 
Congress:  "The  railroad  brotherhoods  have  $42,cxx),ooo  now  on  deposit  in  banks. 
And  the  interest  on  those  funds  is  being  used  by  the  banks  to  fight  the  group  who 
deposited  the  money.  We're  going  to  put  in  a  system  of  people's  banks  and  they'll  be 
run  in  the  interest  of  the  people."  (Sandburg,  "The  Farmer-Labor  Congress,"  Sur- 
vey, Feb.  21,  1920,  606.)  See  also  Mussey,  "Co-operation  at  Chicago,"  The  Nation, 
March  6,  1920,  290. 

3*  In  addition  to  the  references  cited  in  a  preceding  chapter,  read  the  account  of 
the  efforts  of  politicians  to  wreck  the  banks  of  the  Nonpartisan  League,  in  "  North 
Dakota  Leaders  Come  Back,"  Nonpartisan  Leader,  November  3,  1919,  and  "  Farmers' 
Bank  at  Fargo  Reopened,"  Nonpartisan  Leader,  November  10,  1919.  See  also  Gaston, 
"  The  Nonpartisan  League,"  306-309. 

85  For  instance,  see  "  A  Challenge  to  Stock-holders,"  in  The  World  Tomorroto, 
Feb.,  1920,  48. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  57 

field  of  the  motives  of  propertied  classes  has  yet  been  subjected  to 
the  scientific  scrutiny  that  its  importance  demands. 

The  investigation  should  trace  the  historical  development,  as  far 
as  possible.  In  the  chapter  on  Psychological  Aspects  of  Intra- 
national Relations  are  indicated  some  aspects  of  the  historical  in- 
quiry. Capitalistic  industry  in  the  United  States  at  first  had  many 
of  the  aspects  of  agricultural  industry.^*'  Just  as  farmers  may  be 
classified  psychologically  as  speculative  and  conservative,^^  so  busi- 
ness men  are  by  nature  speculative  or  inclined  to  cautious  shrewd- 
ness in  their  dealings.  Among  conservative  farmers,  the  farmer's 
essential  aim  was  to  pay  for  his  farm  and  make  for  himself  a  com- 
fortable home.  The  farm  he  acquired  represented  his  life's  work. 
He  had  little  inclination  to  seek  governmental  aid  as  compared 
with  the  speculative  farmer,  "  who  sought  above  all  to  capitalize 
the  future  possibilities  of  his  acreage,"  ^^  and,  in  so  doing,  was  not 
averse  to  enlisting  the  help  of  the  state.  Consequently  it  was  this 
type  of  farmer  that  came  into  closest  relation  with  the  politicians. 
"  They  were  quite  willing  to  exhaust  the  credit  of  their  state  gov- 
ernments in  the  effort  to  provide  highways,  canals,  railroads,  and 
the  other  necessities  of  local  economic  development."  ^^  The  first 
manufacturers  and  merchants  often  were  farmers'  sons  and  the 
aim  of  the  conservative  type  was  to  build  up  a  business  and  pay 
for  it,  that  is,  pay  back  the  borrowed  money.  The  business  rep- 
resented the  founder's  life  work.  Now  the  psychology  of  this 
business  building  differed  from  the  modern  psychology  of  business 
in  important  respects.  In  the  course  of  his  work,  the  business  man 
might  make  profits  but  to  "  get  rich  "  was  not  his  main  purpose 
any  more  than  it  was  that  of  the  conservative  farmer.  He  might 
think  he  would  be  satisfied  if  eventually  he  was  worth  twenty  or 
thirty  thousand  dollars  because  this  was  the  sum  which  would  give 
him  an  ample  property  income  in  his  declining  years.  His  essen- 
tial aim  was  not  to  amass  a  fortune  but  to  build  up  a  business  and 
eventually  retire  on  a  property  income  that  was  ample  for  his  needs. 
In  the  course  of  his  work  his  business  became  precious  to  him  be- 
cause it  was  that  for  which  he  had  given  his  life,  just  as  children 
are  precious  to  the  mother  as  that  for  which  she  has  given  her  life, 

"  Croly,  "Progressive  Democracy,"  51. 

87  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  199-209. 

88  Croly,  op.  cit.,  72. 


58       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and  the  book  to  the  author  as  that  for  which  he  has  {^iven  his  life. 
T  ife  is  precious  and  whatever  one  ^ives  it  for  becomes  precious. 
To  be  sure  the  business  may  not  turn  out  to  be  as  successful  as  de- 
<;i-ed.  but  neither  mav  the  children  or  the  book.  Nevertheless, 
whatever  one  sacrifices  Hfe  for  is  precious,  wherefore  the  business 
man  will  fiofht  to  defend  his  business  from  despoilers,  the  mother 
to  defend  her  children  from  those  who  disparage  them  and  the 
author  to  defend  his  book  from  malicious  critics.  The  early  de- 
velopment of  business  was  one  which  enlisted  all  the  instincts  not 
only  for  the  acquisition  of  property,  but  also  for  its  defence  both 
by  the  accumulator  and  on  his  behalf  by  the  community,  as  later 
develonments  have  not.^"  What  the  conservative  business  man 
accumulated  appeared  more  nearly  his  creation  in  this  period  than 
later.  Furthermore,  a  large  proportion  of  the  population  were 
similarly  engaged,  as  farmers,  in  the  individualistic  acquisition  of 
wealth.  Consequently  public  sentiment  acted  more  instinctively 
and  intensely  on  behalf  of  the  right  of  the  business  man  to  his 
profits  in  this  period  than  it  has  since.  For  conditions  have  so 
changed  that  it  is  difficult  readily  to  discern  particular  instances  of 
fortunes  made  solely  or  largely  by  creative  effort.  And  a  smaller 
proportion  of  the  population  than  formerly  are  now  in  a  position 
to  appreciate  and  sympathize  with  individualistic  creative  effort. 
The  early  development  of  business  was  keenly  competitive.  The 
speculative  type  of  business  man  was  inclined  to  seek  the  aid  of  the 
state  in  his  operations,  or  to  enlist  the  influence  of  politicians  against 
rivals  seeking  state  aid,*^  and  thus  there  early  appeared  a  domi- 
nant class;  *^  but  the  more  conservative  rank  and  file  asked  mainly 
to  be  protected  from  the  competition  of  more  highly  developed 
foreign  industries.  The  public  acquiesced  in  this  program  of  free 
and  unregulated  competition  because  it  was  told  that  keen  compe- 
tition protected  the  consumer  by  keeping  prices  down,  and  the 
workman  by  stimulating  competition  of  employers  for  efficient 
labour  and  so  keeping  wages  up.  Therefore,  since  the  state  did 
not  intervene  to  the  extent  that  it  did  later,  business  men  made 
less  effort  to  control  governments  in  order  to  protect  themselves 
from  interference  than  later.     Then  came  gradually  the  movement 

40  See  the  chapter  entitled,  Psychological  Processes  in  the  Development  of  Private 
Property  {concluded). 

*i  See  the  chapter  entitled,  Psychological  Aspects  of  Intra-natiQnal  Relations, 
*2  Croly,  op.  cit.,  50,  63,  64.. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  59 

for  consolidation  to  eliminate  competition,  a  more  aggressive  seek- 
ing of  high  protective  tariffs  to  eliminate  foreign  competition,  and 
price  agreements.  "  Manufacturers  drew  up  the  tariff  schedules 
to  suit  themselves.  Corporation  laws  and  railroad  rates  were 
made  chiefly  by  their  beneficiaries.  .  .  ."  ^^  It  was  argued  that 
the  business  leaders  of  the  nation  were  the  natural  leaders,  that 
their  prosperity  meant  national  prosperity  and  that,  therefore,  rule 
by  this  dominant  class  was  the  natural,  inevitable  and  desirable 
rule.**  These  were  secondary  explanations  that  were  advanced  to 
justify  the  instinctive  profit-seeking  impulses  of  the  dominant  class, 
and  they  developed  into  a  philosophy  that  was  widely  accredited 
and  that  the  business  men  themselves  more  or  less  sincerely  be- 
lieved. Their  instinctive  impulses  for  profits  were  less  clearly  con- 
scious than  the  justifications  thereof,  though  the  former  were  essen- 
tial in  the  profit-seeking  behaviour,  which  under  other  conditions 
would  have  found  other  justifications.  In  fact  it  did  find  other 
justifications  in  the  local  economy  that  preceded  the  period  of  a 
national  economy,  and  in  the  international  economy  of  the  succeed- 
ing period.  The  justifications  given  by  a  dominant  class  for  its 
dominance  are  popularly  accredited  not  because  of  their  truth  but 
because  of  the  prestige  and  social  control  of  the  class  that  advances 
them.  This  is  not  saying  that,  under  critical  investigation,  they 
might  not  show  more  or  less  of  truth.'*^ 

The  result  of  the  movement  for  consolidation  in  industry  was  an 
increasing  control  over  business,  and  an  increasing  influence  in  poli- 
tics, by  the  speculative  type  of  business  man,  and  an  increasing 
fearfulness  of  conservative  business  men  to  compete  with  the  great 
businesses  that  developed.  The  monopolistic  tendencies  threatened 
also  consumers  and  workmen;  governmental  regulation  developed, 
and  with  it  developed  the  aggressive  special  interests  that  aimed  to 
control  governments  against  the  interests  of  consumers,  workmen 
and  the  small  investor.  Business-building  has  become  less  the  work 
of  men  who  develop  individual  business,  and  more  the  work  of  pro- 
moters and  banking  houses  which  assemble  the  funds  of  thousands 
of  depositors  and  investors  and  finance  corporations  managed  by 
hierarchies  of  officials.  This  development  has  caused  the  indi- 
vidual business  builder  to  recede  into  the  background  and  has  con- 

« Ibid.,  87. 

^*Ibid.,  84-88. 
*5  Ibid.,  87-90. 


6o       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

centrated  power  in  the  hands  of  aggressive  special  interests,  so  that 
the  conception  of  a  dominant  class  is  acquiring  an  increasing  defi- 
niteness. 

The  present  and  the  succeeding  chapters  aim  to  present  some  of 
the  psychological  aspects  of  an  inquiry  into  the  political  function- 
ing of  a  dominant  class,  in  connection  with  the  conception  of  sov- 
ereignty. The  political  significance  of  a  dominant  class  is  due  to 
the  fact  that  governments  always  have  been  under  the  control  of 
propertied  classes.  This  stimulates  aggressiveness  in  the  leader- 
ship, especially  the  reactionary  leadership,  of  a  dominant  class 
whenever  non-propertied  resistance  challenges  its  political  control. 
Such  occasions  reveal  the  potential  power  of  a  dominant  class.  Its 
potential  power  is  evident,  also,  when  a  nation  faces  a  crisis,  for 
instance,  a  war.  During  the  recent  World  War  governments  were 
forced  to  grant  employers  extraordinary  opportunities  for  making 
money  in  order  to  stimulate  production,  which  governmental  policy 
in  many  cases  resulted  in  enormous  profits.^*'  Having  learned  their 
power  in  the  war  experience,  they  continued  the  profiteering  in  time 
of  peace.^'^  The  social  psychologist  must  analyse  this  political  con- 
trol that  is  exercised  by  a  dominant  class.  He  must  seek  to  under- 
stand how  a  majority  of  voters  are  controlled  by  a  propertied 
minority  through  the  great  party  organizations.^^  His  researches 
will  take  him  into  a  study  of  the  work  of  a  party  organization  hand- 
ling large  campaign  contributions,^®  and  of  the  motives  that  de- 
termine an  election,^^  which  often  are  very  obscure.^^  He  must 
study  particularly  the  influence  of  the  *'  bosses  "  of  a  party  organi- 
zation.^^    Clues  may  be  gained  from  testimony  of  bosses, ^^  but  a 

*6  Newsome,  "Reconstruction  in  Britain,"  The  Dial,  July  12,  1919,  9;  Hobson, 
"Taxation  in  the  New  State,"  178-179.  It  is  estimated  that  16,696  large  fortunes  were 
amassed  in  the  United  States  in  the  last  ten  years,  most  of  them  in  the  last  four.  {Re- 
construction, June,  1919,  164.) 

*^  "  The  Golden  Fleece,"  The  Nation,  Jan.  24,  1920,  558. 

48  Myers,  "The  History  of  Tammany  Hall." 

40  Ford,  "  The  Rise  and  Growth  of  American  Politics,"  Ch.  XXIV. 

^°  Ogburn  and  Peterson,  "  Political  Thought  of  Social  Classes,"  Pol,  Sc.  Quart., 
June,  1916,  300-317. 

^1  Lowell,  "  Public  Opinion  and  Popular  Government,"  72. 

^^ Ibid.,  102-104;  Beard,  "Readings  in  American  Government  and  Politics,"  567- 
572,  125-131. 

53  For  instance,  it  is  said  of  the  personality  of  George  B.  Cox,  Republican  boss  of 
Cincinnati  for  twenty-seven  years,  who  "  made  and  unmade  representatives,  mayors, 
judges  and  even  governors":  He  "was  big  and  strong  and  forceful.  Often  he 
knocked  out  his  man  ...  in  the  turbulent  district  of  the  city  his  reputation  grew." 
Of  bis  sympathy  it  is  said,  his  "  headquarters  were  in  the  saloon  he  opened  .  .  .  called 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  61 

thorough  understanding  of  the  situation  can  be  had  only  by  work- 
ing as  a  bona  fide  member  of  a  political  organization.^^ 

Large  propertied  groups  have  various  forms  of  influence  over 
office-holders  not  possessed  by  small  propertied  and  non-propertied 
groups.  First,  there  are  the  positive  inducements  that  wealth  can 
offer:  the  influence  of  financial  interests  on  party  organizations 
through  their  campaign  contributions,  so  that  a  legislator's  pohtical 
future  may  seem  to  him  to  depend  on  their  favour;  the  financial 
rewards  that  may  be  received  in  a  great  variety  of  ways,  these  re- 
wards often  bestowed  indirectly,  thus  seeming  not  to  be  rewards 
for  political  service.  Secondly,  there  is  the  subconscious  influence 
exerted  on  oflice-holders  by  wealthy  individuals  as  the  persons  of 
prestige  in  their  constituencies  —  the  apprehension,  expectation  and 
other  suggestive  states  of  mind  which  may  be  awakened  in  an 
oflSce-holder  by  the  suggestions  received  directly  or  indirectly  from 
property-owning  interests  of  his  constituency.  And  above  all  there 
is  the  influence  of  these  interests  on  the  press,  which  so  controls  the 
public  that  it  may  manufacture  sentiment  for  or  against  an  office- 
holder. These  problems  of  class  influence  over  government  are 
not  susceptible  of  historical  treatment  but  are  problems  for  social 
psychology. 

In  addition  to  their  influence  over  party  organizations  and  gov- 
ernment oflficials,  propertied  interests  also  exert  a  subconscious  so- 
cial control  over  the  voting  masses.  We  have  to  analyse  the  parti- 
san zeal  ^^  that  causes  voters  to  refuse  to  believe  the  plain  facts 
as  to  the  influence  over  their  party  organization  of  propertied 
interests  —  the  instinctive  impulses  that  enter  into  the  loyalty  of 
voters  to  their  party  regardless  of  its  leadership  and  controlling 
interests.  We  have  to  analyse,  also,  the  motives  that  make  voters 
suggestible  to  a  dominant  class.  Even  where  voters  vote  in  secret 
they  may  still  be  influenced  in  their  voting  by  fear  of  a  dominant 

'The  Power  House.'  Here  the  down  and  outer  could  always  find  a  friend,  a  drink 
and  a  dime  for  a  meal."  (Associated  Press,  May  20,  1916.)  Another  clue  to  the 
nature  of  the  boss'  organization  is  the  effect  on  his  organization  of  a  defeat.  As 
mere  victory  gives  great  prestige  so  mere  defeat,  regardless  of  the  circumstances,  is  a 
serious  blow,  especially  if  administered  by  a  young  and  inexperienced  candidate, 
which  explains  the  bitterness  with  which  a  boss  fights  an  insurgent  movement  in  the 
party  organization.  His  hold  depends  on  the  confidence  of  his  organization  in  his 
personal  power,  and  as  insurgency  challenges  this,  defeat  seriously  weakens  him. 

54  When  political  bosses  write  accounts  of  their  work  (see,  for  instance,  the  "Auto- 
biography of  Thomas  Collier  Piatt"),  their  accounts  are  too  biassed  to  be  trustworthy 
sources,  but  are  suggestive. 

65  Ostrogorski,  op.  cit.,  11:353-360. 


62        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

class,  that  is,  fear  that  "  if  the  election  did  not  go  to  suit  the  capi- 
talists they  would  give  us  hard  times."  It  is  a  problem  in  how  far 
this  fear  —  justified  or  not  —  which  is  often  professed  by  working- 
men,  is  an  essential  motive  for  supporting  the  party  of  a  dominant 
class,  and  in  how  far  it  is  merely  an  excuse  given  for  continuing  the 
habit  of  voting  the  old  party  ticket.  Voters  are  moved  also  by 
admiration  and  regard  for  an  upper  class.  A  labouring  man  who 
is  a  candidate  for  public  office  is  not  apt  to  win  the  support  of  la- 
bouring men  because  he  is  a  labouring  man;  ^^  he  lacks  the  prestige 
of  the  candidate  who  has  the  capitalistic  backing.  Labouring  men, 
as  well  as  other  men,  admire  those  who  have  achieved  success  in 
what  everybody  is  seeking  success  in  —  making  money.  Thus  while 
railway  corporations  were  long  known  to  exercise  a  strong  influence 
in  legislative  halls,  and  were  disliked  and  suspected  on  that  account, 
the  great  railway  builders  and  financiers  were  objects  of  profound 
popular  admiration;  ^'' — their  exploits  were  made  known  through 
the  press,  which  represented  them  as  admirable,  even  wonderful 
men.^^  On  the  other  hand  the  American  people  have  little  or  no 
pride  in  their  great  literary  men.  "  The  American  public  has  not 
yet  learned  to  regard  such  men  as  objects  of  national  pride.  .  .  . 
The  real  influence  and  standing  of  a  man  of  letters  in  any  American 
community  ...  is  negligible.  Most  Americans  are  less  proud, 
at  heart,  of  the  world-wide  fame  of  Edgar  Allan  Poe  than  of  the 
world-wide  ubiquity  of  a  certain  kind  of  car."  ^^  Popular  admira- 
tion is  felt  above  all  for  the  man  who  is  successful  in  the  popular 
venture  of  making  money  ;^*'  wherefore  the  dominant  class  of  suc- 
cessful money-makers  has  wielded  a  powerful  political  influence  in 
the  United  States. 

Popular  admiration  has  nothing  contemptible  in  it  that  weakens 
it  in  the  long  run,  as  submission  is  weakened  by  its  contemptible 
aspect,  for  instance,  when  striking  workmen,  humiliated,  return  to 
work  after  losing  the  strike.     Radical  organs  of  the  working  classes 

58  Addams,  "  Democracy  and  Social  Ethics,"  257,  263. 

07  Bryce,  "The  American  Commonwealth,"  11:515. 

58  This  type  of  financier  is,  however,  rapidly  becoming  a  thing  of  the  past.  See 
Veblen,  "The  Industrial  System  and  the  Captains  of  Industry,"  The  Dial,  May  31, 
1919,  555- 

5»  Perry,  "  The  Written  Word  —  How  University  Organizations  Can  Help  Toward 
a  Better  Day,"  Proceedings  of  the  Fifty-Second  Convocation  of  the  University  of  the 
State  of  New  York,  83. 

80 Lindsay,  "The  Principle  of  Private  Property,"  in  Gore,  "Property,  Its  Rights, 
and  Duties,"  73-77. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  63 

often  refer  to  the  workers  as  "  wage  slaves  "  in  order  to  stir  in 
workmen  a  contempt  for  themselves  as  submissive  and  arouse  them 
to  revolt.®^  Submission  is  contemptible  but  not  admiration,  except 
as  it  shows  lack  of  intelligence  and  then  only  to  those  who  are  in- 
telligent, not  to  the  impulsively  admiring  masses.  Under  what 
conditions  does  this  admiration  finally  cease  and  leave  large  sections 
of  a  population  resentful  of  reactionary  capitalistic  control,  dis- 
trustful of  a  controlled  government,  and  in  a  condition  to  develop 
a  class  consciousness?  Obviously  this  is  a  social-psychological 
problem. 

A  dominant  class  does  not  rely  entirely  or  largely  on  its  domi- 
nating power.  Its  political  representatives,  in  their  solicitude  to 
preserve  their  social  control  as  against  the  political  representatives 
of  other  classes,^^  have  secured  the  enactment  by  governments  of 
measures  that  give  them  control  of  susceptibilities  of  the  masses 
other  than  their  impulse  to  submit  to  domination  —  of  their  capac- 
ity to  admire  efficiency,  and  to  be  devoted  to  those  who,  they  believe, 
are  trying  to  help  them.  While  a  dominant  class  originally  con- 
trolled by  power  to  dominate,  the  maintenance  of  control  has  come 
to  require,  more  and  more,  the  possession  of  other  qualities  of 
social  control  which,  in  turn,  have  determined  the  enlargement  of 
governmental  functions.  Thus  social  control  has  become  inex- 
tricably bound  up  with  political  control  until  political  control  has 
extended  itself  over  the  whole  range  of  social  control.  Thus  the 
real  rulers  of  society  are  undiscoverable  without  social-psychologi- 
cal investigation. 

The  sovereignty  of  a  democratic  state  is  much  more  complex 
psychologically  than  a  mere  obedience-compelling  power.  It  relies 
on  its  obedience-compelling  power  only  as  a  last  resort.^^  In  the 
United  States,  for  instance,  though  the  government  did  not  fail  to 
use  its  coercive  power,  while  at  war,  against  those  who  opposed 
the  war  and  openly  attempted  to  obstruct  the  war  program  of  the 
government,  yet,  in  securing  the  loyalty  of  the  people,  it  relied 

*i  "  Every  worker  is  either  a  submissive  slave  or  a  class  conscious  rebel."  {The 
Labor  Defender,  Feb.  i,  1919.) 

82Litnnan,   "Revolutionary  Russia,"   Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  XII:  188-189. 

*3 "  All  government  must  have  force  at  its  disposal,  but  no  government  can  last 
which  has  merely  force  at  its  disposal,  even  the  force  of  a  veteran  army  of  profes- 
sional soldiers.  All  government  implies  consent  as  well  as  force."  (Ritchie,  "  On 
the  Conception  of  Sovereignty,"  Amer.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Sc,  1:407.)  See  also 
Bryce,  "The  American  Commonwealth,"  II: 218-220. 


64       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

much  more  on  its  power  to  impress  the  people  with  its  efficiency  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  war;  and  there  is  little  doubt  that,  if  it  had 
proved  very  inefficient,  no  exercise  of  coercion  would  have  pre- 
vented an  uprising  of  the  people  and  an  interference  with  the  war 
program  of  the  government  in  the  direction  of  greater  efficiency. 
It  also  relied  much  on  impressing  the  people  with  its  beneficence. 
For  instance,  during  the  period  of  scarcity  of  coal,  the  people  were 
assured  that  householders  would  have  their  necessary  supply  at  a 
reasonable  price,  even  before  business  establishments  and  transpor- 
tation. It  relied  also  on  the  appeal  of  the  war  as  a  just  war,  as 
presented  by  the  administration  leaders  and  those  they  associated 
with  themselves.  It  cannot  be  said  that  these  lines  of  control  were 
less  effective  in  enlisting  the  loyal  support  of  the  people  than 
coercion  or  threat  of  coercion  or  popular  apprehension  thereof. 
In  time  of  peace,  coercion  is  still  less  exclusively  relied  on. 

In  a  democracy,  where  the  executive  and  legislative  officials  are 
elected  by  popular  vote,  their  behaviour  is  inevitably  determined 
by  the  motive  to  make  their  party  and  themselves  popular. 
Wherefore,  as  officials  they  appeal  to  much  the  same  instincts  to 
which  they  appealed  as  candidates  for  office.  A  candidate  for 
elective  office  gets  his  position,  in  the  first  place,  through  the  ad- 
miration his  personality  excites.  How  much  of  the  popularity  of 
Mr.  Roosevelt,  once  the  idol  of  the  American  people,  was  due  to 
his  superior  energy,  his  physical  courage  and  love  of  adventure, 
and  his  relentless  resistance  of  the  growing  power  of  monopoly  1 
The  same  instinct  is  seen  in  the  admiration  of  the  energy  and 
courage  that  works  material  achievement, —  for  instance,  in  the 
popular  admiration  of  the  railway  magnate  whose  achievements 
the  papers  glorify.  The  qualities  which  enable  the  candidate  for 
political  office  to  win  an  election  enable  him,  as  a  governmental 
official,  to  swing  public  sentiment  against  his  opponents  and  to 
get  the  measures  of  his  party  enacted  into  law.  Some  of  these 
measures  may  not  enlist  enthusiastic  popular  support,  some  of  the 
politicians  of  his  party  may  not  be  popular,  but  the  people  are  for 
them  because  of  their  admiration  for  him.  Wherefore,  legislators 
and  others,  who  also  depend  on  popularity,  and  risk  unpopularity 
by  opposing  him,  are  constrained  to  do  his  will.  In  like  manner 
the  popular  admiration  for  the  railway  or  other  magnate  enables 
the  capitalistic  interests  with  which  he  is  connected,  though  the 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  65 

people  may  fear  the  power  of  those  interests  and  resent  their 
monopolistic  tendencies,  to  control  the  people  in  spite  of  their  fear 
and  resentment.  Again  if,  in  the  intervals  between  the  political 
exploits  of  the  great  executive,  stories  of  the  generosity  and  com- 
passion of  the  mighty  man  reach  the  ears  of  the  people,  his  control 
is  increased  thereby.  In  like  manner  the  astounding  philanthropies 
of  magnates,  which  are  heralded  in  the  press,  cause  the  public  to 
warm  towards  corporate  wealth  in  general,  and  particularly  toward 
the  corporations  with  which  the  public  benefactors  are  connected. 
In  a  democracy  the  superiority  that  stirs  popular  admiration^ 
and  the  generosity  and  compassion  that  stir  popular  devotion  are 
essential  in  poHtical  control,  and  this  influence  is  exercised  by  offi- 
cials who  are  representatives  of  a  dominant  class,  in  the  interest 
of  the  political  control  of  that  class.  High-handed  measures  by  a 
dominant  class  stir  resentment,  but  secret  control  through  the  ad- 
mired and  loved  baihffs  of  propertied  interests  is  readily  acquiesced 
in.  Hence  the  loyalty  of  the  masses  to  the  boss  and  his  political 
organization  and  candidates,  though  these  are  rumoured  to  be  more 
or  less  favourable  to  the  behests  of  propertied  interests.  Through 
this  social  control  a  dominant  class  maintains  a  political  control 
which  does  not  ordinarily  require  the  use  of  force,  but  which  is  sup- 
plemented by  force  whenever  force  is  required.  This  exercise  of 
political  control  by  a  dominant  class,  peaceably  or  by  force,  is  be- 
ginning to  be  realized  by  the  more  thoughtful  among  the  public, 
as  we  may  infer  from  the  increasing  directness  with  which  it  is 
asserted  by  publicists  and  editors  of  progressive  magazines  of 
opinion.  As  these  assertions  become  more  direct  and  open,  the 
magazines  that  speak  for  the  dominant  class  counsel  caution  in  its 
exercise  of  its  will.  As  an  instance  of  direct  assertion  of  the  con- 
trol of  a  dominant  class :  "  While  constitutionalism  and  democ- 
racy have  ameliorated  some  of  the  evils  of  the  arbitrament  of  force 
in  pohtics,  they  have  left  it  in  ultimate  command.  The  state,  as 
now  organized,  is  essentially  the  embodiment  of  power  rather  than 
justice.  Its  worshippers,  when  they  proclaim  and  glorify  its  sov- 
ereign irresponsibility,  admit  this  indictment.  It  must  demand 
above  everything  else  obedience  to  its  own  commands,  no  matter 
whether  those  commands  are  or  are  not  justifiable.  It  must  insist 
fanatically  on  law  and  order  —  meaning  by  law  and  order,  not  the 
triumph  of  moral  knowledge,  but  the  ability  of  the  police  to  enforce 


66       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

obedience.  And  the  commands  which  the  state  must  insist  all  citi- 
zens shall  obey  are  commands  which  are  intended  in  nine  cases  out 
of  ten  to  secure  to  the  property-owner  not  only  the  undisturbed 
but  usually  the  exclusive  and  irresponsible  enjoyment  of  his  prop- 
erty. It  is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  prevailing  conceptions  both 
of  the  state  and  of  property  that  neither  politicians  nor  property- 
owners  are  obliged  to  recognize  any  except  the  mildest  obligations 
in  the  exercise  of  their  power. 

"The  possessors  of  this  power  and  their  interest  in  its  perpetu- 
ation dominate  the  standards  of  reputable  individual  and  collective 
conduct.  There  was  a  time  when  the  Christian  Church,  as  the 
spokesman  of  the  moral  and  religious  interests  of  mankind,  claimed 
to  embody  standards  of  behaviour  which  the  state  and  the  prop- 
erty-owner ought  to  observe  in  actual  practice.  It  did  not,  to  be 
sure,  have  much  success  in  enforcing  the  claim."  ^^ 

The  two  great  historical  rivals  for  social  control  have  been  the 
state  and  the  church.  The  state  was  an  institution  for  social  con- 
trol by  a  fear-inspiring  dominant  propertied  class;  the  Christian 
Church  was  in  origin  an  institution  for  social  control  by  those  who 
preached  a  love-inspiring  deity.  But  the  dominant  class  acquired 
an  influence  in  the  Church,  and  the  Church  became  a  state  Church, 
and  a  theology  of  a  fear-inspiring  deity  overshadowed  the  other, 
and  the  Church  ultimately  became  the  servant  of  the  "  constituted 
authorities."  Today  the  social  control  exercised  by  a  dominant 
class  and  its  political  control,  as  one  phase  of  its  social  control,  is, 
for  the  most  part,  undisputed  by  the  church,  though  there  are 
clergymen  who  have  taken  a  stand  against  it,  individually  ^°  and 
collectively.*'^  Other  clergymen  have  as  positively  taken  a  stand 
for  the  dominant  class  and  against  resisting  clergymen.^'''  The  or- 
ganization of  the  idealists  of  the  community,  inside  the  church  and 
out,  to  develop  a  social  control  that  will  effectuate  a  moral  political 
control  is  a  problem  which  is  engaging  the  minds  of  progressive 
leaders. 

A  government  weakens  its  influence  by  appearing  to  be  sub- 
servient to  any  one  class ;  wherefore  officials  are  apt  to  refuse,  out- 

«*  Croly,  "Disordered  Christianity,"  Neiv  Republic,  Dec.  31,  1919,  137. 
C5  Read  a  typical  experience  of  a  minister's  relation  to  members  of  this  class  in  his 
church,  in  Jackson,  "  A  Community  Church,"  Chs.  I-II. 

86  "Freedom  of  Opinion  and  the  Clergy,"  New  Republic,  Feb.  11,  1920,  303-305. 
67  "  The  Way  to  Unconstitute  Authority,"  New  Republic,  Feb.  19,  1920,  306-308. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  67 

wardly  at  least,  to  act  for  a  class.®^  The  great  parties  are  not 
openly  and  avowedly  representative  of  classes  but  aim  to  convey 
the  impression  that  they  are  "  the  party  of  the  whole  people." 
Party  leaders  look  at  proposed  measures  from  the  point  of  view 
of  "  politics,"  that  is,  of  what  their  attitude  to  this  and  that  meas- 
ure may  do  to  impress  the  people  with  the  importance  of  the  party 
as  the  representative  of  the  people,  and  to  discredit  a  rival  party 
as  such,  as  well  as  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  economic  interests 
which  the  party  leaders  aim  to  serve.  On  great  occasions  this  con- 
ception of  the  public  welfare  may  transcend  even  the  exigencies  of 
party  rivalry,  and  the  leader  may  become  a  protagonist  for  the 
welfare  of  the  whole  people.  President  Wilson,  in  his  opening  ad- 
dress on  the  League  of  Nations  at  the  Peace  Conference,  said: 
"  I  may  say  without  straining  the  point  that  we  are  not  the  repre- 
sentatives of  governments,  but  representatives  of  peoples.  .  .  . 
Gentlemen,  the  select  classes  of  mankind  are  no  longer  the  gover- 
nors of  mankind.  The  fortunes  of  mankind  are  now  in  the  hands 
of  the  plain  people  of  the  world."  ^^  A  rational  social  purpose  for 
a  whole  people  or  for  humanity  invariably  brings  its  protagonist 
into  conflict  with  a  dominant  class,  which  is  apt  to  make  its  para- 
mount influence  felt  when  it  comes  to  working  out  the  rational 
social  purpose. 

An  obvious  class  control  of  government  weakens  the  authority 
of  the  state,  and  weakens  the  state  in  its  rivalry  with  other  states. 
Where  an  employing  class  obviously  controls,  well  organized  labour 
groups  grudgingly  render  a  forced  obedience  and  an  ineflicient  serv- 
ice. Where  a  working  class  obviously  controls,  the  employing 
class  is  defiant,  or  deliberately  inefl'icient.  For  instance,  in  the 
United  States,  during  the  first  year  of  the  World  War,  "  the  at- 
tempt was  made  for  nearly  a  year  to  bring  together  employers  and 
employes  for  production  of  munitions  of  war,  under  the  direction 

88  For  instance,  when  formal  protest  was  made  by  manufacturing  interests  against 
the  confirmation  by  the  New  York  State  Senate  of  one  of  the  nominees  to  the  State 
Industrial  Commission,  and  when  opposition  to  the  nominee  was  voiced  also  by  organ- 
ized labour.  Governor  Smith  replied:  "I  do  not  believe  in  splitting  the  Industrial 
Commission  into  groups  representing  various  interests.  If  it  is  to  have  representa- 
tives of  manufacturers,  why  not  have  representatives  of  merchants,  or  of  some  other 
branch  of  business?  I  do  not  believe  that  you  must  have  the  different  interests  repre- 
sented when  it  comes  to  doing  business  for  the  state.  Every  industrial  commissioner 
ought  to  represent  all  of  the  ten  million  persons  in  the  state  and  not  any  group  of 
persons."     (Associated  Press  (R.  D.  C),  Jan.  15,  1919-) 

•»  Associated  Press  (R.  D.  C),  Jan.  29,  1919. 


68       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

of  a  trade  unionist  as  Secretary  of  Labor.  Notwithstanding  his 
great  abihty  and  unquestioned  fairness  it  was  impossible  to  secure 
the  co-operation  of  employers.  He  represented  but  one  of  the 
opposing  interests,  and  his  staff  lacked  the  business  experience  and 
record  of  impartiahty  needed  to  obtain  their  confidence.  Finally, 
the  President  directed  the  Secretary  of  Labor  to  select  as  his  ad- 
visers representative  employers  and  employes.  He  went  to  the 
one  great  organization  of  employers,  the  National  Industrial  Con- 
ference Board,  and  to  the  great  organization  of  employes,  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor.  Each  side  appointed  five  repre- 
sentatives and  they  in  turn  each  selected  the  most  representative 
professional  men  in  the  country,  ex-President  Taft,  to  lead  the  em- 
ployers, and  Frank  P.  Walsh  to  lead  the  workingmen. 

"  Forthwith  this  representative  body  formulated  a  national  la- 
bor program  which  the  Secretary  adopted,  '  to  maintain  maximum 
production  by  settling  obstructive  controversies  between  employers 
and  workers.'  ''^ 

"  Somewhat  similar  arrangements  were  made  to  cover  all  of  the 
vital  activities  of  the  Department,  including  employment  offices, 
housing,  et  cetera.   .   .   . 

"  So,  in  the  stress  of  national  peril  American  democracy  called 
to  its  aid,  not  only  distinguished  individuals,  but  the  organized 
oDDOsing  class  interests  of  the  nation.  The  organizations  them- 
selves were  incorporated  in  the  framework  of  government.  .  .  . 
Only  through  organization  can  the  modern  industrial  worker, 
whether  capitalist  or  laborer,  have  an  effective  voice  either  in  in- 
dustry or  government.  His  liberty  is  bound  to  be  limited  anyhow 
by  the  liberties  and  powers  of  opponents  or  competitors.  In  his 
individual  weakness  he  gains  greater  power  and  liberty  through 
organization.  And  representative  democracy  is  .  .  .  the  class 
partnership  of  organized  capital  and  organized  labor,  in  the  pub- 
lic interest."  '^^ 

The  employing  class  has  generally  opposed  this  project  of  repre- 
sentative industry  because  it  destroys  the  traditional  position  of 
authority  of  that  class.  It  threatens  a  change  in  the  nature  of 
sovereignty,  which  has  been  an  obedience-compelling  power  exer- 
cised largely  in  the  interest  of  propertied  classes.     Against  these 

70  Official  Bulletin,  April  i,  1918,  p.  7. 

7J  Cpnamons,  "  Industrial  Goodwill,"  41-43. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  CLASS  STRUGGLE  69 

and  other  objections  to  representative  control  of  industry,  and  to  the 
demand  of  employers  that  they  be  not  interfered  with  in  their  exer- 
cise of  their  traditional  exclusive  control  Mr,  Ordway  Tead  declares 
that  the  project  of  representative  industry  "  is  dictated  by  a  far 
more  fundamental  demand,  the  universal  demand  of  human  nature 
to  express  itself  with  maximum  effect  and  to  the  best  advantage. 
Today  if  we  know  anything  we  know  this,  that  human  nature  does 
not  express  itself  with  maximum  effect  and  to  the  best  advantage 
unless  it  concentrates  its  energies  under  conditions  where  it  is  asked 
to  assume  responsibility  and  where  it  has  some  guaranty  that  in  so 
doing  it  is  not  endangering  its  whole  position. 

".  .  .  Democracy,  if  it  means  anything,  in  its  application  not 
only  to  industry  but  to  all  human  activity,  means  two  things:  A 
spiritual  change  and  an  institutional  change.  It  means  that  we 
are  going  to  treat  people  as  an  end  in  themselves,  something  to  be 
worked  for,  and  something  to  develop  as  individuals,  as  personali- 
ties. And  it  means  that  our  institutions  in  politics  and  industry 
must  be  adjusted  and  reorganized  to  make  possible  that  participa- 
tion of  individuals  in  affairs,  which  constitutes  real  democratic  gov- 
ernment, which  makes  real  development  of  personahty  possible."  '^^ 

The  development  of  democracy  depends,  therefore,  on  the  capac- 
ity of  the  different  economic  groups  of  a  nation  to  think  of  their 
interests  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  public  welfare  in  this  new 
sense  of  equality  of  opportunity  for  development  of  personality, 
and  to  organize  and  vigorously  press  the  different  policies  that  this 
view  of  the  public  welfare  seems,  to  them,  from  their  different 
angles,  to  demand.  No  economic  group  could  successfully  issue  a 
political  appeal  to  the  mass  of  voters  by  simply  emphasizing  its  own 
interests.  The  nearest  approach  to  such  a  political  appeal  is  that 
of  a  dominant  class  which,  because  it  controls  a  great  political 
party,  relies  on  the  habitual  party  allegiance  of  a  large  mass  of 
voters  to  enable  it  to  dictate  policies  that  seek  primarily  its  own 
class  interests.  When  a  new  party  arises  its  leaders  are  "  too 
aware  of  their  obligations  "  "^^  to  make  the  purpose  of  the  party 

^2  Tead,  "  Outline  of  a  National  Labor  Policy,"  Proceedings  of  the  Employment 
Managers'  Conference,  U,  S.  Bur.  Labor  Statistics,  Bulletin  No.  247,  May,  1918,  152- 
154. 

^3  For  instance,  the  leaders  of  the  new  Labor  party  "  were  too  aware  of  their  obli- 
gations "  to  adopt  a  platform  confined  to  labour  interests.  (Merz,  "Enter:  The  Labor 
Party,"  The  Neiv  Republic,  Dec.  lo,  1919,  54.) 


76        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  realization  of  the  interests  of  a  distinct  class.  For  the  new 
party  must  appeal  to  diverse  economic  groups  if  it  is  to  make  head- 
way against  the  old  entrenched  parties.  And  in  appealing  to  the 
interests  of  these  diverse  groups,  the  platform  necessarily  becomes 
one  that  seeks  to  adjust  conflicting  interests  in  a  way  to  make  a 
reasonable  appeal  to  the  public. 

A  people  that  has  this  capacity  to  organize  in  diverse  economic 
groups  and  vigorously  to  press  the  policies  that  its  views  of  public 
welfare  suggest,  insists,  in  the  first  place,  on  freedom  to  organize, 
and  on  freedom  of  speech  and  of  assemblage.  With  freedom  of 
speech  It  becomes  possible  for  the  conflicting  groups  freely  to  rival 
each  other  In  appeals  for  popular  support.  Among  a  people  which 
excels  in  this  capacity  for  organization  of  groups  for  vigorous  con- 
flict under  legal  forms  the  coercive  aspect  of  government  is  reduced 
to  a  minimum,  as  compared  with  the  government  of  a  people  which 
has  weak  capacity  for  voluntary  organization.  For  instance,  the 
French  are  Individualistic  and  outspoken  enough  in  criticism  of 
their  government,  but  they  have  lacked  capacity  for  voluntary  or- 
ganization and  a  vigorous  pressing  of  organized  interests.  At  the 
same  time  that  they  criticize  the  government,  they  are  looking  to  It 
to  protect  their  individuality,  instead  of  seeking  to  use  it  for  the 
adjustment  of  conflicting  group  Interests.  Hence  the  government 
in  France  assumes  bureaucratic  authority  that  it  does  not  have  in 
Anglo-Saxon  countries,  where,  to  be  sure,  a  dominant  class  may  for 
a  time  maintain  a  subtle  control  and,  on  occasion,  exercise  a  ruth- 
less coercion,  but  where  organized  resistance  of  such  domination  is 
apt  to  develop.  In  Anglo-Saxon  nations,  however,  the  control  of 
dominant  classes  has  been  more  largely  acquiesced  in  in  the  past 
than  it  will  be  in  the  future.  The  claim  of  the  state  to  an  absolute 
sovereignty  is  more  and  more  questioned.  "  Indeed,  it  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  organized  workers  the  world  over,  have  come  to 
fear  the  state  to  the  extent  that  the  state  means  not  common  action 
for  the  common  good,  but  rather  action  enforced  upon  the  people 
by  a  dominant  governing  group.  .  .  ."  ''^ 

7*Tead,  "The  People's  Part  in  Peace,"  22-23.  -  . 


CHAPTER  IV 

SOVEREIGNTY    AND    THE    CLASS    STRUGGLE     {concluded) 

WE  have  indicated  some  of  the  psychological  aspects  of 
sovereignty,  and  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  carry 
a  step  further  the  analysis  of  the  change  that  has  been 
taking  place  in  sovereignty,  in  so  far  as  it  involves  psychological 
processes.  When  only  one  class  had  political  rights  that  class 
could  enforce  its  will  on  other  classes.  Sovereignty  was  obedience- 
compelling  power.  When  all  classes  have  political  rights,  if  one 
class  that  controls  the  government  for  the  time  being  tries  to  en- 
force its  entire  will,  it  is  sooner  or  later  thrown  out  of  power,  or 
there  is  unrest  and  revolution.  Sovereignty  is  no  longer  merely 
obedience-compelling  power.  The  class  dominant  for  the  time 
being  finds  that  the  government  officials  which  it  supported  as  candi- 
dates for  office,  as  government  officials  find  themselves  in  a  position 
in  which  different  shades  of  opinion  of  different  classes  play  upon 
them.  They  are  ambitious  to  retain  their  power  and  to  rise  in 
political  life.  They  try  to  induce  representatives  of  the  dominant 
class  to  be  satisfied  with  less  than  their  whole  will.  They  try  to 
give  the  will  of  other  classes  some  expression,  to  make  them  think 
their  will  has  more  influence  than  it  really  has,  in  order  to  secure 
their  support  of  a  party  that  serves  primarily  a  dominant  class. 
Sovereignty  then  becomes  an  obedience-invoking,  instead  of  an 
obedience-compelling,  power.  To  the  degree  in  which  officials  are 
rational,  they  will  seek  to  bring  out  of  this  class  conflict  for  political 
control  measures  that  advance  the  public  welfare.  Their  power  to 
do  this  will  depend  on  the  degree  in  which  the  leaders  of  conflict- 
ing classes  happen  to  be  intelligent  and  progressive.  If  they  are 
so  in  a  high  degree  sovereignty  will  cease  to  be  the  power  of  a 
dominant  class  to  invoke,  and,  when  necessary,  to  compel,  obedi- 
ence and  will  become  a  power  of  supreme  direction  of  intelligently 
co-operating  classes.  No  modern  state  has  yet  achieved  this  fully 
rational  exercise  of  sovereignty. 

The  beginnings  of  a  co-operation  of  classes  are  apt  to  be  forced 

71 


72       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

beginnings.  Just  as  international  co-operation  was  forced  on  the 
allied  nations  by  the  World  War  —  though  this  beginning  proved 
of  none  effect  by  reason  of  the  recurrence  of  national  rivalries  at 
the  termination  of  the  War, —  so  in  each  nation  classes  were  forced 
to  co-operate.  Each  class  shared  the  common  impulsive  purpose 
to  defeat  the  enemy  and  frowned  on  behaviour  of  its  own  members, 
as  well  as  of  another  class,  that  was  not  in  furtherance  of  the  na- 
tional purpose.  But  with  the  return  of  peace  the  class  struggle 
was  resumed  in  each  nation.  However,  during  the  war  period  the 
working  classes  came  to  realize  as  never  before  that  the  national 
strength  depended  on  them,  inasmuch  as  they  constituted  the  armies 
of  the  nations  and  produced  the  supplies  for  the  armies.  The  re- 
peated appeals  issued  to  them  to  stand  firm  in  the  field  and  in  the 
workshops,  inasmuch  as  the  outcome  of  the  war  depended  on  their 
valour,  caused  them  to  feel  that  they  were  in  fact  the  dominant 
class  of  the  nation.  The  contradiction  between  this  fact  and  the 
actual  condition  of  political  control  by  a  propertied  minority  has 
impressed  the  working  hosts  in  all  nations.  With  the  return  of 
peace,  therefore,  the  class  struggle  was  revived,  with  a  determina- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  working  classes  and  a  desperation  and  arbi- 
trariness on  the  part  of  the  dominant  classes  not  felt  before.  The 
working  classes  are  no  longer  content  to  acquiesce  in  the  control  of 
governments  by  propertied  classes.  This,  it  is  said,  has  given  the 
labour  movement  in  the  great  nations  a  "  larger  purpose,"  as  seen 
in  a  "  new  morale  "  on  the  part  of  labour,  which  is  seen,  among 
other  evidences,  in  the  increased  care  of  unions  to  keep  order  dur- 
ing a  strike;^  in  a  new  sense  of  solidarity  of  heretofore  distinct 
labour  groups,  a  solidarity  of  all  those  "  who  are  willing  to  con- 
tribute by  labour  of  brain  or  hand  to  the  social  welfare  " ;  ^  in  the 
rise  of  political  labour  parties ;  and,  finally,  in  the  proposal  of  labour 
to  undertake  co-operative  stores,^  building  contracts,*  and  the  op- 
eration of  great  industries  like  the  mines  '^   and  the  railroads.® 

1  Ward,  "  Social  Unrest  in  the  United  States,"  Bulletin  of  Methodist  Federation  for 
Social  Service,  3-4;  Methodist  Federation  for  Social  Service,  "Two  Recent  Strikes  of 
Special  Significance,"  Bulletin,  May,  1919,  3. 

2  Ward,  "  Social   Unrest  in  the  United  States,"  4. 

3  Warbasse,  "  Co-operation  in  an  American  Feudal  Fife,"  The  World  Tomorronu, 
February,  1920,  56. 

*  Cole,  "A  Building  Guild  for  Great  Britain,  New  Republic,  March  3,  1920,  25-27. 
^  See  the  Reports  of  the  Coal  Industry  Commission  of  Great  Britain,  published  by 

The  Nation  Press,  191 9,  3-27. 

•  Plumb,   "  Plan  of   Organized  Employes  for  Railroad  Organization,"   The  Public, 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       73 

These  political  movements  of  the  working  hosts  are  in  their  in- 
fancy. There  are  still  unawakened,  conventionalized  masses  of 
labour  in  the  various  nations. 

The  new  attitude  of  labour,  whereby  awakened  sections  of  the 
working  masses  are  willing  to  assume  responsibility  in  the  manage- 
ment of  industry  and  in  political  administration,  implies  a  new  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  sovereignty.  It  means  that  sovereignty 
is  coming  to  be  conceived  as  not  merely  an  obedience-compelling 
power,  but  as  a  power  of  intelligent  administration  of  the  resources 
and  industries  of  the  nation  for  the  public  welfare.*^  The  old  atti- 
tude of  labour  to  the  government  was  that  of  "  hands  off,  let  us 
run  our  strikes  and  don't  interfere."  Sovereignty  was  subcon- 
sciously assumed  as  a  mere  obedience-compelling  power,  which 
unions  did  not  wish  to  interfere  with  their  efforts  to  improve  their 
condition.  On  the  employers'  side  sovereignty  was  regarded  as 
obedience-compelling  power  which  traditionally  had  been  exercised 
in  their  favour  so  that,  under  the  law,  they  had  the  advantage,  and 
wanted  no  action  by  the  government  except  to  enforce  the  existing 
law  and,  by  "  government  by  injunction,"  ^  to  lend  the  force  of  the 
government  to  the  employers  as  desired.  This  still  continues  the 
expressed  attitude  of  reactionary  employers'  associations ;  but  there 
are  evidences  of  the  new  conception  of  sovereignty  among  pro- 
gressive employers  in  the  United  States,  for  instance,  in  the  intro- 
duction by  employers,  under  governmental  direction,  of  shop  com- 
mittees,® which  as  developed  in  England  call  for  a  new  governmen- 
tal supervision  of  industry.  Employers'  associations  in  England 
and  the  United  States  that  oppose  shop  committees  oppose  them, 
among  other  reasons,  because  they  oppose  the  governmental  regu- 
lation of  industry  which  they  necessitate.^"  The  new  conception 
of  sovereignty  as  an  intelligent  directive  force  depends  for  its  de- 
velopment on  the  future  of  the  class  struggle.  If  employers  in 
sufficient  numbers  rise  to  the  new  conception,  and  if  labour  organi- 

April  26,  1919,  427-429.  See  also  Marot,  "Responsible  Unionism,"  The  Dial,  Aug. 
23,  1919,  131-133;  "A  Railroad  Symposium,"  The  Nation,  Aug.  i6,  1919;  "The 
Plumb  Plan,"  The  Neiv  Republic,  Aug.  20,  1919. 

''See  the  platform  of  the  new  Labor  party,  Merz,  "Enter:  The  Labor  Party,"  New 
Republic,  Dec.  10,  1919,  54. 

8 "  The  Folly  of  Government  by  Injunction,"    The  New  Republic,  Dec.   10,   1919, 

43-44- 

»  Stoddard,  "  The  Shop  Committee,"  Chs.  II-J.V. 

1°  Wolfe,  "  Works  Committees  and  Joint  Industrial  Councils,"  a  report  by  the 
Industrial  Relations  Division  of  the  United  States  Shipping  Board,  1919,  57-58. 


74       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

zations  rise  to  It/^  a  progressive  development  of  industry  under 
governmental  direction  and  a  new  democratic  conception  of  sov- 
ereignty is  assured.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  traditional  concep- 
tion of  sovereignty  as  mere  obedience-compelling  power  continues 
to  prevail,  the  old,  exclusive  control  of  the  government  by  a  domi- 
nant class  is,  nevertheless,  passing  because  labour,  unorganized  and 
organized,  will  persist  in  the  struggle  to  possess  itself  of  the  obedi- 
ence-compelling power.  The  propertied  classes  also  will  struggle 
to  maintain  possession  of  that  power  in  order  not  to  be  deprived 
of  the  privileges  which  law  and  government  have  secured  to  them. 
A  class  struggle  of  increasing  intensity  seems,  therefore,  the  in- 
evitable alternative. 

The  alternative  presents  itself  not  only  for  private  but  also  for 
public  business.  The  denial  to  public  employes  of  the  right  to 
strike  is  deduced  from  the  traditional  conception  of  sovereignty  as 
obedience-compelling  power.  On  the  other  hand  there  is  a  grow- 
ing sentiment  among  public  employes  for  the  adoption  of  the  meth- 
ods of  organized  labour.^^  Of  this  movement  Dr.  Beard  says : 
"  It  is  of  course  easy  for  an  excited  patriot  to  declare  flatly  that 
public  employees  should  never  have  the  right  to  strike.  It  is  cer- 
tainly shocking  to  think  of  the  post-office  employees  laying  down 
their  mail  bags  and  walking  out,  and  it  might  be  easy  in  the  present 
state  of  our  political  development  to  forbid  such  action  under 
drastic  penalties.  Nevertheless,  with  the  growth  in  the  number  of 
public  employees,  their  increasing  organization  and  their  tendency 
to  affiliate  with  other  labour  organizations,  it  is  hardly  to  be 
doubted  that  we  shall  have  to  face  in  the  field  of  public  employment 
something  more  formidable  than  the  ordinary  association  that  an- 
nually beseeches  Congress  for  an  improvement  in  the  conditions  of 
employment."  ^^  Public  opinion  against  strikes  of  public  employes 
is  strong  when  they  are  doing  vitally  necessary  work.  There  is 
the  same  public  reaction  against  a  strike  of  private  employes  doing 
vitally  necessary  work,  for  instance,  a  coal  strike  at  the  beginning 
of  winter.     The  reaction  in  the  case  of  the  public  employes  is 

"  Stoddard,  "  The  Shop  Committee  —  Some  Implications,"  The  Dial,  July  12, 
1919,  8. 

12 "  Legislative  Program  of  the  Federal  Employes,"  Good  Government,  XXXVI: 
24-25. 

18 Beard,  "A  Modern  Employment  Policy  for  the  Government,"  Good  Government, 
January,  1919,  16-17. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       75 

justified  by  Invoking  the  conception  of  sovereignty  as  obedience- 
compelling  power,  and  asserting  that,  therefore,  public  employes 
have  no  right  to  strike.  But  the  real  motive  of  objection  to  the 
strike  is  the  same  in  both  cases.  The  people  are  impatient  with 
the  severe  inconveniences  caused  by  these  strikes. ^^  If  the  public 
have  to  choose  between  the  right  to  strike  and  the  right  of  the 
employer  to  dominate,  they  are  apt  to  choose  the  latter  because 
'*  the  obstinate  employer's  power  always  seems  to  be  asserted  in 
favour  of  the  tranquillity  of  the  state."  ^^  But  workmen  will  not 
give  up  their  right  to  resist  arbitrary  domination  because  of  this 
preference  of  the  public  for  the  employer's  attitude.  The  alter- 
native, for  public  and  private  enterprises  alike,  is  a  legal  arrange- 
ment giving  employes  an  essential  part  in  the  management  of  the 
enterprise. ^^  Sovereignty  then  ceases  to  be  a  power  to  compel 
public  employes  to  submit  to  the  domination  of  politicians  and 
office-holders,  and  a  power  that  a  dominant  class  uses  against  the 
striking  workmen  of  private  employers,  and  becomes  a  supreme 
directing  power  in  which  all  parties  participate  through  their  rep- 
resentatives. 

We  need  to  Inquire  into  the  social-psychological  processes 
through  which  sovereignty  may  come  to  be  a  supreme  power  of 
direction  of  co-operating  classes.  This  is  a  problem  for  the  po- 
litical scientist  as  well  as  for  the  social  psychologist  and,  at  this 
point,  the  fields  of  the  two  sciences  are  very  closely  allied.  From 
the  social-psychological  viewpoint  we  note  that,  as  in  the  individual 
mind  there  may  be  one  dominant  Impulse  and  no  choice,  or  con- 
flicting Impulses  and  choice,  so  in  a  state  sovereignty  may  be  the 
exercise  of  the  impulsive  will  of  a  dominant  class,  or  there  may  be 
a  conflict  of  class  Impulses  and  rational  adjustment.  Where  a 
dominant  class  is  strong  enough  through  its  control  of  the  govern- 
ment to  repress  free  public  discussion  of  the  propaganda  of  a  re- 
sisting class  that  is  organized  as  a  political  party,  in  that  instance 
we  have  an  exercise  of  the  will  of  a  dominant  class.  Nothing  Is 
then  left  for  the  resisting  class  but  extra-legal  action.  ^'^     The  exer- 

1*  Lippmann,  "Can  the  Strike  Be  Abandoned?"  The  New  Republic,  Jan.  21,  1920, 
226. 

15  Ibid.,  226. 

18  Ibid.,  226,  227. 

1''  As  former  Justice  Charles  E.  Hughes  wrote  in  his  letter  of  protest  against  the 
action  of  the  Republican  members  of  the  New  York  legislature  in  suspending  the  five 
members  of  the  Socialist  party  of  that  body:    "Nothing  in  my  judgment  is  a  more 


76       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

cise  of  the  will  of  a  dominant  class  is  facilitated  by  the  fact  that 
only  a  small  minority  of  voters  are  capable  of  taking  the  impulsive 
attitudes  of  conflicting  classes  intellectively.  Wherefore,  they  ac- 
cept the  attitude  of  the  classes  to  which  they  are  instinctively 
suggestible  —  the  propertied  classes.  The  development  of  sov- 
ereignty as  an  intelligent  directing  force  waits  upon  a  development 
of  a  public  education  which  will  enable  citizens  to  take  intellectively 
the  impulsive  attitudes  of  different  classes.  Such  an  education  will 
enable  citizens  fairly  to  judge  as  to  the  reasonable  compromise, 
and  to  influence  public  opinion  in  the  support  of  the  supreme  di- 
recting power  that  decides  the  compromises.^^  It  is  suggested 
that  this  educated  citizenship  be  represented  by  a  body  whose  pur- 
pose is  to  direct  the  movement  for  law  reform.^^  However,  until 
a  considerable  body  of  the  citizens  of  the  state  have  been  so  trained 
that  they  can  think  and  act  independently  of  the  influence  of  a  domi- 
nant class,  the  mass  of  citizens  will  continue  to  be  subject  to  the 
attitudes  of  the  controlling  classes,  with  the  secondary  explanations 
with  which  those  attitudes  are  conventionally  justified. 

Essential  in  the  processes  which  have  determined  political  action 
in  the  past  have  been  the  impulsive  control  maintained  by  dominant 
classes  and,  more  recently,  resisting  movements  and  class  struggle. 
Political  progress  never  has  been  a  matter  of  foresight  and  plan- 
ning on  the  part  of  an  inteUigent  body  politic  but  of  instinctive 
movements,  unrest,  conflict  and  compromise.  Progress  for  cen- 
turies took  place  only  when  rival  political  groups  that  were  domi- 
nated by  despots  and  aristocracies  came  into  conflict  as  a  result  of 
the  movements  of  peoples,  and  the  shock  of  conflict  broke  the  tra- 
ditional systems  of  beliefs  in  which  the  members  of  groups  had  been 

serious  mistake  .  .  .  than  to  deprive  Socialists  or  radicals  of  their  opportunities  for 
peaceful  discussion,  and  thus  to  convince  them  that  the  Reds  are  right  and  that  vio- 
lence and  revolution  are  the  only  available  means  at  their  command."  (Associated 
Press  (N.  Y.  T.),  Jan.  lo,  1920.)  A  protest,  signed  by  twenty-two  clergymen  repre- 
senting the  Federal  Council  of  Churches  in  America,  against  "  the  deportation  of 
men  without  judicial  trial;  the  proposed  repressive  legislation  now  before  Congress 
threatening  the  primary  rights  of  free  speech,  free  press  and  peaceable  assembly,"  de- 
clared that  "  Constitutional  changes  can  be  affected  without  violence  in  America,  be- 
cause of  our  right  to  free  expression  of  opinion  by  voice  and  ballot.  We  cannot  now 
deny  this  American  substitute  for  violence  without  directly  encouraging  resort  to  revo- 
lution."    (Associated  Press   (N.  Y.  T.),  Jan.  29,  1920.) 

18  Higgins,  "  A  New  Province  for  Law  and  Order,  II,"  Harvard  Laiv  Revieiv, 
XXXII:  191-217. 

1^  Pound,  "Juristic  Problems  of  National  Progress,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social. ,  May,  1917, 
730-731. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       77 

tralned.^^  Only  thus  was  progress  possible,  because  the  masses 
were  dominated  and  kept  in  ignorance.  This  has  continued  to  be 
the  condition  even  in  civilized  nations,  until  recently;  and  the  essen- 
tial process  of  progress  has  continued  to  be  the  shock  of  interna- 
tional conflict.  Says  Professor  Mitchell,  speaking  of  the  effect  of 
the  World  War  in  promoting  scientific  administration :  "  The  epi- 
sode in  statistical  organization  which  I  have  sketched,  the  effect  of 
the  war  upon  our  attitude  toward  the  use  of  facts  for  the  guidance 
of  policy,  links  the  present  stage  of  civilization  with  man's  savage 
past.  .  .  .  The  savage  and  the  barbarian  are,  such  conservative 
creatures  that  nothing  short  of  a  catastrophe  can  shake  them  out 
of  their  settled  habits.  ...  In  physical  science  and  in  industrial 
technique,  it  is  true,  we  have  emancipated  ourselves  largely  from 
the  savage  dependence  upon  catastrophes  for  progress.  .  .  .  But 
in  matters  of  social  organization  we  retain  a  large  part  of  the  con- 
servatism characteristic  of  the  savage  mind."  ^^ 

Essential  in  the  political  situation  has  been  the  control  of  igno- 
rant, subservient  and  conventionalized  masses  by  propertied  classes, 
and  this  continues,  though  less  absolute,  in  spite  of  the  formal  po- 
litical freedom  of  the  "  advanced  nations."  The  formal  political 
freedom  originated  as  a  result  of  conflicts  between  propertied 
classes  for  the  control  of  governments.  "Step  by  step  from  Run- 
nymede  to  the  present  the  conflicts  of  interests  of  different  classes 
have  worked  for  the  development  of  the  enfranchisement  of  the 
people.  ...  In  England  it  was  on  one  side  a  party  working  for 
the  franchise  for  the  agricultural  workers  because  it  was  to  their 
advantage  to  do  so,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  other  checkmated 
this  move  by  extending  the  franchise  to  the  inhabitants  of  towns."  ^^ 
Thus  having  acquired  the  franchise  the  working  hosts,  long  used 
to  political  subjection,  have  until  recently  used  it  in  support  of  the 
rule  of  the  propertied  classes.  They  have  not  learned  to  use  their 
political  power  to  free  themselves  from  their  economic  subjection. 
The  political  class  conflict  is  just  beginnlng.^^ 

20Teggart,  "The  Processes  of  History,"  151. 

21  Mitchell,  "  Statistics  and  Government,"  Quart.  Pub.  Amer.  Statist.  Ass'n.  Re- 
print, 228. 

22  Gillin,  "The  Origin  of  Democracy,"  Amer.  Jour.  Sociol.,  May,  1919,  710. 

23  The  American  Federation  of  Labor  up  to  1920  officially  followed  the  policy  of 
supporting  that  one  of  the  great  parties  —  both  of  which  are  committed  to  the  capi- 
talistic regime  —  which  gave  most  satisfactory  promises  of  supporting  the  measures 
for  which  the  Federation  stood.    At  the  same  time  it  sought  to  "  educate  the  public 


78       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  development  of  the  political  phase  of  the  class  conflict  is,  in 
the  nature  of  the  case,  inevitable.  As  Ihering  pointed  out,  as  long 
as  an  individual  of  a  lower  class  alone  has  a  sensitive  feeling  of 
humiliation  because  of  his  social  inferiority,  he  can  do  little  to  im- 
prove his  position.  "  Only  when  such  a  way  of  feeling  becomes 
general  is  there  any  prospect  for  the  individual,  instead  of  wasting 
his  strength  in  a  useless  struggle,  to  turn  it  to  account,  in  union 
with  those  who  think  as  he  does,  to  raise  the  level  of  the  honor 
of  his  class;  and  I  mean  here,  not  simply  the  subjective  feeling  of 
honor,  but  its  objective  recognition  by  other  classes  of  society  and 
by  legislation."  ^*  The  acquisition  of  political  rights  by  the  work- 
ing hosts  has  been  followed  by  a  very  slow  passing  of  the  attitude 
of  submission  to  propertied  classes  that  had  long  had  exclusive  po- 
litical rights.  With  the  passing  of  this  attitude,  the  instinct  of 
rivalry  will  cease  to  animate  merely  the  sensitive  member  of  a 
lower  class  who  feels  humiliation  because  of  inferiority,  and  will 
succeed  the  instinct  of  submission  generally  among  the  working 
classes.  This  instinct  of  rivalry  has  been  awakened  by  the  acqui- 
sition of  political  rights,  and  the  more  ambitious  among  the  en- 
franchised masses  are  beginning  to  be  dissatisfied  with  a  non-prop- 
ertied condition  that  means  social  inferiority  and  political  impo- 
tence. Not  that  they  are  envious  of,  or  greedy  for,  large  property. 
They  seek  merely  the  "  manly  feeling  "  of  the  ownership  of  some 
property,^^  and  a  voice  in  the  management  of  the  industry  of  which 
they  are  a  part. 

In  his  emphasis  on  rivalry  for  ownership  and  the  sense  of  inde- 
pendence and  relief  from  subservience  to  domination  realized  by 

mind  "  and  appeal  to  the  public  "  conscience  "  on  behalf  of  the  legislation  it  desired. 
(See  the  American  Federation  of  Labor's  "Reconstruction  Program,"  American  Fed- 
erat'tonist,  Feb.,  1919,  133-134.)  Within  the  Federation  there  were  powerful  labour 
organizations  opposed  to  the  non-political  policy  of  the  Federation.  (West,  "  Will 
Labor  Lead?"  The  Nation,  April  19,  1919,  600-601.)  The  radical  labour  groups 
outside  the  Federation  bitterly  opposed  this  policy  of  the  Federation  but  differed  in 
their  own  policies.  (Brissenden,  "The  L  W.  W.,"  Ch.  Ill,  pp.  237-241,  277-279.) 
The  bitterness  of  the  feeling  of  the  different  political  labour  groups  against  non-poli- 
tically  organized  federations  of  labour  unions  and  the  psychology  of  this  attitude  can 
be  understood  only  by  comparing  the  files  of  the  American  Federationalist,  for  in- 
stance, the  issue  of  July,  1919,  p.  602,  with  the  files  of  a  socialist  magazine,  The  Lib- 
erator, for  instance,  the  issue  of  August,  1919,  pp.  12-20,  and  files  of  an  L  W.  W. 
paper,  the  Rebel  Worker  or  The  One  Big  Union  Monthly.  See  President  Gompers* 
criticism  of  the  policy  of  a  political  labour  party,  American  Federationist,  Jan., 
1919,  41. 

»/     24 Ihering,  "The  Struggle  for  Law,"  trans,  by  Lalor,  49-50. 

^      ^^Ibtd.,  50. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       79 

ownership,  Ihering  had  in  mind  the  peasant  seeking  to  acquire 
ownership  of  some  land.  Among  workmen  in  manufacturing  in- 
dustry, as  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  labour  movement 
is  for  a  voice  in  the  management  of  industry.  It  has  a  larger 
motive  than  mere  instinctive  rivalry.  It  is  a  movement  to  do  away 
with  industrial  autocracy,  to  escape  the  vicissitudinous  element  in 
the  workingman's  life,  and  to  form  an  economic  basis  for  positive 
self-development.  This  movement  has  forced  a  class  struggle  that 
is  projecting  itself  into  politics.  The  beginnings  of  this  political 
struggle  have  already  caused  the  reactionary  section  of  the  domi- 
nant class  in  the  United  States  to  attempt  to  deny  to  the  non-prop- 
ertied classes  political  and  legal  rights  they  have  acquired;  and 
this  has  stirred  a  resentment  in  proportion  to,  or  rather  out  of  pro- 
portion to  the  sense  of  honour  that  was  gained  by  gaining  those 
rights,  for,  in  the  long  interval  since  they  were  gained,  the  attitude 
of  the  non-propertied  masses  has  been  changing  from  submission 
to  the  sense  of  free  rivalry  engendered  by  the  free  action  encouraged 
under  those  rights.  The  class  struggle  will,  therefore,  be  intensi- 
fied by  the  struggle  of  the  masses  to  maintain  political  rights  as 
"  hard-bought  acquisitions  in  the  fight  for  freedom." 

As  long  as  the  masses  remained  without  political  rights  and  sub- 
servient, the  sovereign  class  had  a  benevolent  attitude  to  the  subject 
masses,  an  attitude  of  satisfied  domination  and  of  satisfaction  at 
being  relieved  from  the  hardships  of  life  through  its  enjoyment  of 
the  fruits  of  the  exertions  of  the  dominated  classes.  This  benevo- 
lent attitude  characterized  the  slave-holders  of  the  South,  and 
caused  kindliness  for  the  slave  and  the  graciousness  of  manner  of 
the  southern  gentleman.^^  It  characterized  the  ruling  classes  of 
old.  But  let  the  under  classes  become  restive,  let  them  cease  their 
habitual  obedience,  and  the  dominating  attitude  of  the  slaveholder 
and  of  the  lord  of  serfs  revealed  itself.^  The  same  attitude  was 
seen  in  Russia  up  to  the  time  of  the  Revolution.  And  when  under 
classes  possessed  themselves  of  the  sovereignty,  members  of  the 
upper  class  of  Russians  regretted  that  the  peasants  had  not  been 
kept  in  serfdom, ^^  and  preferred  that  Russia  should  be  conquered 
by  Germany  rather  than  to  be  ruled  by  a  long  contemned  class.^^ 

26  Trowbridge,  "  My  Own  Story,"  293.  ~ 

^'^  Ibid.,  292;  Ashley,  "Economic  History,"  1:37-40. 

28  Hapgood,  "  The  Storm  Cellar,"  Ne%v  Republic,  Jan.  28,  1920,  255. 

2»  Bryant,  "  Six  Red  Months  in  Russia,"  171-172. 


8o       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

We  find  a  similar  bitterness  of  class  feeling  in  countries  that  have 
long  been  "  democratic."  There  contests  between  different  sec- 
tions of  a  political  party,  one  standing  for  the  traditional  capitaHs- 
tic  domination,  the  other  for  measures  that  look  to  industrial  de- 
mocracy, often  are  more  bitter  than  are  contests  between  rival  par- 
ties. This  is  because  the  struggle  against  industrial  autocracy  has 
become  a  political  struggle.  The  achievement  of  political  freedom 
has  suggested  an  achievement  of  industrial  freedom  by  political 
means.  "  It  is  a  matter  for  solemn  reflection,  after  a  view  of  the 
origin  and  evolution  of  the  state,  that  up  to  the  present  time  the 
work  of  democracy  has  been  to  conquer  and  control  institutions  al- 
ready made  by  the  superior  classes.  .  .  . 

"  Having  conquered  political  institutions  of  royal  and  aristo- 
cratic origin,  democracy  is  now  at  work  on  economic  institutions. 
.  .  .  Democracy  is  at  work  to  subject  to  public  purposes  the  mag- 
nificent economic  structures  erected  by  .  .  .  mighty  organizers  of 
men,  money  and  materials."  ^^ 

Until  recently  the  progress  of  the  working  masses  has  been  an 
incidental  result  of  conflicts  between  propertied  interests.  Labour 
has  been  unorganized,  mute,  distrustful  of  its  own  leaders,  without 
adequate  political  leadership,  contemned  by  property-owning 
classes  and  their  beneficiary  groups,  and  self-contemned.  The  con- 
flict between  propertied  classes  and  non-propertied  masses  did  not 
become  a  perceptible  force  in  the  development  of  the  state  until  the 
decades  preceding  the  rise  of  popular  sovereignty;  and  it  did  not 
become  a  continuing  and  disruptive  phenomenon  until  recently. 
Until  the  rise  of  popular  sovereignty  and  the  subsequent  awaken- 
ing of  the  conventionalized  masses  to  the  opportunities  afforded 
by  democratic  government,  law  was  essentially  the  command  of  a 
dominant  class.  Law  functioned  to  protect  the  political  right  of 
upper  classes  to  dominate  under  classes,  and  to  protect  the  prop- 
erty rights  of  the  former.  Even  with  the  rise  of  popular  sover- 
eignty there  was  no  immediate  development  of  a  class  struggle  be- 
tween propertied  and  non-propertied  classes.  The  struggle  was 
between  capitalistic  and  agrarian  propertied  classes. ^^     As  long  as 

30  Beard's  essay  in  Cleveland,  and  Schafer,  "  Democracy  in  Reconstruction,"  490- 
491. 

*i  Beard,  "  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian  Democracy."  One  of  the  important 
phases  of  the  struggle  has  been  the  resistance  of  the  agrarian  classes  against  unjust 
taxation.    The   agrarian   interests   always   have   paid   more,   often   very   much  more 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       81 

workmen  in  the  United  States  could  leave  their  jobs  and  take  up 
cheap  land,  or  could  save  money  and  hope  to  become  employers, 
or  could  save  and  hope  eventually  to  become  "  independent,"  that 
is,  able  to  live  on  a  property  income,  they  had  no  clear-cut  class 
consciousness.  But  when  it  was  no  longer  possible,  except  for  ex- 
traordinary workmen,  to  hope  ever  to  become  an  employer  or  to  be 
able  to  live  on  property  income, ^^  when  a  man  once  a  workman  was 
always  a  workman,  then  began  to  develop  a  consciousness  of 
common  ends  for  which  labour  should  work  —  of  reforms 
which  should  guarantee  to  the  working  masses  the  comforts 
of  hfe,  a  comfortable  and  secure  old  age,  the  determination 
of  working  conditions,  and  a  share  in  the  management  of  in- 
dustry. This  struggle  for  life,  for  common  ends  which  all  work- 
men desire,  has  developed  a  class  consciousness  in  England  that 
marks  the  end  of  the  undisputed  rule  of  dominant  propertied 
classes,^^  and  the  same  development  is  beginning  in  the  United 
States.  Tt  is  retarded  here  by  the  still  vital  individualistic  tradi- 
tions surviving  from  the  period  of  cheap  land  and  freedom  of  op- 
portunity for  winning  economic  independence.  As  the  class  strug- 
gle develops  those  of  the  conventional  mass  of  voters  who  have 
heretofore  accepted  uncritically  and  subconsciously  the  attitudes  of 
the  class  that  possessed  greatest  suggestive  power  have  to  find 
"  reasons  "  for  their  attitudes.  These  may  be  merely  secondary 
explanations  for  a  subconscious  prejudice,  or  the  attitudes  of  the 
different  classes  may  be  taken  intellectually,  analyzed  and  evaluated 
in  the  light  of  a  rational  theory  of  social  progress.  The  period  of 
the  class  struggle  thus  appears  as  a  transition  period  between  the 
sovereignty  of  the  past,  which  was  an  undisputed  obedience-com- 
pelling power  of  the  dominant  classes,  and  the  sovereignty  of  the 
future,  which  is  a  power  of  intelligent  direction  by  the  state  of  the 
activities  of  co-operating  economic  groups. 

The  developing  differentiation  of  the  population  of  each  nation 
along  economic  lines  has  resulted  in  conflicting  interests  of  increas- 

than  their  just  share  of  the  taxes.  (Levine,  "The  Taxation  of  Mines  in  Montana," 
Ch.  I.)  Capitalists  holding  enormous  areas  of  unimproved  land,  on  the  contrary, 
have  paid  and  continue  to  pay  "  in  many  instances  a  positively  ridiculous,  low  tax." 
(California  Commission  of  Immigration  and  Housing,  "A  Report  of  Large  Land- 
holdings  in  Southern  California,"  1919,  5.) 

82  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  384. 

83Angell,  "The  British  Revolution  and  the  American  Democracy,"  Pt.  II,  Chs. 
I-IV. 


82        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ing  complexity;  and  the  increasing  economic  interdependence  of  tlie 
antagonistic  interests  serves  to  intensify  the  tension.  There  are 
conflicts  between  mining  and  manufacturing  interests;  between 
transportation  and  manufacturing  interests;  between  financial  and' 
agrarian  interests;  between  financial  interests  and  the  small  in- 
vestor; between  financial  interests  and  industrial  engineers;  be- 
tween industrial  and  financial  interests  and  the  mass  of  consumers; 
between  capital  and  labour.  Of  these  the  conflict  that  is  most  por- 
tentous for  the  development  of  democracy  is  that  between  capital 
and  labour.  With  the  growth  of  intelligence  the  jealousies  and 
conflicts  between  different  labour  groups  tend  to  give  way  before 
a  widening  sense  of  solidarity  of  labour,  though  this  development 
is  impeded  by  the  rise  of  new  labour  groups  out  of  the  conven- 
tionalized mass  of  labour,  which  groups  are  long  actuated  by  the 
distinct  interests  and  ideas  that  prompted  their  formation  and  by 
jealousies  and  other  causes  of  conflict  that  arise  in  the  course  of 
their  adjustment  with  other  groups.  For  some  time,  therefore, 
the  tendency  towards  conflicts  between  labour  groups  may  keep 
pace  with  the  tendency  toward  solidarity.  But,  in  the  long  run, 
the  growth  of  inteUigence  results  in  a  widening  sense  of  solidarity 
of  labour,  in  virtue  of  which  it  will  present  an  increasingly  solid 
front  against  capital  pohtically.^* 

This  conflict  between  capital  and  labour  is  due  in  the  first  instance 
to  reactionary  capitalistic  interests.  Reactionary  employers'  asso- 
ciations aim  to  keep  labour  submissive  to  the  domination  of  employ- 
ers. This  domination  exercised  by  employers  stirs  the  resistance 
of  labour  groups  far  and  wide,  which  are  bound  together  by  this 
emotional  attitude  of  resistance.  Employers  also  feel  common 
cause  because  of  their  emotional  determination  to  perpetuate  their 
domination.  This  is  the  state  of  the  class  struggle,  and  it  neces- 
sarily projects  itself  into  politics.^^     It  is  a  conflict  in  which  the 

8*  This  effect  of  the  growth  of  intelligence  is  seen  not  only  among  white  but  also 
among  Negro  workmen.  Booker  T.  Washington  simply  aimed  to  make  Negroes  more 
intelligent  and  reliable  workmen.  The  result  of  their  increasing  intelligence  and 
efficiency  has  been  to  cause  the  development  of  organizd  resistance  by  Negroes  of  the 
domination  of  employers,  under  the  leadership  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor. 
("The  Negro  and  the  American  Federation  of  Labor,"  in  The  Messenger,  August, 
1919,  10;  "The  Negro  Mass  Movement,"  The  Messenger,  May-June,  1919,  8.)  See 
also  Sandburg,  "  The  Chicago  Race  Riots,"  Chs.  V,  XL 

^^  For  instance,  the  president  of  the  National  Founders'  Association,  in  his  address 
to  the  members  of  the  association,  November,  1918,  warned  them  that  "failure  to  take 
active    political    interest   in   your   home    district    adds    to    the    influence    of    unionism 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       83 

employed  are  apt  to  feel  a  grievance  not  only  against  their  par- 
ticular employers  but  also  indiscriminately  against  capitalistic  in- 
terests; and  those  interests  to  feel  indiscriminately  that  all  labour 
movements  are  a  menace  to  property  ownership.  The  resisting 
masses  are,  therefore,  ready  to  listen  to  proposals  for  a  "  dictator- 
ship of  the  proletariat,"  while  the  reactionary  capitalistic  interests 
stand  for  a  continuance  of  their  dictatorship.^*^ 

This  conflict  makes  for  inefficiency  in  industry.  The  attention 
of  workmen  is  unconsciously  diverted  from  their  work  by  their 
dissatisfied  state  of  mind;  and  deliberate  inefficiency  in  work  be- 
comes a  widespread  practice. ^"^  Furthermore,  in  the  periods  of  vio- 
lent resistance  no  work  is  done,  and  the  effect  of  such  a  period  is 
long  felt.  "  The  attitude  of  the  employing  class  has  forced  trade 
unions  to  become  for  the  most  part  fighting  organizations.  Work- 
ers have  been  obliged  to  fight  primarily  for  an  increased  share  of 
the  necessaries  of  hfe  and  for  the  recognition  of  their  unions."  ^^ 
Men  cannot  work  and  fight  too  —  hence  the  class  struggle  causes 
industrial  inefficiency.  It  causes  also  political  inefficiency.  The 
more  intense  the  struggle,  the  more  do  legislatures  and  courts  be- 
come partisans  of  the  dominant  class  and  unable  to  keep  the  pub- 
lic welfare  in  view  in  the  performance  of  their  functions. 

Inasmuch  as  labour  includes  the  great  mass  of  consumers  the 

and  to  the  crushing  power  of  governmental  interference  in  industry."  (Quoted  from 
address  printed  in  The  Open  Shop  Review,  Dec,  1918,  473.)  And  he  pointed  the 
warning  by  quoting  James  O'Connell,  Vice-President  of  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor,  in  the  Boilermakers'  Journal  of  October,  1917:  "It  is  not  a  mere  question 
of  being  behind  President  Wilson.  That  is  a  catch  phrase  and  sounds  nice.  The 
question  is,  are  you  behind  yourself?  No  movement  can  be  successful  in  this  country 
unless  the  trade  union  movement  says  so.  Otherwise,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  would  not  have  sent  for  the  President  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor 
— 'if  he  did  not  believe  that  behind  all  this  struggle  for  democracy  organized  labor 
must  be  at  the  head  of  it."  The  National  Founders'  Association  "  has  joined  the  Na- 
tional Association  of  Manufacturers,  The  National  Council  for  Industrial  Defence, 
and  The  Anti-Boycott  Association  in  fighting  anti-injunction  laws "  and  other  laws 
sought  by  organized  labour,  and  "  has  itself  at  times  retained  a  representative  in 
Washington  to  watch  proposed  legislation  of  possible  interest  to  the  Association 
and  to  direct  attempts  to  quash  such  as  is  undesirable."  (Sleeker,  "The  National 
Founders'  Association,"  Quart.  Jour.  Econ.,  XXX:  Reprint,  33-34.  The  National 
Association  of  Manufacturers  also  is  pledged  "to  oppose  any  and  all  legislation  not 
in  accord"  with  its  interests.  {American  Industries,  March,  1919,  45.)  The  members 
of  the  Association  are  urged  to  be  less  partisan  and  more  active  politically  against  or- 
ganized labour.  (Emery,  "  Class  Legislation  for  Industry,"  an  address  delivered  be- 
fore National  Association  of  Manufacturers,  1908,  Reprint,  28.) 
3^  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  387. 

37  Brissenden,  "  The  I.  W.  W.,"  277. 

38  Croly,  op.  cit.,  386-387. 


84       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

conflict  of  labour  with  capital  tends  to  become  psychologically  as- 
sociated with  the  conflict  between  consumers  and  capitalistic  inter- 
ests.^^ That  is,  the  resentment  of  labour,  as  workmen,  against 
capital  is  increased  by  its  resentment,  as  consumers,  against  prof- 
iteering corporations;^''  labour  thus  comes  to  feel  that  it  has  a 
double  cause  against  capital.  As  to  the  conflict  between  the  small 
investor  and  great  financial  interests,  this,  with  the  increase  of  in- 
come of  the  working  masses,  also  will  tend  to  accentuate  the  feeling 
against  capital.  The  conflict  between  controlling  financial  interests 
and  the  best  type  of  industrial  engineer  also  is  a  phase  of  the  con- 
flict between  capital  and  labour,  for  the  engineers  oppose  the  capi- 
talistic domination  that  stirs  the  resentment  of  labour  because  this 
interferes  with  their  task  which  is  to  increase  production.  Pro- 
duction is  increased  by  stimulating  the  creative  intelligence  of  la- 
bour, which  is  impossible  as  long  as  labour  is  resentful  of  capi- 
talistic domination.*^ 

Labour's  resistance  of  reactionary  capitalistic  interests  may,  for 
lack  of  intelligent  leadership,  assume  as  instinctive  a  form  as  the 
domination  exercised  by  the  reactionary  interests ;  or,  under  intelli- 

39  Babson,  "The  Creative  Urge,"  Current  Affairs,  March  17,  1919,  5. 

*"  For  instance,  the  chief  of  the  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Engineers  said  in  an 
address  to  the  Committee  on  Interstate  Commerce  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in 
support  of  the  Sims  bill  for  the  public  ownership  and  private  operation  of  the  rail- 
roads: "At  the  request  of  these  organizations  (the  railroad  brotherhoods),  the  Sims 
bill  is  now  before  you.  I  speak  as  the  voice  of  these  2,000,000  men,  delegated  by  them 
to  announce  to  this  committee  and  to  the  people  of  this  country  that  they  are  supporting 
this  measure  with  all  the  strength  and  all  the  unity  of  purpose  that  can  move  so  large 
a  body  of  citizens. 

"  Joined  with  us  and  represented  by  Mr.  Morrison  is  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor,  adding  three  million  and  a  half  of  men  to  (hat  body  of  railway  employes,  who 
instituted  this  movement. 

"  The  full  force  of  capitalistic  organizations  has  been  set  against  labor  to  hold 
and  to  keep  all  the  profit  of  industry.  The  strength  of  the  labor  unions  has  been 
exerted  to  wrest  from  capital  some  share  of  the  profits  for  the  wage  earners. 

"This  has  been  a  perpetual  struggle  by  the  workers  to  maintain  a  tolerable  stand- 
ard of  existence;  on  the  part  of  capital  to  amass  greater  profits.  At  times  both  sides 
could  ignore  the  needs  of  the  public.  But  now  the  very  growth  of  the  labor  organi- 
zations has  brought  into  their  ranks  a  great  mass  of  the  consumers.  .  .  . 

"  For  whatever  the  worker  receives  in  wages  he  must  spend  for  the  necessaries  of 
life.  .  .  .  The  hope  of  a  finer  life  is  never  realized.  So  long  as  consumers  are  forced 
to  pay  extortionate  profits  .  .  .  there  is  no  solution  of  the  industrial  problem."  (Re- 
ported in  the  Utica  Observer,  Aug.  6,  1919.) 

*i  Wolf,  "Securing  the  Initiative  of  the  Workman,"  Atner.  Econ  Rev.,  IX  (Supple- 
ment) :  120-121 ;  Wolf,  "Individuality  in  Industry,"  Proceedings  of  Employment  Man- 
agers' Conference,  1917,  U.  S.  Bur.  Lab.  Statistics,  Bulletin  No.  227,  201-204;  Veblen, 
"The  Captains  of  Finance  and  the  Engineers,"  The  Dial,  June  14,  1919,  596-606; 
Smyth,  "Is  the  'Art  of  Efliciency '  Efficient?"  Industrial  Management,  Nov.,  1917, 
203-207 ;  Gantt,  "  Organizing  for  Work." 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       85 

gent  leadership,  for  instance,  the  leadership  of  progressive  Indus- 
trial engineers,  progressive  employers,  progressive  labour  leaders 
and  progressive  political  leaders,  it  may  take  an  intelligent  form. 
With  the  development  of  an  intelligent  leadership,  and  with  the 
increasing  secession  of  workmen  from  the  conventional  mass  of 
voters,  sovereignty  as  a  mere  obedience-compelling  power  will  be 
no  longer  possible.  As  the  masses  cease  conventionally  to  accept 
law  as  a  command  to  be  obeyed,  the  state  can  continue  to  exist  only 
if  the  economic  groups  which  have  long  acted  as  units  in  economic 
adjustments  become  units  for  political  adjustment  in  economic  mat- 
ters.^^ 

When  an  industrial  group  has  long  acted  as  an  economic  unit,  it 
begins  to  become  conscious  of  the  larger  aspects  of  its  group  pur- 
pose, the  political  aspects;  and,  when  a  number  of  these  groups 
have  developed  this  political  consciousness,  the  economic  basis  is 
beginning  to  form  for  a  new  type  of  state.  Political  scientists  who 
predict  this  change  in  the  form  of  the  state  maintain  that  the  na- 
tional parliaments  that  represent  geographical  areas  should  delib- 
erate and  decide  only  questions  that  concern  the  people  as 
a  whole,  for  instance,  questions  affecting  the  people  as  con- 
sumers, and  questions  of  the  regulation  of  banking,  while  there 
should  be  parliaments  representing  the  different  occupational  groups 
to  decide  questions  of  the  management  of  industry.  It  is  main- 
tained that  "  jurisdiction  must  be  coextensive  with  knowledge  and 
competence  in  action,  .  .  .  that  .  .  .  government  should  be  based 
on  a  realistic  analysis  of  the  different  functions  to  be  performed."  ^^ 
With  representative  government  thus  based  on  functional  divisions, 
we  should  "  have  done  with  this  confusion  where  legislatures  also 
contend  with  '  the  railroad  vote,'  '  the  packers'  vote,'  '  the  steel 
interests,'  '  the  oil  group,'  '  the  insurance  clique,'  and  so  on.  It  is 
not  so  much  that  these  special  interests  are  corrupt  as  that  they  are 
misplaced  and  hence  inefficient.  The  place  for  industrial  Interests 
to  be  voiced  and  decisions  made  is  in  a  body  representative  of  all 
industrial  interests   avowedly  meeting  together   for  purposes   of 

*2  The  ideal  of  an  industrial  democracy  is  opposed  by  reactionary  employers'  asso- 
ciations which  hold  that  the  United  States  is  "  a  republic,  not  a  democracy,"  that 
"  extreme  democracy  is  Bolshevism,"  and  that  "  democratizing  industrial  institutions 
means  Russianizing  them."  (See  the  Open  Shop  Revieiv,  May,  1919,  194-206.)  For 
a  contrary  view  see  Ward,  "  The  New  Social  Order,"  239-240. 

«  Tead,  "  The  Meaning  of  National  Guilds,"  The  Dial,  Vol.  LXVII,  Aug.  23,  1919, 
150. 


86        THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

democratic  control  and  operation  in  the  public  interest."  *^  Under 
this  organization  labour  would  cease  to  be  used  as  a  commodity, 
with  raw  materials,  in  profit-seeking,  and  the  whole  body  of  work- 
men, unskilled  workers  as  well  as  skilled,  and  also  managers,  tech- 
nicians and  office  workers,  would  compose  the  voting  body  of  an 
industry,  which  would  choose,  not  only  its  representatives  in  the 
political  body,  but  also  the  industrial  managers  from  the  foremen 
up.^'^ 

This  proposition  for  the  reorganization  of  the  state  obviously  is 
not  a  purely  legal  one  but  involves  social-psychological  problems.*'' 
Indeed  the  arguments  on  which  its  protagonists  most  rely  are  social- 
psychological  arguments.  They  insist  "  that  the  guild  state  im- 
plies a  new  motive  dominant  in  industry.  Industry  is  to  be  a  pub- 
lic service  conducted  in  close  relation  to  known  demands  and  needs. 
No  one  by  virtue  of  ownership  is  to  have  the  power  to  say  what 
land  or  material  resources  shall  be  used,  or  the  power  to  exact  a 
perennial  tribute  for  their  use.   .   .   . 

"  Regarding  the  problem  of  individual  motive  for  work  and  pro- 
ductiveness, the  guild  analysis  is  guilty  of  no  over-generous  assump- 
tions about  human  nature.  It  of  course  denies  the  proposition  that 
the  central  driving  motive  in  industry  has  to  be  private  profit.  But 
it  jumps  to  no  communist  proposal  of  equal  pay  or  labor  tickets 
or  any  other  unusual  device.  It  contends  rather  that  the  industries 
shall  be  reasonably  autonomous  as  regards  determination  of  re- 
wards to  be  paid  for  work;  and  that,  with  profit  to  all,  an  industry's 
superior  efficiency  in  reducing  costs  might  become  a  factor  in  this 
determination."  ^'^ 

The  more  strictly  political  aspects  of  the  proposed  reorganization 
also  involve  social-psychological  considerations.  For  instance,  it 
is  said  that  the  interest  of  most  men  in  politics  is  slight  if  they  look 
at  political  problems  as  individual  citizens  living  in  a  certain  geo- 
graphical area,  but  strong  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  occu- 
pational interests;  that  not  only  issues  but  also  candidates  would 
arouse  a  more  intelligent  Interest  if  they  were  representatives  of 
the  voters'   occupational  group,  instead  of  merely  their  district, 

**lbid.,  151. 

*'  Cole,  "  The  National  Guilds  Movement  in  Great  Britain,"  U.  S.  Dept.  of  Labor, 
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Monthly  Labor  Revieiv,  July,  1919,  24-32. 
<6  Follett,  "  The  New  State,"  Pts.  I,  IIL 
*^Tead,  op.  cit.,  151.     See  also  Cole,  "Self-Government  in  Industry,"  272-274. 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       87 

and  that  their  conduct  as  representatives  of  such  groups  could  be 
more  intelligently  judged  than  if  they  represented  a  geographical 
district  with  its  chaos  of  interests.  Undoubtedly  political  progress 
lies  in  so  reforming  political  arrangements  as  to  supplement  the 
inevitable  tendency  of  people  to  follow  personal  leadership  ^^  with 
a  stimulus  to  a  critical  following  of  such  leadership;  and  intimacy 
of  knowledge  of  the  leader  and  a  vital  and  understanding  interest 
in  the  issues  is  indispensable  to  this  critical  relation.  Wherefore, 
it  is  contended  that  representation  based  on  occupational  groups 
would  increase  the  citizen's  effective  interest  in  politics.  Again,  by 
accepting  this  basis  of  representation,  it  is  said,  the  intense  class 
conflict  would  be  allayed  because  the  adjustment  of  group  interests 
would  be  facilitated  by  a  parliament  in  which  all  groups  were  fairly 
represented. 

Certain  social-psychological  processes  would  be  as  fundamental  in 
the  proposed  new  form  of  state  as  in  the  old.  With  an  occupa- 
tional basis  the  final  alignment  would  be  psychological  because  each 
occupational  group  would  be  divided  into  progressive  and  con- 
servative factions.  Again,  the  political  influence  of  a  group  would 
not  necessarily  be  in  proportion  to  its  numbers.  The  influence  of 
the  representatives  of  a  numerically  unimportant  group  would  not 
necessarily  be  negligible,  because  the  average  intelligence  of  that 
group  might  be  high  and  its  leadership  very  influential  over  the 
leadership  of  other  groups.  Personal  influence  would  be  as  domi- 
nant a  factor  in  the  new  form  of  government  as  in  the  old.  Hence 
the  proposed  new  form  raises  social-psychological  problems.  It  is 
because  we  have  regarded  problems  of  the  state  as  problems  of  cut 
and  dried  legal  forms  that  we  have  failed  to  reahze  their  social- 
psychological  basis. 

The  problem  of  an  occupational  basis  of  representation  raises 
the  question  of  the  effect  of  such  a  change  on  pohtical  freedom."*^ 
Freedom  of  thought  and  speech  tends  to  be  narrowly  restricted 
where  a  reactionary  class  is  struggling  to  maintain  its  suggestive 
control  of  ignorant  masses,  or  a  resisting  class  is  struggling  to  main- 
tain its  newly  acquired  control.  Where  a  reactionary  class  is  still 
in  control,^*'  it  represses  freedom  of  thought  and  speech  and  the 

*s  Croly,  "Progressive  Democracy,"  313. 

*9  Reckitt  and  Bechhofer,  "  The  Meaning  of  National  Guilds,"  22. 
^''During  the  great  steel  strike  of  1919,  the  "business  men"  of  the  steel  mill  towns 
of  Pennsylvania  exercised  an  autorcratic  repression  of  freedom  of  speech  and  assem- 


88       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

resisting  class  declares  loudly  for  freedom.  But  when  the  resist- 
ing class  wins  control  it  may  become  as  repressive  as  the  dominating 
class,  through  fear  of  that  class  regaining  control.  Suppose,  now, 
instead  of  intensely  conflicting  and,  therefore,  intolerant  classes, 
which  are  rivalling  one  another  to  control  the  masses,  there  were  a 
number  of  politically  organized  occupational  groups.  Instead  of 
an  ignorant,  conventionalized  mass  of  voters  blocked  off  into  dis- 
tricts and  wards,  the  voters  would  be  organized,  for  the  settlement 
of  certain  issues,  according  to  occupation,  each  group  alive,  or  grad- 
ually awakening  to  a  vital  political  purpose,  conscious  of  other  live 
groups  with  similarly  vital  purposes,  jealous  of  its  political  free- 
dom, and  aware  of  the  necessity  of  allowing  other  groups  a  like  free- 
dom. Under  such  an  arrangement  the  masses  would,  it  seems,  be 
less  subject  than  at  present  to  the  control  of  extremely  intolerant 
conflicting  classes,  each,  when  in  control,  interfering  with  political 
freedom  in  order  to  maintain  its  control.  To  repress  freedom 
seems  easy  and  is  the  instinctive  impulse  in  a  period  of  keen  class 
conflict,  where  the  voters  are  a  conglomerate  mass  of  varying  shades 
of  ignorance  and  indifference,  and  are  subject  to  the  control  of  news- 
papers and  demonstrations.  But  such  repression  would  seem,  it  is 
said,  less  easy  if  even  the  weakest  groups,  numerically,  were  in  a 
position  to  raise  a  strong  protest  against  repression  of  their  propa- 
ganda. Evidently,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the 
bearing  of  the  proposed  change  in  representation  on  the  problem 
of  political  freedom  without  understanding  the  psychology  of  social 
suggestion,  especially  the  processes  of  social  suggestion  that  are 
involved  in  the  rivalry  of  classes  to  control  the  masses  of  a  body 
politic. 

The  conflict  of  classes  makes  for  social  progress  in  the  highest 
degree  only  if  the  problem  presented  by  any  particular  conflict  is 
regarded  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  public  welfare,  not  the  welfare 

blage  in  the  towns  either  through  the  city  officials,  or  where  these  were  not  pliable, 
by  meeting  at  the  train  speakers  who  were  to  address  the  strikers  and  notifying  them 
Y  to  leave  town.  (Shaw,  "  Closed  Towns,"  Survey,  Nov.  8,  1919,  38-64.)  The  action 
of  the  United  States  government  against  the  miners  in  the  coal  strike  of  1919  was  sim- 
ilarly autocratic  in  that  the  government  had  declared  the  war  at  an  end  and  had 
ceased  months  ago  to  check  the  coal  operators  in  raising  their  charges,  and  then  en- 
joined the  coal  miners  not  only  from  striking  but  also  from  saying  anything  that  would 
encourage  a  strike  on  the  ground  that  the  war  was  not  at  an  end.  (Hard,  "  What 
the  Miners  are  Thinking,"  Neiv  Republic,  Nov.  12,  1919,  324.)The  repression  of  free- 
dom of  speech  during  this  period  of  great  strikes  shows  the  hand  of  a  dominant  class 
on  the  government,  both  city,  and  state,  and  national.  (Hard,  "A  Class  Policy  in 
Coal,"  New  Republic,  Nov.  19,  1919,  352-355.) 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  THE  CLASS  STRUGGLE       89 

of  a  class.^^  But  the  welfare  of  a  class  is  a  part  of  the  public 
welfare.  The  public  welfare  can  be  rightly  conceived  only  by  con- 
sidering primarily  not  the  legal  status  of  each  class  but  its  human 
status.  The  law,  having  developed  primarily  for  the  protection  of 
propertied  interests,  emphasizes  the  welfare  of  propertied  classes 
at  the  expense  of  non^propertied.  While  legal  status  emphasizes 
the  welfare  of  propertied  classes,  human  status  emphasizes  the 
welfare  of  non-propertied,  because  these  constitute  the  vast  major- 
ity of  the  population  and  do  the  large  part  of  the  work  of  the 
world.^^  Human  status  means  status  as  a  being  with  a  human  per- 
sonality which  has  its  own  laws  of  development.^^  As  a  human 
being  in  society  man  has  an  aspiration  for  development  that  forbids 
his  acquiescing  in  economic  conditions  which  make  that  develop- 
ment impossible.  The  material  basis  of  satisfactions  is  limited  and 
this  economic  scarcity  requires  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  all  those 
whose  superior  personal  force  or  talent  enable  them  to  appropriate 
more  than  their  needs  require.  Hence  the  necessity  of  the  state; 
it  subordinates  the  competitive  interests  of  man  to  the  common  re- 
quirements for  the  development  of  personality.^*  The  form  of 
the  state  and  its  laws  and  institutions  will  change  in  order  that  it 
may  exercise  more  fully  this  function.^''  The  most  ideal  form  of 
state  requires  the  exercise  of  force  in  the  regulation  of  competitive 
interests  and  the  suppression  of  selfish,  reactionary  interests.^®  Up 
to  the  present  time  the  state  has  placed  property  rights  above  the 
right  of  the  non-propertied  majority  to  conditions  that  make  pos- 
sible the  maximum  development  of  personality  under  the  inevitable 
economic  scarcity.  At  these  various  points,  therefore, —  develop- 
ment of  personality  in  society,  reaction  of  personality  on  society,  ad- 
justment of  competitive  interests  in  the  state,  changes  in  form  of 
state  for  more  satisfactory  adjustment,  class  domination  of  state  — 
social  psychology  is  in  close  touch  with  political  science. 

Our  analysis  of  political  relations  has  revealed  a  change  in  recent 
years  in  those  psychological  relations  which  have  been  collectively 

51  Commons,   "  Labor   and  Administration,"   Chs.  V-VI. 

52  The  conflict  between  legal  and  human  status  recurred  again  and  again  in  the 
hearings  before  the  British  Coal  Commission  (Gleason,  "The  British  Coal  Commis- 
sion—  Robert  Smillie,"  The  Survey,  July  5,  1919,  521). 

53  Hocking,  "  Human  Nature  and  Its  Remaking,"  Pts.  I-II. 
5*  Ibid.,  Ch.  XXVIII. 

55  Ibid.,  Ch.  XXIX. 

••  Dewey,  "  The  Discrediting  of  Idealism,"  The  New  Republic,  Oct.  8,  191 9,  284-286. 


90       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

termed  sovereignty.  To  understand  the  nature  of  sovereignty  re- 
quires more  careful  inductive  studies  of  the  psychological  processes 
than  have  yet  been  made.  The  opportunities  for  psychological 
studies  of  sovereignty  in  times  past  are  limited,  because  an  analysis 
of  political  attitudes  in  the  past  is  impossible  except  through  docu- 
mentary sources.  Thinkers  who  lay  great  emphasis  on  induction 
will,  therefore,  appreciate  the  value  of  analysis  of  political  atti- 
tudes in  the  present.  Confusion  in  the  discussion  of  the  nature  of 
sovereignty  can  be  avoided  by  recognizing  that  theories  must  change 
not  only  as  conditions  change  but  also  as  methods  of  thinking 
change.  A  survival  of  the  deductive  attitude  with  an  absorption 
in  history  causes  an  over-emphasis  on  obedience-compelling  power. 
The  first  great  thinker  to  emphasize  the  social-psychological  point 
of  view,  Montesquieu,^'^  made  the  mistake  of  too  much  emphasis 
on  ancient  history  and  too  little  study  of  the  governments  of  his 
own  time,^^  with  the  result  of  transmitting  at  least  one  misconcep- 
tion as  to  government  and  sovereignty  in  his  own  time.^^  The 
proper  emphasis  on  induction  will  result  in  an  appreciation  of  the 
largeness  of  the  social-psychological  aspect  of  the  problem,  an  em- 
phasis on  intensive  study  of  the  nature  of  sovereignty  in  the  present, 
and  in  a  cautious  approach  to  theory.  It  is  evident  that,  for  the 
future  development  of  political  science,  exhaustive  studies  of  the 
nature  of  sovereignty  in  the  present,  and  the  accumulation  of  such 
studies  year  after  year,  will  eventually  furnish  valuable  sources  for 
the  historical  study  of  sovereignty. 

^'^  Ehrlich,  "  Montesquieu  and  Sociological  Jurisprudence,"  Harvard  Laiu  Review, 
XXIX:  583. 

^s  Ibid.,  597. 

5®  His  doctrine  of  the  separation  of  powers.  See  Montesquieu,  "  The  Spirit  of  the 
Laws,"  trans,  by  Nugent  and  Pritchard,  Bk.  XI,  Ch.  6.  See  also  Goodnow,  "  Prin- 
ciples of  Constitutional  Government,"  84-85,  153. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    PSYCHOLOGY    OF    NATIONALITY 

WHEN  the  struggle  of  classes  for  the  obedience-compelling 
power  of  the  state  becomes  intense,  when,  in  a  capitalistic 
state,  a  resisting  under  class  is  forbidden  to  hold  meet- 
ings in  public  buildings  and  other  public  places,  in  order  to  prevent 
the  dissemination  of  their  ideas,  when,  in  a  socialistic  state,  a  capi- 
talistic class  is  likewise  subjected  to  repression  by  the  strong  arm 
of  the  state,  it  may  appear  that  class  consciousness  is  more  intense 
than  consciousness  of  national  unity.  This  view  is  emphasized 
when  it  is  seen  that  the  dominant  class  of  the  capitalistic  nation 
warms  toward  capitalistic  classes  in  other  nations  and  through  its 
control  of  the  press  expresses  its  detestation  of  resisting  under 
classes  in  other  nations,  and  when  it  is  seen  that  the  dominant  class 
of  the  socialistic  nation  warms  toward  the  "  proletariat  "  in  other 
nations  and  expresses  its  hostility  to  capitalistic  classes  of  other 
nations.  The  increasing  intensity  of  the  class  struggle  does  indeed 
develop  a  class  internationalism  which  weakens  nationalistic  feeling. 
Nevertheless,  the  sense  of  nationality  is  by  no  means  obliterated.^ 
It  is  a  phenomenon  more  largely  of  deep-seated  social  attitudes  ^ 
than  is  class  consciousness,  in  which  clearly  conscious  ideas  and 
impulses  are  more  conspicuous  elements.  But  in  a  time  of  extreme 
hostihty  between  nations  it  becomes  a  phenomenon  of  impulse  and 
idea  —  a  clearly  conscious  purpose  to  remain  distinct  and  inde- 
pendent and  to  resist  influences  contrary  thereto.^  Because  a  state 
of  mind  is  the  essential  thing  in  nationality,^  social  psychology  is, 
in  the  sense  of  nationality,  closely  related  to  political  science.  The 
purpose  of  the  present  chapter  is  not  to  offer  a  psychological  analy- 
sis of  the  sense  of  nationality,  which  would  require  a  volume,  but 

1  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  socialistic  parties  of  various  nations   abandoned 
their  conception  of  the  international  brotherhood  of  all  workers  to  support  the  national 
purpose  of  their  several  nations. 
/    2  Perry,  "The  Present  Conflict  of  Ideals,"  387-388. 

3  Pillsbury,  "  The  Psychology  of  Nationality  and  Internationalism,"  Ch.  IV. 
•*  Perry,  of.  cit.,  381;  Pillsbury,  op.  c'tt.,  246-247. 

91 


92       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

to  Indicate  the  relation  of  social  psychology  to  political  science  in 
this  connection. 

With  the  Increasing  tendency  to  the  migration  of  peoples  and  to 
intermarriage,  likeness  of  race  has  become  less  Important  in  the 
sense  of  nationality  and  the  mere  fact  of  association  more  impor- 
tant. A  people,  more  closely  associated  with  each  other  than  with 
outsiders,  inevitably  becomes  group-conscious  ^  and  shares  the  im- 
pulse to  extend  the  group  territory  and  otherwise  to  seek  supe- 
riority as  a  group.  This  sense  of  nationality  Is  much  weakened 
unless  the  people  speak  the  same  language.^  In  addition  to  this  su- 
perficial sense  of  nationality  due  to  contiguity  and  communication, 
there  is  a  deeper  sense  when  a  people  have  certain  traditions  In 
common,  certain  like  fundamental  attitudes,  as  the  same  rehgious 
or  political  attitudes.  From  this  fundamental  likeness  of  attitudes, 
other  forms  of  likeness  —  like  impulses,  like  Ideas  —  result.  Es- 
sential In  the  unity  of  a  people  Is  their  political  attitude.  A  com- 
mon consciousness  of  the  same  country  of  blrth,^  the  same  lan- 
guage,^ the  same  religion,®  and  a  similar  physiognomy  enhance  na- 
tional feeling;  ^°  with  the  growth  of  empire  a  common  political 
attitude  has  become  more  and  more  essential. ^^  It  Is  at  this  point 
that  political  science  Is  closely  connected  with  social  psychology  In 
the  conception  of  nationality.  For  the  political  attitude  essen- 
tially determines  the  nature  of  the  political  institutions,  and  these 
are  subject  matter  of  political  science. ^^ 

The  political  attitude  of  different  nations  varies  according  to  the 
degree  of  submission  with  which  the  masses  acquiesce  In  the  proj- 
ects for  self-aggrandizement  of  a  ruling  dynasty  or  a  dominant 
class.^^     The  submission  is  less  extreme  among  the  Anglo-Saxons 

6  Pillsbury,  op.  cit.,  Ch.  II. 

8  Ibid.,  144. 

^  Zimmern,  "  Nationality  and  Government,"  96. 

8 Buck,  "Language  and  the  Sentiment  of  Nationality,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  X: 44-70; 
Margoliouth,  "  Language  as  a  Consolidating  and  Separating  Influence,"  in  Papers  on 
Inter-Racial   Problems,   First   Universal   Races   Congress,   University  of  London,   1911, 

57-61- 

8  Davids,  "  Religion  as  a  Consolidating  and  Separating  Influence,"  in  Papers  on 
Inter-Racial  Problems,  First  Universal  Races  Congress,  University  of  London,  1911, 
62-66 ;  Thomas,  "  The  Prussian-Polish  Situation :  An  Experiment  in  Assimilation," 
Amer.  Jour.  Sociol.,  XIX:  627. 

lORuyssen,  "What  is  a  Nationality?"  Intern.  Concil,  No.  112,  8-22. 

"Veblen,  "The  Nature  of  Peace,"  85-103. 

12  Pillsbury,  op.  cit.,  Ch.  IX. 

18  Veblen,  op.  cit.,  26. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  93 

than  among  the  Germans  "  before  the  revolution.  At  one  extreme 
is  the  attitude  of  the  nation  which  observes  unquestioning  obedience 
to  the  commands  of  an  autocracy,  at  the  other  extreme  the  condi- 
tioned acquiescence  of  the  masses  of  a  democracy;  but  one  must 
avoid  a  hard  and  fast  distinction  in  thought,  as  there  is  none  in 
psychological  fact,  in  spite  of  the  patent  constitutional  distinction 
between  autocracy  and  democracy.^^ 

The  autocratic  attitude  is  one  of  a  set  purpose  to  compel  acqui- 
escence of  subjects  in  projects  for  national  aggrandizement.  This 
purpose  is  "  the  result  of  a  peculiar  moral  attitude  or  bent,  habitual 
to  such  statesmen,  and  in  its  degree  also  habitual  to  their  com- 
patriots, and  is  indispensably  involved  in  the  Imperial  frame  of 
mind.  ...  In  short,  the  dynastic  statesman  is  under  the  governance 
of  a  higher  morality,  binding  him  to  the  service  of  his  nation's 
ambition  —  or  in  point  of  fact,  to  the  personal  service  of  his  dynas- 
tic master  —  to  which  it  is  his  dutiful  privilege  loyally  to  devote 
all  his  powers  of  force  and  fraud. 

"  Democratically-minded  persons,  who  are  not  moved  by  the  call 
of  loyalty  to  a  gratuitous  personal  master,  may  have  some  difficulty 
in  appreciating  the  force  and  the  moral  austerity  of  this  spirit  of 
devotion  to  an  ideal  of  dynastic  aggrandizement,  and  in  seeing 
how  its  paramount  exigence  will  set  aside  all  meticulous  scruples 
of  personal  rectitude  and  veracity,  as  being  a  shabby  with-holding 
of  service  due."  ^^ 

The  masses  of  a  nation  acquiesce  in  the  prevailing  political  atti- 
tude, if  not  because  it  is  congenial,  then  because  of  response  to  social 
suggestion.  It  needs  to  be  congenial  in  order  to  evoke  a  spon- 
taneous, enthusiastic  patriotism.  Thus  Bismarck  writes  of  German 
patriotism:  "  In  order  that  German  patriotism  should  be  active 
and  effective,  it  needs  as  a  rule  the  middle  term  of  dependence  on 
a  dynasty;  independent  of  dynasty  it  rarely  comes  to  the  rising 
point,  though  in  theory  it  daily  does  so,  in  parliament,  in  the  press, 
in  public  meeting;  in  practice  the  German  needs  either  attachment 
to  a  dynasty  or  the  goad  of  anger,  hurrying  him  into  action:  the 
latter  phenomenon,  however,  by  its  own  nature  is  not  permanent. 
It  is  as  a  Prussian,  a  Hanoverian,  a  Wurtemberger,  a  Bavarian  or  a 

1*  Ibid.,  104-108. 

i^Laski,  "The  Responsibility  of  the  State  in  England,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  March,  1919, 
466. 
i«  Yeblen,  op.  cit.,  84-86. 


94       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Hessian,  rather  than  as  a  German,  that  he  is  disposed  to  give  un- 
equivocal proof  of  patriotism;  and  in  the  lower  orders  and  the  par- 
liamentary groups  it  will  be  long  before  it  is  otherwise.   .   .   . 

".  .  .  The  preponderance  of  dynastic  attachment,  and  the  use 
of  a  dynasty  as  the  indispensable  cement  to  hold  together  a  definite 
portion  of  the  nation  calling  itself  by  the  name  of  the  dynasty  is 
a  specific  peculiarity  of  the  German  Empire.   .   .   . 

"  Whatever  may  be  the  origin  of  this  factitious  union  of  particu- 
larist  elements,  its  result  is  that  the  individual  German  readily  obeys 
the  command  of  a  dynasty  to  harry  with  fire  and  sword,  and  with 
his  own  hands  to  slaughter  his  German  neighbours  and  kinsfolk 
as  a  result  of  quarrels  unintelligible  to  himself.  To  examine 
whether  this  characteristic  be  capable  of  rational  justification  is  not 
the  problem  of  a  German  statesman,  so  long  as  it  is  strongly  enough 
pronounced  for  him  to  reckon  upon  it."  "  Contrast  this  spon- 
taneous subservience  to  a  dynasty  with  the  traditional  independence 
and  individualism  of  the  English  and  American  people.  Their 
patriotism  is  spontaneous  when  it  is  a  question  of  asserting  inde- 
pendence against  a  German  dynastic  ambition  for  world  supremacy. 

Consciousness  of  a  distinguishing  political  attitude  becomes  par- 
ticularly strong  in  the  sense  of  nationality  when  a  nation  is  con- 
scious of  an  essential  difference  between  the  attitude  which  has  de- 
termined its  political  institutions  in  the  past  and  the  attitude  which 
has  determined  the  institutions  of  a  rival  nation  —  for  instance, 
the  American  consciousness  of  the  difference  between  the  ideal  of 
liberty,  enunciated  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  the 
German  ideal  of  authority  emphasized  by  Bismarck.^^  This  con- 
sciousness of  a  distinct  pohtical  attitude  is  important  in  the  sense 
of  nationality  of  a  great  empire  which  contains  people  of  different 
nativities,  languages,  religions,  and  physical  aspects.  It  is  also  es- 
sential in  determining  the  inclination  of  one  nation  to  co-operate 
with  another  against  a  third;  this  was  illustrated  in  the  incentive 
given  the  United  States  by  the  overthrow  of  autocracy  in  Russia  to 
join  the  Entente  allies  in  the  war  against  the  Teutonic  allies. 

It  takes  a  conflict  between  nations  to  bring  out  vividly,  in  the 
consciousness  of  each  nation,  its  essential  political  attitude.  Just 
as  the  Englishman's  conception  of  private  rights  is  ordinarily  sub- 

17  Butler  (editor),  "  Bismarck,  The  Man  and  the  Statesman,"  I:  320-324. 
^^Ibid.,  I:  314-315. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  95 

conscious,  and  he  becomes  conscious  of  his  rights  only  by  fighting 
for  them,^^  so  a  nation  becomes  conscious  of  its  political  attitude 
by  fighting  for  it.  Fighting  against  Germany  not  only  called  at- 
tention to  the  democratic  political  attitude  as  the  thing  fought  for, 
but  also  called  attention  to  the  German  attitude  of  domination- 
submission  as  the  thing  fought  against.  The  attention  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  democratic  nation  was  called  not  only  to  their  own  demo- 
cratic attitude  of  freedom  but  also  to  the  defects  in  their  political 
freedom,  to  the  attitude  of  domination-submission  in  their  political 
party  organizations,  and  in  their  denial  to  women  of  the  right  to 
vote.  Their  attention  was  further  called  to  the  contradiction  be- 
tween a  democratic  political  attitude  and  the  attitude  of  domina- 
tion-submission in  industrial  relations;  and  there  arose  a  demand 
for  industrial  democracy. ^^  Attention  was  called,  also,  to  the  fact 
that  the  autocratic  attitude  determined  ecclesiastical  ^^  and  aca- 
demic relations, ^^  and  also  the  editing  of  the  press. ^^  The  hitherto 
unconscious  psychological  basis  of  the  various  sections  of  social  or- 
ganization was  scrutinized  and  compared  with  the  attitude  which 
the  conflict  had  made  an  ideal;  and  the  wisdom  of  the  domination- 
submission  relation,  where  it  continued  to  exist  in  a  nation  pro- 
fessedly democratic,  became  a  matter  of  discussion. 

This  prominence  acquired  by  the  democratic  attitude  was  dis- 
pleasing to  those  classes  in  France,  England  and  the  United  States 
whose  attitude  to  democracy  was  the  reactionary  capitalistic  atti- 
tude of  distrust  of  popular  rule  and  the  aristocratic  attitude  of 
contempt  for  the  masses.^^  The  outbreak  of  the  war  found  them 
acclaiming  democracy,  but,  with  its  progress,  they  were  sobered 
with  a  sense  of  the  significance  of  a  real  democratic  movement,  and 
what  it  would  mean  for  their  privileged  position.  "  When  the 
war  broke  out,  all  the  reactionaries  in  England  and  France  began 
to  speak  of  the  danger  to  democracy,  although  until  that  moment 
they  had  opposed  democracy  with  all  their  strength.     They  were 

18  See  the  chapter  entitled,  Psychological  Implications  of  Interpretations  of  Private 
Rights. 

20  Angel  1,    "  The   British   Revolution    and   the   American    Democracy,"   Pt.    II,    Chs. 
I-IV,  Appendix  I;  Kellogg  and  Gleason,  "British  Labor  and  the  War." 

21  Croly,  "The  Future  of  the  State,"  Neiv  Republic,  Sept.  15,  1917,  179-181. 

22  Veblen,   "The  Higher  Learning  in  America";   Dewey,  "The   Case  of  the  Pro- 
fessor and  the  Public  Interest,"  The  Dial,  Nov.  8,  1917,  435. 

23  Lippmann,  "  Liberty  and  the  News." 

2*  Kallen,  "  The  Structure  of  Lasting  Peace,"  vii-ix. 


96       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

not  sincere  in  so  speaking;  the  impulse  of  resistance  to  Germany 
made  them  value  whatever  was  endangered  by  the  German  attack. 
They  loved  democracy  because  they  hated  Germany;  but  they 
thought  they  hated  Germany  because  they  loved  democracy."  ^^ 

In  addition  to  the  attitudes  that  constitute  the  sense  of  nation- 
ality, there  are  certain  instinctive  impulses,  which  operate  along 
the  lines  of  the  essential  attitudes.  People  have  an  instinctive  fear 
of  standing  alone,  an  instinct  to  draw  together  for  security,^*'  to 
feel  a  gratifying  sense  of  solidarity^ —  of  "  each  for  all  and  all  for 
each."  It  is  when  people  are  in  this  mood  of  apprehension  and 
drawing  together  that  the  guide  posts  of  past  experience  —  the 
symbols  of  a  common  language  and  a  traditional  political  allegiance 

—  are  influential  in  determining  with  whom  they  shall  draw  to- 
gether, and  from  whom  they  shall  draw  apart.^^  National  am- 
bition, also,  stimulates  a  sense  of  nationality,^^  which  operates  in 
the  direction  particularly  of  the  political  attitude  that  distinguishes 
the  nation.^^  Under  the  incentive  that  is  imparted  by  this  national 
ambition,  other  attitudes,  as  the  consciousness  of  a  common  coun- 
try, language,  religion,  fall  in  abeyance  in  comparison  with  the  po- 
litical attitude.  Or  these  other  attitudes  may  continue  active,  and 
may  work  at  cross  purposes  with  the  national  ambition  for  increased 
economic  opportunities  as  a  means  of  extension  of  the  influence  of 
the  political  attitude. 

In  time  of  war  or  other  intense  international  rivalry  the  sense  of 
nationality  involves  a  vivid  collective  consciousness,^"  which  includes 
a  consciousness  not  only  of  the  national  political  attitude  but  also 
of  the  immediate  group  purpose  and  of  the  many  things  which 
everybody  is  saying  and  doing  toward  realizing  that  purpose.  An 
individual  does  not  share  in  the  collective  consciousness  unless  he 
ceases  to  feel  personal  impulses  which  conflict  therewith  ^^  and 
comes  to  feel  the  common  impulses  with  reference  to  national  sym- 
bols and  the  national  ideas  which  are  being  held  before  the  people. 
For  instance,  during  the  nation-wide  campaign  of   19 17,  in  the 

25  Russell,  "  Why  Men  Fight,"  15-16. 
26Pillsbury,  op.  cit.,  53. 

-  27Kallen,  "The  Structure  of  Lasting  Peace,"  19-20. 
^spillsbury,  op.  cit.,  215. 

29Veblen,  op.  cit.,  31  flF. 

80  Veblen,  op.  cit.,  89 ;  Pillsbury,  op.  cit.,  Ch.  VI,  202-205. 

•iMcDougall,  "The  Will  of  the  People,"  Sociological  Review,  1912,  V:  89-104. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  97 

United  States,  to  sell  "  liberty  bonds,"  the  idea  of  buying  liberty 
bonds  was  held  before  the  people  throughout  the  nation  by  adver- 
tising and  by  the  press;  and  that  man  did  not  share  in  the  collective 
consciousness  who,  in  investing  his  money,  thought  only  of  the 
interest  to  be  gained  from  the  investment  and  did  not  share  the 
impulse  to  invest  in  liberty  bonds  for  the  sake  of  helping  the  gov- 
ernment to  win  the  war.  This  impulse  to  help  the  government 
against  the  enemies  of  the  nation  was  the  essential  impulse  of  the 
collective  consciousness.  "  If  you  can't  fight,  your  money  can," 
was  the  slogan.  The  essential  impulse  was  to  "  fight  "  on  behalf  of 
the  country,^^  and  those  who  exercised  the  social  control  through- 
out the  nation  connected  this  impulse  to  fight  with  the  idea  of  buy- 
ing liberty  bonds,  with  contributions  to  the  Red  Cross,  and  so  on. 
People  who  invested  for  personal  gain,  who  made  work  for  them- 
selves or  their  families  instead  of  for  the  Red  Cross  and  other  na- 
tional agencies  their  first  thought,  did  not  share  fully  in  the  col- 
lective consciousness.  A  collective  consciousness  does  not  neces- 
sarily involve  any  intellectual  agreement  among  the  people  as  to 
the  wisdom  of  the  national  purpose,  nor  even  any  intelligent  idea 
as  to  what  the  national  purpose  may  mean.  It  involves  merely  a 
common  impulse  to  advance  the  national  purpose,  whatever  it  may 
mean,  whether  it  be  wise  or  unwise,  in  the  ways  suggested  by  the 
government,  the  press,  and  the  other  agencies  of  social  control.^^ 
In  time  of  peace  also  there  may  be  a  vivid  national  conscious- 
ness, if  a  nation  is  in  a  state  of  resistance  to  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic domination  and  exploitation  which  is  being  practised  against 
it  by  another.  Instance  the  vivid  national  consciousness  of  Poland 
since  the  attempt  to  Germanize  Poland  was  begun  in  1873.^*  The 
leaders  who  were  killed  in  this  struggle  against  tyranny  became 
symbols  of  the  national  resistance,  and  these  symbols  united  the 
nation  by  intensifying  the  common  consciousness  of  the  prevailing 
attitude  of  resistance.  This  sense  of  solidarity  was  further  stimu- 
lated by  making  of  the  symbols  of  resistance  a  ritual  for  the  group. 
"  In  order  to  see  itself,  the  Polish  people  has  to  look  at  the  past, 
and  there  is  scarcely  a  house  where  one  will  not  find  memorial  pic- 
tures of  the  national  martyrdom.     The  martyrology,  which  no 

82  Russell,  op.  cit.,  14-15. 
s^Pillsbury,  op.  cit.,  198. 

8*  Thomas,    "  The    Prussian-Polish    Situation :    An    Experiment    in    Assimilation," 
Atner.  Jour.  Social.,  March,  1914,  625-640. 


98       THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

other  people  possesses  in  so  developed  a  form,  Is  the  political  rosary 
of  the  Poles,  which  is  prayed  over  unceasingly,  and  whose  cruel 
beads  each  one  has  often  fingered.  In  such  wise  for  years  senti- 
mental men  are  ever  anew  raising  their  voices  and  warning  the 
Polish  people  that  they  ought  not  entirely  to  give  themselves  up  to 
the  fashionable  industrial  organizations;  for  the  trade  union  and 
peasant  association  have  no  Polish  divisions  and  for  them  the  rosary 
has  no  prayer."  ^^  In  the  same  way  religious  persecution  In  the 
past  developed  a  vivid  sectarian  consciousness  and  a  martyrology 
for  the  resisting  sects,  which  strengthened  their  resistance.  Some- 
times a  national  resistance  is  stimulated  by  a  sectarian  resistance, 
as  in  Poland,  which  resisted  Germany  not  only  as  a  nation  but  also 
as  Roman  Catholic  in  religion.^® 

In  a  period  of  intense  international  rivalry  the  political  attitude 
Is  either  given  added  fixity  or,  if  the  nation  proves  unsuccessful  in 
the  rivalry,  Is  weakened.  Does  any  one  doubt  that  a  victory  for 
the  Teutonic  Allies  in  the  World  War  would  not  have  weakened 
our  democratic  attitude  and  strengthened  the  militaristic  atti- 
tude? ^"^  Is  it  not  evident  that  the  victory  for  the  Entente  Allies, 
in  spite  of  the  reactionary  Treaty,  of  Peace  and  in  spite  of  the  sur- 
viving intolerant  and  coercive  spirit  of  the  war  period,  has  stimu- 
lated the  democratic  attitude  throughout  the  world?  That  is  the 
cause  of  the  Increasing  unrest  and  resistance  among  the  workers 
of  the  world  —  it  Is  an  impulsive  movement  toward  Industrial  de- 
mocracy. The  attempted  repression  of  it  is  the  impulsive  reaction 
of  reactionary  capitalistic  Interests  allied  with  a  military  class 
against  democracy. 

But  there  are  other  psychological  effects  of  the  victory  which  are 
formidably  interfering  with  its  favourable  effect  on  democracy. 
To  explain  what  these  are  would  require  several  chapters,  but  the 

85  Bernard,  "  Die  Polenfrage,"  197. 

88  "Ask  a  Pole  his  nationality  and  he  will  not  improbably  reply:  'Catholic.'" 
(Thomas,  op.  cit.,  67.) 

87  In  Japan,  even  while  the  World  War  was  in  progress,  the  success  of  Germany 
against  superior  forces  caused  an  active  German  propaganda  to  be  carried  on  by 
Japanese  officials.  "  I  learned  that  in  the  army  the  conscript  recruits  had  been  sys- 
tematically got  together  and  taught  the  superiority  of  German  institutions  to  those  of 
the  Allies,  and  especially  the  superiority  of  German  militarism  and  the  fact  that  it 
could  not  be  defeated."  (Dewey,  "Liberalism  in  Japan,"  The  Dial,  Oct.  4,  1919, 
284.)  When  Germany  was  defeated  a  wave  of  democratic  sentiment  spread  through- 
out Japan,  which,  however,  receded  because  of  "  the  lesson  of  the  failure  at  Paris  of 
the  fine  words  which  President  Wilson  flourished  when  he  took  the  United  States 
into  the  war."     {Ibid.,  a84.) 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  99 

situation  in  the  United  States  may  be  stated  more  briefly.  The 
opinion  of  the  great  English  and  French  observers  of  American 
life,  that  we  are  a  people  of  a  somewhat  provincial  self-esteem,^^ 
is,  we  must  admit,"  not  without  some  degree  of  truth.  It  had  a 
basis  in  our  sense  of  our  vast,  undeveloped  natural  resources,  in 
the  economic  freedom  of  the  settlers  of  the  country,  and  in  our 
benevolent  attitude  in  offering  a  ho«me  to  the  oppressed  of  the 
nations  of  the  world.  The  coming  of  millions  of  foreigners,  from 
every  nation  of  the  world,  caused  us  to  feel  our  superiority.  Then, 
too,  the  freedom  of  opportunity  that  determined  the  development, 
for  a  time,  of  our  economic  and  political  institutions  caused  these 
to  be  thought  superior  to  those  of  other  nations.  This  sense  of 
superiority  was  still  further  increased  by  our  rapid  rise  to  a  world 
power,  which  was  not  devoid  of  spectacular  incidents  that  stirred 
the  pride  of  the  whole  nation  to  a  high  pitch.  Finally,  the  fact 
that  we  entered  the  World  War  just  in  time  to  save  Europe  from 
the  domination  of  the  German  militarists,  and  that,  after  thus  dra- 
matically ending  the  war,  we  were  asked  to  save  Europe  economic- 
ally, did  not  tend  to  weaken  the  national  self-esteem.  This  psycho- 
logical trait,  or  state,  is  unfavourable  to  the  development  of  de- 
mocracy for  several  reasons.  It  means  that,  as  a  nation,  we  are 
satisfied  with  things  as  they  are,  for  our  very  greatness  makes  it 
unnecessary  to  change  anything.  This  means  that  the  national 
self-esteem  is  particularly  favourable  to  those  classes  in  the  nation 
to  whose  interest  it  is  to  maintain  things  as  they  are,  and  is  un- 
favourable to  those  classes  to  whose  interests  the  prevailing  con- 
ditions are  contrary.  Because  of  the  national  complacency,  the 
former  classes  are  more  repressive  where  movements  for  progress 
occur  than  they  would  otherwise  dare  to  be.  This  psychological 
condition  showed  itself  especially  in  the  coercion  of  labour  in  the 
years  following  the  World  War,  which  was  more  extreme  than 
before,  and  in  the  weak  reaction  against  that  coercion  of  a  public 
that  was  particularly  complacent  at  that  time  because  of  the  happy 
outcome  of  the  war. 

Another  cause  of  the  national  complacency  that  furthered  capi- 
talistic repression  in  this  period  was  the  attitude  of  the  returned 
soldiers.     Many  people  had  believed  that  the  soldiers  would  return 

88  De  Tocqueville,    "Democracy  in  America,"   11:183-184,  238-241;    Bryce,   "The 
American  Commonwealth,"  II :  322. 


loo     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

enthused  for  democracy,  with  a  zest  for  independent  thinking,  and 
for  reform  movements  that  looked  toward  those  developments  in 
political  and  economic  freedom  to  which  our  traditions  committed 
us.  Many  of  them  did  return  in  this  frame  of  mind,  but  the  influ- 
ence of  others  was  thrown  for  reaction  instead  of  progress.  The 
aggressive  reactionaries  had  brought  back  with  them  the  repressive 
spirit  of  military  discipline,  instead  of  an  enthusiasm  for  democ- 
racy, and  the  public,  because  of  its  complacency  as  a  victorious  na- 
tion, and  because  of  its  pride  in  the  soldiers  who  wrought  for  the 
great  victory,  acquiesced  in  the  repressive  and  inquisitorial  be- 
haviour. The  fact  is  that  the  intense  political  rivalry  had  pro- 
duced political  fanatics,  as  intense  sectarian  rivalry  once  produced, 
and  still  does  produce  religious  fanatics.  Intense  rivalry  makes 
the  beliefs  of  the  rivalrous  groups  obsessions  before  which  oppo- 
sition is  to  be  crushed  out  by  force.  This  fanaticism,  which  once 
animated  religious  sects  the  world  over,  among  many  of  the  re- 
turned soldiers  came  to  attach  itself  to  the  nation.  They  thereby 
became  an  unofficial  military  class;  and  the  fanaticism  of  this  class 
was  intensified  by  the  fact  that  it  was  highly  pleasing  to  economic 
and  political  powers  that  be,  and,  therefore,  was  favourably  no- 
ticed in  the  press.  Hence  the  social  control  of  the  military  class 
was  enhanced  by  its  flattering  associations  and  favourable  news- 
paper publicity.  The  same  fanaticism  characterized  the  German 
military  class,  and  the  influence  of  this  class  was  similarly  out  of 
all  proportion  to  its  numbers.  The  extraordinary  influence  of  a 
military  class  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  the  visible  symbol  of  the 
national  superiority.  Its  prestige  as  such  causes  the  people  sub- 
consciously to  accept  the  military  attitudes  in  civil  life. 

The  militaristic  attitude  of  authority-obedience  develops  in  a 
nation  as  a  result  of  certain  relations  between  classes  in  a  nation 
or  between  nations.  Intensifying  economic  rivalry  between  nations 
causes  the  reactionary  economic  interests  of  a  nation  to  desire  an 
assurance  of  the  support  of  a  strong  army  and  navy,  and  intensify- 
ing rivalry  between  capital  and  labour  causes  reactionary  capital- 
istic interests  to  desire  the  assurance  of  military  support  against 
labour.  Changing  international  and  intra-national  relations  might 
conceivably  result  in  compulsory  military  training  in  the  United 
States,  which  development  of  a  military  class  would  accentuate  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  loi 

evils  of  the  military  mind  that  are  already  pronounced  among  us. 
The  military  mind  accepts  the  purpose  laid  on  from  above.  Free- 
dom of  thought  and  speech  is  limited  to  ideas  that  are  in  harmony 
with  that  purpose.  Wherever  the  influence  of  a  military  class 
reaches,  freedom  of  speech  is  done  away  and  all  the  attitudes  of 
character  developed  by  free  speech  are  weakened.  And,  as  institu- 
tions are  the  effect  rather  than  the  cause  of  psychological  processes, 
any  considerable  development  of  a  military  class  in  the  United  States 
would  result  in  a  change  in  institutions  in  the  direction  of  the  auto- 
cratic form. 

A  reversion  to  autocratic  institutions  seems  incredible  when  we 
consider  our  traditions.  But  it  is  not  so  incredible  when  we  con- 
sider that  the  essential  process  in  poHtical  evolution  has  been  the 
conflict  of  peoples  and  the  changes  in  their  idea-systems  occasioned 
thereby.^^  If  the  masses  of  the  different  nations  continue  sub- 
servient to  rivalrous  capitalistic  interests,  and  the  rivalry  of  these 
becomes  keener,  militarisms  may  develop  instead  of  pass  away. 
During  a  war,  under  the  impelling  force  of  instinctive  fear  and 
rivalry,  the  rank  and  file  of  a  nation  are  united  in  the  one  impul- 
sive national  purpose  and  alter  their  habits  as  directed  by  their 
leaders  for  the  realization  of  that  purpose.  When  peace  follows 
war  the  life  interests  of  the  rank  and  file  return  again  to  the  com- 
munity, the  job  and  the  family  life.  But,  by  appeahng  to  fear 
and  rivalry  in  time  of  peace,  as  the  militarists  in  all  nations  are 
constantly  doing,  it  is  possible  for  interests  that  control  govern- 
ments to  secure  popular  acquiescence  in  measures  that  imperceppbly 
change  institutions  in  the  direction  of  the  autocratic.  The  habits 
of  the  people  may  be  changed  gradually  in  time  of  peace,  as  they 
are  more  suddenly  in  time  of  war,  by  enlisting  in  time  of  peace, 
imperceptibly,  the  instinctive  impulses  violently  stirred  in  time  of 
war,  and  this  change  in  habitual  instinctive  impulses  works  the  de- 
sired change  in  institutions.  During  the  decade  preceding  the 
World  War  the  people  of  Germany  were  united  in  a  great  national 
rivalrous  purpose  under  the  instigation  of  the  military,  political 
and  economic  powers,  and  were  stimulated  in  this  purpose  by  fear 
of  England.  The  same  change,  with  the  same  inevitable  result, 
might  conceivably  take  place  in  the  United  States  in  the  not  distant 

«/     *®Teggart,  "The  Processes  of  History,"  150-151. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA" 
SANTA  BAIiBAiU 


102     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

future,  because  of  increasingly  hostile  rivalry  with  other  nations. 

We  have  to  admit  that,  thus  far,  the  impulsive  purpose  of  a  na- 
tion to  maintain  or  improve  its  international  position  —  to  seek 
national  superiority  —  has  been  essential  in  the  sense  of  national 
unity  of  the  great  nations;  and  aggressive  economic  and  military 
rivalry  has,  therefore,  seemed  inevitable.  Such  a  sense  of  unity 
has  united  nations,  not  only  in  war  but  in  peace.  In  our  own  sense 
of  national  unity,  perhaps  the  essential  factor  has  been  our  sense 
of  our  national  superiority.  In  our  isolation  this  did  not  seriously 
interfere  with  liberty.  But  as  we  come  into  more  intense  rivalry 
with  other  nations,  aggressive  economic  and  military  rivalry  will 
more  and  more  seem  inevitable,  with  its  coercion.  We  have  to 
choose  between  this  rivalrous  nationalism  with  coercion,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  an  ideal  of  international  co-operation,  on  the  other. 
The  latter  ideal  is  one  in  which  sympathetic  and  intellectual  im- 
pulses, not  fearful,  rivalrous  and  dominating  impulses,  determine 
the  purposes  of  the  national  leadership  and  the  ideals  of  the 
thoughtful  public  opinion  of  the  nation.  This  psychological  basis 
of  class  co-operation  within  the  nation,  of  national  unity,  and  of 
international  co-operation,  never  has  been  attained  in  any  nation. 

If  the  relation  within  a  nation  and  between  nations  is  ever  to  be- 
come a  relation  of  intelligent  co-operation,  this  development  re- 
quires, above  everything  else,  not  merely  the  breaking  up  of  the 
traditional  national  attitudes,^*'  but  also  the  weakening  of  the  over- 
mastering tendency  of  human  nature  to  react  unthinkingly  accord- 
ing to  habits  and  attitudes.  It  requires  also  that  the  impulsive 
force  through  which  this  overmastering  tendency  to  habit  is  weak- 
ened shall  be,  not  the  force  of  rivalrous,  but  of  sympathetic  and 
intellectual  impulses.  These,  if  stimulated  by  the  agencies  of  social 
suggestion,  will  formulate  a  new  ideal.  "  As  nationality  is  largely 
dependent  upon  the  development  of  ideals  and  a  new  ideal,  when 
developed,  has  the  force  of  instinct,  it  is  always  possible  to  make 
progress."  ^^  But  progress  in  the  past  has  depended  on  the  shock 
of  group  conflict,  which  has  accomplished  the  "  mental  release  " 
from  tradition  of  the  members  of  a  group. ^^  The  masses,  instead 
of  being  educated,  have  been  kept  in  ignorance  and  subjection  by 

*o  Orth,   "  Law  and   Force   in   International   Affairs,"   Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  Apr.    i, 
1916,  341-344- 
*^  Pillsbury,  op.  cit.,  279. 
*2T€ggart,  op.  cit.,  151. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  103 

ruling  classes  for  the  sake  of  the  preservation  of  the  "  rights  "  of 
the  latter  and  the  satisfaction  of  their  ambitions. 

The  upper  classes  have  held  the  social  power,  and  therefore,  the 
responsibility  of  enlightening  the  masses  or  keeping  them  in  igno- 
rance. In  some  nations  the  upper  classes  have  determined  that 
the  masses  should  have  no  education,  on  the  ground  that  a  people 
can  be  more  easily  kept  in  subjection  by  keeping  them  in  ignorance. 
When  the  people  have  had  some  education  the  upper  classes  have 
controlled  the  boards  that  determined  what  education  they  should 
have  and  what  education  they  should  not  have.  A  people  may 
be  more  effectually  kept  in  ignorance  by  giving  them  education  than 
by  denying  it,  because  they  may  be  given  what  is  represented  to  be 
vital  education,  and  thereby  made  to  believe  they  have  education, 
when  it  fails  to  touch  the  vital  problems  of  their  lives.  They  are 
practically  as  ignorant  as  before  and  are  more  effectually  kept  in 
ignorance,  because  the  appearance  of  so  doing  is  avoided,  as  it  is 
not  by  denying  them  education  altogether. 

As  long  as  the  masses  of  a  nation  are  ignorant  and,  therefore, 
are  predominantly  creatures  of  instinctive  impulse  and  habit,  the 
political  leaders  can  enlist  the  unintelligent  patriotic  support  of  the 
masses  in  any  project  in  the  interest  of  a  dominant  class  which  can 
be  brought  into  line  with  popular  impulses  and  attitudes  by  cleverly 
suggested  explanations.  This  condition  of  the  masses  whereby  they 
are  subject  to  the  suggestive  control  of  the  interests  that  happen  to 
exercise  a  predominant  influence  over  the  government  at  the  time  is 
not  a  desirable  "condition  in  that  it  makes  impossible  a  steadily  pro- 
gressive public  policy  and  one  that  shall  invariably  command  the  con- 
fidence of  other  nations.  Only  with  an  intelligent  and  critical  cit- 
izenship is  a  progressive  public  policy  possible.  In  how  far  a  citi- 
zenship is  intelligent  and  able  to  discriminate  merely  plausible  justi- 
fications of  unwise  public  policy  from  the  requirements  of  wise  policy 
is  a  question  of  social-psychological  fact.  Because  the  facts  are  so 
difficult  to  observe  and  analyse  on  a  large  scale,  there  is  a  difference 
of  opinion  among  students  of  society  as  to  the  motives  of  statesmen 
in  giving  justifications  for  their  political  action,  and  as  to  the  func- 
tioning of  those  justifications  in  the  minds  of  the  rank  and  file.*^ 

Not  until  recently  has  the  necessity  of  an  intelligent  citizenry 

*3  Compare  Veblen,  "  The  Nature  of  Peace,"  35-36,  with  Perry,  "  The  Present  Con- 
flict of  Ideals,"  14-15. 


104      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

been  realized.  The  result  is  the  Americanization  movement. 
There  are  two  opposite  and  conflicting  tendencies  in  this  movement. 
In  order  to  understand  these  tendencies  it  is  necessary  to  recall  the 
essential  elements  in  the  American  sense  of  nationality  from  the 
beginning.  While  the  country  was  first  settled  by  those  who 
sought  political  and  religious  liberty,  the  essential  lure  of  immi- 
gration since  the  independence  of  the  nation  was  established  has 
been  the  superior  economic  opportunities  offered  by  cheap  land 
and  high  wages.  The  American  of  the  nineteenth  century  felt 
that  his  country  was  superior  to  any  other  and  the  basis  of  his 
belief  was  economic.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  President 
Lincoln  relied  for  support  not  on  compassion  for  the  slave  and  an 
impulse  to  free  him  but  on  the  American's  sense  of  national  great- 
ness, which  required  a  united  nation  and  the  preservation  of  the 
union.  A  sense  of  national  greatness  —  a  satisfaction  of  the  rival- 
rous  disposition, —  not  sympathy  or  intelligence,  has  been  essential 
in  our  sense  of  nationality. 

The  economic  basis  of  this  sense  of  nationality  lay  in  the  un- 
rivalled opportunities  for  accumlation  of  wealth  offered  by  the  new 
country,  which  stimulated  the  property-getting  impulses  and  moral 
qualities.  These  are  set  forth  in  "  Poor  Richard's  Almanac." 
The  teachings  of  Benjamin  Franklin  in  Poor  Richard  "  moulded 
our  great-grandparents  and  their  children;  they  have  formed  our 
popular  traditions;  they  still  influence  our  actions,  guide  our  ways 
of  thinking,  and  establish  our  points  of  view.  .  .  ."  *^  This  is 
because  they  expressed  the  property-getting  attitude  of  the  peo- 
ple. Poor  Richard  was  a  personification  of  the  self-reliant  in- 
dustriousness,  thrift  and  frugality  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  peo- 
ple.*°  In  those  first  decades  no  boy  could  grow  up  in  expectation 
of  being  able  to  live  without  working.  "  Father's  got  money,  why 
should  I  work?  "  had  not  yet  become  the  inner  thought  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  boys  and  young  men  who  expect  to  inherit  money,  and 
who  are  supported  in  ease  by  their  parents.  Because  every  man 
had  an  opportunity  to  work  and  save,  there  was  approximate  free- 
dom of  economic  opportunity — "land  of  freedom,  land  of  for- 
tune " ;  —  and  because  these  conditions  were  not  found  in  the  old 
world  there  was  an  easy  sense  of  the  superiority  of  the  country. 

■** Morse,  "Benjamin  Franklin,"  22. 

*6  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  Ch.  IV. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  105 

With  the  development  of  private  property,  a  large  part  of  the 
property  of  the  United  States  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  small 
minority  of  the  citizens.^*'  This  happened  not  because  the  small 
minority  had  superior  industriousness,  thrift  and  frugality  but  by 
a  development  of  transportation,  of  industrial  and  financial  organi- 
zation that  was  fostered  in  their  own  interest  by  those  who  con- 
trolled the  invested  earnings  of  the  industrious  and  thrifty,  and 
who  controlled  the  governments. 

There  are,  therefore,  two  opposite  tendencies  in  the  present 
Americanization  movement.  One  is  to  restore  the  original  free- 
dom of  economic  opportunity,  without,  of  course,  restoring  the 
original  conditions  of  cheap  land  and  small  industries,  which  is  im- 
possible. The  other  is  to  maintain  economic  relations  as  they  are. 
"  *  Americanization  '  I  cry  the  employers  of  labour.  *  That  is  all 
very  simple.  Teach  the  men  to  stay  on  their  jobs  —  that's  Ameri- 
canization! '  "  *'''  To  others  Americanization  means  to  teach  un- 
questioning submission  to  political  authority;*^  to  others  it  means 
"  the  preservation  of  the  status  quo,"  *^  that  is,  the  maintenance 
of  the  social  control  of  the  propertied  classes;  to  others  it  means 
teaching  English  to  foreigners ;  ^°  to  the  hangers-on  of  political  par- 
ties it  means  another  opening  for  political  jobs;  ^^  to  many  others  it 
means  an  opportunity  to  win  favourable  public  attention.  All  these 
interested  parties  are  mainly  intent  on  a  propaganda  which  aims  to 
teach  foreigners  the  English  language,  to  inculcate  certain  plati- 
tudes about  liberty  and  property  and  thus  to  prepare  the  masses 
to  accept  through  social-suggestion  the  attitudes  that  determine  the 
editing  of  a  capitalistic  press,  essential  among  which  attitudes  is 
deference  to  the  propertied  interests  as  they  have  developed  in  the 
United  States.  On  the  other  hand,  the  program  of  those  who  aim 
to  restore  freedom  of  opportunity  is  the  gradual  democratization 
of  industry.  This  requires,  primarily,  a  development  of  intelli- 
gence and  sympathy  throughout  the  nation.^^  xi^jg  jg  ^q  ^g  accom- 
plished through  fostering  intelligence  and  co-operation  in  industry, 

46 King,  "The  Wealth  and  Income  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,"  Chs, 
IV,  IX. 

*7Lubin  and  Krysto,  "The  Menace  of  Americanization,"  The  Survey,  Feb,  21, 
1920,  6n, 

*^Ibid.,  611, 

*9Ibid.,  611. 

^^Ibid.,  611,  , 

"  Ibid.,  610. 

"  Ibid.,  612. 


io6     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and  through  emphasis  on  the  inculcation  of  sympathetic  and  intel- 
lectual attitudes  in  public  education. 

As  to  the  development  of  intelligence  and  co-operation  in  indus- 
try, Mr.  Robert  B.  Wolf,  the  distinguished  industrial  engineer, 
says: 

"  Until  we  have  changed  the  autocratic  character  of  our  indus- 
tries (which  really  dominate  the  political  situation),  it  will  be  im- 
possible to  have  a  democratic  society. 

"  By  a  democratic  society  I  mean  that  form  of  social  structure 
which  encourages  and  aids  the  growth  of  the  creative  spirit  in  man, 
expressing  itself  through  the  trades  and  professions  and  the  organ- 
ized industries. 

"  This  I  do  not  believe  can  be  accomplished  until  the  executive, 
legislative  and  judicial  functions  of  the  government  cooperate  with 
the  trades  and  professional  associations  and  industrial  organiza- 
tions to  give  greater  opportunity  for  the  free  expression  of  indi- 
viduality. When  this  is  done  we  shall  have  an  organization  of 
society  based  upon  respect  for  the  individual,  which  is  the  only 
true  democracy. 

"  What  right  have  we  then  to  expect  a  high  development  of  pro- 
ductive (creative)  effort  when  we  limit  the  intelligent  handling  of 
materials  and  forces  to  the  few  who  autocratically  claim  it  as  their 
right  to  dominate  the  wills  of  others,  especially  when  their  contact 
with  the  actual  work,  because  of  the  increasing  size  of  our  industrial 
organizations,  is  becoming  constantly  more  remote?  Of  course, 
we  must  have  leaders;  otherwise  there  can  be  no  organization,  but 
leading  is  vastly  different  from  driving.  '  Teach,  don't  boss,'  is  a 
sign  we  see  posted  in  industrial  plants  quite  frequently  these  days, 
and  it  is  one  of  the  healthy  '  signs  '  of  the  times."  ^^  Mr.  Wolf 
declares  that  the  dominating  attitude  of  employers  is  the  essential 
cause  of  labour  unrest.  He  asserts:  "The  short-sighted  em- 
ployer may  prevent  his  employees  from  using  their  brains  at  their 
work,  and  because  of  this,  hold  their  compensation  down  to  a  low 

53  Wolf ,  "Securing  the  Initiative  of  the  Workman,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX  (Supple- 
ment) :  120-12I.  See  also  Mr.  Wolf'8  description  of  the  methods  by  which  he  devel- 
oped the  creative  impulse  of  workmen  in  the  pulp  and  paper  industry  (Wolf,  "Indi- 
viduality in  Industry,"  Proceedings  of  the  Employment  Managers'  Conference,  1917, 
U.  S.  Bur.  Labor  Statistics,  Bulletin  227,  pp.  201-204.  In  a  letter  to  the  author  in 
June,  1919,  Mr.  Wolf  wrote:  "I  am  doing  some  work  for  several  industries  outside 
of  the  pulp  and  paper  field,  and  I  find  the  principles  worked  out  in  our  own  line 
applicable  in  such  diversified  industries  as  steel  and  iron  and  the  soda  industry." 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY         107 

level.  There  is  no  advantage  in  so  doing,  however,  for  the  result 
of  the  attempt  to  repress  individual  initiative  is  simply  to  deflect 
creative  power  into  destructive  channels. 

*'  This  autocratic  domination  of  the  wills  of  the  workmen,  by 
preventing  free  self-expression,  is  the  cause  of  practically  all  the 
destructive  forces,  exhibiting  themselves  in  certain  phases  of  Bol- 
sheviki  and  I.  W.  W.  movements.  The  creative  process  in  the 
individual  cannot  be  suppressed  —  it  can  only  be  deflected  (per- 
verted) into  useless  or,  worse  still,  destructive  channels."  ^* 

Mr.  Wolf  calls  for  co-operation  between  the  government  and 
industry  as  a  means  of  stimulating  the  intellectual  or  creative  im- 
pulses throughout  industry.  He  conceives  of  the  nation  as  an 
economic  unit,  and  of  the  sense  of  nationality  as  a  joyful  sense  of 
the  excellent  opportunities  afforded  by  the  nation  for  self-realiza- 
tion through  the  work  of  life.  He  makes  clear  that  his  concep- 
tion is  of  what  ought  to  be  and  what  might  be,  not  of  what  is. 
But  he  points  out  that  the  government's  industrial  policy  during 
the  war  afforded  the  beginnings  of  what  ought  to  be  and  that  the 
main  features  of  that  policy  should  be  continued  in  time  of  peace: 
"  I.  They  called  upon  the  practical  men,  the  representatives  of  the 
workmen,  the  engineers  and  the  scientists  to  tell  them  what  to  do 
and  how  to  do  it.  They  asked  those  men  to  build  up  organizations 
to  direct  the  industrial  operations  of  the  country.  Gradually  this 
group  of  men,  whose  training  had  made  them  masters  of  the  ma- 
terial forces,  began  to  accumulate  information  which  enabled  them 
to  know  what  the  nation's  resources  actually  were.  They  encour- 
aged the  producers  to  organize  into  associations  to  aid  them  in 
making  a  complete  survey  of  the  field  of  resources  and  require- 
ments, and  in  this  way  were  able  to  determine  which  organizations 
had  the  greatest  capacity  to  render  service.  The  legislative  branch 
of  the  government  was  acting  under  the  direction  of  these  bureaus 
of  industrial  leaders  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  could  not  act  in- 
telligently without  them. 

"  How  can  we  expect  to  get  intelligent  legislation  in  peace  times 
without  the  same  cooperation  between  nationally  organized  indus- 
try and  the  national  legislative  body? 

"  2.  The  second  thing  the  government  did  was  to  administer  the 
finances  of  the  country  in  such  a  way  that  credit  was  extended 

^*  Wolf,  op.  cit.,  I2I-I22. 


io8     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

to  those  who  were  estimated  to  have  the  greatest  capacity  to  ren- 
der service.  Without  this  executive  power  to  administer  credit 
where  needed,  little  could  be  accomplished  for  it  had  to  be  admin- 
istered for  the  good  of  the  whole  country.  Why  then  isn't  this  a 
necessary  peace-time  executive  function  also? 

"  With  the  governmental  administration  of  credit  for  the  benefit 
of  society,  the  interest  charges  would  naturally  be  made  as  Hght  as 
possible  in  order  to  reduce  the  burden,  and  thereby  stimulate  cre- 
ative enterprise."  ^^ 

This  co-operation  of  all  governmental  agencies  with  industry  not 
only  for  industrial  progress  merely  but  for  human  progress,  for 
the  development  of  the  individual  personality,  will,  says  Mr.  Wolf, 
develop  a  collective  efficiency,  a  sense  of  national  unity,  and  a  dis- 
tinct national  consciousness.  The  final  international  relation  is  not 
one  of  rivalry  for  supremacy  but  of  co-operation.  Each  nation, 
he  says,  must  "  become  finally  a  conscious  unity  for  expressing  itself 
in  constructive  service  for  advancing  the  welfare  of  the  world. 

"  Surely  an  association  of  nations  based  upon  this  conception  of 
rendering  service  need  not  think  of  a  type  of  Internationalism  which 
does  away  with  national  characteristics.  Those  groups  which  logi- 
cally and  naturally  should  work  together  must  form  themselves  into 
individual  societies  or  governments;  otherwise,  the  progress  of  the 
human  race  will  not  be  Individual  or  generic.  The  Individuality  of 
the  nation  must  be  just  as  carefully  and  conscientiously  developed 
as  the  individuality  of  the  plant  in  the  larger  corporations,  or  the 
individuality  of  the  department  within  the  plant  or  the  man  within 
the  department.  When  each  nation  realizes  that  Its  growth  in  cre- 
ative power  depends  upon  Its  cooperation  with  other  nations  for 
the  welfare  of  the  whole  world,  the  attitude  of  exploitation  which 
has  dominated  national  life  in  the  past  will  disappear.  .  .  ."  ^^ 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  Mr.  Wolf's  theory  it 
is  necessary  to  recall  what  was  said  in  the  Introduction  about  the 
fundamental  nature  of  assumptions  as  to  human  nature  in  inter- 
preting the  facts  of  the  social  sciences.  If  social  scientists  merely 
accept  the  human  nature  implied  in  the  habitual  political  and  eco- 
nomic relations,  their  interpretations  of  their  facts  will,  obviously, 
differ  much  from  what  it  would  be  from  the  viewpoint  of  an  ade- 

5"  Ibid.,  129.     See  also  Fisher,  "  Economists  in  Public  Service,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev., 
IX  (Supplement) :  15. 
66  Wolf,  op.  cit.,  130. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY         [109 

quate  conception  of  human  nature.  At  this  point,  therefore,  there 
is  the  closest  possible  relation  between  social  psychology  and  po- 
litical science.  The  political  scientist  does  not  carry  his  analysis 
beyond  the  attitudes  implied  in  the  political  relations  with  which 
he  is  at  the  time  concerned  but,  in  the  interpretation  of  the  possible 
lines  of  political  progress,  he  must  consult  with  the  social  psycholo- 
gist as  to  the  capacity  for  progress  that  is  afforded  by  the  instinctive 
dispositions  of  human  nature  as  a  whole. 

The  second  line  of  effort  for  the  stimulation  and  training  of 
the  creative  impulses  lies  through  public  education.  The  working 
masses  must  not  have  to  wait  until  they  are  adult  workers  before 
these  impulses  are  stirred.  They  must  be  trained  intellectually 
while  children  through  a  system  of  public  education  developed  with 
that  end  in  view.  In  educational  policy,  the  emphasis  should  be 
on  the  stimulus  and  training  of  the  intellect,  because  the  strongest 
tendencies  in  human  nature  are  to  react  according  to  instinct  and 
habit.  The  most  intellectual  men,  in  spite  of  themselves,  con- 
stantly find  that  they  are  developing  attitudes  that  weaken  their 
efficiency  and  that  of  the  groups  to  which  they  belong.  Thus  the 
managers  of  industrial  enterprises  find  themselves  falling  into  cer- 
tain attitudes  to  their  subordinates,  judging  whether  or  not  sub- 
ordinates have  made  good  according  to  their  attitudes  toward  them 
rather  than  according  to  the  objective  results  of  their  work. 
The  subordinates  in  turn  find  themselves  reacting  in  this  way 
to  their  subordinates,  and  so  on  down  to  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
employes,  among  whom  the  favouritism  and  inefficiency  of  their 
superiors  is  common  talk;  so  that  esprit  de  corps  disappears  from 
the  organization,  and  each  enjoys  the  thought  of  what  he  is  getting 
out  of  the  enterprise  instead  of  what  he  is  putting  into  it.  This  is 
true  not  only  in  industry  but  also  throughout  social  organization. 
In  education  itself,  this  deadening  tendency  creep?  in.  Curriculums 
become  rigid,  methods  become  pedantic,  the  minds  of  teachers  be- 
come inflexible,  their  relations  to  their  students  become  attitudinal. 
For  instance,  teachers  often  mark  students  according  to  their  "  es- 
timate "  of  their  ability,  that  is,  according  to  their  attitudes  to  stu- 
dents instead  of  from  a  critical  analysis  of  the  students'  work. 
Reaction  from  habit  and  attitude  is  the  easy  reaction  and  this  tend- 
ency is  increased  by  the  lack  of  emphasis  on  the  training  of  the 
intellect.     This  condition  affects  the  national  consciousness.     As 


no      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

will  be  shown  In  a  succeeding  chapter,  patriotism  is  largely  a  phe- 
nomenon of  instinctive  impulse  and  attitude;  there  is  very  little  in 
it  that  is  intelligent. 

Public  education  must  reach  not  only  the  youth  of  the  land  but 
also  adults.  The  public  education  of  adults,  which  is  beginning 
to  be  attempted  in  this  country  and  in  Europe,  will  amount  to  little 
if  the  work  of  the  masses  makes  little  or  no  appeal  to  their  intelli- 
gence. A  man  cannot  go  through  the  day's  work  like  an  automa- 
ton and  then,  at  the  close,  suddenly  become  conscious  that  he  has 
intellectual  faculties  that  ought  to  be  developed.^''^  Unless  there 
is  some  call  for  intelligence  in  the  course  of  the  work,  studies  to 
develop  intelligence  after  work  hours  will  hardly  seem  worth  while. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  intelligent  citizenship  requires  that  the 
work  of  the  masses  be  such  as  not  to  deaden  intelligence.  But,  in 
addition  to  the  work  appealing  to  intelligence,  there  must  be  pay 
and  leisure  adequate  to  encourage  workmen  to  feel  impulses  for 
positive  self-development.  The  political  representatives  of  a  so- 
cial order  which  "  has  in  the  past  required  the  sacrifice  of  the  many 
to  the  few  "  ^^  constantly  preach  self-restraint.^^  Under  the  cloak 
of  a  hypocritical  regard  for  the  many  they  seek  to  perpetuate  the 
sacrifice  of  the  many  to  the  few.  The  ideal  of  social  education  is 
self-development  of  the  many;  and  it  assumes  that,  while  there  is  an 
economic  scarcity  which  fixes  a  limit  to  the  material  means  of  self- 
development,  education  will  Inevitably  result  in  such  a  re-distribu- 
tion of  wealth  as  shall  permit  the  widest  possible  self-development. 

That  the  sense  of  nationality  from  now  on  may  be  not  a  reaction- 
ary but  a  progressive  force,  the  citizens  of  the  different  nations 
must  be  trained  for  progressive  citizenship.  Such  an  education 
should  Include  an  analysis  of  group  conflicts  and  of  the  conflicts  of 
instinctive  interests  within  groups.  The  group  conflicts  Include 
family,  class,  sectarian  and  other  forms  of  group  rivalry  within  the 
nation,  as  well  as  International  rivalry.  Education  for  progressive 
citizenship  Is  impossible  when  rival  groups  use  public  education  in 
their  own  Interest.  Families  are  apt  to  favour  such  education  as 
shall  not  be  subversive  of  conformity  to  beliefs  that  the  children 

67  "Relation  of  Industrial  and  Social  Conditions  to  Adult  Education,"  U.  S.  Bureau 
of  Labor  Statistics,  Monthly  Labor  Revieiu,  Nov.,  1918,  65,  66,  69. 
"8  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  414. 
"» Ibid.,  412-423,  _ 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY         in 

of  the  family  must  profess  if  the  family  is  to  retain  its  "  standing  " 
in  the  community.  Families  also  favour  such  education  as  will 
enable  their  children  to  gain  recognition  from  an  upper  class,  or 
to  prove  their  superiority  to  other  children,  especially  those  of  an 
upper  class.  The  interest  of  the  family  in  education  is  apt  to 
spring,  therefore,  from  impulses  of  family  rivalry  rather  than  from 
a  public  welfare  ideal ;  hence  family  influence  over  the  educational 
system  is  contrary  to  education  for  progressive  citizenship.®^ 
Again,  sectarian  groups  demand  that  public  education  shall  not 
call  in  question  the  sectarian  beliefs.®^  Students  of  the  history  of 
education  know  the  baneful  effects  on  education  of  the  struggle 
of  sects  to  control  it;  and  sects  have  by  no  means  ceased  efforts  for 
this  control.  With  education  under  sectarian  control,  education 
for  progressive  citizenship  would  be  impossible.  Again,  capitalis- 
tic interests  oppose  teaching  that  is  not  in  line  with  their  ambitions; 
property-owning  interests  oppose  teaching  that  makes  them  appre- 
hensive about  the  security  of  property  or  the  certainty  of  dividends ; 
and  these  interests  exercise  no  inconsiderable  influence  over  public 
education  in  the  United  States.®^  Such  influence  is  contrary  to  edu- 
cation for  progressive  citizenship.  Again,  the  nation  opposes 
teaching  that  is  not  in  line  with  instinctive  patriotism.®^  While 
programs  of  reform  must  be  developed  with  an  eye  to  the  exigencies 
of  international  rivalry,  education  is  not  reform,  and  it  should  be 
entirely  free  and  unconnected  with  nationalistic  impulses.®"* 

Family,  class,  sectarian  and  national  rivalries  constitute  impul- 
sive conflicts,  which  make  impossible  an  educational  ideal  of  free 
intellectual  development.  The  conflicting  groups  strive  to  control 
public  education  in  the  interest  of  the  satisfaction  of  the  group 
impulses.  The  degree  of  intellectual  freedom  actually  enjoyed  by 
the  teacher  is  always  a  result  of  compromise  between  these  con- 
flicting interests.  On  the  one  hand  is  the  social  pressure  exerted 
as  a  result  of  the  various  group  rivalries,  and  of  beliefs  that  have 
become  traditional.  On  the  other  hand  is  the  necessity  that  teach- 
ers have  unbiassed  minds  if  educational  institutions  are  to  render 

«o  Russell,  "  Why  Men  Fight,"  174. 

«i/^jV.,  162-163.    . 

82Veblen,  "The  Higher  Education  in  America,"  Ch.  II. 

83  Russell,  op.  cit.,  161-162. 

«*  Beard,  "  Propaganda  in  Schools,"  The  Dial,  June  14,  1919.  598-599- 


112      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

efficient  service.  Thinking  is  unreliable  if  the  thinking  proceeds 
from  a  family,  class,  sectarian  or  even  strictly  national  point  of 
view. 

It  may  seem  an  impossible  task  —  this  of  training  the  rank  and 
file  of  a  nation  to  judge  impartially  as  between  their  nation  and 
another.  The  best  preparation  for  such  judgment  is  an  education 
that  teaches  impartial  judgment  in  the  more  frequently  recurring 
class  conflicts  within  the  nation.  For,  as  the  individual  is  a  mem- 
ber of  some  nation,  so  he  is  a  member  of  some  class  —  that  one 
with  which  he  habitually  sympathizes.  For  impartial  judgments 
between  classes  it  is  essential  to  make  a  special  effort  to  understand 
the  class  to  which  one  does  not,  in  sympathy,  belong.  Paradoxical 
as  it  may  seem,  this  is  usually  the  working  class;  for,  though  the 
majority  of  people  are  workers,  their  prevailing  attitude  is  one  of 
admiration  of  an  upper  class.  One  may  often  hear  workmen, 
when  reading  of  a  strike,  express  a  contempt  for  the  striking  work- 
men. Especially  is  this  true  of  classes  whom  we  are  accustomed  to 
think  of  as  "  educated  " —  they  instinctively  sympathize  with  em- 
ployers rather  than  with  workmen.  Yet  the  presumption  is  fa- 
vourable to,  rather  than  against  strikers.  For,  in  conflicts  between 
employers  and  workmen,  the  former  invariably  have  the  advantage, 
and  workmen  know  it  and  strike  only  as  a  last  resort.  Employers 
have  the  advantage  in  that  labour  is  a  perishable  commodity  —  if 
not  used  today,  that  day's  labour  is  lost, —  and  workmen  cannot 
afford  to  lose  their  labour  because  they  have  no  financial  resources. 
Employers  are  backed  by  immense  financial  resources  in  addition 
to  their  own,  for  banking  interests,  as  well  as  other  corporations  in 
the  same  industry  and  in  other  industries,  stand  ready  to  support 
a  corporation  involved  in  an  industrial  struggle.  Consequently 
workmen  are  apt  to  feel,  "  What  can  labour  do  against  capital?  " 
The  only  support  which  striking  workmen  can  hope  for  is  the  sym- 
pathy of  other  bodies  of  workmen  similarly  situated  and  of  that 
uncertain  force  termed  public  opinion.  But,  except  in  rare  cases 
when  much  publicity  has  been  given  the  causes  of  a  strike,  so  that 
the  public  understands  the  situation  and  is  In  a  position  intelligently 
to  support  the  party  on  whose  side  justice  lies,  the  pubhc  is  apt 
impulsively  to  sympathize  with  employers.  The  reasons  are,  first, 
that  newspapers,  being  capitalistic  enterprises,  are  more  apt  to 
print  the  employers'  side,  which  they  get  from  the  employers'  pub- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  113 

liclty  agents,  than  the  workmen's  side ;  second,  that  people  in  gen- 
eral impulsively  respect  the  man  of  wealth  power  and  the  class  of 
wealth  power,  so  that  they  readily  credit  what  the  newspapers 
print  of  the  employers'  side,  and,  in  a  situation  in  which  they  must 
impulsively  sympathize  with  one  party  and  condemn  another,  they 
sympathize  with  employers  and  condemn  workmen.®^  As  long  as 
the  public  thus  reacts  impulsively  instead  of  inteUigently  toward 
labour  problems  —  as  will  be  the  case  as  long  as  public  education 
avoids  these  problems, —  labour,  organized  and  unorganized,  will 
have  to  encounter  this  great  obstacle  of  an  impulsively  adverse  pub- 
lic opinion.  Because  of  their  unfavourable  position  both  as  re- 
gards resources  and  public  opinion,  workmen  are  naturally  sub- 
missive, and  employers  are  naturally  dominating  because  of  their 
favourable  position.  Workmen  do  not  like  to  strike.  The 
strike  is  a  last  resort.  The  result  is  that  long  before  a  strike 
occurs  the  resentment  of  workmen  has  become  a  cumulative  phe- 
nomenon. And  the  strike,  when  it  comes,  stirs  the  indignation  of 
employers  as  a  defiance  of  their  authority  and  an  interference  with 
their  right  to  manage  their  own  business.  The  result  of  this  clash 
of  resentment  of  workmen  and  indignation  of  employers  is  that 
industrial  conflicts  are  inevitably  explosions  of  impulse  instead  of 
occasions  for  the  constructive  development  of  industrial  relations, 
and  this  still  further  inclines  the  public  against  the  strikers  who 
seem  to  have  caused  the  disorder. 

If  now  we  view  this  impulsive  conflict  impartially  we  see  that 

"5  This  attitude  was  seen  in  the  great  steel  strike  of  1919  which  was  caused  by  the 
refusal  of  the  president  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  to  confer  with  representa- 
tives of  organized  labour  of  which  his  workmen  were  a  part.  The  press  and  public 
opinion  did  not  condemn  his  action  as  would  have  been  the  case  if  it  had  been  the 
leader  of  the  strikers  who  had  refused  to  confer  with  the  president  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration. "  Had  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  declined  to  confer  with  Mr.  Gary  he  would  have 
been  denounced  from  one  end  of  the  country  to  the  other  as  a  firebrand.  But  Mr. 
Gary  can  decline  to  confer  with  the  representative  of  a  very  large  section  of  his 
men;  he  can  refuse  to  arbitrate,  to  consult,  to  mediate,  even  to  discuss;  he  can  bluntly 
repudiate  all  the  known  methods  of  peaceful  adjustment,  and  so  far  as  one  can  judge 
by  the  press,  few  voices  are  raised  against  such  behavior  on  his  part."  ("The  Steel 
Strike,"  The  Neiv  Republic,  Oct.  1,  1919,  245.)  This  attitude  of  the  public  is  the  more 
significant  of  its  impulsive  suggestibility  to  the  industrial  and  financial  powers  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  intolerable  conditions  in  the  Steel  Corporation  were  made  public 
by  Dr.  Fitch  in  1911,  in  his  book,  "The  Steel  Workers,"  and,  at  the  time  of  the  strike, 
in  magazine  articles.  For  instance  see  Fitch,  "  A  Strike  for  Freedom,"  The  Survey, 
Sept.  27,  1919,  891.  But  the  public  remained  largely  in  ignorance  of  the  conditions, 
and  in  the  absence  of  knowledge,  accepted  the  attitude  of  the  employers  against  the 
workmen. 


114     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

workmen  no  more  have  a  right  to  submit  to  the  domination  of 
employers  than  have  employers  a  right  to  dominate  workmen  and 
compel  them  to  work  under  conditions  or  for  a  wage  that  makes 
impossible  their  realization  of  maximum  vitality  and  efficiency. 
We  see  that,  in  case  of  a  strike  that  cannot  be  allowed  to  go  on 
because  of  the  public  disaster  it  will  occasion,  the  government  is 
just  as  much  under  obhgation  to  compel  employers  to  yield  to  the 
just  demands  of  workmen,  as  to  compel  workmen  to  relinquish 
unjust  demands  against  employers.  It  is  as  much  under  obligation, 
in  its  conception  of  the  justice  of  a  case,  to  consider  the  rights  of 
workmen  as  human  beings  with  capacity  for  self-realization,  as  to 
consider  the  rights  of  employers  as  property-owners.  A  rational  ■» 
social  purpose  requires  of  workmen  that  they  insist  on  the  working 
conditions  and  the  wage  that  is  necessary  for  maximum  vitahty  and 
efficiency  and  self-realization;  it  requires  of  employers  the  pro- 
vision of  working  conditions  and  a  wage  that  make  possible  maxi- 
mum vitality  and  efficiency,  and  an  increasing  self-realization  of  the 
working  masses.  A  rational  social  purpose  therefore  requires  of 
the  public  that  they  regard  industrial  relations  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  national  industrial  efficiency  and  the  development  of  the 
personality  of  workmen,  not  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  impul- 
sive respect  for  the  employing  class  and  an  acceptance  of  the  atti- 
tude of  that  class  because  it  is  the  class  of  prestige  in  the  nation. 

In  so  far,  then,  as  public  opinion  is  operative  in  the  regulation  of 
the  conflict  between  capital  and  labour,  the  rising  generation,  which 
is  to  become  the  employing  class  and  the  working  class  and  the 
public,  must  be  subjected,  when  of  school  age,  to  a  training  in  the 
analysis  of  industrial  conditions  and  relations,  to  the  end  that  the 
public  in  its  reaction  to  industrial  disputes  may  be  capable  of  im- 
partial judgment.  In  addition  to  such  a  training  given  in  the 
course  of  public  education,  another  condition  that  facilitates  intelli- 
gent instead  of  impulsive  behaviour  in  industrial  disputes  is  a  bal- 
ance of  power  between  the  conflicting  industrial  interests.  The 
more  intelligent  the  public  becomes  on  industrial  matters,  the  less 
impulsively  will  it  support  employers  in  a  dispute,  and  the  less 
blindly  will  it  support  the  political  dominance  of  the  employing 
class.  Thus  will  a  development  of  public  intelligence  ultimately 
have  the  effect  of  equalizing  the  power  of  the  conflicting  classes. 

This  training  for  impartial  judgment  in  class  conflict  is  at  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  NATIONALITY  115 

same  time  a  training  in  the  intellectual  attitudes  that  are  required 
for  any  impartial  judgment  whatever,  whether  between  classes  or 
nations.*^^  Public  education  must  be  so  thoroughly  intellectual  as 
to  eliminate  prejudice  —  family,  class,  sectarian,  national.  The 
central  fact  in  education  for  citizenship  is  "  thinking  " ;  ^'^  and  no 
thinking  is  possible  without  freedom  from  external  restraint,®^  and 
from  the  control  of  impulses  other  than  the  intellectual.  Freedom 
in  this  wide  sense  is  essential  for  the  development  of  personality, 
which  is  the  end  of  the  state.  The  thinking  that  is  essential  in  the 
development  of  personahty  is  openminded,  often  with  a  feeling  of 
reverence  before  great  problems  that  baffle  the  intellect;  is  straight- 
forward, without  fear  or  hesitancy;  is  singleminded,  with  no 
thought  of  the  bearing  of  the  solution  of  the  problem  on  public 
approval  or  disapproval,  promotion  or  demotion;  and  finally  is 
responsible  in  that  the  significance  of  the  solution  for  the  conduct 
of  the  individual  is  thought  through  to  conviction,  on  which  the 
individual  is  ready  to  act.®^  Education  must  lead  to  the  formation 
of  convictions  for  civic  and  political  action,  to  the  end  that  every 
citizen  may  become,  within  the  limits  of  his  capacity,  an  effective 
agent  for  progress. 

^*  This  education  is  impossible  without  certain  reforms  that  will  give  the  masses 
the  necessary  incentive  to,  and  leisure  hours  for,  thought  and  study.  These  reforms 
include  shortening  the  hours  of  labour,  doing  away  with  overtime  except  where  it  is 
absolutely  necessary,  doing  away  with  the  evil  effects  of  monotonous  labour  by  alter- 
nating 'kinds  of  work,  creating  opportunities  for  the  exercise  of  initiative  and  for  giv- 
ing workmen  a  share  in  the  management  of  industry,  guaranteeing  the  worker  a  rea- 
sonable security  of  livelihood,  and  other  reforms.  See  the  report  of  the  Committee 
on  Adult  Education:  Interim  Report  on  Industrial  Conditions  in  Relation  to  Adult 
Education  —  Ministry  of  Reconstruction,  London,  1918. 

*'^  Dewey,  "  Democracy  and  Education,"  Ch.  XII. 

•^Laski,  "Authority  in  the  Modern  State,"  56,  90,  izi,  231,  268,  275. 

P8  Dewey,  op.  cit.,  204-210. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    CONFLICT    OF    POLITICAL    ATTITUDES    AND    IDEALS 

THE  political  attitude  of  a  people  determines  its  political 
behaviour  and  affects  its  entire  social  organization.  To 
illustrate  this  functioning  of  political  attitudes  let  us  com- 
pare the  attitude  of  the  German  people  during  the  autocratic  pe- 
riod of  German  history  with  that  of  "  democratic  "  nations. 

Essential  in  the  political  relations  of  the  German  people  in  the 
autocratic  period  was  the  habitual  instinctive  relation  of  domina- 
tion-submission. This  relation,  which  is  the  essential  one  in  mili- 
tary relations,  we  find  running  through  all  aspects  of  their  social 
organization.  It  determined  the  framework  of  the  German  govern- 
ment, as  seen  in  the  dominating  power  of  the  executive,^  in  the 
subordination  thereto  of  the  legislative  ^  and  judicial  ^  branches  of 
the  government,  and  in  the  predominance  of  the  emperor  as  the 
chief  executive  authority.^  Emperor  William  II  is  reported  to 
have  said  in  a  public  address :  "  There  is  only  one  master  of  the 
nation:  and  that  is  I,  and  I  will  not  abide  any  other."  ^  He  con- 
ceived of  his  mastership  as  similar  to  that  of  a  commander-in-chief 
of  an  army.  In  the  same  year  as  that  of  the  above  utterance  he 
said:  "  I  need  Christian  soldiers,  soldiers  who  say  their  Pater 
Noster.  The  soldier  should  not  have  a  will  of  his  own  but  you 
should  all  have  but  one  will  and  that  is  my  will;  there  is  but  one 
law  for  you  and  that  is  mine."  ® 

With  this  is  to  be  contrasted  the  English  attitude  of  resistance 
to  autocracy,  which  gave  rise  to  a  system  of  government  in  which 
the  exercise  of  the  executive  power  "  is  always  subject  to  the  con- 

^  Kruger,  "  Government  and  Politics  of  the  German  Empire,"  Ch.  VII. 

2  Ibid.,   Chs.   V-VI ;   Lowell,   "  The  Governments  of  France,   Italy   and   Germany," 
188-212. 

3  Kruger,  op.  cit.,  197;  Veblen,  "Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution," 
208. 

*"  Bismarck,  The  Man  and  the  Statesman,"  I:  151-152,  307;  Kruger,  op.  cit.,  Ch. 
VIII. 

5  Collier,  "Germany  and  the  Germans,"  136-137. 
^  Ibid.,  137. 

116 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  117 

trol  of  Parliament.  The  members  of  the  Cabinet,  who  exercise  it 
in  the  name  of  the  Crown,  are  in  reality  a  committee  of  the  Parlia- 
ment." "^  With  the  German  system  of  the  autocratic  period  is  to 
be  contrasted  also  the  system  of  the  United  States  which  was 
"  based  squarely  on  the  idea  of  popular  sovereignty."  ^  The  con- 
stitution was  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the  popular  will,  and  it 
was  provided  that  the  organs  of  government  should  exercise  only 
the  powers  given  them  by  the  constitution  ^ —  not,  as  the  Crown  in 
England,  all  power  not  expressly  withheld.^*^  But  neither  in  Eng- 
land nor  in  the  United  States  is  the  political  attitude  essentially 
different  from  that  of  Germany.  The  absolutism  of  the  state  in  all 
cases  results  in  an  irresponsibility  of  the  state.  Have  the  victims 
of  the  excitement  of  the  United  States  courts  in  interpreting  the 
Espionage  Act,  in  19 19—1920,  any  more  redress  against  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  than  a  subject  of  Germany  during 
the  autocracy  would  have  had  in  a  similar  situation  against  the 
governmefit  of  Germany?  The  United  States  government  is  no 
more  responsible  than  others  for  the  weakness  and  ignorance  of  its 
officials.  "  The  fact  is  that  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  democratic 
state  bears  upon  itself  the  marks  of  its  imperial  origin.  The  es- 
sence of  American  sovereignty  hardly  differs,  under  this  aspect, 
from  the  attributes  of  sovereignty  as  Bodin  distinguished  them 
three  centuries  ago.  What  emerges,  whether  in  England  or  in 
the  United  States,  is  the  fact  that  an  Austinian  state  is  incompatible 
with  the  substance  of  democracy.  For  the  latter  implies  responsi- 
bility by  its  very  definition;  and  the  Austinian  system  is,  at  bottom, 
simply  a  method  by  which  the  fallibility  of  men  is  concealed  im- 
posingly from  the  public  view."  ^^ 

The  German  attitude  of  domination-submission  was  conspicuous 
also  in  the  German  attitude  to  law.  The  lesser  respect  of  the 
Germans  for  law  as  such,  and  their  greater  subservience  to  the 
word  of  a  superior,  is  to  be  contrasted  with  the  English  and  Ameri- 
can respect  for  law  as  such  and  insistence  on  the  observance  of  the 
law  by  superiors.     A  militaristic  system  of  necessity  emphasizes 

^  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  107 ;  Lowell,  "  The  Gov- 
ernment of  England,"  1:31,  63. 

8  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  86. 

8  Ibid.,  89. 

-^^Ibid.,  85. 

^^Laski,  "The  Responsibility  of  the  State  in  England,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  March,  1919, 
466. 


ii8     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  army  attitude  of  command  and  obey.  To  be  sure,  "  when 
.  .  .  we  refer  to  the  '  will '  of  the  commanding  general,  we  refer 
to  regulated  and  not  to  arbitrary  action,  so  that  even  in  the  theatre 
of  war,  where  the  military  commander  is  supreme,  the  idea  of  law 
does  not  disappear."  ^^  But  it  fades  into  the  background  as  com- 
pared with  its  prominence  in  civil  life.  The  emphasis  is  on  obedi- 
ence to  the  word  of  the  superior  officer,  not  to  the  law  under  which 
he  commands  and  subordinates  obey.  And  because  the  idea  of  law 
falls  into  the  background  and  the  will  of  the  commanding  officer 
occupies  the  foreground,  long  habituation  to  a  militaristic  regime 
results  in  a  national  character  different  from  that  in  which  men, 
living  in  a  relatively  secure  environment,  devote  themselves  to  the 
individualistic  acquisition  of  property  and  jealously  defend  their 
property,  and  cultivate  respect  for  the  law  which  protects  them 
therein.  In  a  nation  of  this  latter  kind,  there  will  be  a  more  or 
less  determined  resistance  of  domination  which  interferes  with  the 
acquisition  of  wealth.  Domination-resistance  becomes  a  conspicu- 
ous attitude  in  the  national  character.  In  both  types  of  nations 
there  is  admiration  for  superiority;  but  in  the  one  admiration  for 
the  personality  of  superior  dominating  power  predominates,  in  the 
other  admiration  for  the  property  owner  or  the  class  of  large 
property  owners. ^^  The  arbitrary  will  of  the  ruler  is  curbed  by  the 
insistence  of  property  owners  on  his  observance  of  laws  that  guar- 
antee to  them  what  they  claim  as  their  rights,  and  thus  originates 
and  develops  public  law.  Again,  an  absorption  in  property-getting 
conduces  to  respect  for  law  as  the  bulwark  of  the  security  of  prop- 
erty owners;  and  the  jealousies  and  conflicts  among  property  own- 
ers beget  a  respect  for  law  as  the  means  of  repressing  human  wil- 
fulness, and  for  interpreters  of  law  as  arbiters  in  controversies 
over  property.  Thus  develops  private  law.  Finally,  as  the  instru- 
ments of  production  pass  into  comparatively  fewer  hands,  law 
becomes  an  agency  for  the  regulation  of  industry  on  behalf  of  the 
public  welfare  and  for  the  protection  of  the  working  masses  against 
exploitation  by  those  who  own  the  instruments  of  production. 
Thus  develops  the  law  of  commerce  and  labour. 

A  people  like  the  English,  among  whom  the  property  attitudes 

1^  Moore,  "Law  and  Organization,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  IX:  No.  3. 
18  Veblen,  "  Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution,"  165-166. 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  119 

have  predominated,  are  individualistic,  self-reliant,  reserved,  prac- 
tical and  sagacious  in  thinking,  self-controlled  and  therefore  con- 
servative in  their  morality;  "  while  the  Germans,  among  whom  the 
militaristic  attitudes  have  predominated,  are  characterized  by  an 
aptitude  for  organization, ^'^  and  a  psychological  differentiation, 
which,  in  the  case  of  those  animated  by  intellectual  impulses  results 
in  a  profundity  and  thoroughness  in  thinking  and  in  carrying  out 
ideas;  ^^  in  the  case  of  those  animated  by  dominating  impulses  in 
an  extreme  egoism;  ^"^  in  the  case  of  those  animated  by  submissive 
impulses  in  an  extreme  servility.  On  account  of  the  suppression  of 
instinctive  impulses  that  results  from  this  psychological  differenti- 
ation, a  wide  range  of  subconscious  impulses  is  fostered  in  the 
Germans,  resulting  in  an  emotional  life  with  a  realm  of  its  own,^^ 
which  conduces  to  a  less  conservative  morality  than  that  of  the 
English. 

Essential  in  the  political  attitude  of  Germany  was  the  militaristic 
attitude  of  admiration  for  personal  dominating  power, ^^  and  sub- 
mission to  domination,  with  a  sense  of  security  under  this  protec- 
tion; as  contrasted  with  the  attitude  of  England,  essential  in  which 
is  rivalry  for  property,  admiration  for  the  property  owner,  and 
insistence  on  free  action  in  acquisition,  under  the  law,  with  a  com- 
paratively weak  instinct  for  other  protection.  Commenting  on  this 
difference  of  attitude,  Veblen  says :  "  With  this  feudalistic  loyalty 
(of  the  Germans)  goes  an  enthusiastic  sense  of  national  solidarity 
and  a  self-complacent  conviction  of  the  superior  merits  of  the  views 
and  usages  current  in  the  Fatherland.  .  .  .  The  dynastic  state,  of 
course,  is  a  large  element  in  the  'Culture'  of  this  people;  very 
much  as  its  repudiation  is  an  integral  feature  of  a  cultural  scheme 
accepted  among  English-speaking  peoples.  Indeed,  there  is  little, 
if  substantially  anything,  else  in  the  way  of  incurable  difference  be- 
tween the  German  and  the  English  scheme  of  things  than  this  dis- 
crepancy between  this  ideal  of  the  dynastic  state  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  preconception  of  popular  autonomy  on  the  other.     The 

"  Perry,  "  The  Present  Conflict  of  Ideals,"  Ch.  XXXI. 

1"  Ibid.,  408-412. 

1^  Ibid.,  398-404. 

1^  Ibid.,  404-408. 

18  Ibid.,  413-416. 

1*  Liebknecht,  "  Militarism,"  65-67. 


120     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

visible  differences  of  principle  In  other  bearings  will  commonly  be 
found  to  be  derivatives  or  ramifications  of  these  incompatible  senti- 
ments on  the  head  of  personal  government."  ^° 

The  German  national  character  was  determined  less  by  inevitable 
"  racial  traits  "  than  by  the  Instinctive  Impulses  stirred  by  the  situ- 
ation of  the  German  people.  "  A  Dutchman  has  probably  much 
the  same  native  disposition  as  a  German,  but  his  instincts  In  adult 
life  are  very  different  owing  to  the  absence  of  militarism  and  of 
the  pride  of  a  Great  Power."  ^^  The  militarism  that  was  fostered 
by  the  dynasty  and  the  capitalistic  classes  of  Germany  attained  the 
dignity  of  a  cult  through  the  teaching  of  Treltschke  and  Nietzsche. 
The  national  development  seemed  to  many  thinking  men  to  verify 
this  philosophy.  The  rapidly  Increasing  population  of  Germany 
caused  apprehension  of  national  need  unless  there  was  the  neces- 
sary economic  expansion.  Apprehension  was  caused,  also,  by  the 
rapidly  increasing  population  of  Russia  and  the  menace  of  this  to 
Germany's  subsistence  and  securlty.^^  What  would  Germany  do 
when  the  country  became  too  small  for  its  population?  What 
would  happen  if,  with  its  diminishing  natural  resources,  It  became 
unable  to  get  raw  materials  from  other  nations  with  which  to  sup- 
ply the  factories  that  gave  work  to  its  Immense  population?  Com- 
paratively easy  was  It  to  suggest  to  the  masses  so  situated  that  their 
prosperity  depended  on  the  attitude  of  Russia,  with  Its  immense 
resources,  and  that  a  favourable  attitude  could  be  guaranteed  only 
by  Germany's  becoming  the  great  political  power  of  Europe,  This 
would  guarantee,  also,  a  favourable  attitude  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
land and  France.  The  capricious  autocracy  of  Russia,  the  histori- 
cal resentment  of  France,  and  the  naval  dominance  of  England 
seemed  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  any  relation  of  International 
co-operation.  Thus  it  was  easy  for  the  ambitious  dynasty  and  the 
capitalistic  interests  of  Germany  to  Instigate  thinking  and  non- 
thinking people  to  an  Impulse  for  national  supremacy.  Obviously 
this  militaristic  national  character  developed  out  of  a  situation 
which  is  not  Inevitable  but  can  be  removed  by  international  or- 
ganization for  economic  co-operation. 

The  submission  of  the  German  people,  in  the  autocratic  period, 

20  Veblen,  o/>.  «V.,  165-168. 

21  Russell,  "Why  Men  Fight,"  37. 

22 Turner,  "The  Cause's  of  the  Great  War,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  IX: 23. 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  121 

was  a  less  unwilling  submission  than  in  Russia.  During  the  two 
decades  that  preceded  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War  the  German 
people  showed  an  increasing  impulse  for  national  superiority,  which 
came  to  animate  all  classes.  German  socialism  was  a  protest 
against  this  ideal  but  eventually  acquiesced.  Of  that  autocratic 
period  it  is  said:  "  Germany  has  passed  far  beyond  the  state  of 
paying  homage  to  her  dreamers  and  poets.  The  vast  developments 
of  technical  science  are  leaving  a  characteristically  '  real '  mark, 
not  only  on  the  intellectuals,  but  on  the  common  people.  The  men 
who  shape  industrial  policies  have  left  no  stone  unturned  to  stimu- 
late a  consciousness  of  the  growing  power  of  Germany,  and  to 
strengthen  the  hands  of  the  class  that  directs  imperial  policy.  .  .  . 
What  the  university  professors  have  been  for  the  pure  intellectuals, 
captains  of  industry  have  been  for  the  middle  classes  and  the 
masses.  Their  joint  influence  has  tended  to  infect  the  nation  with 
a  restless  impulse,  ...  to  shape  things  anew  at  whatever  cost, 
materially  and  spiritually."  ^^  The  attitude  that  characterized 
social  relations  in  Germany  during  the  autocratic  period  sprang 
from  an  impulse  for  national  superiority  which,  through  various 
sources  of  social  suggestion,  came  to  animate  all  classes.  Indi- 
vidual and  class  subordination  resulted  as  a  willing  surrender  to 
that  obsession. ^^  The  really  intellectual  men,  the  men  who  had 
the  courage  of  their  convictions,  were  denied  a  hearing  and  im- 
prisoned if  they  persisted.  And  wherever  dissent  spread  among 
the  masses,  fear  to  speak,  even  to  think  the  dissent  through  to  con- 
viction, kept  the  dissenter  subservient  to  the  militarism. 

The  essential  feature  of  the  national  consciousness  of  Germany 
during  that  period  was  the  vigour  and  energy  of  its  underlying  in- 
stinctive impulses.  This  was  such  as  to  captivate  the  intellectual 
processes  and  draw  them  into  the  service  of  the  predominant  im- 
pulsive movements.  Thus  developed  associations  of  ideas  that  re- 
inforced the  impulsive  movements.  The  vigour  of  these  move- 
ments was  due,  in  part,  to  the  contribution  made  to  that  vigour  by 
the  associations  of  ideas  and,  in  part,  to  the  great  variety  of  strong 
instincts  enlisted  by  the  impulse  for  national  superiority.  That  im- 
pulse justifies  and  instigates  the  sexual  and  parental  instincts,  for 

23  McLaren,  "The  Mind  and  Mood  of  Germany  To-day,"  Atlan.  Mon.,  Dec,  1917, 
798. 
2*  Liebknecht,  "  Militarism,"  3-7,  22-40. 


122     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

national  supremacy  requires  an  overflowing  population;  hence  the 
ideal  of  national  supremacy  appeals  to  the  masses,  especially  in  a 
nation  the  government  of  which  has  shown  in  a  substantial  way 
a  paternalistic  solicitude  for  the  relief  of  the  hazards  of  family 
life.  Again,  the  impulse  for  national  superiority  enlists  the  in- 
stincts of  intellectuals,  for  thinking  on  behalf  of  the  ambitions  of  the 
political  and  other  powers  satisfies  the  rivalrous  instinct  to  seek  pro- 
motion, and  the  instinct  to  seek  the  protection  of  the  strong;  and  is 
less  of  a  mental  strain  than  painstaking  analysis;  and  involves  less 
anxiety  for  security  of  academic  tenure  and  social  position  than  does 
singleminded  thinking.  It  satisfies  also  the  instinct  of  subservience 
to  the  great  ones,  and  the  instinct  for  the  popular  adulation  of  the 
"  great  philosopher."  The  impulse  for  national  superiority  satisfies, 
also,  the  instincts  of  economic  interests;  for  the  satisfaction  of  the 
acquisitive  and  rivalrous  and  dominating  instincts  these  interests  re- 
quire the  backing  of  a  superior  military  power  in  their  international 
operations  and  of  a  strong  government  in  their  relations  with  labour. 
The  impulse  for  national  superiority  satisfies  also  the  dominating  and 
contemptuous  instincts  of  an  upper  class;  the  greater  the  power  of 
the  state,  the  greater  the  superiority  of  an  upper  class  and  the  more 
abject  and  contemptible  the  inferiority  of  a  lower. 

It  is  this  combination  of  instinctive  impulses  on  behalf  of  the 
ideal  of  national  superiority  that  gives  a  culture  which  centres  about 
that  ideal  an  absorbing  and  solidifying  influence.  When  we  con- 
sider the  driving  force  of  this  type  of  culture,  we  are  inclined  to 
doubt  whether  it  can  be  outlived  by  mankind,  unless  each  nation 
makes  immense  strides  in  increasing  the  general  Intelligence  of  its 
masses,  and  in  the  development  of  Industrial  democracy.  It  owes 
Its  strength  to  Its  unsurpassed  variety  of  absorbing  instinctive  sat- 
isfactions, which  appeal  to  all  classes,  and  to  the  consequent  ease 
with  which  instinctive  impulses  subconsciously  determine  the  asso- 
ciations of  ideas. 

Just  as  the  German  people,  by  their  Impulse  for  national  supe- 
riority and  their  belief  in  their  superiority,  worked  themselves  into 
a  condition  In  which  war  was  inevitable,  so  there  Is  a  tendency  In 
all  nations  for  propertied  classes  to  become  obsessed  with  their 
superiority  and  thus  to  become  so  dominating  as  Inevitably  to  pro- 
voke a  class  war.  In  fact  the  dominating  attitude  of  Germany 
toward  the  rest  of  the  world  originated  with  the  propertied  classes 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  123 

of  Germany.  Those  Germans  who  refused  to  accept  the  domi- 
nating attitude  of  their  government  toward  other  nations  were 
those  who  resisted  the  domination  of  the  upper  classes  over  lower 
in  their  own  nation.  Germany  was  defeated  but  this  dominating 
attitude  of  upper  to  lower  classes  was  not  defeated.  Its  final  de- 
feat in  each  nation  can  come  only  through  a  thorough  education  of 
all  classes,  which  requires  the  substitution,  for  the  class-controlled 
educational  system  of  each  nation,  of  education  which  empha- 
sizes perfectly  free  intellectual  inquiry,  and  an  intellectual  self- 
control. 

Proceeding  with  our  delineation  of  the  German  political  attitude 
before  the  revolution,  we  note  that  its  influence  pervaded  every 
aspect  of  German  behaviour.  It  determined  the  repressive  politi- 
cal policy  toward  dependent  peoples, ^^  as  compared  with  the  policy 
of  autonomy  followed  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States;  also 
the  centralized  financial  control  of  Germany  ^^  as  contrasted  with 
the  sentiment  against  centralized  control  in  the  United  States,  and 
the  effort  to  avoid  an  appearance  of  centralization,^'^  though  de- 
centralization has  not  been  actually  achieved. ^^  It  was  seen  in  the 
disciplined  industrial  organization  of  Germany  ^^  due  directly  to 
military  discipline.^^  The  period  of  the  great  development  of 
German  industry  coincided  with  the  period  of  consolidation  of  in- 
dustry throughout  the  world;  and  for  this  consolidation  of  industry 
the  Germans  were  particularly  fitted  by  army  discipline.  This 
made  the  industrial  leaders  organizers  of  men,  developed  capacity 

25  Thomas,  "  The  Prussian-Polish  Situation,"  Amer.  Jour,  Social.,  March,  1914, 
628-637. 

2*  Federal  Trade  Comnaission,  Report  on  Cooperation  in  American  Export  Trade, 
Pt.  I,  44-48,  57-64. 

27  Report  of  the  Committee  Appointed  to  Investigate  the  Concentration  and  Control 
of  Money  and  Credit.  House  of  Rep.,  62nd  Congress,  3rd  Sess.,  Report  No.  1593, 
136-138. 

28  The  "  process  of  pooling  and  syndication  that  is  remaking  the  world  of  credit 
and  corporation  finance  has  been  greatly  helped  on  in  America  by  the  establishment 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  system  while  somewhat  similar  results  have  been  achieved 
elsewhere  by  somewhat  similar  devices.  That  system  has  greatly  helped  to  extend, 
facilitate,  simplify,  and  consolidate  the  unified  control  of  the  country's  credit  ar- 
rangements, and  it  has  very  conveniently  left  the  substantial  control  in  the  hands  of 
those  larger  financial  interests  into  whose  hands  the  lines  of  control  in  credit  and 
industrial  business  were  already  being  gathered  by  force  of  circumstances  and  by 
sagacious  management  of  the  interested  parties."  (Veblen,  "The  Industrial  System 
and  the  Captains  of  Industry,"  The  Dial,  May  31,  1919,  557.) 

29  Federal  Trade  Commission,  Report  on  Cooperation  in  American  Export  Trade, 
Pt.  I,  98-114. 

*°  Sombart,  "  The  Quintessence  of  Capitalism,"  284. 


124      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

to  submit  to  discipline,  not  only  among  manual  workers  but  also 
among  brain  workers  and  scientists  of  all  kinds,  for  the  progress 
of  industry.^^  Army  discipline  made  manual  workmen  submissive 
and  reliable,  made  brain  workers  methodical  in  their  work  in  that 
they  were  less  disturbed  by  personal  rivalry  than  workmen  un- 
trained in  army  life.  And  it  enabled  industrial  and  financial  lead- 
ers to  work  together  under  governmental  direction  for  national 
economic  progress. 

The  German  political  attitude  was  seen,  also,  in  the  bureaucratic 
regulation  of  the  life  and  conduct  of  the  German  people  by  their 
government,^^  as  compared  with  the  freedom  allowed  in  Eng- 
land; ^^  in  the  censorship  of  the  press,  as  compared  with  the  greater 
freedom  of  the  press  in  England  and  America.^*  It  was  seen  also 
in  the  domination  exercised  over  wife  and  children  by  the  husband 
and  father,  and  in  the  "  unthinking  adulation,  the  blind  acceptance 
of  inferiority  "  shown  by  women  toward  the  men.^^  This  family 
submission  is  closely  connected  with  political  submission  in  that 
men  must  not  listen  to  the  appeal  of  wife  and  children  when  it  con- 
flicts with  the  command  of  the  sovereign.  Men  must  be  ready  to 
renounce  family  for  the  service  of  the  State  and  the  family  must 
acquiesce.  In  a  militarism  the  soldier  is  the  attention-compelling 
figure  in  the  community  and  only  the  man  can  be  a  soldier.  So  the 
woman  is  regarded  as  much  inferior  to  man.^^  Furthermore,  the 
officer's  conspicuous  attitude  is  one  of  arrogance  toward  civilians, 
and  civilians  imitate  this  attitude  in  their  relations  with  their  in- 
feriors, including  their  inferiors  in  the  family.  This  domination 
of  women  is  further  intensified  by  the  effect  of  military  life  in  pro- 
voking the  lower  instincts,  particularly  the  sexual  instinct,  which 
intensifies  sexual  domination. 

The  German  attitude  of  domination-submission  was  seen  also  in 
the  educational  system. ^"^  The  studies  prescribed  and  the  methods 
of  teaching  were  intended  to  fit  the  children  of  each  social  class  to 
become  efficient  workmen  as  members  of  their  class  and  to  serve 
the  state  as  obedient  subjects.     In  addition  to  this  training,  Em- 

81  Hauser,  "  Germany's  Commercial  Grip  on  the  World,"  40. 
32  Collier,  "  Germany  and  the  Germans,"  356-358,  362,  405. 
^^  Ibid.,  "England  and  the  English,"  32-33. 

34  Dibble,  "  The  Newspaper,"  29-30,  88-95. 

35  Collier,  "  Germany  and  the  Germans,"  374-376,  339,  399,  407. 

36  Treitschke,  "  Politics,"  1 :  23. 

37  Collier,  "  Germany  and  the  Germans,"  305. 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  125 

peror  William  II,  when  a  young  man,  advocated  such  a  training 
in  German  history  as  should  make  the  youth  enthusiastic  supporters 
of  the  autocracy.  In  a  public  address,  he  is  reported  to  have  said 
that,  instead  of  so  much  teaching  of  languages,  history  should  be 
taught,  particularly  the  most  glorious  periods  of  German  history, 
in  order  to  enthuse  the  youth  to  support  the  royal  ambition.  "  The 
Schools  and  Universities  ought  to  have  .  .  .  instructed  the  young 
generations  in  such  a  way  that  young  men  who  are  now  about  my 
age,  that  is  to  say  thirty,  should  by  this  time  have  brought  together 
the  materials  wherewith  I  might  work  the  State  and  thus  speedily 
become  master  of  the  situation."  "  Such  was  not  the  case,"  he 
continued.  "  The  last  moment  when  our  Schools  provided  for  the 
needs  of  our  patriot  life  and  development,  was  in  the  years  '64,  %6, 
'70.  Then  the  Prussian  schools  were  depots  for  the  idea  of  Unity 
which  was  taught  everywhere.  .  .  .  All  this  ceased  after  1871. 
The  Empire  was  constituted,  we  had  what  we  wanted,  and  we  fell 
asleep  on  our  laurels."  ^^  The  German  educators  were  not  unrespon- 
sive to  his  mandate  and  the  result  was  that  "  The  Greater  Germany 
gospel  found  its  most  active  apostles  in  the  schoolmasters  and  uni- 
versity professors.  History  in  the  German,  schools  has  always  been 
taught  on  lines  calculated  to  inspire  respect  for  the  national  heritage 
as  determined  by  the  Prussian  tradition.  Detitschland  iiher  Alles, 
known  to  every  boy  and  girl,  I  have  frequently  heard  sung  in  the 
schools.  The  school-books  all  breathe  an  ardent  nationalism.  I 
also  recollect  vividly  other  books,  widely  read  by  the  youth  of  both 
sexes,  which  present  the  potentialities  of  Germanism  in  glowing 
colors,  and  contrast  Germany's  cultural  achievement  with  that  of 
'  decadent '  nations,  to  the  disparagement  of  the  latter.  The  uni- 
versity professors  have  done  more  than  any  other  body  of  men  in 
the  empire  to  sow  the  seed  of  an  aggressive  Deutschtum  in  ado- 
lescent Germany.  Their  influence  on  public  opinion  has  been  par- 
ticularly sinister,  because,  not  only  military  officers,  but  thousands 
of  students  from  the  commercial  middle  class  spend  their  most  im- 
pressionable years  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  university."  ^^ 

To  the  German  educator  of  the  autocratic  period  an  education 
of  the  boy  for  citizenship  was  one  "  which  enables  him  to  under- 

»*  Demolins,  "  Anglo-Saxon  Superiority,"  25-26. 

«»  McLaren,  "The  Mind  and  Mood  of  Germany  Today,"  Atlan.  Mon.,  Dec,  1917, 
795-796. 


126      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

stand  generally  the  functions  of  the  State,  by  means  of  which  he  is 
able  and  willing  to  fill  his  place  in  the  State  organism  according  to 
the  best  of  his  powers."  ^"^  The  essential  function  of  German  pub- 
lic education  was  to  promote  a  feeling  of  national  solidarity,^^  of 
acquiescence  in  the  control  of  the  upper  classes,^^  and  of  content- 
ment among  the  working  classes. ^^  The  educational  system  it  was 
declared  must  recognize  the  "  two  fundamental  moral  principles 
which  indubitably  guide  every  well-bred  man,  namely,  those  of 
moral  self-assertion  and  of  moral  self-abnegation."  ^*  A  militarism 
requires  self-assertion  toward  those  below,  and  self-abnegation  be- 
fore those  above  one  in  authority.  Compare  this  ideal  with  that 
of  American  education.  In  the  United  States  as  well  as  in  Ger- 
many, authority-obedience  has  played  too  large  a  part  in  education. 
This  is  contrary  to  the  democratic  ideal  of  education.  "  The  con- 
ventional type  of  education,  which  trains  children  to  docility  and 
obedience,  to  the  careful  performance  of  imposed  tasks  because 
they  are  imposed,  ...  is  suited  to  an  autocratic  society.  .  .  . 
But  in  a  democracy  they  interfere  with  the  successful  conduct  of 
society  and  government.  .  .  .  Responsibility  for  the  conduct  of 
society  and  government  rests  on  every  member  of  society.  ...  If 
we  train  our  children  to  take  orders,  to  do  things  simply  because 
they  are  told  to,  and  fail  to  give  them  confidence  to  act  and  think 
for  themselves,"  we  are  developing,  as  essential  In  character,  an 
attitude  which  makes  It  Impossible  for  them  to  perform  the  duties 
of  citizenship.  "  The  spread  of  the  realization  of  this  connection 
between  democracy  and  education  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting 
and  significant  phase  of  present  educational  tendencies."  ^^ 

The  delineation  of  the  role  of  the  political  attitude  of  a  people 
Includes  an  analysis  of  Its  relation  to  the  Ideas  and  associative  proc- 
esses of  the  culture  of  the  nation.     We  note  that  German  thought 

*"  Kerchensteiner,  "Education  for  Citizenship,"  23.  The  author  was  a  msmber  of 
the  Royal  Council  of  Education  and  Director  of  the  Public  Schools  of  Munich.  His 
book  was  the  prize  essay  offered  in  the  competition  announced  by  the  Royal  Academy 
of  Youthful  Knowledge  of  Erfurt.  The  theme  was  "  How  are  our  young  men,  from 
the  time  of  leaving  the  Volksschule  (age  14  years)  until  the  entrance  into  military 
service,  ...  to  be  educated  for  citizenship?" 

<i  Ibid.,  9. 

<2  Ibid.,  43.  ... 

48  Ibid.,  42. 

**Ibid.,  64. 

*5  Dewey,  "  Schools  of  Tomorrow,"  303-305.  See  also  Dewey,  "  Democracy  and 
Education,"  Chs.  VII-XII. 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  127 

took  the  lines  of  the  political  attitude.  Where  the  thinker  did  not 
venture  as  did  Hegel  to  invoke  an  Absolute  Reason  as  the  determin- 
ing force  in  human  affairs,  he  asserted  a  categorical  imperative,  as 
Kant,  or  invoked  some  other  dominating  agency;  or  he  developed 
a  philosophy  of  resignation,  as  did  Schopenhauer,  thus  satisfying 
the  attitude  of  submission;  or  he  came  smashing  in  with  a  philoso- 
phy of  self-assertion,  as  did  Nietzsche,  who  asserted  that  the  "  will 
to  power,"  an  exalted  form  of  dominating  power,^®  should  be  the 
one  impulse  of  all  true  men.  The  impulsive  line  taken  by  the 
German  thinker  depended  on  his  disposition,  and  also  on  his  ex- 
perience. Of  the  effect  of  his  disposition  on  his  thinking  Nietzsche 
said,  "  I  made  my  philosophy  out  of  my  will  to  health,  to  life. 
The  years  of  my  lowest  vitality  were  the  years  when  I  ceased  to 
be  a  pessimist."  '^'^  This  dispositional  self-assertion  ^^  was  strength- 
ened by  participation,  in  his  youth,  in  the  victory  of  Germany  over 
France,  and  was  still  further  developed  by  Nietzsche's  reaction 
against  the  self -glorifying,  self-satisfied  spirit  that  came  over  Ger- 
many in  the  years  that  followed.^^  He  is  said  to  have  gotten  his 
idea  of  the  will  to  power  "  amid  the  hurly-burly  of  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War.  As  ambulance  worker  he  saw  various  regiments 
of  our  wonderful  German  army  rush  past  him;  ready  to  face  battle 
and  death,  glorious  in  their  pride  of  life,  their  courage  for  the 
conflict,  a  perfect  expression  of  a  race  that  must  conquer  or  perish. 
Then,  for  the  first  time,  he  felt  most  vividly  that  the  strongest  and 
highest  will  to  life  is  manifested,  not  in  the  paltry  struggle  for 
existence,  but  in  the  will  to  combat,  in  the  will  to  power  and  mas- 
tery. When  my  brother  afterward  looked  back  at  these  events, 
how  different  and  many-sided  that  feeling  of  pity,  so  highly  extolled 
by  Schopenhauer,  must  have  appeared  to  him,  in  comparison  with 
that  marvellous  glimpse  of  the  will  to  life,  to  combat  and  to  power. 
Here  he  saw  a  condition  of  things  in  which  man  feels  his  strongest 
impulses,  his  conscience  and  his  ideals  to  be  identical."  ^'^ 

The  Germany  of  Nietzsche's  day  had  passed  out  of  the  infe- 
riority and  depressed  submission  of  the  Germany  of  Schopenhauer's 

48  Salter,  "  Nietzsche  the  Thinker,"  197-198. 

*7  Quoted  in  Laing,  "  The  Origin  of  Nietzsche's  Problem  and  Its  Solution,"  Intern. 
Jour.  Ethics,  July,  1916,  510-511. 

48Kallen,  "Nietzsche  —  Without  Prejudice,"  The  Dial,  Sept  20,  1919,  252. 

*»  Salter,  op.  cit.,  463-467. 

soPrau  Forster  Nietzsche,  "The  Life  of  Nietzsche,"  11:317-318. 


128      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

day^^  and  was  moving  on  the  rising  tide  of  the  anticipation  of  in- 
creasing national  power.^^  But  there  was  also  a  tendency  contrary 
to  this,  a  tendency  to  smug  self-satisfaction,  and  Nietzsche's  am- 
bition was  to  stimulate  the  national  impulse  for  increasing  power, 
to  combat  the  self-satisfied  attitude.^^ 

His  own  dispositional  self-assertion  was  intensified  by  reacting 
against  the  self-satisfied  tendency  of  his  day,  and  was  stimulated 
where  it  came  in  touch  with  the  attitude  of  national  self-assertion. 
This  attitude  of  self-assertion  he  aimed  to  stir  outside  of  Germany 
as  well  as  inside,  to  dominate  the  minds  of  men  by  absorbing  them 
in  his  ideal,  which  for  this  purpose  he  ejected  into  every  field  of 
knowledge. "^^  He  would  inoculate  not  only  the  German  people  but 
all  peoples  with  the  will  to  power.  His  impulse  was  to  dominate 
Europe  with  his  idea  and  so  "  regenerate  European  culture,"  ^^ 
thus  gaining  an  unrivalled  position  of  authority  in  the  world  of 
culture.  But  his  message  was  primarily  for  Germany.  He  called 
for  an  education  that  would  develop  the  will  to  power.  The  ob- 
ject of  education,  he  said,  is  "  To  live  in  the  noblest  aspirations  of 
one's  nation  and  to  exercise  influence  thereby  ...  to  liberate  one's 
age  and  one's  ideal  before  one's  eyes."  ^^  This  impulse  to  domi- 
nate with  the  idea  of  the  will  to  power,  which  idea  he  reinforced 
with  a  great  range  of  secondary  explanations,  resulted  in  the  denial 

51  "  After  the  disappointment  of  the  hopes  of  1848,  under  the  weight  of  the  reac- 
tion an  embittered  mood  prevailed.  This  mood  rediscovered  itself  in  Schopenhauer's 
philosophy.  .  .  .  The  oppressive  spirit  of  reaction  on  the  part  of  the  victorious  rulers 
who  sought  to  wipe  out  of  the  German  constitution  '  the  democratic  blot  of  that  year 
of  shame'  (1848)  denied  scope  for  free  activity  in  religion,  in  thought,  in  political 
and  social  effort  to  the  strong  healthy  impulses  of  the  youth  of  that  period ;  and  in 
so  far  as  they  refused  to  be  quiescent  under  the  Schopenhauerian  doctrine  of  the  noth- 
ingness of  individuality,  they  sought  an  outlet  in  the  sensuous  life  of  beer-drinking 
and  in  the  enjoyment  of  drinlking-songs."  (Laing,  "  Nietzsche's  Problem  and  Its  Solu- 
tion," Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  July,  1916,  514-515.) 

52  In  the  same  way  the  Japan  of  today  has  passed  beyond  the  condition  in  which 
the  pessimism  of  Buddhism  is  congenial.  (Reichaurer,  "  Studies  in  Japanese  Buddhism," 
49,  317,  320.) 

53  "  He  noted  after  the  victorious  wars  against  Denmark,  Austria,  and  particularly 
France,  a  new  spirit  emerging  in  Germany;  and  in  its  smugness,  selfishness,  self- 
glorification,  repulsive  nationalism,  and  national  greed  it  showed  itself  a  spirit  that 
was  far  away  from  that  of  the  world  of  Goethe.  .  .  .  Nietzsche  saw  among  his  fel- 
low-countrymen a  growing  servility,  imitativeness  .  .  .  and  the  gradual  disappearance 
of  any  desire  to  accept  individual  responsibility."     (Laing,  op.  ctt.,  511.) 

54  Salter,  op.  cit.,  Chs.  XIII-XXX. 

55  Nietzsche,  "  The  Case  of  Wagner,"  Trans,  by  J.  M.  Kennedy,  Translator's 
Preface,  xi. 

5«  Frau  Forster  Nietzsche,  "The  Life  of  Nietzsche,"  trans,  by  Ludovici,  I:  281. 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  129 

of  opposing  instinctive  impulses,  for  instance,  the  sympathetic;  °^ 
and  in  over-stimulating  the  rivalrous  and  dominating  impulses  until 
his  ideas  became  obsessions ;  and  obsessions  introduce  a  strain  that 
must  be  relieved  by  action.  His  teaching,  in  a  nation  subject  to 
the  domination  of  a  military  class,  and  of  a  capitalistic  class,  fos- 
tered impulses  for  national  superiority  by  force,  obsessions  that 
caused  a  strain  which  could  be  relieved  only  by  action  in  response 
to  the  ideas,  that  is,  by  aggressive  warfare, ^^ 

Nietzsche's  psychological  situation  required  a  perceptible  na- 
tional movement  toward  the  acceptance  of  his  gospel,  which  was 
not  forthcoming  —  hence  his  suffering.  This  he  tried  to  rise  above 
by  thinking  comfort-giving  ideas.  Thus  he  exclaims,  "  Profound 
suffering  makes  noble;  it  separates."  ^^  But  he  failed  to  satisfy 
his  impulse  to  dominate  conspicuously  with  his  ideas.  He  saw  the 
men  with  whom  he  broke  off  relations  because  of  their  different 
ideas  received  and  accepted  as  apostles  of  culture,  while,  as  yet,  he 
wandered  unheeded.^^  Eventually,  however,  his  writings  became 
immensely  popular  in  Germany  and  were  one  of  the  influences  that 
prepared  the  German  people  to  support  the  ambition  of  the  ruling 
caste  and  the  capitalistic  interests  for  conquest  and  supremacy. 

Nietzsche  used  the  phrase,  will  to  power,  in  an  ambiguous  sense, 
that  is,  to  denote  an  individualistic  impulse,  and  also  to  designate 
power  achieved  through  increasing  the  power  of  the  group  of  which 
one  is  a  member.*^^  His  emphasis  was  on  the  latter  conception,  as 
contrasted  with  the  individualism  of  Herbert  Spencer.®^  Each 
thinker  interpreted  the  doctrine  of  struggle  and  survival  in  terms 
of  his  own  national  attitude,  Spencer  using  it  to  give  sanctity  to 
the  individualistic  struggle  for  property  with  a  minimum  of  gov- 
ernmental regulation,  Nietzsche  using  it  to  justify  and  enthuse  the 
individual's  aspiration  for  power  ^^  by  impressing  his  individuality 
on  his  group,  and  against  an  adverse  environment.  Nietzsche  op- 
posed the  Darwinian  theory  of  the  importance  of  environment  in 
evolution  and  insisted  upon  personal  power  to  shape  the  environ- 

57  Salter,  op.  c'lt.,  17,  148. 

58  Alexander,  "Man's  Supreme  Inheritance,"  173-174. 
60  Nietzsche,  "  The  Case  of  Wagner,"  78. 

60  Frau  Forster  Nietzsche,  "  The  Life  of  Nietzsche,"  II :  Ch.  XXVII. 

61  Stewart,  "  Nietzsche  and  the  Ideals  of  Modern  Germany,"  49-51. 

62  Salter,  op.  cit.,  459,  441. 

63  Stewart,  op.  cit..  Lectures  IV-VI. 


130      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ment.^^  Those  who  demonstrate  this  power  become  the  master- 
ful class  and  those  who  lack  it  become  the  servile  class.  The  servile 
class  develops  a  code  of  morals  that  justifies  its  servility  and  this 
Nietzsche  abhorred.^^  He  would  reform  mankind  by  stirring 
everywhere  a  will  to  power.  Man  should  be  obsessed  by  this  im- 
pulse, and  should  inhibit  compassion  and  all  other  interfering  im- 
pulses."^ This  masterful  class  should  dominate  the  world,  said 
Nietzsche."''^ 

Thus  the  motive  emphasized  by  his  philosophy  was  congenial  to 
the  ambition  of  the  militaristic  class  of  Germany.  But  his  philoso- 
phy as  worked  out  was  contrary  to  the  forces  that  produced  the 
World  War,  for  essential  therein  was  the  rivalry  of  capitalistic 
interests  that  controlled  the  governments  of  European  nations,  and 
Nietzsche  explicitly  denied  the  right  of  business  interests  to  control 
governments.*'^  The  sovereignty  should  be  wielded,  he  said,  by  the 
real  rulers,  the  men  of  unrivalled  will  to  power.®^  The  business 
and  industrial  classes  should  be  prosperous  but  should  not  rule. 
Hence  his  opposition  to  democracy  in  any  form."^^  Nor  were 
Nietzsche's  real  rulers  the  military  aristocracy,  but  the  men  of 
intellect  who  use  the  actual  rulers  as  their  instruments'^^  and 
whose  rule  makes  for  the  highest  good  of  all  concerned.  His  con- 
ception is,  therefore,  an  idealistic  one  at  this  point  and  is  opposed 
both  to  the  forces  that  make  of  a  monarchy  a  militarism,  and  to 
those  that  make  of  a  democracy  a  plutocracy.  But  the  effect  of 
such  a  philosophy  as  Nietzsche's  is,  on  the  whole,  to  stimulate  the 
self-assertion  of  rulers  and  plutocrats  because  in  the  last  analysis 
it  emphasizes  instinctive  self-assertion.  The  defect  in  his  concep- 
tion is  that  thinkers  and  rulers  who  have  no  sympathy  —  merely  a 
will  to  power, —  whose  intellect  serves  this  one  impulse  will  not 
think  in  a  way  that  is  wise  for  the  public  welfare. 

The  more  decisive  the  attitude  of  domination-obedience  in  the 
behaviour  of  a  group,  the  less  apt  is  thought  to  diverge  from  the 
associations  of  that  attitude,  except  in  the  minds  of  the  greatest 

«* Perry,  "The  Present  Conflict  of  Ideals,"  152;  Salter,  op.  cit.,  198. 
^^  Nietzsche,  "  The  Genealogy  of  Morals,"  Sec.  14. 

66  "  The  Will  to  Power,"  Sees.  641,  681,  689. 

67  Ibid.,  728. 

68  Salter,  op.  cit.,  455. 
60  Ibid.,  429,  390-406. 
''o  Ibid.,  441. 

'1  Ibid.,  429. 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  131 

thinkers.  The  very  force  of  the  social  control  exercised  In  a  na- 
tion characterized  by  domination-submission  intimidates  all  but  the 
most  vigorous  thinkers;  and  the  divergence  of  these  from  the  pre- 
vailing thought  tends  to  be  extreme.  The  result  is  a  scarcity  of 
diverging  thinkers,  an  Inconsiderable  Influence  exerted  by  those 
who  diverge  extremely,  and,  therefore,  a  tendency  to  uniformity 
in  thought.  This  condition,  among  others,  causes  thinkers  of  those 
nations  to  minimize  the  importance  of  original  thinking,  and,  in 
some  cases  to  deny  the  existence  of  intellectually  free  individuals: 
"  The  greatest  error  of  individual  psychology  Is  the  assumption 
that  man  thinks.  .  .  .  What  thinks  In  man  Is  not  he  but  the  social 
community  of  which  he  Is  a  part.  The  fountain  of  his  thought 
lies  not  In  himself,  but  in  the  social  milieu  in  which  he  lives.  In  the 
social  atmosphere  which  he  breathes.  .  .  ."  '^^  "  The  heroes  of 
history  are  only  marionettes  who  carry  out  the  will  of  the  group."  "^^ 
"  Out  of  frictions  and  struggles,  .  .  .  finally  come  forth  .  .  .  the 
new  civilizations,  the  new  state  and  national  unities  .  .  .  and  this 
merely  through  social  action  and  reaction,  entirely  Independent  of 
the  initiative  and  will  of  Individuals,  .   .   ."  "^^ 

German  philosophers  of  the  autocratic  period  showed  a  deficiency 
in  brilliancy  of  analysis  and  discrimination,  which  distinguishes  the 
scientific  thinker,  and  an  impulse  to  dominate  with  mere  weight  of 
learning  or  with  prolific  writing  or  with  the  impressiveness  of  their 
conceptions.  The  formula  of  struggle  and  survival  lends  itself  to 
this  type  of  thinker  because  It  emphasizes  the  will  to  power,  suc- 
cess, as  well  as  because  of  the  prestige  of  the  theory  itself.'^^  The 
result  Is  that  It  was  used  and  misused  by  German  thinkers  who,  in 
their  impulse  to  dominate  the  age  With  their  thought,  either  used 
the  theory  as  a  foil  for  an  opposite  theory,  or  extended  the  theory 
far  beyond  the  scope  originally  assigned  it,  thus  making  extreme 
interpretations  in  the  fields  of  politics,  morals,  religion,  and  art. 
The  more  it  was  used  in  this  way,  the  greater  its  prestige  became 
as  a  principle  of  interpretation  of  immense  range,  and  hence  the 
greater  the  incentive  to  its  use  because  of  the  prestige  It  gave  the 
ideas  and  the  writer.     Its  satlsfyingness  for  the  impulse  to  domi- 

■^2  Gumplowicz,  "  Grundriss  der  Soziologie,"  76. 

73  Ibid.,  "  Der  Rassenkampf,"  37. 

74  Ibid.,  "  Soziologie  und  Politik,"  94. 
-7"  Stewart,  op.  cit.,  Lecture  IV, 


132      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

nate  with  thought  made  Darwinian  and  anti-Darwinian  interpreta- 
tions seductive  and  blinded  thinkers  to  the  necessity  of  the  use  of 
those  scientific  methods  which  Darwin  used  so  patiently  and  per- 
sistently. 

Thinkers  of  a  nation  in  which  domination-obedience  is  essential 
in  behaviour  are  affected  by  this  attitude  with  a  certain  submissive- 
ness  to  the  powers  that  be,  with  whom  they  wish  their  ideas  to  find 
favour.  They  are  affected  also  with  an  impulse  to  dominate  with 
their  ideas,  to  provoke  a  social  assent  to  their  views;  and,  there- 
fore, they  tend  not  to  express  views  which  are  so  contrary  to  the 
prevailing  social  attitudes  as  to  call  forth  social  dissent.  On  the 
contrary,  the  thinkers  of  a  nation  in  which  an  attitude  of  resistance 
to  domination,  that  is,  an  attitude  of  liberty,  is  pronounced,  are, 
from  the  nature  of  the  attitude,  stimulated  to  more  or  less  critical 
thinking.  In  England  the  attitude  of  resistance  or  independence 
has  impressed  itself  on  the  institutions,  and  has  expressed  itself 
periodically  in  reforms  in  economic  '^^  and  political  institutions,"^^ 
in  ecclesiastical  institutions  "^^  and  in  artistic  standards.'^^  How- 
ever, a  national  attitude  for  individual  liberty  may  tyrannize  over 
the  intellect  as  much  as  any  other  national  attitude.  It  may  pre- 
vent an  unprejudiced  analysis  of  political  and  economic  problems 
where  this  analysis  points  to  the  necessity  of  governmental  limi- 
tation of  liberty  for  the  public  welfare.  This  is  seen  in  the  way 
in  which  the  attitude  called  laissez-faire  has  given  a  bias  to  think- 
ing on  economic  and  political  problems.  Bentham,  apostle  of 
laissez-faire,  declared  that  every  economic  class  —  laborers  as  well 
as  employers  —  should  be  given  complete  freedom  from  govern- 
mental restrictions. ^°  He  assumed  that,  with  such  freedom,  the 
economic  classes  could  work  out  a  relation  to  one  another  in  which 
each  would  enjoy  the  maximum  freedom  that  is  possible  in  the 
industrial  relation.  This  principle,  re-afl'irmed  by  the  early  econo- 
mists, was  influential  in  retarding  the  development  of  labour  legis- 
lation in  Europe  long  after  it  had  become  evident  that,  without 
governmental  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  the  employing  class, 

■^^  Bruce,  "  Laissez-faire  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,"  Green  Bag, 
XX:  553-554. 

"  Jephson,  "  The  Platform," 

''8  Dicey,  "Law  and  Opinion  in  England,"  397-407. 

"  Brooke,  "  English  Literature,"  Ch,  VIIL 

Po  Dicey,  op.  cit.,  147,  quoting  Bentham,  "Works,"  V:234. 


POLITICAL  ATTITUDES  AND  IDEALS  133 

the  labouring  class  was  subject  to  the  domination  and  exploitation 
of  that  class,  politically  as  well  as  economically. 

Herbert  Spencer  re-affirmed  the  individualistic  attitude,  includ- 
ing the  economic  phase  of  it  —  laissez-faire, —  and  this  endorse- 
ment of  the  political  attitude  of  the  English  national  character, 
and  of  the  economic  attitude  of  influential  classes,  won  for  his  work 
marked  approval.^^  Spencer  came  of  non-conformist  ancestry  and 
was  strongly  conscious  of  his  attitude  of  independence,  and  fol- 
lowed it  in  non-conformity  in  dress  and  manners  as  well  as  in  his 
thinking.^^  His  vigorous  intellectual  impulses  required  freedom 
from  restraint  for  their  satisfaction;  and  he  felt  that  as  he  enjoyed 
independence  in  thought  and  action,^^  so  no  man's  liberty  ought  to 
be  hindered  as  long  as  he  did  not  interfere  with  his  neighbour's 
liberty.  It  should  be  noted  that  when  his  assertion  of  independ- 
ence went  beyond  political  and  economic  relations,  in  which  his 
opposition  to  governmental  regulation  of  industry  amounted  to  an 
assertion  of  the  right  of  industrial  and  political  domination  of  the 
legally  dominant  propertied  classes, —  when  his  assertion  of  inde- 
pendence went  beyond  this  and  asserted  freedom  of  thought  and 
action  of  the  individual  in  all  his  relations',  his  thinking  was  gen- 
erally opposed.  Nevertheless,  the  attitude  of  intellectual  inde- 
pendence determined  his  thinking  from  the  beginning  to  the  end 
of  his  life.®^  It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  the  leading  English 
philosophers  have  never  been  as  popular  in  their  nation  as  the  lead- 
ing German  philosophers  in  their  nation. 

The  German  attitude  of  submission  of  the  autocratic  period  fitted 
the  people  to  listen  reverently  to  their  philosophers,  whose  think- 
ing gave  the  prevailing  attitudes  the  prestige  of  learning  and  logic 
and  made  the  philosophers  the  idols  of  academic  circles.  In  Eng- 
land the  indifference  of  the  masses  to  abstract  thinking  as  "  im- 
practical," and  the  conventionalized  thinking  of  academic  circles 
has  given  the  independent  philosopher  a  position  of  solitary  dis- 
tinction. Far  from  being  the  idol  of  academic  circles,  he  leads  a 
life  apart  and  often  in  opposition  to  the  academic  life  of  the  nation. 

Spencer's  philosophy  was  contrary  to  the  philosophy  of  a  mili- 

^^  Spencer  said  that  his  Social  Statics  was  more  favourably  noticed  than  any  of  his 
later  books.     ("Autobiography,"   1:422;   see  also  Royce,  "Herbert  Spencer,"  198.) 
^2  Royce,  op.  cit.,  190-191. 
*8  Spencer,  "Autobiography,"  11:513-514. 
8* /^iV/.,  11:515-518. 


134     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

taristic  state.  He  distinguished  two  stages  of  progress,  the  mili- 
tary and  the  industrial.  Coercion  is  characteristic  of  the  one, 
voluntary  co-operation  of  the  other.  "  In  a  society  organized  for 
militant  action,  the  individuality  of  each  member  has  to  be  so  sub- 
ordinated in  life,  liberty  and  property,  that  he  is  largely  or  com- 
pletely owned  by  the  state.  Under  the  industrial  regime  the  citi- 
zen's individuality,  instead  of  being  sacrificed  by  the  society,  has 
to  be  defended  by  the  society.  The  defence  of  his  individuality 
becomes  the  society's  essential  duty."  ®^ 

Protection  of  individuality  by  society,  rightly  understood,  is  the 
opposite  of  laissez-faire,  which  would  leave  each  individual  free 
and  unprotected  by  governmental  action.  The  latter  type  of  indi- 
vidualism has  been  essential  in  the  American  national  character. 
It  is  the  attitude  of  American  business  enterprise;  it  emphasizes  the 
right  of  the  profit-seeker  to  take  all  the  risks  incident  to  profit- 
seeking^^  and  to  enjoy  unlimited  returns.  The  impulse  for  risk- 
taking  in  business  has  permeated  American  business  from  the  be- 
ginning, including  farmers  and  tradesmen,  as  well  as  manufacturers 
and  financiers,  and  the  result  has  been  that,  politically,  the  Ameri- 
can people  have  stood  for  freedom  of  private  enterprise,  with  an 
appeal  to  chance  ^"^  that  such  a  policy  would  "  bring  us  out  all 
right."  Like  the  English,  the  Americans  have  also  been  charac- 
terized by  a  reverence  for  law  as  the  means  of  preserving  the  es- 
tablished order  of  private  property.^®  This  political  attitude 
originated  away  back  when  agriculture  was  the  chief  industry  in 
the  United  States.^^  How  the  early  economic  conditions  of  Amer- 
ica fostered  an  individualistic  attitude,  how  this  was  in  harmony 
with  the  individualistic  attitude  of  the  English  common  law,  which 
was  brought  to  this  country  by  the  early  immigrants,  how  American 
business  enterprise  has  continued  individuahstic  and  planless,  so 
far  as  the  public  welfare  is  concerned,  how  conditions  are  beginning 
to  change  and  are  developing  an  economic  and  political  attitude  and 
a  philosophy  contrary  to  the  traditional  attitude  and  philosophy 
will  be  shown  in  subsequent  chapters. 

85  Spencer,  "  Principles  of  Sociology,"  II :  607. 

88  Fisher,  "Economists  in  Public  Service,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX   (supplement)  :  13. 

87  Dewey,  "Progress,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  Apr.,  1916,  313,  314,  318. 

88  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  45. 
8»  Ibid.,  73. 


CHAPTER  VII 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    ASPECTS    OF    INTRA-NATIONAL    RELATIONS 

IN  the  development  of  the  United  States  we  may  distinguish 
four  types  of  relations  successively  developing  within  the  na- 
tion: a  period  of  comparative  equality  of  opportunity,  with 
little  class  consciousness  except  between  rural  and  urban  popula- 
tions, between  agrarian  and  capitalistic  Interests ;  ^  a  period  of 
ascendancy  of  capitalistic  interests  and  of  national  policies  that 
sought  primarily  the  prosperity  of  those  interests,^  with,  however,  a 
keen  rivalry  between  those  interests  for  political  and  economic  ad- 
vantage; a  period  of  increasing  dominance  of  financial  and  other 
great  corporate  interests;  a  rising  resistance  to  monopoly,  profiteer- 
ing, labour  domination  and  other  forms  of  the  dominance  of  capi- 
talism, resulting  in  an  attempt  to  regulate  capitalism  in  the  public 
interest. 

In  the  period  of  settlement  of  a  new  country  men  feel  their  in- 
dependence and  their  approximate  equality  in  economic  oppor- 
tunity,^ and  they  contrast  this  with  the  oppression  sufi^ered  by  the 
people  of  older  nations.  The  sense  of  the  superiority  and  the 
self-sufl'iciency  of  the  new  country  is  apt  to  cause  a  sentiment  for 
national  isolation.  The  consciousness  of  superiority  may  continue 
long  after  the  equality  of  opportunity  has  ceased  to  exist  for  large 
sections  of  the  population;  and  this  surviving  consciousness  may 
maintain  the  sentiment  for  national  isolation,  and  also  for  the 
preservation  of  the  political  unity  of  the  nation,^  on  account  of  the 
sense  of  national  strength  which  unity  gives,  and  the  confidence 
thereby  afforded  of  power  to  perpetuate  the  national  independence 
and  isolation. 

In  the  period  of  ascendancy  of  capitalistic  interests,  there  was 

1  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  Ch.  III. 

^Ibid.,  Chs.  IV-V. 

8  This  spirit  of  individualism  was  conspicuous  in  the  eastern  (Williams,  "An 
American  Town,"  Pt.  I,  Ch.  V;  Pt.  II,  Ch.  XII)  and  in  the  western  United  States 
(Hill,  "The  Public  Domain  and  Democracy,  Chs.  IV-VIII). 

*  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  19. 

13s 


136     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

keen  competition  between  transportation  lines,  manufacturing  cor- 
porations, and  financial  corporations.  Rivalry  was  not  confined 
to  the  business  enterprises;  it  was  everywhere  prevalent.  The 
rivalrous  ^  spirit  of  America  survived  from  the  freedom  of  oppor- 
tunity of  the  preceding  period  afforded  by  the  vast  area  of  cheap 
land,  and  it  was  further  stimulated  by  the  active,  outdoor  life  of 
the  American.  The  contests  of  strength  in  both  work  and  play 
"  resulted  in  an  unfeigned  admiration  of  the  powerful  man.  With 
this  was  associated  a  love  of  fair  play  which  might  show  which 
really  was  the  powerful  man."  ^  The  rivalrous  spirit  was  further 
intensified  by  the  fact  that  a  considerable  part  of  the  early  popu- 
lation of  America  sprang  from  those  who  emigrated  to  the  New 
World  because  of  their,  or  their  immediate  ancestors',  resistance 
of  domination  in  the  Old  World.  Consequently  they  were  men 
who,  by  disposition,  insisted  on  free  rivalry. 

The  third  type  of  behaviour  arises  when,  in  the  struggle  for 
wealth,  certain  men  have  acquired  financial  power  and  have  the 
impulse  to  stifle  competition  in  order  to  monopolize  the  market. 
The  business  men  of  an  industry  then  begin  to  fear  to  antagonize  the 
rising  powers  in  the  industry.^  The  impulse  to  stifle  competition 
not  only  was  the  motive  of  the  growth  of  the  great  monopolies, 
but  also  animated  the  many  successful  concerns  that  had  long  en- 
joyed semi-monopolistic  privileges.  The  impulse  is  to  maintain  a 
privileged  position  by  the  domination  of  rivals.  This  type  of  be- 
haviour has  been  encouraged  by  the  passing  of  the  conditions  that 
stimulated  free  rivalry,  which  has  resulted  in  a  loss  of  independence, 

^  The  coining  of  this  new  word,  which  will  be  used  throughout  this  book,  has  the 
assent  of  certain  professors  of  English  literature  to  whom  I  stated  the  case:  The 
word,  rivalry,  has  come  to  be  generally  used  by  psychologists  to  designate  a  certain 
instinctive  disposition  and  the  impulses  that  spring  therefrom;  and,  consequently, 
there  is  need  of  an  adjective  to  correspond  exactly  with  the  noun,  as  emulous  and 
other  synonyms  do  not. 

*  Williams,  op.  cit.,  40. 

"^  Corporations  bent  on  creating  a  monopoly  find  their  task  made  easy  by  the  appre- 
hension of  independent  weaker  companies.  In  the  meat-packing  industry,  "  The 
powerful  position  in  the  industry  which  the  big  packers  occupy  and  such  practices  as 
the  foregoing,  by  which  they  have  made  themselves  felt,  have  inspired  the  independ- 
ents with  much  caution  and  even  fear  of  running  counter  to  them.  (Federal  Trade 
Commission,  Report  on  the  Meat-Packing  Industry,  1919,  Pt.  Ill:  138.)  Again,  in  a 
decision  in  a  government  suit  against  the  American  Can  Company,  the  judge  de- 
clared that  the  reason  so  many  can-makers  sold  out  to  the  American  Can  Company 
was  fear  of  what  would  happen  if  they  did  not;  that  some  were  threatened  but  that 
threats  were  generally  unnecessary  because  "  the  apprehension  was  quite  general 
that  the  only  choice  was  between  going  out  or  being  driven  out."  (U.  S.  v,  American 
Can  Co.,  Distr.  C.  Md.,  Feb.  23,  1916,  Reprint.) 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  137 

a  tendency  to  fear  the  powers  that  be  and  to  seek  to  instigate  their 
favour,  and  to  rely  on  "  pull." 

The  third  type  of  behaviour  is  pronounced  in  a  society  controlled 
by  an  hereditary  wealthy  class.  In  the  United  States  no  class  has 
won  a  position  of  undisputed  domination  because  of  the  popular 
form  of  government.  The  development  of  constitutional  gov- 
ernment has  been  In  the  direction  of  the  restraint  of  class  domina- 
tion by  making  government  officials  elective  and  by  giving  men  and, 
recently,  women  of  all  classes  the  right  to  vote  for  legislators  and 
executive  officers,  and,  in  many  cases,  administrative  officers  and 
judges,  with  a  secret  ballot  and  with  other  safeguards  that  pre- 
vent the  voter  being  influenced  by  external  Influences.^  But  the 
law  and  custom  inherited  from  the  past  developed  in  the  course  of 
social  control  by  propertied  classes.  The  development  of  social 
institutions  has  been  determined  by  the  property-owning  classes 
with  the  supreme  end  of  preserving  unrestricted  the  rights  of  pri- 
vate property  traditionally  preserved  by  law  ®  and  religious  sanc- 
tion ^^  and  philosophical  disquisition.^^  Therefore  the  attitudes  of 
society  are  in  harmony  with  the  social  control  exercised  by  the 
propertied  classes.  We  are,  perhaps,  too  apt  to  think  of  those 
classes  as  exerting  a  conscious  and  deliberate  control  over  the  gov- 
ernment. This  is  often  done,  but,  until  recently,  it  has  been  gen- 
erally unnecessary.  The  propertied  classes  have  always  subcon- 
sciously assumed  their  right  to  govern;  and  the  other  classes  have 
acquiesced  in  that  attitude  of  authority.  We  are  apt  to  think  of 
lower  classes  as  constantly  resenting  any  assumption  of  authority 
on  the  part  of  upper,  but  such  resentment  has,  until  recently,  been 
exceptional.  These  exceptional  occasions  of  popular  resentment 
are  more  vividly  conscious  to  the  public  mind  than  Is  the  prevailing 
subconscious  acquiescence  in  the   authority  of  propertied  classes. 

In  European  countries  for  a  long  period  the  control  of  one  prop- 
erty-owning class,  the  landed  class,  was  fixed  and  unquestioned. 
The  third  type  of  behaviour,  that  of  domination  by  a  propertied 
class,  prevailed.  Eventually,  however,  this  control  exercised  by 
the  landed  class  was  disputed  by  the  rising  manufacturing  and 

8  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  Ch,  XV. 

8  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer,  Social.  Soc,  VII:  153; 
Schapiro,  "  Social  Reform  and  the  Reformation,"  48-49. 

^°  Westermarck,  "The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  Ideas,"  11:60-69. 

^1  Harrington,  "  The  Commonwealth  of  Oceana,"  with  an  introduction  by  Morley, 
15-20;  Locke,  "Two  Treatises  of  Government,"  Bk.  II,  Chs.  2,  5,  9,  11. 


138     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

commercial  classes.  Before  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  James  Madison  wrote:  "  A  landed  interest,  a 
manufacturing  interest,  a  mercantile  interest,  a  moneyed  interest, 
with  many  lesser  interests,  grow  up  of  necessity  in  civilized  nations, 
and  divide  them  into  classes,  actuated  by  different  sentiments  and 
views.  The  regulation  of  these  various  and  interfering  interests 
forms  the  principal  task  of  modern  legislation,  and  involves  the 
spirit  of  party  and  faction  in  the  necessary  and  ordinary  operations 
of  government."  ^^  Early  in  the  history  of  our  government  we 
discern  the  rivalry  of  propertied  interests  in  governmental  af- 
fairs." The  capitalistic  class  at  the  present  time  includes  rival 
interests  which  strive  for  governmental  control  but  which  draw 
together  and  work  in  common  to  repress  any  movement  for  popu- 
lar control.  This  distrust  of  popular  control  also  existed  at  the 
time  of  the  formation  of  the  federal  constitution,  which  was  so  de- 
vised as  to  prevent  the  control  of  the  government  by  "  an  over- 
bearing majority,  which  Madison,  in  another  place,  prophesied 
would  be  the  landless  proletariat.^^  .   .   ."  ^^ 

This  dominating  attitude  of  propertied  classes  was  contrary  to 
the  spirit  of  America,  which  was  one  of  free  rivalry  for  property. 
The  assumption  of  a  landless,  non-propertied  class  that  must  be 
guarded  against  In  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land  was  contrary 
to  the  existing  conditions,  for.  In  a  country  of  cheap  land  and  ad- 
venturous settlers,  there  was  comparative  freedom  of  opportunity 
for  acquiring  property.  This  condition  affected  men  In  different 
ways  according  to  their  Instinctive  dispositions.  Those  of  a  pre- 
dominantly acquisitive  disposition  were  persistent  workers  ^^  with 
little  imagination,  those  of  an  extremely  rivalrous  disposition  were 
men  of  vivid  imagination,  who  "  were  always  going  to  do  some- 
thing great,"  ^'^  but  with  little  power  of  persistent  work.  This 
speculative  class  pushed  on  to  the  frontier,  where,  in  a  new  and 
rich  country,  the  rivalrous  Imagination  had  free  play,  and  economic 
activity  took  the  form  of  exploitation  rather  than  constructive  pro- 
duction.^^ 

12  The  Federalist,  No.  X. 
-  1'  Beard,  "  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian  Democracy." 

1*  Farrand,  Records,  Vol.  II,  p.  203. 

IS  Beard,  "  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States," 
157-158. 

1^  V^illiams,  "  An  American  Town,"  30-32. 

^''  Ibid.,  202. 

18  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  96. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  139 

Economic  conditions  were  such  as  tended  to  stimulate  the  rival- 
rous  disposition  and  the  speculative  attitude.  Land  was  easily 
acquired, ^^  men  were  independent,  and  not  fearfully  dependent  on 
landlords  for  the  opportunity  to  make  a  living.  With  the  in- 
crease in  population  land  was  rising  in  value,  and  a  man's  land 
might  prove  to  be  so  unusually  well  situated  as  to  increase  rapidly 
in  value  with  the  development  of  transportation  and  the  growth 
of  population.^"  Wherefore  success  in  accumulation  of  wealth  de- 
pended  not  merely  on  energy  and  sagacity  but  on  chance.  Hence 
the  speculative  aspect  of  American  economic  life.^^  So  much  was 
this  so  that  economic  behaviour  often  lost  all  semblance  of  pro- 
ductive effort. ^^  As  the  opportunities  for  speculation  diminished, 
there  continued  the  uncertainty  of  the  seasons  so  that  the  farmer, 
in  planting  in  the  spring,  took  a  chance  as  to  whether  or  not  he 
would  reap.^^  There  continued  uncertainty,  also,  as  to  the  growth 
of  population,  the  location  of  the  railroad,  the  securing  of  capital 
for  the  development  of  land,  and  other  conditions  that  affect  land 
values.  In  many  sections  the  natural  resources  were  enormously 
rich,  and  stirred  extravagant  anticipation  throughout  the  popula- 
tion.^^ This  rivalrous  ambition,  developed  by  economic  conditions, 
in  turn  affected  political  behaviour.  It  gave  rise  to  the  spoils  sys- 
tem which  made  political  activity  an  affair  of  reckless  adventure. 
Any  "  position  might  lead  anywhere,  and  that  quickly;  removal  was 
constantly  Impending;  government  service  was  speculative.  .  .  ."  ^^ 
There  was  an  impatience  with  every  appearance  of  an  exercise  of 
political  domination  over  indivlduahstic  ambition. ^^  This  ambi- 
tion and  impulsive  anticipation  was  seen,  also.  In  the  religious  be- 
haviour of  the  period,  which  was  less  conventional  and  more  im- 
pulsive than  anywhere  else  in  the  world.^^     It  was  seen,  also,  in  the 

19  Hill,  "The  Public  Domain  and  Democracy,"  Ch.  II. 

20  Ibid.,  73-78. 

21  Flint,  "Recollections  of  the  Last  Ten  Years"  (1826),  200-203;  Trollope,  "North 
America,"  1:45;  Turner,  "The  Significance  of  the  Frontier  in  American  History," 
Proceedings  of  Forty-First  Annual  Meeting  of  State  Historical  Society  of  Wisconsin, 
Reprint,  11-13;  Turner,  "The  Rise  of  the  New  West,"  85-92. 

22  Flint,  op.  cit.,  199. 

23  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  229 ;  Carver,  "  Principles  of  Rural  Economics," 
14-24. 

2*Weyl,  "The  New  Democracy,"  Chs,  III-IV. 
25  Fish,  "  The  Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage,"  203,  104. 

2«  Ibid.,   8i ;    see   also   Ostrogorski,   "  Democracy   and   the   Organization   of   Political 
Parties,"  II :  52 ;  Turner,  "  The  Rise  of  the  New  West,"  107. 
2T  Bryce,  "  American  Commonwealth,"  II :  577 ;  Hill,  op.  cit.,  87. 


140      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

recreation  of  the  period,   in  the  prevalence  of  gambling  ^^   and 
horse-trading.^^ 

From  this  period  of  individualistic  rivalry  we  inherit  many  tend- 
encies in  present  day  American  life,  which  will  be  traced  in  a  future 
volume  where,  also,  the  period  itself  will  be  more  fully  analysed. 
But  with  the  change  in  economic  conditions  that  has  resulted  from 
the  passing  of  the  instruments  of  production  under  the  control  of 
great  economic  interests,  this  period  of  individualistic  rivalry  is 
being  succeeded  by  one  of  domination-submission.  Rivalry  in- 
stinctively tends  to  domination  and  repression  of  rivals  as  soon  as 
some  of  the  rivals  have  acquired  a  financial  or  political  advantage. 
For  instance,  "  During  the  first  half  century  banking  in  New  York," 
says  Horace  White,  "  was  an  integral  part  of  the  spoils  of  politics. 
Federalists  would  grant  no  charters  to  Republicans,  and  Republi- 
cans none  to  Federalists.  After  a  few  banks  had  been  established 
they  united,  regardless  of  politics,  to  create  a  monopoly  by  pre- 
venting other  persons  from  getting  charters.  When  charters  were 
applied  for  and  refused,  the  applicants  began  business  on  the  com- 
mon-law plan.  Then,  at  the  instigation  of  the  favored  ones,  the 
politicians  passed  a  law  to  suppress  all  unchartered  banks.  The  lat- 
ter went  to  Albany  and  bribed  the  legislature.  In  short,  politics, 
monopoly,  and  bribery  constitute  the  key  to  banking  in  the  early 
history  of  the  state."  ^^ 

In  spite  of  the  inevitably  growing  tendency  to  economic  domi- 
nation in  a  capitalistic  state,  the  impulses  of  the  preceding  period 
still  survive  in  the  United  States,  and  the  result  is  a  persisting  re- 
sistance of  domination,  especially  in  the  West.  But  the  persisting 
rivalrous  impulses  are  less  and  less  individualistic.  In  the  period 
of  the  ascendancy  of  rivalrous  capitalistic  interests,  the  individualis- 
tic farmer  and  workman  were  slow  in  perceiving  that  the  rivalrous 
corporation  was  not  in  the  same  category  with  the  rivalrous  indi- 
vidual. The  fact  that  the  rise  of  a  corporation  often  was  associ- 
ated with  the  name  of  a  business  man  who  had  risen  from  a  poor 
boy  still  further  perpetuated  the  traditional  conception  of  indi- 
vidualistic rivalry.  But  gradually  it  appeared  that  the  single- 
handed  rivalry  of  individuals  was  fast  disappearing  from  the  capi- 

28SchouIer,  "History  of  the  United  States,"  11:269. 
2»  Williams,  op.  cit.,  199. 

30  White,  "  Money  and  Banking,"  327.     See  also  Myers,  "  The  History  of  Tammany 
Hall,"  113^16. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  141 

talistic  world.  And  now  it  has  become  generally  understood  that, 
as  the  reactionary  forces  are  organized,  so  the  resisting  forces 
must  be  organized.  We  have,  then,  these  tendencies  that  are  com- 
bining to  make  the  resistance  effective :  ( i )  a  change  in  the  type  of 
mind  of  the  people  from  one  in  which  individualistic  rivalrous  am- 
bition predominates  to  one  in  which  more  careful  attention  to  work 
and  co-operation  with  one's  group  is  required  for  prosperity  under 
the  new  economic  conditions;  (2)  the  rise  of  a  menacing  economic 
and  political  centralization  of  power;  ^^  (3)  a  growing  sense  of 
solidarity  of  the  non-propertied  masses  and  an  increasing  conscious- 
ness that  submission  and  the  suffering  of  exploitation  is  inevitable 
for  masses  dependent  on  a  dominant  class  for  the  opportunity  to 
work. 

The  domination  exercised  by  powerful  economic  interests  re- 
sults in  reactionary  governmental  action.  We  term  the  dominat- 
ing type  of  industrial  and  financial  leader  reactionary  because  the 
effect  of  the  behaviour  of  that  type  is  not  only  to  stifle  free  rivalry, 
which,  up  to  the  present  time,  has  been  the  essential  force  in  politi- 
cal and  economic  progress,  but  also  to  stifle  the  sympathetic  and 
intellectual  dispositions,  which  are  to  become  more  vitally  active  in 
progressive  movements. 

The  resistance  maintained  against  reactionary  propertied  inter- 
ests has  thus  far  been  largely  maintained  by  other  propertied 
classes.  The  non-propertied  are  for  the  most  part  unorganized 
politically  and  without  effective  leadership.  There  are  certain  rea- 
sons why  a  political  resistance  confined  to  propertied  classes  does 
not  insure  a  permanently  progressive  democracy.  When  a  new 
propertied  class  has  made  good  its  claim  to  political  recognition, 
domination  on  the  part  of  an  old  class  is  no  longer  possible,  and 
the  situation  makes  for  freer  rivalry,  at  least  for  a  time.  The 
propertied  classes,  in  their  rivalry  for  political  control  avoid  un- 
compromising domination  and  grant  some  demands  of  the  work- 
ing classes  in  the  rivalry  for  their  votes.  The  latter  suspect  the 
intentions  of  the  propertied  classes  for  they  realize  that  the  latter 
control  governments;  and  they  oppose  labour  legislation  and  gov- 
ernmental arbitration  of  industrial  disputes  because  they  believe 
they  will  gain  more  by  trade  union  action  than  through  the  govern- 

" Beard,  "American  Government  and  Politics,"  724;  Beard,  "Readings  in  Ameri- 
can Government  and  Politics,"  606-607. 


142      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ment.      Compromise  is  the  method  by  which  the  political  leader,  in 
this    regime    of   propertied    class    rivalry,    maintains   his    control. 
Domination  is,  however,  closely  connected  with  property  owner- 
ship.    Just  as  children  assume  the  right  to  dictate  in  connection 
with  the  use  of  their  belongings  by  others,  and  just  as,  in  the  family 
of  the  workingman,  the  bread-winner  assumes  the  right  to  dictate 
concerning  expenditures,  so  the  business  corporation  assumes  the 
right  to  manage  its  own  business.*''^     Property  owners  who  are  not 
of  the   progressive   type   have   an   instinctive   repressive   reaction 
against  any  behaviour  in  the  body  politic  which  stirs  a  feeling  of 
insecurity.     There  is  an  instinctive  impulse  to  keep  the  non-prop- 
ertied masses  "  down  "  and  "  quiet."  ^^     Whenever  the  non-prop- 
ertied masses  show  an  increasing  influence  over  the  government, 
the  apprehension  of  reactionary  propertied  interests  ceases  to  be 
subconscious  and  becomes  conscious,  and  there  is  a  drawing  together 
of  erstwhile  competing  interests,  just  as,  in  international  rivalry,  the 
citizens  of  a  nation  draw  together,  and  feel  their  solidarity  when 
they  become   fearful  of  a   formidable  nation  over  the  boundary 
line.     In  both  cases,  the  fear  is  apt  to  be  more  or  less  hysterical  and 
to  exaggerate  the  actual  danger.     That  is  the  psychological  tend- 
ency of  fear.     But  the  exaggeration  increases  the  danger  in  that  it 
makes  mutually  suspicious  nations  unduly  self-assertive  toward  one 
another.     This  was  true  of  the  feeling  in  Germany  toward  Eng- 
land before  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War,     It  became  increas- 
ingly true  also  of  the  attitude  of  capitalistic  interests  toward  labour 
in  the  United  States  during  the  administrations  of  President  Wil- 
son.    In  those  years  of  prosperity,  profits  were  large  and  manu- 
facturers  became    increasingly   apprehensive    of   labour    troubles. 
Then,  too,  there  were  evidences  of  an  increasing  political  power 
of  labour;  and  the  result  was  a  drawing  together  of  propertied  in- 

32  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  387. 

33  To  perpetuate  the  subjection  of  the  non-propertied  classes,  it  is  declared  that 
"  Regardless  of  creed  we  should  give  individual  and  united  support  to  the  agencies 
of  Christianity  in  the  promulgation  of  the  faith,  thus  aiding  in  diverting  human 
unrest  into  its  proper  channels."  (Chas.  S.  Keith,  Chairman,  Governmental  Rela- 
tions Committee,  National  Lumber  Manufacturers'  Association,  First  American  Lum- 
ber Congress  and  Seventeenth  Annual  Meeting,  April,  1919,  68.)  Reactionary  prop- 
ertied interests  aim  to  use,  in  maintaining  the  subjection  of  the  non-propertied,  not 
only  the  church  but  also  the  state,  and  urge  universal  compulsory  military  service  as 
a  means  of  training  in  workmen  in  their  youth  a  spirit  of  obedience.  From  the  same 
motive  reactionary  propertied  interests  warmly  approve  of  those  posts  of  the  American 
Legion  that  have  taken  a  reactionary  attitude  to  labour  unions.  {Open  Shop  Revieiv, 
Feb.,  1920,  66-67;  ^"^0  Workers'  News,  Detroit,  Dec.  25,  1919,  Jan.  i  and  8,  1920.) 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  143 

terests;  and  this  increasing  sense  of  solidarity  of  the  capitalistic 
class  encouraged  a  determination  to  fight  labour,  organized  and 
unorganized,  industrially  and  politically. 

When  this  reactionary  attitude  spreads  through  a  capitalistic 
class,  there  results  an  indiscriminate  protection  of  all  capitalistic  in- 
terests. However  unconscionably  some  monopolies  may  have  prof- 
iteered legislators  that  represent  capitalistic  interests  refuse  to 
interfere  to  prevent  it.  But  they  interfere  drastically  on  behalf 
of  capitalistic  interests.^^  Thus  the  class  struggle  is  so  intensified 
that  progressive  legislation  is  seriously  impeded.  The  courts  as 
well  as  legislatures  become  reactionary.  Justice  Holmes  writes 
that  "  When  socialism  first  began  to  be  talked  about,  the  comfort- 
able classes  of  the  community  were  a  good  deal  frightened,"  and 
looked  to  the  courts  to  protect  their  property;  that  as  a  result  the 
courts  were  influenced  by  individualistic  economic  theories  that  fa- 
voured propertied  interests,  and  were  thus  "  led  into  taking  sides 
upon  debatable  and  often  burning  questions."  ^^  This  effect  of 
socialism  in  causing  a  reactionary  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  courts 
has  continued  to  the  present  day.^*^  The  class  struggle  is  thus  the 
essential  intra-national  phenomenon  and  draws  into  the  impulsive 
conflict  the  different  branches  of  state  and  national  governments. 
The  class  struggle  is  as  far  as  we  can  see  an  irrepressible  conflict, 
which  will  be  resolved  either  by  progressive  adjustments  which  tend 
toward  but  never  reach  entire  harmony,  or,  if  reactionary  proper- 
tied interests  maintain  their  political  ascendancy,  will  continue  with 

s*  For  instance  the  law  passed  in  February,  1920,  for  the  return  of  the  railroads  to 
private  owners  directed  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to  fix  rates  high  enough 
to  earn  at  least  5%  per  cent,  dividends  for  ail  roads.  In  a  speech  against  this  law 
Senator  La  Follette  pointed  out  that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  would  be 
forced  to  accept  the  book  valuation  of  the  railroads  (which  included  the  vast  amount 
of  watered  stock)  inasmuch  as  the  physical  valuation  of  the  roads  would  not  be  com- 
pleted in  two  years,  and  he  quoted  an  estimate  of  Interstate  C6mmerce  Commissioner 
Woolley  that  the  guarantee  of  sV^  per  cent,  would  necessitate  an  advance  of  at  least 
25  per  cent,  in  freight  rates,  which  would  mean  approximately  $875,cxx).ooo.  This 
would  increase  the  cost  of  living  by  $4,375,000,000  "which  the  ultimate  consumer 
would  have  to  pay  for  what  he  uses,  eats,  and  wears,  because,  when  he  buys  the 
finished  article  he  pays  an  accumulation  of  increases."  {Congressional  Record,  Sixty- 
Sixth  Congress,  2nd  Sess.,  Dec.  15,  1919,  609,  Jan.  26,  1920,  2197-2211.)  It  makes  no 
difference  whether  this  estimate  turns  out  to  be  true  or  not,  for  the  point  is  that,  in  the 
face  of  this  estimate  by  an  expert.  Congress  went  ahead  and  passed  the  bill.  This 
shows  how  drastically  Congress  protected  illegitimate  property  rights  at  the  expense  of 
the  public  welfare. 

«5  Holmes,  "The  Path  of  the  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  X:457,  467. 

38  See  the  decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  Jacob  Abrams  v.  United 
States,  discussed  in  the  chapter  entitled,  The  Conflict  of  Judicial  Attitudes. 


144      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

increasing  bitterness  until  a  crisis  has  been  reached  and  passed. 
At  this  point  it  may  be  well  again  to  caution  the  reader  about 
preserving  the  intellectual  attitude  in  an  analysis  of  class  relations. 
Without  a  conscious  and  deliberately  maintained  intellectual  atti- 
tude, the  individual  subconsciously  yields  to  social  suggestion  and 
accepts  the  attitudes  and  prejudices  of  his  class.  As  was  empha- 
sized in  preceding  chapters,  it  is  necessary  to  take  the  attitudes 
of  all  classes  intellectively ;  this  is  the  prerequisite  for  any  social- 
psychological  analysis  of  class  relations.  Otherwise,  to  assume 
the  attitude  of  one  class  is  to  be  prejudiced  against  the  opposite 
class,  which  makes  impossible  a  scientific  analysis  of  either 
class.  Yet  so  rare  is  this  intellectual  attitude  that  one  who 
refuses  to  be  suggestible  to  the  class  in  the  community  that  ex- 
ercises the  social  control  and  to  accept  the  attitudes  and  preju- 
dices of  that  class  is  almost  certain  to  be  accused  of  "  favouring  " 
the  opposite  class.  The  community  refuses  to  recognize  the  intel- 
lectual attitude.  It  is  so  rare  that  it  seems  incredible  that  any  man 
could  be  characteristically  actuated  by  it.  Consequently,  when,  on 
account  of  it,  a  man  is  not  suggestible  to  the  favoured  class  in  the 
community,  as  is  the  rest  of  the  community,  he  is  assumed  to  be 
"  for,"  that  is,  suggestible  to,  the  opposite  class  and  to  share  the 
attitude  of  the  latter  against  the  favoured  class.  For  instance,  a 
man  having  an  intellectual  attitude  to  the  conflict  between  the  prop- 
ertied classes  and  that  type  of  non-propertied  resistance  termed 
Bolshevism  is  accused  of  being  a  Bolshevist  because  he  is  not  against 
Bolshevism  in  the  sense  of  sharing  the  impulsive  prejudice  of  the 
propertied  classes  against  Bolshevism.  He  insists  on  maintaining 
an  intellectual  attitude  in  the  controversy  and  making  a  candid 
analysis  both  of  the  attitude  of  Bolshevism  to  the  propertied  classes 
and  of  the  attitude  of  the  propertied  classes  to  Bolshevism.  Like- 
wise, among  the  Bolshevists,  a  man  maintaining  a  severely  intel- 
lectual attitude  is  condemned  because  he  does  not  accept  the  Bol- 
shevist attitude  against  capitahsm.  Class  prejudice  is  contrary  to 
the  scientific  attitude.  The  intelligent  student  of  social  psychology 
must  maintain  the  scientific  attitude  and  inhibit  the  impulse  to  be 
for  or  against  any  class.  Let  the  reader,  therefore,  study  and  cor- 
rect his  own  attitude  as  we  proceed  with  our  analysis. 

The  apprehension  of  a  class  for  its  position  has  much  the  same 
psychological  causes  as  the  apprehension  of  an  individual.     The 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  145 

individual  feels  apprehension  when  his  reasoning  power  is  shaken 
by  the  unusual.^^  So  a  class  whose  behaviour  Is  determined  by  the 
habitual  reactions  that  depend  on  property  ownership  is  thrown  into 
apprehension  when  that  property  Is  threatened.  If  the  financial, 
industrial,  and  political  leadership  of  the  propertied  classes  were 
overthrown  it  Is  not  clear  how  finance  and  Industry  and  politics 
would  be  conducted.^^  Yet  social  Institutions  are  based,  essen- 
tially, on  Instinctive  impulses  and  ways  of  doing  that  became  ha- 
bitual with  little  direction  from  the  point  of  view  of  public  welfare. 
The  institutions  were  justified  and  rationalized  in  order  to  protect 
the  traditional  privileges  of  propertied  classes,  but  were  not  ana- 
lysed from  the  point  of  view  of  a  rational  social  purpose.  In  so 
far  as  existing  institutions  are  based  on  habits  of  reaction  of  a  domi- 
nant class  that  have  developed  corresponding  habits  of  reacting  in 
submitting  classes,  these  institutions  are  based  on  fortuitous  sub- 
conscious processes,  not  on  conscious  control.  Conscious  control  is 
what  Is  needed  because  changed  conditions  are  bound  to  demand 
changes  in  institutions,  and  this  necessity  of  change,  of  facing  the 
unusual,  will  stir  apprehension,  unrest  and  disorder  unless  educa- 
tion develops  power  of  conscious  control.  Democracy,  rightly  un- 
derstood, means  this  power  of  conscious  control  widely  diffused. 
Until  this  new  attitude  develops  there  will  be  apprehension  on  the 
part  of  the  propertied  classes  and  unrest  of  the  non-propertied. 
The  old,  absolute,  satisfied  domination  of  the  propertied  classes  and 
the  absolute,  quiescent  submission  of  the  non-propertied  is  gone 
for  ever. 

The  dominating  attitude  of  reactionary  propertied  interests  is 
everywhere  subconscious  and  imperceptible  except  in  periods  of 
mass  resistance;  then  it  Is  possible  to  note  among  reactionary  prop- 
erty owners  Indignation  at  the  attempt  to  defy  their  traditionally 
dominant  position.  The  indignation  spreads  from  nations  in  which 
uprisings  have  occurred  to  nations  in  which  uprisings  have  not  yet 
occurred,  where  the  general  Indignation  is  aggravated  by  the  press. 
The  indignation  does  not  permit  of  dispassionate  Inquiry  into  the 
justice  of  the  case.  When  a  resistance  confines  Itself  to  strictly 
legal  forms,  the  same  indignation,  though  in  a  milder  form.  Is  evi- 
dent. It  was  evident  in  the  attitude  of  certain  reactionary  prop- 
s'^ Alexander,  "  Man's  Supreme  Inheritance,"  249. 

s^Veblen,  "The  Captains  of  Finance  and  the  Engineers,"  The  Dial,  June  14,  1919, 
606. 


146     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ertied  interests  to  the  election  of  President  Wilson  for  a  second 
term.  In  spite  of  the  variety  of  issues  that  were  presented  from 
the  platform  and  discussed  among  the  citizens,  it  was  felt  by  those 
vitally  interested  that  the  real  issue  was  whether  or  not  reactionary 
propertied  interests  were  to  determine  certain  important  policies 
of  the  government.^^ 

The  determination  of  reactionary  propertied  interests  to  domi- 
nate the  situation,  regardless  of  consequences,  is  due  to  lack  of 
intelligence  and  foresight.  As  the  instinct  to  dominate  is  pro- 
nounced in  connection  with  unintelligent  property  ownership,  so 
an  unintelligent  non-propertied  condition  begets  an  instinctive  atti- 
tude of  submission.  The  non-propertied  masses  have  instinctively 
accorded  the  possessor  a  right  to  dictate  the  terms  on  which  they 
might  use  his  property  in  production.^*^  This  attitude  of  submis- 
sion has  been  disturbed  only  when  workmen  felt  that,  instead  of 
being  allowed  to  use  the  property  of  an  employer  on  reasonable 
terms,  they  themselves  were  being  used  and  abused.  Then  when 
they  organized  and  resisted  and  found  courts,  executive  officers,  the 
police,  in  sympathy  with  the  employing  class  and  against  them, 
they  realized  for  the  first  time  that  the  government  conducted  by 
representatives  of  the  political  parties  they  had  heretofore  sup- 
ported was  a  government  by  the  employing  classes.^ ^  The  masses 
have  to  learn  these  lessons  by  experience.  Popular  education 
teaches  nothing  vital  as  to  government,  and,  if  it  did,  only  a  small 
percentage  of  the  masses  have  education.  They  have  to  learn  by 
experience  of  political  control  by  a  dominant  class.  The  effective- 
ness of  this  control  has  depended  on  its  secrecy.  Once  realized  by 
the  masses  it  is  apt  to  become  less  effective.     Until  recently  it  has 

39  "  The  Elusive  Labor  Vote,"  Open  Shop  Review,  May,  1919,  184. 

•**^ "  The  average  man  who  applies  for  a  job  is  pretty  sure  to  weaken  when  the 
question  of  salary  is  broached.  He  is  apt  to  wish  to  leave  it  to  the  employer,  which 
puts  a  large  temptation  in  the  latter's  way.  He  is  visibly  relieved  when  he  finds  a 
place  where  a  standard  starting  wage  is  offered  with  advancement  every  so  often. 
He  hates  to  discuss  the  business  side  of  the  question  at  all.  Half  of  the  applicants 
will  accept  a  lower  starting  wage  than  they  consider  themselves  worth.  Men  are 
not  sure  of  their  own  qualifications.  They  are  afraid  that  if  they  claim  all  that  they 
should,  the  boss  will  bring  out  a  job  that  they  never  saw  before  and  show  them  up 
the  first  day.  The  few  exceptions  to  this  rule  majfe  so  much  stir  about  themselves 
that  we  are  apt  to  over-estimate  their  number."  (Henry,  "A  'One-Price'  System  of 
Wages,"  Industrial  Management,  Dec,  1917,  358.) 

*i  Statements  to  this  effect  were  given  to  the  press  by  the  steel  workers  organization 
at  the  close  of  the  great  steel  strike  of  1919,  but  received  scant  attention  in  the  news- 
papers. However,  the  political  repression  was  independently  attested.  See  Shaw, 
"Closed  Towns,"  The  Survey,  Nov.  8,  1919,  38. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  147 

been  little  realized  and,  as  yet,  is  not  generally  realized.  The  pre- 
vailing attitude  of  the  masses  to  the  propertied  classes  has  been 
the  habitual  subconscious  attitude  of  submission.^^  Because  of  the 
habitually  submissive  attitude  of  the  non-propertied  to  the  proper- 
tied classes,  organized  labour  has  had  to  proceed  slowly  in  order 
to  carry  along  with  the  policies  of  organized  labour  the  conven- 
tional working  masses. 

Out  of  the  awakening  of  the  workers  has  developed  the  attitude 
of  resistance,  which,  as  it  enlists  larger  bodies  of  workmen,  gives 
the  labour  movement  a  mass  impetus.  With  every  set-back  experi- 
enced by  a  large  body  of  striking  workmen,  through  governmental 
action  on  behalf  of  employers,  the  resentment  thus  occasioned  unites 
a  wider  section  of  the  working  class.  The  antagonistic  attitudes  of 
workmen  to  employers,  as  well  as  of  employers  to  workmen,  are, 
thus,  essentially,  instinctive  impulses,  but  ideas  are  adduced  as  ex- 
planations and  justifications  thereof,  and  thus  reinforce  the  impulses, 
and  modify  them  in  a  way  to  enlist  a  wider  social  acceptance  of  the 
essentially  impulsive  class  purpose. 

For  their  impulse  to  dominate  the  situation  reactionary  propertied 
interests  give  various  justifications:  that  property  is  accumulated 
through  the  exercise  of  socially  recognized  superior  ability,  and  that 
the  men  of  superior  ability  should  control  the  government ;  that  cap- 
ital is  an  essential  requisite  of  production  and  that  the  saving  of 
money  and  the  creation  of  capital  requires  that  the  government 
guarantee  to  savers  secure  ownership  and  bequest  of  private  prop- 
erty, which  will  be  done  if  propertied  classes  control  the  govern- 
ment; that  social  order  is  furthered  by  unquestioned  control  by  the 
propertied  classes  because  the  non-propertied  are  irresponsible ;  that 
the  prosperity  of  the  non-propertied  classes  depends  on  the  pros- 
perity of  the  propertied,  and  only  the  propertied  understand  how  to 
run  the  government  in  a  way  to  insure  prosperity.  On  the  other 
hand  the  non-propertied  classes  assert  that  property  is  accumulated 
not  necessarily  by  superior  ability,  though  many  capitalists  undoubt- 
edly are  men  of  great  ability,  but  by  privileges  —  in  the  case  of  the 
larger  fortunes  —  which  property  owners  have  acquired  through 
their  control  of  the  government;  that  the  political  leaders  of  the  non- 
propertied  classes  are  men  of  as  great  ability  as  are  those  of  the 
propertied  classes;  that  the  non-propertied  have  even  more  incen- 

*2  Webb,  "  The  Restoration  of  Trade  Union  Conditions,"  69-77. 


148      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

tive  to  save  than  the  propertied  —  if  only  they  had  adequate 
wages  so  that  what  they  could  save  would  seem  to  them  worth 
while, —  because  they  would  save  to  forfend  need  while  property 
owners  have  not  the  incentive  to  save  that  is  given  by  the  appre- 
hension of  possible  need  and  suffering;  that  the  non-propertied  are 
as  interested  in  preserving  social  order  as  are  the  propertied,  be- 
cause on  social  order  depends  the  smooth  running  of  industry,  with- 
out which  prices  are  high  and  the  masses  apt  to  suffer  want;  that 
because,  under  capitalism,  the  prosperity  of  the  working  masses 
depends  on  the  prosperity  of  the  employing  classes,  those  classes 
should  no  longer  be  uncontrolled,  but  should  be  controlled  by  the 
political  leaders  of  the  working  masses  in  order  that  the  latter  may 
thus  protect  their  prosperity.  It  is  further  maintained  that  state 
ownership  of  the  instruments  of  production  would  bring  men  of 
the  highest  ability  into  positions  of  leadership  ^^  through  an  ex- 
tensive system  of  social  accounting  and  control,**  would  stimulate 
production  by  the  extension  of  scientific  management  to  all  indus- 
try;*^ would  encourage  saving  by  making  wages  adequate  and  so 
stimulating  workmen  with  hopefulness  of  being  able  to  accumulate 
considerable  savings ;  would  eliminate  class  struggle  and  so  conduce 
to  social  order;  and  would  put  the  ultimate  control  of  industry  and 
of  the  conditions  of  economic  prosperity  into  the  hands  of  the  work- 

*3  In  the  reports  of  the  commission  sent  by  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  to  investi- 
gate and  report  on  the  Russian  situation,  it  is  said  that  "  The  Soviet  Government  has 
made  great  efforts  to  persuade  industrial  managers  and  technical  experts  of  the  old 
regime  to  enter  its  service.  Many  very  prominent  men  have  done  so.  And  the 
Soviet  Government  pays  them  as  high  as  $45,000  a  year  for  their  services,  although 
Lenin  gets  but  $1800  a  year."  (Reports  of  the  Bullitt  Mission  on  Russia,  The  Nation, 
Oct.  4,  1919,  475.)     See  also  Bullitt's  book,  "The  Mission  to  Russia." 

**  Lenin,  "The  Soviets  at  Work"  (a  pamphlet  published  by  the  Rand  School  of 
Social  Science,  1918). 

45  <<  Without  the  direction  of  specialists  of  different  branches  of  knowledge,  tech- 
nique and  experience,  the  transformation  toward  socialism  is  impossible,  for  socialism 
demands  a  conscious  mass  movement  toward  a  higher  productivity  of  labor  in  com- 
parison with  capitalism,  .  .  .  We  are  forced  now  to  make  use  of  the  old  Bourgeois 
method  and  agree  to  a  very  high  remuneration  for  the  services  of  the  biggest  of  the 
bourgeois  specialists.  ...  It  is  clear  that  such  a  measure  is  a  compromise,  that  it  is  a 
defection  from  the  principles  of  the  Paris  commune,  and  of  any  proletarian  rule, 
which  demand  the  reduction  of  salaries  to  the  standard  of  remuneration  of  the  average 
workers  —  principles  which  demand  that  career  hunting  be  fought  by  deed,  not  by 
words."  {Ibid.)  "One  might  draw  an  analogy  between  the  history  of  the  Taylor 
efficiency  scheme  in  the  United  States  and  in  Russia.  Here  labor  fights  it  as  a 
device  of  production  possessed  solely  by  employers  and  controlled  non-collectively 
by  employers.  In  Russia,  the  Soviet  Goverment  is  .  .  .  attempting  to  utilize  effi- 
ciency in  the  interests  of  the  entire  industrial  world  instead  of  in  the  interests  of  a 
small  if  important  fraction  thereof."  (Stoddard,  "The  Shop  Committee  —  Some  Im- 
plications," The  Dial,  July  12,  1919,  8.) 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  149 

ing  masses'  own  political  leaders  and  thereby  stimulate  efficient  work 
because  of  their  confidence  in  and  co-operation  with  their  leadership. 

These  assertions  on  both  sides  are  explanations  and  justifications 
that  are  aside  from  the  instinctive  attitude  of  the  classes  to  one 
another,  that  come  after  and  qualify  and  reinforce  the  reactions  of 
domination  and  resistance  but  do  not  originally  determine  those 
reactions.  The  assertions  of  the  propertied  classes  are  assertions 
that  are  thought  to  justify  the  capitalistic  order  and  the  control  of 
the  government  by  the  propertied  classes  as  against  any  possible 
improvement  under  the  proposed  socialistic  measures;  the  assertions 
of  the  protagonists  of  the  non-propertied  classes  are  assertions  that 
they  think  justify  the  socialistic  order,  as  contrasted  with  any  pos- 
sible improvement  of  the  capitalistic  order.  Into  a  discussion  of 
the  relative  merits  of  these  assertions  of  the  parties  to  the  class 
conflict  we  do  not,  therefore,  need  to  enter  as  we  are  indicating 
merely  their  relation,  as  secondary  explanations,  to  the  instinctive 
attitude  of  the  classes  one  to  another. 

The  problem  reduces,  then,  to  a  problem  of  public  education. 
What  is  needed  is  a  public  education  that  will  enlighten  both  upper 
and  lower  classes  ^*^  in  a  way  to  convert  the  instinctive  attitudes 
into  an  intelligent  relation.  Social  progress,  thus  far,  has  taken 
place  in  spite  of,  instead  of  under  the  leadership  of,  educated  men. 
Educated  men,  partly  because  of  the  nature  of  their  education,  have 
been  largely  indifferent  to  social  progress.  Most  of  them  are  mem- 
bers of  the  conservative  pohtical  party,  the  party  which  aims  to 
maintain  things  as  they  are,  and  oppose  progressive  measures. ^^ 

*^  This  is  realized  in  Great  Britain.  See  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Adult  Edu- 
cation. Ministry  of  Reconstruction.  London,  1918.  The  committee  which  includad 
R.  H.  Tawney,  the  economist,  Sir  Graham  Balfour,  and  Sir  Henry  Miers,  Principal 
of  Manchester  University,  found  that  the  working  masses  of  England  "  demand  edu- 
cation in  the  hope  that  the  power  which  it  brings  will  enable  them  to  understand  and 
help  in  the  solution  of  the  common  problems  of  human  society."  In  the  United  States, 
the  demand  for  education  is  voiced  by  a  great  number  of  labour  groups.  For  in- 
stance, see  pamphlet  published  by  National  Women's  Trade  Union  League  of  Amer- 
ica entitled.  Women  and  Reconstruction,  1919;  pamphlet  entitled.  Platform  and  Plan 
of  Organization  of  American  Labor  Party  of  Greater  Neiv  York,  1919,  9;  platform  of 
the  Labor  party  of  Illinois  in  The  New  Majority,  Apr.  19,  1919,  6;  platform  of  Cali- 
fornia State  Federation  of  Labor,  The  Survey,  Nov.  23,  1918,  224;  and  the  educational 
program  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  adopted  at  its  annual  convention,  in 
American  Federationist,  August,  1919,  694.  See  also  Stoddard,  "  The  Boston  Trade 
Union  College,"  The  Nation,  Aug.  30,  1919,  298-300. 

*''  In  England,  "  nearly  all  the  clergy  of  the  Established  Church,  and  ...  a  major- 
ity of  the  graduates  of  the  universities  "  belong  to  the  Conservative  or  Unionist  party, 
the    party    of    the    aristocratic    and    wealthy   classes.     (Ogg,    "The    Governments   of 


150     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Social  progress  has  taken  place  as  a  result  of  impulsive  unrest  and 
resistance  of  lower  classes,  to  alleviate  which  compromises  have 
been  effected  by  officials  and  politicians  who  sought  thereby  to  win 
or  hold  the  support  of  the  non-propertied  voters  by  a  minimum  of 
yielding  to  their  demands,  and  to  keep  the  confidence  of  the  prop- 
ertied classes  by  maintaining,  as  far  as  possible,  their  traditional 
privileges.  As  long  as  this  continues  to  be  the  method  of  prog- 
ress, the  class  conflict  will  go  on.  Periods  of  unrest  and  violence 
will  be  followed  by  quiescent  periods,  but  as  long  as  the  working 
hosts  are  without  adequate  leadership,  as  long  as  they  are  not  suf- 
ficiently intelligent  persistently  to  support  a  progressive  leadership, 
the  conflict  will  go  on.  The  education  that  is  necessary  for  a  con- 
tinual social  progress  must  be  unhampered  by  nationalistic,  sec- 
tarian, and  class  prejudices,  must  reach  all  classes  and  conditions  of 
men,  and  must  be  through  and  through  scientific. 

This  brings  us  to  the  fourth  type  of  intra-national  relations  re- 
ferred to  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  chapter.  The  growth  of 
nation-wide  corporations  and  their  power  to  profiteer  at  the  expense 
of  the  consumer  has  weakened  the  traditional  belief  that  the  profit- 
seeker  is  entitled  to  all  he  can  make.^^  At  the  same  time  the  popu- 
lation has  developed  capacity  to  co-operate  and  a  taste  for  co-oper- 
ation through  the  increasing  tendency  of  individuals  to  form  clubs 
and  federations  of  clubs,  for  mutual  association  and  improvement, 
and,  thus  organized,  to  take  up  as  organizations,  instead  of  as  in- 
dividuals, the  economic  and  political  problems  of  the  members.*^ 
Another  cause  of  the  rise  of  an  ideal  of  co-operation  is  the  gradual 
enlightenment  of  the  working  classes  as  to  the  control  under  which 
they  work,  which  enlightenment  has  begun  to  react  on  that  control. 
They  have  begun  to  demand  that  the  industrial  relation  be  less  a 
matter  of  instinct  and  habit  and  more  a  relation  of  intelligent  ad- 
justment. The  change  of  attitude  of  labour  has  made  the  old  re- 
actionary capitalism  conscious  of  the  nature  and  significance  of  its 
behaviour  and  of  the  weakness  of  its  position  in  a  government  con- 
trolled in  the  last  analysis  by  a  majority  of  the  adult  males  and 

Europe,"  164.)  Ogg  writes:  "Since  1885  not  a  Liberal  member  has  been  returned 
from  any  one  of  the  universities."     {Ibid.,  164,  note.) 

^8  This  change  of  economic  belief  has  spread  throughout  Europe  as  well  as  the 
United  States.  See  "  The  Economic  Council  of  Labor,"  Cambridge  Magazine,  Jan.  24, 
1920,  229. 

*9  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  196-198 ;  Sandburg,  "  The  Farmer-Labor  Con- 
gress," Survey,  Feb.  21,  1920,  605-606. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  151 

females.  The  result  is,  in  some  quarters,  a  conciliatory  attitude  of 
capitalism,  a  disposition  to  relinquish  the  dominating  attitude  and 
to  give  labour  a  voice  in  industrial  matters.^*'  The  development  of 
industrial  co-operation  requires  that  the  initiative  be  taken  by  em- 
ployers,^^ as  in  the  introduction  of  the  shop  committee  ;^^  but  this 
co-operative  relation  will  necessarily  be  supervised  by  the  govern- 
ment.^^ Furthermore,  the  government  will  necessarily  take  the 
initiative  in  all  cases  where  the  public  welfare  requires  co-operation 
which  is  not  forthcoming  on  the  initiative  of  the  parties  to  the  in- 
dustrial relation.  "  But  the  essential  work  must  be  done  by  re- 
sponsible business  men,  who  are  not  afraid  to  reorganize  their 
own  industries  in  the  interest  of  a  constitutional  system.  They 
must  be  prepared  to  risk  the  prosperity  of  an  established  business 
for  the  sake  of  making  the  operation  of  that  business  conducive  to 
the  increasing  independence,  responsibility  and  loyalty  of  its  work- 

s**  Cyrus  McCormick,  Jr.,  of  the  International  Harvester  Company,  is  quoted  as 
follows:  "What  the  workingman  is  asking  for,  and  what  we  are  trying  to  give  him, 
is  a  voice  in  the  control  of  the  business  in  which  he  is  a  copartner.  This  demand 
has  taken  on  various  forms  in  different  places.  In  Russia  and  elsewhere  on  the 
European  continent  it  is  known  as  Bolshevism;  in  England  they  call  it  the  Whitley 
plan;  elsewhere  it  may  be  called  employees'  representation,  and  somewhere  else  co- 
partnership. Under  all  of  these  however,  is  the  basic  fact  that  the  relationships  be- 
tween employer  and  employee  must  be  founded  on  something  else  than  a  cash  bond. 
.  .  .  With  every  one  of  our  hitherto  most  guarded  ledgers  open  to  these  men,  we 
believe  that  they  would  see  the  facts  as  clearly  as  we  saw  them."  (Quoted  by  Stod- 
dard, "The  Shop  Committee  —  Some  Implications,"  The  Dial,  July  12,  1919,  8.) 

^1  While  the  employer  must  take  the  initiative,  the  plan  should  be  worked  out  in 
joint  conference  between  the  management  and  the  workmen,  instead  of  being  handed 
down  by  the  corporation.  (Stoddard,  "The  Shop  Committee  —  Some  Implications," 
The  Dial,  July  i3,  1919,  8.) 

S2Renold,  "Shop  Committees  in  Practice,"  Survey,  March  1,  1919,  761-765;  Gleason, 
"The  New  Constitutionalism  in  British  Industry,"  Survey,  Feb.  i,  1919,  594-598; 
Gleason,  "The  Whitley  Councils,"  Survey,  Apr.  5,  12,  19,  1919;  Stoddard,  "The  Shop 
Committee." 

53  The  Carton  Foundation  issued  a  report  in  1919  wherein  the  Whitley  councils, 
in  which  employers  and  workmen  unite  in  the  management  of  industry,  were  com- 
mended, but  which  added:  "At  the  same  time  it  must  be  recognized  that  there  is  a 
certain  danger  in  this  industrial  autonomy.  The  possibility  of  employers  and  em- 
ployed in  any  industry  combining  to  exploit  consumers  or  to  put  pressure  on  the  gov- 
ernment for  the  promotion  of  sectional  interests  must  not  be  overlooked.  ...  It 
seems  inevitable  that  .  .  .  some  central  organization,  representative  of  all  important 
industries,  should  be  created  for  the  purpose  of  coordinating  the  action  of  the  vari- 
ous councils  and  adjusting  the  competing  claims  of  overlapping  or  interconnected  in- 
dustries. In  such  case  it  will  be  necessary  very  carefully  to  consider  and  define  the 
powers  of  such  central  organization  and  its  relation  to  Parliament,  in  order  to  guard 
against  the  possibility  of  steps  being  taken  by  this  functional  body  or  by  the  industrial 
councils,  which  might  prove  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  general  public  or  to 
national  life  in  its  social  aspects."  (Quo.ed  by  Gleason,  "The  Whitley  Councils," 
Survey,  Apr.  12,  1919,  76.) 


152      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ers."  ^*  This  suggests  the  social-psychological  nature  of  the  prob- 
lem of  co-operation,  for,  obviously,  employers  who  willingly  ven- 
tured this  risk  would  be  animated  by  instinctive  impulses  different 
from  those  of  the  prevailing  employer.  That  employers  are,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  animated  by  different  dispositions,  and  that  these 
do  cause  variations  in  economic  behaviour,  and  that  there  are  vari- 
ations of  the  kind  required  for  the  development  of  co-operation  will 
be  pointed  out  in  a  succeeding  chapter.^^ 

The  industrial  co-operation  so  far  proposed  by  progressive  em- 
ployers does  not  go  far  enough  to  do  away  with  class  antagonism 
in  industry.  This  will  not  be  done  away  by  shop  committees  ^^  or 
other  forms  of  co-operation  that  stop  short  of  a  co-operative  dis- 
tribution of  income.^''^  Professor  Commons  writes  that  "  the  trou- 
ble between  capital  and  labor  must  be  looked  upon,  so  far  as  we 
can  now  see,  as  a  permanent  struggle.  .  .  .  But  there  are  certain 
points  where  the  interests  of  capital  and  labor  are  harmonious, 
or  can  be  made  harmonious.  By  recognizing  these  two  facts  of 
permanent  opposition  and  progressive  cooperation,  it  may  be  pos- 
sible to  devise  methods  of  legislation,  court  interpretation  and  ad- 
ministration which  will  reduce  antagonism  to  promote  cooper- 
ation." ^^ 

The  development  of  co-operative  industrial  relations  cannot  but 
have  a  marked  effect  on  the  class  conflict  as  a  political  force.     The 

^*  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  393. 

^^  See  the  chapter  entitled,  The  Relation  of  Social  Psychology  to  Economics. 

5*  Five  of  the  fifteen  members  of  the  Whitley  Committee,  including  J.  A.  Hobson, 
reported  as  follows:  "By  attaching  our  signatures  to  the  general  reports,  we  desire  to 
render  hearty  support  to  the  recommendations  that  industrial  councils  or  trade 
boards  .  .  .  should  be  established  for  the  several  industries  or  businesses,  and  that 
these  bodies,  representative  of  employers  and  employed,  should  concern  themselves 
with  the  establishment  of  minimum  conditions  and  the  furtherance  of  the  common 
interests  of  their  trades. 

"  But  while  recognizing  that  the  more  amicable  relations  thus  established  between 
capital  and  labor  will  afford  an  atmosphere  generally  favorable  to  industrial  peace 
and  progress,  we  desire  to  express  our  views  that  a  complete  identity  of  interests 
between  capital  and  labor  cannot  be  thus  effected,  and  that  such  machinery  cannot 
be  expected  to  furnish  a  settlement  for  the  more  serious  conflicts  of  interests  involved  in 
the  working  of  an  economic  system  primarily  governed  and  directed  by  motives  of 
private  profit."  (Quoted  by  Gleason,  "The  Whitley  Councils,"  Survey,  Apr.  12,  1919, 
76.) 

5'f  Valentine  and  Tead,  "Work  and  Pay:  A  suggestion  for  Representative  Govern- 
ment in  Industry,"  Quart.  Jour..  Econ.,  XXXI:  248-257.  The  plan  outlined  is  a 
result  of  the  experience  of  the  late  Mr.  Valentine  as  Director  of  the  Joint  Board  of 
Protocol  Standards  of  the  Dress  and  Waist  Industry  of  New  York  City. 

''8 "  Final  Report  of  the  United  States  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,  191 5," 
309;  Commons,  "Industrial  Good  Will,"  58-61. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  153 

class  conflict  will  become  less  bitter  and  it  will  be  possible  for  law- 
making to  become  something  besides  a  mere  compromise  between 
conflicting  classes.  It  will  be  easier  to  enact  laws  which  may  affect 
the  welfare  of  some  classes  more  than  others  but  without  the  aim 
of  satisfying  any  particular  class.  Some  of  these  measures  are 
highly  important  for  the  public  welfare,  but  have  been  delayed  by 
class  selfishness.  For  instance,  both  employers  and  wage  earners 
originally  opposed  health  insurance,  the  employers,  among  other 
reasons,  because  they  must  contribute  a  part  of  the  insurance  fund  ^^ 
and  wage  earners  because  they  must  contribute  a  part ;  ^"  but  under 
the  administration  of  a  health  insurance  law,  both  capital  and  la- 
bour would  learn  to  co-operate  for  the  public  welfare.^^  "  This 
class  of  legislation  Is  cooperative.  .  .  ."  ®^  As  government  passes 
under  expert  direction  it  is  possible  to  ameliorate  the  class  conflict 
through  expert  leadership  for  the  public  welfare. 

However,  in  an  economic  system  determined  essentially  by  the 
impulse  for  private  profits  and  In  a  political  system  in  which  the 
predominant  influence  Is  exercised  by  profit-seekers,  if  the  profit- 
seeking  Impulses  can  be  enlisted  for  a  reform  the  reform  is  more 
apt  to  be  effective  than  under  the  impulsion  of  other  motives. 
Workmen's  compensation  has  achieved  Its  end  of  diminishing  acci- 
dents because  this  was  for  the  interest  of  the  employer  as  profit- 

^®  Tucker,  "Compulsory  Health  Insurance,"  American  Industries,  Feb.,  1919,  24. 

8<'  Fisher,  "  The  Need  for  Health  Insurance,"  Amer.  Labor.  Leg.  Rev.,  March,  1917, 
14-16;  Green,  "Trade  Union  Sick  Funds  and  Compulsory  Health  Insurance,"  Amer. 
Labor  Leg.  Rev.,  March,  1917,  93. 

^1  "  Just  as  employers  have  installed  safeguards  for  dangerous  machinery  in  order 
to  reduce  the  cost  of  workmen's  compensation,  so  in  order  to  reduce  the  cost  of  health 
insurance  they  will  supply,  for  instance,  better  sanitation,  ventilation  and  lighting, 
more  physiological  hours  of  labor,  and  fuller  consideration  for  the  special  needs  of 
employed  women  and  children.  In  localities  where  the  employer  provides  tenements 
for  his  workmen,  he  will  be  led  to  study  and  improve  housing  conditions.  So-called 
welfare  work  will  be  made  more  effective  and  helpful.  Employers  will  collect  facts 
and  statistics  as  to  sickness,  analyze  them  and  apply  such  corrections  as  the  facts  discov- 
ered indicate.  Dr.  Rubinow  states  that  a  large  corporation  after  introducing  health 
insurance  tried,  for  the  first  time,  to  discover  its  sickness  rate  and  found  it  to  be  three 
times  what  is  usual.  Further  investigations  showed  that  this  excessive  rate  was 
due  to  bad  conditions,  not  in  the  factory,  but  in  the  sanitation  of  the  city.  As  a  con- 
sequence an  effort  was  made  for  the  first  time  toward  improving  these  conditions.  It 
is  especially  to  be  expected  that  as  soon  as  employers  realize  the  nerve  strain  caused 
by  overlong  hours  and  consequent  increase  of  illness  and,  therefore,  the  cost  to  them- 
selves, they  will  acquaint  themselves  with  the  effects  of  long  hours  of  labor  and  reduce 
them."  "  The  employee,  on  the  other  hand,  will  be  likewise  stimulated  to  welcome  and 
to  utilize  factory  hygiene,  and  improve  his  own  domestic  hygiene  and  individual  hy- 
giene."    (Fisher,  op.  cii.,  17-18.) 

•2  Commons  and  Andrews,  "  Principles  of  Labor  Legislation,"  462. 


154     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

seeker;  and  it  is  said  of  health  insurance  that  it  will  not  be  effective 
"  until  sickness  prevention  is  made  a  source  of  financial  profit  to 
business  men."  ^^  It  is  difficult  effectively  to  administer  a  law 
affecting  industrial  conditions  which  has  the  opposition  of  business 
men.  For  governmental  commissions  and  inspectors,  in  common 
with  all  other  officials,  are  more  or  less  under  the  subconscious  in- 
fluence and  conscious  control  of  business  men.  Incompetent  poli- 
ticians are  appointed  to  positions  which  require  experts,  and  men 
of  this  type  readily  succumb  to  the  business  influence  so  that  the 
conscientious  expert  who  occasionally  is  appointed  finds  it  difficult 
to  function. 

The  problem  of  co-operation  under  expert  administration  in- 
volves psychological  analyses.  The  opposition  to  experts  is  due, 
among  other  causes,  to  the  fact  that  until  recent  times  "  office  meant 
dominance."  ^^  And  though  formally,  in  a  democracy,  the  official 
is  the  servant  of  the  people,  actually  office  still  means  dominance. 
Office  means  dominance  not  only  in  the  government  but  throughout 
the  social  organization.  One  of  the  chief  incentives  to  the  forma- 
tion of  voluntary  associations  is  the  possibility  of  holding  office 
therein  and  thereby  Increasing  the  Indivlduars  prestige  in  the  com- 
munity. And  when,  for  instance,  a  society  for  social  service  hires 
an  expert  social  worker,  the  officers  of  the  society  often  take  pleas- 
ure in  emphasizing  their  dominant  position  by  dictating  to  the 
social  worker.  This  attitude  to  expert  knowledge  is  seen  also  in 
officials  of  a  democratic  state.  They  take  pleasure  in  emphasizing 
their  dominant  position  by  expressing  a  contempt  for  experts  and 
ignoring  the  recommendations  of  commissions  of  experts.  Fur- 
thermore, these  officials  are  primarily  partisan  In  their  point  of 
view.  They  owe  their  position  to  the  dominant  party  organization. 
Party  organizations  have  traditionally  assumed  that  administration 
does  not  require  experts;  that  among  the  servants  of  the  organiza- 
tion could  be  found  men  equal  to  any  administrative  work  of  the 
government;  that  If,  in  certain  cases,  other  experts  had  to  be  called 
in,  the  regular  officials  were,  in  the  last  analysis,  competent  judges 
of  their  recommendations  and  their  work.  Consequently  elected 
officials  have  been  forced  or  influenced  by  the  party  organizations 
that  elected  them  to  make  appointments  at  the  dictation  of  local 

•3  Commons,  "A  Reconstruction  Health  Program,"  The  Survey,  Sept.  6,  1919,  799. 
•* Tufts,  "Ethics  and  International  Relations,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  Apr.,  1918,  312. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  155 

party  leaders,  "  and  the  appointed  officials  are  naturally  more  so- 
licitous to  please  their  real  than  their  technical  superiors."  ^^  The 
result  has  been  that  officers  of  administration  have  not  generally 
been  experts  and  have  been  converted  by  their  real  superiors  into 
"  agents  of  partisan  policy."  ®^ 

The  result  is  that  the  government  is  notoriously  inefficient,  and 
the  result  of  this  is  that  the  attitude  of  the  people  is  to  entrust  as 
little  business  as  possible  to  the  government.  To  remedy  this  gov- 
ernmental inefficiency  it  is  suggested  that  the  functions  of  govern- 
ment should  be  multiplied,*''''  and  thus  the  people  be  stimulated  to 
develop  a  more  efficient  government,  or  suffer  a  break-down  of  ad- 
ministration. But  the  multiplication  of  governmental  functions,  if 
officials  continue  to  serve  selfish  political  and  capitalistic  interests, 
simply  gives  the  party  in  power  greater  power  to  maintain  its 
selfish  dominance.  Long-continued  political  dominance  by  a  cer- 
tain party  gives  the  entire  officialdom  of  that  party  an  attitude  of 
infallibility  in  the  exercise  of  judgment  and  a  tendency  to  be  arbi- 
trary and  sometimes  insolent  in  the  exercise  of  authority,®^  particu- 
larly toward  members  of  the  opposite  party.  This  arbitrary  atti- 
tude is  particularly  true  of  the  powers  behind  the  throne,  the  local 
and  state  bosses,  who  maintain  their  positions  through  many  ups 
and  downs  of  officials,  and  it  is  true  also  of  their  creatures  in  the 
officialdom.  The  increase  of  governmental  power  may  also  in- 
crease the  subservience  of  the  people  to  political  dominance.  Pro- 
fessor Commons  warns  that  "  as  soon  as  people  come  to  look  upon 
the  coercive  power  of  government  as  the  only  means  of  remedying 
abuses,  then  the  struggle  for  control  of  government  is  substituted 
for  the  private  initiative  through  private  associations  from  which 
the  real  substantial  improvements  must  come."  ®®  It  is  the  intelli- 
gent initiative  of  these  private  associations  that  prevents  public 
administration  from  becoming  inefficient,  wasteful,  corrupt  and  arbi- 
trary.''^® 

Governmental  efficiency  requires  an  increasing  use  of  expert 
knowledge  not  only  in  administration  but  also  in  legislative  and  ju- 

">  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  348. 
'>*  Ibid.,  350. 

«7  Rowe,  "  Problems  of  City  Government,"  Chs.  IX,  XII. 
'8  Croly,  "Progressive  Democracy,"  351-353. 

•'  "  Final   Report  of  the   United   States   Commission  on   Industrial  Relations,   1915," 
J08-309;  Croly,  "Progressive  Democracy,"  317-318. 
"Beard,  "American  City  Government,"  79. 


156     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

dicial  work.'^^  The  courts  '^^  and  the  legislatures  "^^  should  pro- 
vide themselves  with  the  necessary  expert  knowledge  for  the  assist- 
ance of  untrained  judges  and  legislators,  and  for  those  who  are 
trained  but  who,  in  the  press  of  business,  are  unable  to  make  suffi- 
ciently thorough  investigations. 

The  development  of  expert  administration  waits  upon  a  more  in- 
telligent electorate.  With  the  increasing  complication  of  political 
problems,  thoughtful  voters  are  less  and  less  satisfied  with  their 
own  understanding  of  these  problems  ''^  and  come  to  realize  that 
problems  requiring  technical  training  must  be  entrusted  for  solu- 
tion to  experts.  One  of  the  main  interests  of  the  thoughtful  voter 
is,  therefore,  in  the  attitude  of  candidates  for  executive  positions 
carrying  large  appointive  power.  Will  this  candidate  consider  ef- 
ficiency first  or  political  obligations  first  in  making  important  ap- 
pointments ?  Again  we  come,  therefore,  to  the  social-psychological 
problem  of  the  motives  of  the  electorate. 

An  uneducated  electorate  does  not  appreciate  the  necessity  of 
an  expert  administration.  It  is  subject  to  the  social  control  of 
political  leaders  who  prevail  largely  through  an  unconscious  use 
and  a  deliberate  manipulation  of  the  instinctive  processes  of  social 
suggestion.  What  these  are  will  be  explained  in  a  future  volume. 
The  point  to  be  made  here  is  that  an  electorate  does  not  instinc- 
tively have  confidence  in  administrative  commissions  of  experts. 
It  has  to  acquire  this  confidence  through  education.  Popular  edu- 
cation does  nothing,  and  college  education  does  little  to  give  this 
vitally  necessary  education.  "  Is  it  fair  to  ask  millions  of  demo- 
crats to  have  a  profound  respect  for  scientific  accomphshments 
whose  possession  is  denied  to  them  by  the  prevaihng  social  and 
educational  organization?  It  can  hardly  be  claimed  that  the 
greater  proportion  of  the  millions  who  are  insufficiently  educated 
are  not  just  as  capable  of  being  better  educated  as  the  thousands 
to  whom  science  comes  to  have  a  real  meaning.  Society  has  merely 
deprived  them  of  the  opportunity.  .  .  .  The  best  way  to  popu- 
larize scientific  administration,  and  to  enable  the  democracy  to  con- 
sider highly  educated  officials  as  representative,  is  to  popularize  the 
higher  education.     An  expert  administration  cannot  be  sufficiently 

71  Commons  and  Andrews,  "Principles  of  Labor  Legislation,"  416-430. 
^    72  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Social.  Soc,  VII:i6o-i6i. 
'8  McCarthy,  "  The  Wisconsin  Idea." 
'^*  Lowell,  "  Public  Opinion  and  Popular  Government,"  46-49. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  157 

representative  until  it  comes  to  represent  a  better  educated  con- 
stituency." '^^ 

Even  with  the  necessary  education  the  functioning  of  the  thought- 
ful voter  is  becoming  more  difficult  in  the  modern  state.  This  is 
due  to  the  multiplication  of  the  functions  of  the  state  and  the  in- 
creasing complexity  of  administration.  Mere  increase  of  popula- 
tion increases  the  power  of  the  multitude  as  against  the  individual. 
We  have  to  consider  "  its  vastness  and  the  resulting  sense  of  indi- 
vidual helplessness.  The  citizen  who  is  out  of  sympathy  with  the 
aims  of  the  State,  unless  he  is  a  man  of  very  rare  gifts,  cannot  hope 
to  persuade  the  State  to  adopt  purposes  which  seem  to  him  better. 
Even  in  a  democracy  all  questions  except  a  very  few  are  decided 
by  a  small  number  of  officials  and  eminent  men;  and  even  the  few 
questions  which  are  left  to  the  popular  vote  are  decided  by  a  dif- 
fused mass-psychology,  not  by  individual  initiative.  This  is  espe- 
cially noticeable  in  a  country  like  the  United  States,  where,  in  spite 
of  democracy,  most  men  have  a  sense  of  almost  complete  impotence 
in  regard  to  all  large  issues."  "^^  Most  voters  do  not  understand 
the  issues  their  votes  decide.  They  are  organized  for  political 
action  into  political  parties ;  but  this  merely  means  organized  igno- 
rance, which  party  leaders  and  capitalistic  interests  easily  control. 

If  in  ordinary  times  the  individual  feels  he  counts  for  little  or 
nothing,  he  feels  still  more  powerless  during  a  period  when  the 
nation  is  swept  by  an  emotion,  for  instance,  the  "  Red  hysteria  "  of 
1919-1920  in  the  United  States.  Not  only  the  rank  and  file  but 
leaders  in  every  line  were  subject  to  that  hysteria,  or  were  afraid  to 
speak  out  and  show  that  they  were  not,  or  were  silent  because  they 
felt  they  had  no  power  to  lead  the  many  out  of  the  mania.'^''^  There 
were,  however,  a  few  fearless  spirits  who  could  speak  with  author- 
ity and  did  so.  For  instance.  Judge  George  W.  Anderson  said: 
"  Many  —  perhaps  most  —  of  the  agitators  for  the  suppression  of 
the  so-called  '  Red  menace,'  are,  I  observe,  the  same  individuals, 
or  class  of  forces,  that  in  the  years  '17  and  '18  were  frightening 
the  community  to  death  about  pro-German  plots  and  their  danger 
to  America. 

"  I  ought  to  know  something  about  those  plots.     It  was  my  duty 

'"^  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  376-377. 

''*  Russell,  "  Why  Men  Fight,"  60-61. 

''THapgood,  "The  Storm  Cellar,"  New  Republic,  Jan,  28,  1920,  255. 


158      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

to  know.  As  United  States  Attorney  from  November,  19 14,  to 
October  15,  19 17,  I  was  charged  with  a  large  responsibility  as  to 
protecting  the  community  from  pro-German  plots.  In  October, 
19 17,  I  went  on  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission;  and  was 
until  the  armistice  in  intimate  personal  association  with  the  Attor- 
ney General,  and  with  the  men  charged  with  responsibility  as  to 
discovering,  preventing,  and  punishing  pro-German  plots.  What 
I  now  say,  I  say  entirely  on  my  own  responsibility;  but  I  say  it  after 
exchanging  views  with  many  others  having  analogous  responsibili- 
ties during  this  war  period.  If  in  fact  the  pro-German  plots  were 
no  adequate  basis  for  public  fear,  and  for  legislative  and  official 
activities  against  the  right  of  individual  and  social  liberty,  it  is  quite 
possible  that  the  Red  menace,  promoted  in  large  part  by  the  same 
notoriety-seeking  individuals  and  newspapers,  ought  not  to  frighten 
us  to  death.  Now,  I  assert  as  my  best  judgment,  grounded  on  the 
Information  that  I  can  get,  that  more  than  ninety-nine  percent  of 
the  advertised  and  reported  pro-Gepnan  plots  never  existed.  I 
think  it  is  time  that  publicity  was  given  to  this  view.  I  doubt  the 
Red  menace  having  more  basis  in  fact  than  the  pro-German  peril. 
I  assert  the  significant  fact  that  many  of  the  same  persons  and 
newspapers  that  for  two  years  were  faking  pro-German  plots  are 
now  promoting  '  The  Red  Terror.'  "  "^^  The  Red  hysteria  was 
even  more  intense  than  the  pro-German  hysteria  "  because  nothing 
is  so  alarming  as  a  threat  against  a  bank  account,  more  perhaps, 
because  the  German  danger  was  thousands  of  miles  away.  In  this 
case,  on  the  contrary,  our  politicians  and  our  newspapers  have  vied 
with  one  another  in  depicting  the  peril  as  crimson  and  as  on  our  own 
doorsteps."  ''^  The  Red  hysteria  was  not  due  merely  to  notoriety- 
seeking  politicians  and  newspapers,  but  was  encouraged  and  sup- 
ported by  reactionary  propertied  interests  because  it  distracted  the 
attention  of  the  people  from  the  high  prices,  so  that  profiteering 
could  go  on  unimpeded,  and  because  it  was  a  means  of  frightening 
people  from  expressing  and  holding  opinions  detrimental  to  reac- 
tionary propertied  interests. 

78  Quoted  in  "The  Red  Hysteria,"  New  Republic,  Jan.  28,  1920,  250-251.  A  sim- 
ilar view  was  taken  by  United  States  district  attorney  F.  F.  Kane  in  opposition  to 
Attorney-General  Palmer.  See  Kane's  letter  to  Palmer  and  Palmer's  reply  in  the 
Survey,  Jan.  31,  1920,  501-503.  See  also  Hale,  "The  'Force  and  Violence'  Joker," 
New  Republic,  Jan.  21,  1920,  231. 

■^8  Hapgood,  op.  cit.,  256. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  159 

Owing  to  the  tendency  of  the  individual  to  feel  his  powerless- 
ness  in  a  great  state  at  all  times,  and  especially  during  a  nation- 
wide mania,  the  state  tends  to  become  autocratic  from  the  mere 
lack  of  individual  initiative  among  its  citizens.  Thus  discouraged 
by  the  bigness  of  the  mass  of  which  he  is  a  minute  part  the  indi- 
vidual lacks  incentive  to  use  what  intelligence  he  may  have  and 
surrenders  to  the  instinct  to  move  with  the  crowd  and  to  the  in- 
stincts that  move  the  crowd.  The  crowd  prevails  over  the  indi- 
vidual and  thus  gives  the  final  impetus  to  utterly  irresponsible 
behaviour. 

In  connection  with  this  political  impotence  of  the  individual  there 
must  be  considered,  also,  the  tendency  of  a  position  of  political  au- 
thority to  strengthen  the  rivalrous  and  dominating  dispositions  of 
those  who  have  reached  such  a  position  largely  through  the  exer- 
cise of  those  dispositions.  A  noticeable  change  in  the  direction 
of  a  tendency  to  be  dominating  often  develops  in  the  personality 
of  political  leaders  who  started  in  their  careers  with  a  pronounced 
disposition  for  free  rivalry  and  fair  play.  The  change  is  due  to 
the  habitual  exercise  of  authority.  One  of  the  results  of  this 
change  is  that  it  introduces  an  autocratic  tendency  in  the  state. 
Another  is  that  the  autocratic  officials  thereby  become  unfit  to  pro- 
mote friendly  relations  between  states.  "  Pride  of  dominion,  un- 
willingness to  decide  disputes  otherwise  than  by  force  or  the  threat 
of  force,  is  a  habit  of  mind  greatly  encouraged  by  the  possession 
of  power.  Those  who  have  long  been  in  the  habit  of  exercising 
power  become  autocratic  and  quarrelsome,  incapable  of  regarding 
an  equal  otherwise  than  as  a  rival.  .  .  .  Men  who  have  the  habit 
of  authority  are  peculiarly  unfit  for  friendly  negotiation;  but  the 
official  relations  of  States  are  mainly  in  the  hands  of  men  with  a 
great  deal  of  authority  in  their  own  country.  This  is,  of  course, 
more  particularly  the  case  where  there  is  a  monarch  who  actually 
governs.  It  is  less  true  where  there  is  a  governing  oligarchy,  and 
still  less  true  where  there  is  some  approach  to  real  democracy. 
But  it  is  true  to  a  considerable  extent  in  all  countries."  ^^  The 
tendency  of  a  great  state  is,  then,  to  become  a  strong  state,  coercive 
both  in  internal  and  international  relations,  owing  to  the  tendency 
of  positions  of  great  power  to  make  officials  dominating,  and  to 

80  Russell,  op.  cit.,  63-64.  See  also  Young,  "  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near 
Eait,"  334  ff. 


i6o     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  tendency  of  the  mere  size  of  the  mass  to  discourage  Individual 
initiative. 

As  indicated  in  the  chapter  on  The  Psychology  of  Nationalism, 
the  remedies  for  this  tendency  toward  increasing  political  domi- 
nation-subservience are  a  change  in  industrial  relations  that  will 
encourage  individual  initiative,  and  a  reform  in  public  education 
that  will  make  the  training  of  the  intellect  essential  in  education. 
Another  remedy  is  governmental  decentralization.  Centralization 
means  increase  of  power  in  the  hands  of  those  who  hold  the  high 
offices.  It  means  also  an  increase  in  the  vastness  of  the  business 
of  government,  and  the  removal  of  officials  from  the  scene  of  the 
matters  with  which  they  are  concerned.  Officials  thus  situated 
"  will  tend  to  .  .  .  pay  attention  not  to  the  particular  circum- 
stances of  the  special  problem  involved,  but  to  its  general  ruling 
in  broad  cases  of  the  kind."  *^  This  tends  to  make  officials  arbi- 
trary, for  "  what  is  thereby  engendered  is  an  attempt  not  so  much 
to  provide  solutions  as  to  evade  them.  In  a  great  strike,  for  ex- 
ample, government  arbitration  will  not  mean  so  much  a  genuine 
effort  after  justice  as  the  purchase  of  a  solution  on  any  terms.  .  .  . 
In  industry  as  a  whole,  the  government  is,  from  the  nature  of 
things,  interested  in  the  maintenance  of  order  and  it  knows  well 
enough  that  the  maintenance  of  order  is  in  inverse  ratio  to  the 
duration  of  the  strike.  .  .  .  And,  at  the  worst,  it  may  suffer  itself 
to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  one  of  the  contending  parties.  Where 
picketing,  for  instance,  is  concerned,  the  knowledge  that  govern- 
ment stands  for  a  certain  theory  of  order,  necessarily  operates  to 
minimize  the  strength  of  the  men."  ®^  This  repressive  tendency 
of  government  operates  to  repress  interferences  with  order  without 
inquiry  into  the  justice  of  the  case,  and  the  tendency  is  increased  in 
proportion  to  the  size  of  the  nation  and  the  degree  of  centralization 
of  the  government. 

The  essential  elements  in  the  different  types  of  intra-national  re- 
lations are  the  instinctive  dispositions  that  give  the  trend  to  those 
relations.  This  analysis  does  not  ignore  the  customary  aspects  of 
a  relation  or  the  ideas  involved.  But  the  ideas  are  impulsively 
determined,  and  the  essential  thing  in  the  customary  aspect  is  the 
habitual  instinctive  impulses.     For  instance,  the  relation  between 

8iLaski,  "Authority  in  the  Modern  State,"  77. 
^^Ibid   (quoted  without  footnotes). 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  161 

employer  and  workmen  may  be  one  of  authority-obedience,  or  one 
of  intelligent  co-operation.  When  it  is  one  of  authority-obedience, 
it  is  a  relation  in  which  the  essential  factor  is  habitual  domination 
on  the  part  of  the  employer  and  habitual  submission  on  the  part  of 
the  workmen.  When  domination  becomes  habitual  the  dominat- 
ing one  ceases  to  have  a  conscious  sense  of  exerting  domination; 
and  when  submission  becomes  habitual  the  submitting  one  ceases 
to  have  a  sense  of  having  to  submit.  The  relation  has  ceased  to 
be  consciously  impulsive  and  has  become  habitual.  The  submitting 
one  acquiesces  subconsciously,  and  would  perhaps  defend  his  sub- 
mission as  "  right  "  and  failure  to  submit  as  "  wrong."  Or  his 
submission  may  remain  conscious,  as  when  he  submits  grudgingly 
and  with  some  resentment.  The  relation  may  be  one  of  habitual 
domination-submission;  or  it  may  be  a  relation  of  intelligent  co- 
operation, in  which  authority-subordination  is  understood  by  all 
concerned  to  be  necessary.  Employers  differ  in  their  conception  of 
the  industrial  relation.  Some  believe  in  a  relation  of  impulsive 
domination-submission,  which  ought  to  be  made  habitual  by  drill, 
while  others  believe  in  a  relation  of  intelligence  in  the  exercise  of 
authority  and  in  subordination. 

Instinctive  impulses  are  essential  not  only  in  the  face-to-face  re- 
lations of  industry  but  also  in  relations  between  classes,  in  which 
one  class  aims  to  use  the  government  to  assist  its  domination  of, 
or  resistance  of  another.  Reactionary  employers  aim  to  maintain 
the  legal  right  to  dominate  workmen,  and  workmen  aim  to  gain  the 
legal  right  to  resist  the  domination  of  reactionary  employers. 
Hence  the  class  struggle  for  the  control  of  the  government.  The 
relations  between  classes  are  more  complicated  than,  but  not  essen- 
tially different  from,  the  relations  between  employers  and  work- 
men. If  the  latter  are  prevailingly  those  of  domination-submis- 
sion, the  political  relation  will  be  one  of  class  domination-submis- 
sion, and  one  class  will  struggle  to  control  the  government  in  the 
interest  of  Its  domination  of  the  other.  If  the  relation  between 
employers  and  workmen  is  one  in  which  resistance  of  workmen  and 
a  sense  of  free  rivalry  is  becoming  increasingly  prevalent,  this  will 
show  itself  in  the  relation  between  classes,  and  an  upper  class  will 
find  its  exclusive  control  of  the  government  becoming  more  diffi- 
cult. Publicists  who  stand  for  a  relation  of  Intelligent  authority- 
subordination  between  employers  and  workmen  look  upon  the  gov- 


i62     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ernment  not  as  a  dominating  power  but  as  the  supreme  directing 
power  in  industry,  and  aim  to  enlist  intelligent  public  opinion  in 
policies  to  this  end.  What  we  actually  have,  then,  are  reactionary 
capitalistic  interests  and  capitalistic  interests  which  are  less  uncom- 
promising and  stand  for  freer  action  of  labour;  submissive  labour  in- 
terests that  are  conventional  in  their  political  allegiance  and  politi- 
cally resistful  labour  interests;  a  thoughtful  and,  as  yet,  not  very 
influential  public  opinion  that  stands  for  an  intelligent  authority- 
subordination  in  industry  and  for  more  effective  governmental  di- 
rection of  industry  —  all  these  interests  at  the  same  time  seeking 
to  influence  the  conventionalized  mass  of  voters  and  to  direct  gov- 
ernmental action;  and  the  resulting  governmental  action  is  the  ad- 
justment which  happens  to  be  reached  at  any  particular  time  be- 
tween these  conflicting  interests. 

This  conflict  is  essentially  a  conflict  of  instinctive  impulses.  The 
dominating  capitalistic  interests  are  such  because  men  of  a  domi- 
nating disposition  have  gained  the  ascendancy  therein.  The  less 
uncompromising  capitalistic  interests  are  such  not  only  because  the 
leaders  therein  have  learned  by  experience  the  folly  of  an  uncom- 
promising attitude,  but  also  because  they  were  of  such  a  disposition 
that  they  could  learn.  The  submissive  labour  interests  are  such 
because  of  a  submissive  disposition  as  well  as  because  experience 
has  confirmed  or  has  not  disturbed  that  disposition.  Those  labour 
groups  are  apt  to  be  resistful  whose  work  requires  courage  and 
daring,  which  work,  therefore,  selects  workmen  of  a  resistful  dispo- 
sition. The  rational  publicists  are  such  because  they  are  men  of 
a  strong  sympathetic  and  intellectual  disposition.  As  long  as  men 
differ  in  the  emphasis  laid  by  their  heredity  on  certain  parts  of  their 
original  nature  there  will  be  a  conflict  of  interests,  and  the  adjust- 
ment of  these  conflicts  will  be  an  essential  process  in  governmental 
action. 

The  different  types  of  intra-national  relations  described  in  the 
present  chapter  became  successively  predominant  in  the  United 
States  as  the  nation  developed,  because  economic  conditions  so 
changed  as  to  make  one  instinctive  disposition,  or  group  of  instinc- 
tive dispositions,  after  another  pronounced.  In  the  settlement  of 
the  country  the  acquisitive  disposition  predominated.  The  essen- 
tial relation  was  that  between  man  and  the  physical  environment, 
and  the  instincts  brought  into  play  were  the  instincts  to  acquire 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  163 

wealth.^^  The  families  lived  more  or  less  isolated  lives  and  this 
economic  condition  determined  that  certain  Instinctive  Impulses 
should  not  be  developed,  as  well  as  that  others  should  be  developed. 
The  habitual  exercise  of  the  latter,  in  adaptation  to  the  environ^ 
ment,  developed  the  essential  attitudes  of  character, —  in  this  case, 
persistence,  thrift,  frugality  and  other  acquisitive  attitudes. 

In  addition  to  the  acquisitive  disposition,  which  was  most  pro- 
nounced,^"*  the  rivalrous  and  the  sympathetic  were  brought  into 
play  in  the  course  of  the  day's  work  and  of  the  neighbourhood  life. 
When  the  economic  relation  Is  primarily  one  between  the  indi- 
vidual and  external  nature,  the  rivalry  is  largely  play  rivalry  that 
arises  in  the  course  of  the  work.  Furthermore,  the  dominating  dis- 
position takes  the  form  of  attack  on  physical  nature  and  the  mas- 
tering of  obstacles  presented  thereby.  By  this  diverting  of  egoistic 
Instinctive  Impulses  Into  relations  with  physical  nature  the  way  is 
left  open  for  a  development  of  Instinctive  sympathy  In  social  rela- 
tions. And,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  find  a  pronounced  sympathetic 
relation  in  this  period  of  development.^^  The  hardships  of  the 
life  of  direct  contact  with  nature  strongly  developed  the  egoistic 
instincts,  but  at  the  same  time  tended  to  confine  the  action  of  these 
largely  to  relations  with  physical  nature ;  though,  to  be  sure,  when 
a  farmer  did  meet  an  obstacle  in  his  social  relations,  he  was  apt 
to  react  to  it  In  the  same  masterful  manner  in  which  he  skidded  a 
log  or  persuaded  an  unwilling  animal.  But  because,  outside  of  his 
family,  the  economic  factor  In  his  social  relations  was  casual,  instinc- 
tive sympathy  was  pronounced  In  his  social  relations. 

As  the  nation  increased  in  population  opportunities  for  acquiring 
wealth  through  business  shrewdness,  speculation,  and  governmental 
privileges  multiplied  and  resulted  In  a  keen  business  rivalry;  and 
the  increasing  wealth  of  the  population  and  the  growth  of  towns 
stimulated  rivalry  in  the  display  of  wealth.  In  the  rural  districts 
the  early  rivalry  in  physical  prowess  and  working  power  ^^  devel- 
oped into  a  rivalry  In  wealth  power  and  its  display.^'^  In  this  pe- 
riod of  small  business  enterprises  the  more  or  less  comradely  rela- 
ys Williams,  "An  American  Town,"  Pt.  I,  Ch.  IV;  Thorndike,  "The  Original  Nature 
of  Man,"  50-54. 

^*  Wiliams,  op.  cit.  40. 

*5  Ibid.    42-44. 

^*  Ibid.,  36-37. 

^Ubid.,  Pt.  II,  Chs:  I,  V,  VII. 


i64      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

tion  of  business  men  to  their  workmen  continued  much  the  same 
as  that  of  the  farmer  to  his  hired  help.  Many  business  men  were 
sons  of  farmers  and  had  worked  with  the  father  and  his  men  in 
the  field.  The  spirit  of  good-natured  rivalry  prevailed  among  the 
workmen  in  the  factory  as  it  had  in  the  field.  The  business  man 
made  profits  but  the  difference  between  his  Income  and  that  of  his 
workmen  was  as  nothing  compared  with  the  later  period  of  price 
agreements  and  great  corporations  with  their  monopolistic  advan- 
tages. In  this  period  of  business  rivalry  in  the  towns  the  direct 
relation  with  physical  nature  continued  essential  in  the  rural  dis- 
tricts. The  population  of  the  nation  thus  differentiated  into  a  sec- 
tion in  which  the  acquisitive  disposition  continued  to  predominate 
and  a  section  in  which  the  rivalrous  disposition  came  to  the  front.^^ 
With  the  development  of  business  rivalry,  the  dominating  dispo- 
sition ^^  asserted  itself.  Domination  was  to  be  seen  in  the  period 
of  the  predominance  of  the  acquisitive,  and  of  the  rivalrous  dispo- 
sitions, but  in  these  periods  was  confined  to  the  treatment  of  horses 
and  other  beasts  of  burden,  and  occasionally  of  hired  men  by  the 
farmer,  and  in  some  cases,  of  members  of  the  family  by  the  father.®*^ 
If  manifested  toward  neighbours  or  working  associates,  it  stirred 
fierce  resentment.®^  With  the  passing  of  the  public  domain  into 
private  ownership,  however,  and  the  rise  of  the  great  corporation 
and  of  a  vast  working  population,  containing  a  large  foreign  ele- 
ment, dependent  for  an  opportunity  to  earn  a  living  on  financial  in- 
terests that  controlled  the  capital  of  the  country,  the  instinctive 
disposition  of  domination  became  conspicuous  in  the  behaviour  of 
employers  toward  workmen,  and  eventually  in  behaviour  toward 
competitors  —  in  the  development  of  monopoly.  This  dominating 
behaviour  met  resistance  from  those  sections  of  the  population  in 
which  the  acquisitive  and  rivalrous  dispositions  continued  to  pre- 
dominate,—  resistance  by  trade  unions,  farmers'  associations,  and 
by  merchants  and  manufacturers  who  demanded  the  privilege  of 
independently  carrying  on  their  business.  Where  there  was  no 
resistance,  the  disposition  of  fearful  submission  came  to  prevail 
among  the  masses. 

88  Ibid.,  201-205. 

89  Thorndike,  op.  cit.,  92-94. 
"0  Williams,  op,  cit.,  229-230. 
»i  Ibid.,  60. 


INTRA-NATIONAL  RELATIONS  165 

With  the  development  of  successive  types  of  intra-national  rela- 
tions, the  economic  and  the  political  organization  are  shaped  in  a 
way  to  satisfy  the  predominant  dispositions.  But  the  other  dispo- 
sitions continue  active,  so  that  the  development  of  organization  in 
satisfaction  of  the  predominant  dispositions  is  deflected  by  oppos- 
ing tendencies.  Industrial  domination  stirs  resistance,  evidences  of 
prosperity  and  display  among  employers  stir  rivalry,  the  poverty 
caused  by  exploitation  stirs  sympathy;  and  there  results  a  conflict 
in  the  group  leadership  between  those  whose  plans  for  changes  in 
the  economic  and  poHtical  organizations  are  determined  by  egoistic 
dispositions  and  those  whose  plans  are  determined  by  a  sympathetic 
intelHgence.  The  point  of  view  of  the  latter  is  wider  than  the 
welfare  merely  of  the  family  or  business  group  or  class  with  which 
the  self  and  its  interests  are  identified.  But  the  egoistic  leader- 
ship has  played  the  predominant  part  in  the  development  of  eco- 
nomic and  political  organization.  The  sympathetic  point  of  view 
is  discouraged  by  the  fact  that  the  interests  of  the  public  are  vague 
and  uncertain  as  compared  with  the  concrete  and  positive  interests 
of  the  groups  with  which  the  self  is  identified.  Consequently  the 
sympathetic  disposition  is  hesitant,  ineffective  unless  reinforced  by 
a  vigorous  intellectual  disposition.  Vigour  of  intellect  is  increased 
by  an  education  which  emphasizes  intellectual  training  and  trains 
the  youth  in  an  appreciation  of  public  welfare  interests.  When 
there  has  developed  a  leadership  with  a  vigorous  and  trained  intel- 
lectual capacity,  and  which  is  committed  to  the  realization  of  a  ra- 
tional social  purpose,  we  may  expect  a  new  trend  in  the  econortiic 
and  political  organization.  This  great  conflict  between  egoistic 
and  public  welfare  interests  is  the  subject  of  a  future  volume. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    ASPECTS    OF    INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 

THE  traditional  conception  of  sovereignty  has  two  aspects, 
the  relation  of  sovereign  and  subjects,  and  the  relation  of 
a  sovereign  state  to  other  states.  "  The  modern  idea  of 
national  sovereignty,  i.e.,  of  complete  independence  of  external 
authority  only  gradually  won  its  way,  and  the  assertion  of  national 
sovereignty  went  along  with  the  decay  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
and  the  revolt  of  the  Northern  nations  against  the  authority  of  the 
Pope."  ^  The  conception  of  sovereignty  as  involving  entire  na- 
tional independence  was  given  final  expression  by  Austin  who  de- 
nied that  international  law  is  law  in  a  true  sense,  that  is,  positive 
law  in  the  sense  in  which  he  used  the  term.^  He  assumed,  there- 
fore, that  states  might  observe  international  law  and  still  be  under 
no  positive  law,  that  is,  might  still  be  independent,  and  that  com- 
plete independence  is  characteristic  of  the  sovereign  state.  Com- 
plete independence  requires  that  a  state  be  prepared  to  maintain 
its  independence  by  force,  unaided.  While  it  is  not  economically 
self-sufficient  it  relies  on  its  military  force  to  maintain  such  a  con- 
trol of  raw  materials  and  trade  routes  as  is  necessary  to  its  inde- 
pendence. Today,  however,  no  state  is  thus  independent.  By  no 
military  force  can  it,  unaided,  maintain  sufficient  control  of  trade 
routes  and  raw  materials  to  guarantee  its  independence.  "  For  ex- 
ample: Indispensable  engines  of  war  require  rubber,  sulphuric 
acid,  nitrates,  manganese.  Rubber  is  to  be  had  mostly  from  Brazil, 
the  East  Indies,  the  Straits  Settlements;  sulphur,  in  commercial 
quantities,  only  in  the  United  States,  in  Japan,  in  Sicily,  and  pyrites, 
from  which  it  may  be  derived,  largely  in  Spain;  nitrates  only  in 
Chile ;  manganese  only  in  Russia,  India  and  Brazil.  The  blockade 
which  cuts  Germany  off  from  these  things  cuts  her  off  from  neces- 
saries of  war.  .  .  .  Try  as  she  will,  she  cannot,  in  the  nature  of 

1  Ritchie,  "  On  the  Conception  of  Sovereignty,"  An.  Amer.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Sc,  I: 
408-409. 
2 Austin,  "Lectures  on  Jurisprudence,"  I:  187-188. 

166 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  167 

things,  be  a  modern  state  and  conduct  a  modern  war,  and  be  self- 
sufficient;  nor  can  any  other  state.  National  economy,  at  least,  is 
not  sovereign.  National  economy,  at  least,  means  interdepend- 
ence of  nations."  ^ 

The  traditional  conception  of  entire  independence  of  the  sover- 
eign state  implies  international  relations  similar  to  those  assumed 
by  international  law.  International  law  has  assumed,  as  the  pre- 
vailing international  relation,  a  rivalry  that  tends  to  develop  a 
struggle  for  supremacy  between  great  nations  or  groups  of  nations. 
It  is  true  that  international  rivalry  has  had  this  tendency.  The 
strong  and  dominating  nations  have  tended  to  absorb  the  weaker. 
It  is  stated  that  *'  All  through  history  there  has  been  but  one  de- 
termining cause  of  political  union  between  communities  —  physical 
force  or  the  fear  of  physical  force.  .  .  .  No  community  has  con- 
sented to  link  its  fortunes  with  the  fortunes  of  another  save  when 
instigated  by  the  fear  of  violence  from  that  other  or  a  third  power. 
Many  attempts  have  been  made  on  other  grounds,  many  other  ex- 
cellent motives  have  suggested  themselves  to  thinking  men.  But 
the  determining  cause,  the  dead  lift  over  the  hill,  has  always  been 
force  or  fear  of  it."  *  President  Goodnow  writes  that,  "  While 
this  statement  is  perhaps  too  general  and  too  sweeping,  it  cannot 
be  denied  that  political  unity  owes  much  to  conquest."  ^ 

International  law  has  made  this  fact  of  international  struggle  for 
domination  too  exclusive  In  its  assumptions  as  to  the  normal  rela- 
tion between  states.  The  result  is  that  the  principles  based  on 
these  assumptions  involve  contradictions,  for  instance,  between 
the  principle  of  the  independence  and  equality  of  nations  and  "  an- 
other principle  antagonistic  and  potentially  fatal  to  it.  This  was 
the  principle  that  every  independent  nation  had  the  right  to  declare 
war,  for  any  cause  deemed  by  it  to  be  sufficient;  and  that,  having 
declared  war,  it  immediately  acquired  all  the  rights  pertaining  to 
that  condition,  including  the  right  of  conquest,  under  which  the 
strongest  power,  even  though  it  were  the  aggressor,  might  law- 
fully proceed  to  destroy  or  absorb  its  adversary."  ®  A  theory  of 
international  relations  which  is  psychologically  accurate  requires  a 

s  Kallen,  "  The  Structure  of  Lasting  Peace,"  41-42. 

*  Jenks,  "  Government  of  Victoria,"  373. 
^  Goodnow,  op  cit.,  17. 

*  Moore,  "  International  Cooperation,"  Intern.  Concil.,  Bulletin,  No.  loo,  5. 


i68      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

broader  psychological  basis  than  a  mere  assumed  rivalry  which 
tends  to  develop  into  a  struggle  for  domination. 

There  are  four  possible  types  of  international  behaviour:  more 
or  less  complete  national  isolation ;  "^  international  rivalry  without 
domination;  an  international  struggle  for  domination;  and  inter- 
national co-operation.  National  isolation  is  a  temporary  phase 
of  international  behaviour.®  Isolation  is  sought  by  a  nation  which 
is  settled  in  a  new  and  rich  country  and  is  absorbed  in  the  exploita- 
tion of  its  natural  resources  and  in  the  development  of  transporta- 
tion and  manufacturing.  The  capitalistic  class  which  develops 
finds  isolation  unprofitable ;  and  the  rivalry  that  develops  with  capi- 
talistic classes  in  other  nations  leads  the  nation  into  a  new  inter- 
national relation. 

The  international  struggle  for  domination  has  predominated  in 
international  behaviour  throughout  the  history  of  civilization.® 
"  Historically,  armed  strength  seems  to  have  been  the  condition 
of  national  survival.  In  the  pre-machine  age  the  world  was  poor; 
such  wealth  as  there  was  existed  largely  in  the  form  of  land  and  its 
products;  slavery  made  profitable  the  conquest  of  rich  territories 
and  the  subjugation  of  their  peoples.  Population  growth  was  an 
almost  inevitable  stimulus  to  conquest,  military  aggression  was  the 
quick  road  to  wealth.  .  .  .  Foreign  trade  in  those  days  was  al- 
ways backed  by  force  or  the  threat  of  force.  It  was,  indeed, 
plunder  where  possible,  browbeating  and  overreaching  where 
strength  was  more  equally  matched.  It  easily  passed  over  into 
actual  war  where  that  promised  more  profit.  Commerce  in  good 
part  was  war;  for,  in  a  world  of  poverty,  wealth  was  the  condition 
of  population,  population  of  power,  power  of  territory,  and  terri- 
tory again  of  wealth."  ^^  Under  these  conditions  much  of  the 
literature  of  the  ancient  nations  on  the  subject  of  international  re- 
lations was  simply  declamatory  utterance  of  ideas  suggested  by  the 
prevailing  international  hostility.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  litera- 
ture of  "  the  ancient  Hebrews,  who,  regarding  themselves  as  the 
*  chosen  people  of  God,'  conceived  themselves  to  be  merely  the  in- 

7  Veblen,  "  The  Nature  of  Peace,"  67,  40. 

8  Angell,  "  America  and  the  New  World-State,"  Pt.  I,  Ch.  I. 

9  Gibbons,  "  The  New  Map  of  Asia." 

1°  Mussey,  "Is  Commerce  V7ar?"  Intern.  Concil.,  Special  Bulletin,  5.  See  also  Adam 
Smith,  "  An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations,"  Bk.  V, 
Ch.  I. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  169 

strument  of  the  Almighty  in  obliterating  their  enemies.  It  was  in 
the  137th  Psalm,  in  the  phrase  '  Happy  shall  he  be  that  taketh  and 
dasheth  thy  little  ones  against  the  stones,'  that  Grotius  found  an 
unquestionable  proof  that  the  right  of  war  permitted  the  slaughter 
of  women  and  infants  with  impunity.  Nor  can  it  be  denied  that,  in 
a  milder  form,  the  doctrine  of  the  '  manifest  destiny  '  of  certain 
nations  to  extend  their  boundaries,  by  force  if  necessary,  is  tinc- 
tured with  the  same  thought."  ^^ 

The  aggressive  relation  of  primitive  groups  was  followed  suc- 
cessively by  the  rivalry  of  village  communities,  of  feudal  groups 
and  of  free  cities,  all  of  which  aimed  to  make  themselves  superior, 
economically  and  otherwise,  at  the  expense  of  rival  groups. ^^  The 
territorial  state  restrained  the  rivalry  of  its  constituent  cities  and 
feudal  groups  in  the  interest  of  its  own  superiority  over  rival 
states. ^^  And  finally  with  the  development  of  industry  and  com- 
merce arose  the  great  nations,^^  which  regulated  the  rivalry  of 
their  constituent  groups  in  the  interest  of  the  national  superiority. 
The  policy  of  creating  national  economic  superiority  as  a  means  to 
political  superiority  was  called  mercantilism.  "  The  essence  of 
the  system  lies  not  in  some  doctrine  of  money,  or  of  the  balance  of 
trade;  not  in  tariff  barriers,  protective  duties,  or  navigation  laws; 
but  in  something  far  greater :  —  namely,  in  the  total  transforma- 
tion of  society  and  its  organization,  ...  in  the  replacing  of  a 
local  and  territorial  economic  policy  by  that  of  the  national  state."  ^^ 
This  theory  of  international  relations  has  been  given  a  new  impe- 
tus by  the  impulses  stirred  by  the  World  War;  it  is  championed  by 
those  interests  which  stand  for  the  traditional  national  rivalry  of 
economic  interests  and  is  called  neo-mercantilism.  "  The  neo-mer- 
cantilist  view  harks  back  to  the  old  concept  of  nations  as  economic 
no  less  than  political  or  social  units.  It  assumes  and  seeks  con- 
sciously to  cultivate  an  identity  of  economic  interests  among  all  the 
people  and  classes  of  a  nation  as  against  those  outside,  contradict- 
ing alike  the  Manchester  doctrine  of  harmony  and  the  socialist 
doctrine  of  class  struggle.  It  expresses  itself  in  protective  tariffs, 
exclusive  colonial  policies,  the  mad  race  of  military  and  naval  arma- 

^^  Moore,  op.  cit.  6. 

^2  Schmoller,  "  The  Mercantile  System,"  trans,  by  Ashley,  4-12. 

''^^  Ibid.,  13-45. 

1*  Ibid.,  46. 

i"  Ibid.,  51 ;  Small,  "  The  Cameralists," 


170      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ment  .  .  .  postulating,  therefore,  the  necessity  of  national  sur- 
vival, it  leads  directly  to  the  duty  of  asserting  national  might  — 
not  only  military,  but  economic,  political,  social,  cultural. 

".  .  .  The  whole  organization  and  activity  of  state  and  people 
must  accordingly  be  directed  to  greater  effectiveness  in  the  inter- 
national struggle,  for  such  is  the  condition  of  national  survival."  ^^ 
Neo-mercantilism  is,  thus,  merely  an  exposition  of  the  relation  of 
an  international  struggle  for  domination.  As  indicated,  it  is  op- 
posed to  the  Manchester  doctrine  of  free  rivalry  according  to 
which  the  advantages  of  free  trade,  as  conceived  by  those  early 
thinkers,  "  would  soon  unite  all  the  peoples  in  bonds  of  economic 
interdependence  so  firm  that  war  would  become  impossible.  The 
Manchester  men  consistently  urged  the  utmost  freedom  of  compe- 
tition both  within  and  without  the  state.  Their  idea  of  harmony 
of  interests  applied  to  nations  no  less  than  to  individuals.  Free 
trade,  internal  harmony,  international  peace  —  such  was  their 
dream."  "  Neo-mercantilism  is  opposed  also  to  socialism  which 
advocates  state  ownership  of  industry  as  a  means  to  international 
co-operation.  The  socialists  declare  that  the  governments  of  all 
nations  are  controlled  by  capitalistic  interests  and  that  war  is  sim- 
ply a  struggle  between  these  interests.  To  do  away  with  war,  the 
workers  in  each  nation  must  substitute  for  capitalism,  state  owner- 
ship of  industry.^® 

The  international  struggle  for  domination  has  been  stimulated, 
and  the  behaviour  in  which  it  expressed  itself  glorified,  by  the  po- 
litical preachers  of  the  militaristic  nation.  The  most  distinguished 
political  preacher  of  this  type  in  recent  years  was  the  German 
Treitschke.^^  Treitschke  was  a  preacher  rather  than  a  thinker;  he 
translated  into  resounding  phrases  the  impulse  of  domination  of  the 
ruling  classes  of  Germany,  and  popularized  these  impulsive  ideas 
as  journalist,  professor  and  deputy  in  the  Reichstag.     His  system 

1'  Mussey,  op.  cit.,  4-5.  See  also  "  Earl  of  Cromer,"  "  Free  Trade  in  its  Relation  to 
Peace  and  War,"  Nineteenth  Century,  LXVIII:  386-388. 

1''  Mussey,  op.  cit.,  3. 

18  Walling,  "Socialism  as  It  Is,"  Pt.  Ill;  "Rand  School  of  Social  Science,"  "The 
Trial  of  Scott  Nearing  and  the  American  Socialist  Society." 

1^  Treitschke's  ideas  are  set  forth  in  his  "  Politics,  "  a  book  which  contains  a  course 
of  lectures  given  at  the  University  of  Berlin  every  year  from  1874  till  his  death.  He 
was  invited  to  Berlin  by  Bismarck  and  became  a  great  admirer  of  William  II,  who 
absorbed  his  ideas  and  whose  personality  inspired  many  of  his  thoughts.  Treitschke's 
followers  included  Bernhardi  ("Germany  and  the  Next  War"),  and  Von  Biilow 
("Imperial  Germany").  Cramb  ("Germany  and  England")  and  Miinsterberg  ("The 
War  and  America")  also  were  imperialists. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  171 

of  thought  involves  no  psychological  analysis  but  defines  political 
relations  in  harmony  with  the  attitude  of  political  domination. 
The  state,  says  Treitschke,  is  "  above  all,  Power  which  makes  its 
will  to  prevail.  .  ,  ."  ^  It  cannot  "  tolerate  any  power  above  its 
own."  ^^  The  state  "  demands  obedience,  ...  A  step  forward 
has  been  taken  when  the  mute  obedience  of  the  citizens  is  trans- 
formed into  a  rational  inward  assent,  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  this 
is  absolutely  necessary.  .  .  .  Submission  is  what  the  state  primarily 
requires;  it  insists  upon  acquiescence;  its  very  essence  is  the  accom- 
plishment of  its  will."  ^^  "  The  State  is  power,  precisely  in  order 
to  assert  itself  as  against  other  equally  independent  powers."  ^^ 
For  this  reason,  "  the  idea  of  one  universal  empire  is  odious.  .  .  ."  ^* 
There  can  be  no  struggle  of  nations  for  domination  with  only  one 
nation  existing,  hence  the  idea  of  a  universal  empire  is  odious. 
The  supreme  end  of  the  state  is  power  for  domination,  and  the  real 
statesman  can  recognize  no  one  but  God  and  the  sword  of  the 
conqueror.^^  Treitschke's  theory  of  the  state  springs,  therefore, 
from  an  attitude  for  political  domination,  and  his  ideas,  including 
his  historical  citations,  are  merely  secondary  explanations  justify- 
ing this  attitude  for  political  domination.  This  is  to  be  the  de- 
termining motive  in  international  relations.  The  powerful  state 
can  have  only  contempt  for  small  states.  Thus  "  if  the  State  is 
power,  only  that  State  which  has  power  realizes  its  own  idea,  and 
this  accounts  for  the  undeniably  ridiculous  aspect  which  we  discern 
in  the  existence  of  a  small  State."  "  Weakness  is  not  itself  ridicu- 
lous, except  when  masquerading  as  strength."  ^^  Only  in  great 
states  "  can  that  truly  national  pride  arise  which  is  a  sign  of  the 
moral  stamina  of  a  people."  ^^  Moral  stamina  springs  from  a 
sense  of  dominating  power  and  only  the  people  of  such  nations  have 
national  pride. ^^  "  No  people  ever  attains  to  national  conscious- 
ness without  over-rating  itself."  ^^  It  follows  from  the  conception 
of  the  state  as  absolute  will  that  the  state  is  obliged  to  keep  its 

20  Treitschke,  "Politics,"  trans,  by  Dugdale  and  De  Bille,  I:  22. 

21  Ibid..  1 :  26. 
22/izW.,  I:  23. 
2^  Ibid.,  I:  19. 
24/^zW.,  I:  19. 
25  Ibid.,  1 :  28. 
20 Ibid.,  I:  34. 
2'' Ibid.,  I:  36. 

28  Ibid.,  1 :  1 9-20. 
^^Ibid.,  I:  19. 


172      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

treaties  only  so  long  as  it  wills  to  do  so ;  ^°  and,  also,  that  states- 
men cannot  be  expected  to  act  according  to  the  rules  of  private 
morality  because  the  highest  moral  duty  is  to  uphold  the  power  of 
the  state. ^^  They  must  be  above  all,  therefore,  men  of  a  massive 
ambition.^^  And  in  satisfying  their  ambition  for  the  state,  the  end 
to  a  certain  extent  justifies  the  means. ^^  Because  of  its  under- 
lying attitude  of  domination,  the  state  cannot  refer  important  in- 
ternational questions  to  arbitration.^*  It  must  enforce  its  will  by 
war.^^  War  is  a  sacred  duty  because  it  is  necessary  to  wage  war  in 
order  to  satisfy  the  state's  impulse  for  domination.^^  Peace  means 
merely  money-getting  and  is,  therefore,  a  veritable  curse.^'^  In 
war  man  tastes  the  joy  of  the  ambition  to  surpass  himself.  The 
state  is  the  army,  and  citizens  must  have  the  impulse  of  soldiers; 
otherwise  there  is  chaos  in  all  relations,  industrial  and  ecclesiastical 
as  well  as  political.^^  The  primary  duty  of  citizens  is  to  submit 
individually  in  order  to  dominate  collectively.^^  The  state  must 
rule  its  subjects  with  firm,  even  harsh  power.*^  Women  are  not 
fitted  for  such  rule  and  hence  should  take  no  part  in  politics.*^  The 
attitude  for  national  domination  thus  determines  Treitschke's 
teaching,  construing  all  social  relations  in  harmony  with  itself,  so 
that  his  theory  of  international  relations  can  be  explained  only  by 
tracing  its  wordy  ramifications  to  their  source  in  his  essential  atti- 
tude. Merely  to  argue  against  such  a  theory  is  not  to  analyse  or 
refute  it,  for  the  arguments  are  apt  to  be  suggested  by  opposing 
attitudes  which  themselves  require  explanation.*^ 

We  turn  now  to  a  third  type  of  international  relations,  that 
in  which  relations  are  rivalrous  without  being  dominating.  Ma- 
chine industry  and  steam  transportation  "  have  made  it  possible 
for  growing  peoples  to  live  and  prosper  without  plunder;  they  have 
made  profitable  the  peaceful  exchange  of  commodities  on  a  world- 

^^Ibid.,  i:  28;  II:  596-597. 

»^Ibid.,  I:  94. 

^2 Ibid.,  I:  58. 

»^Ibid.,  I:  84-85,  99. 

^*Ibid.,  I:  29;  II:  598. 

^^Ibid.,  I:  65-67;  II:  599. 

«^Ibid.,  I:  66-69. 

8''  Ibid.,  I:  50-51. 

^^Ibid.,  I:  47-53;  II:  394-396. 

80/^ii.,  I:  54. 

^oibid.,  I:  95. 

*^  Ibid.,  1:  23. 

*2Veblen,  "Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution,"  208. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  173 

wide  scale.  .  .  .  Reciprocal  trade  means  excess  of  wealth  to  both 
nations."  ^^  But  the  development  of  capitalistic  industry  has  re- 
sulted in  a  rivalry  of  capitalistic  groups  in  the  different  nations  to 
possess  themselves  of  exclusive  economic  advantages.  "  In  fact, 
the  whole  modern  system  of  economic  rivalries  is  due  to  the  mis- 
appropriation of  economic  endeavor  to  dynastic  and  capitalistic 
uses;  is  due  to  the  militaristic  requirement  of  a  self-sufficient  state. 
.  .  .  States  that  grow  and  make  different  things,  that  vary  their 
use  and  bring  them  constantly  within  the  easier  reach  of  more  and 
more  people,  become  more  and  more  dependent  on  each  other  with 
time.  Germany's  rivalry  with  England  did  not  spring  from  the  di- 
versity of  the  two  states'  products,  but  from  their  identity  —  the 
latter  made  them  competitors ;  the  former,  friends. 

"  Now  the  unnecessary  existence  of  rivalry  is  a  perversion  of 
function  in  state  and  industry."  *^  The  rivalry  of  capitalistic  in- 
terests in  different  nations  causes  international  rivalry  to  over- 
shadow international  co-operation,  and  the  masses  support  this 
international  rivalry  because  it  satisfies  those  instinctive  impulses 
once  satisfied  by  sectarian  rivalry.^^ 

As  in  intra-national,  so  in  international  relations  the  third  period 
is  one  of  migration  and  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources.  This 
is  the  purpose  of  the  colonization  of  new  lands  and  of  the  settle- 
ment by  immigrants  of  the  unoccupied  territory  of  other  nations. 
The  prosperity  of  settlers  and  immigrants  in  a  new  country  is  re- 
flected in  the  old,  through  the  money  sent  back,  and  the  glowing 
accounts  of  the  opportunities  in  the  new  country.  Subjects  of  other 
nations  are  welcomed  in  a  new  nation  because  they  people  the 
lands,  make  them  productive,  and  furnish  labour  for  the  growing 
industries.  Wherefore  there  is  an  era  of  free  rivalry  between 
new  countries  and  old,  and  between  old  with  their  attention  directed 
less  on  each  other  than  on  the  peopling  of  colonies  and  new  coun- 
tries. But  in  time  the  earth  is  colonized,  the  new  countries  are 
rapidly  filling  up,  and  the  economic  opportunities  originally  within 
reach  of  all  in  the  new  countries  eventually  pass  under  the  control 
of  employing  classes.  The  populations,  In  the  new  as  In  the  old, 
become  working  masses  dependent  on  employers;  international  ri- 
valry ceases  to  be  free  rivalry  and  centres  in  the  rivalry  of  great 

*3  Mussey,   op.   cit.,   5. 

**Kallen,  "The  Structure  of  Permanent  Peace,"   65-66. 

«Croly,  "The  Future  of  the  State,"  Netv  Republic,  Sept.  15,  1917,  i8o. 


174     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

economic  interests,  backed  by  military  and  naval  forces,  for  the  con- 
trol of  the  natural  resources  and  of  the  markets  of  the  world. 

The  international  rivalry  for  power  in  international  politics  is 
essentially  an  economic  phenomenon.  It  is  an  inevitable  accom- 
paniment of  international  trade  and  investment  for  private  profit. 
So  long  as  propertied  classes  find  profitable  investments  at  home, 
the  investments  of  the  nation  abroad  may  be  inconsiderable.  But 
there  comes  a  time  when  investments  abroad  are  more  profitable 
and  capital  follows  the  direction  of  private  profits.  When  this 
development  in  international  relations  came  in  European  nations, 
"  Capital  the  world  over,  instead  of  being  invested  directly,  was 
committed  to  banks  for  investment;  and  banks,  seeking  the  largest 
profits  for  themselves,  aimed  to  invest  this  capital  in  loans,  con- 
cessions and  other  things  abroad  that  would  bring  them  the  largest 
commissions  and  rake-offs,  and  their  clients  a  somewhat  higher 
income.  .  .  ."  ^®  Dr.  Kallen  gives  examples  of  the  profits  made 
by  international  bankers  and  continues:  "  Clearly  the  largest 
profits  went  in  these  cases  to  the  banks.  To  operate,  they  had  to 
concentrate  the  savings  of  both  large  and  small  depositors  and  in- 
vestors. Great  banking  firms  thus  were  led  to  establish  branches 
at  home  and  abroad,  to  absorb  small  banks  or  destroy  them,  and 
to  come  to  agreements  with  rivals.  .  .  .  Amsterdam,  Berlin, 
Frankfort,  London,  New  York,  Paris,  Vienna,  became  the  great 
money  centres  of  the  world.  .  .  ."  ^"^  At  the  beginning  of  the 
World  War  "  England  was  the  foremost  creditor  country  of  the 
world.  She  had  20  billion  pounds  of  foreign  investments.  .  .  . 
France  was  second  to  England  as  creditor  country.  She  had  8  bil- 
lions in  foreign  investments.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
only  in  recent  times  begun  to  export  capital.  She  had  a  foreign 
investment  of  about  5  billion  dollars.  ...  In  this  respect  the 
United  States  was  hke  Germany  —  a  great  debtor  country,  most 
concerned  in  the  development  of  her  own  resources."  ^^  But  the 
United  States  has  now  become  a  creditor  country.  The  banking 
interests  in  these  nations  are  now  intent  on  the  enormous  profits 
that  can  be  made  from  investments  abroad.  These  profits  are  said 
to  be  the  reward  for  risk-taking,  but  the  banking  interests  are  in- 
tent on  putting  behind  their  investments  abroad  the  mihtary  and 

** Kallen,  "The  League  of  Nations,  Today  and  Tomorrow,"  189-190. 
*'' Ibid.,  192. 
**  Ibid.,  192. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  175 

naval  power  of  their  nation  in  a  way  to  eliminate  as  much  as  pos- 
sible of  the  risk;  and  the  enormous  expense  of  maintaining  a  vast 
military  and  naval  power  is  borne,  in  the  last  analysis,  by  the 
masses  of  the  people. 

The  international  rivalry  is  a  rivalry  of  economic  interests  for 
private  profits.  Sovereignty  becomes  essentially  an  obedience- 
compelling  power  of  propertied  classes  that  control  governments.^® 
A  League  of  Nations  would  assist  those  economic  interests  in 
jointly  controlling  all  governments  in  the  interest  of  private  profits 
unless  there  was  an  international  commission  that  controlled  the 
placing  of  loans  and  concessions,  and  which  itself  was  not  con- 
trolled by  those  interests.^"  A  League  of  Nations  might  eventually 
do  away  with  the  international  struggle  for  domination  by  force 
and,  at  the  same  time,  might  make  possible  a  more  absolute  eco- 
nomic domination  of  small  nations  by  large  ^^  and  of  the  masses  of 
all  nations  by  propertied  classes.^^  But,  what  appears  in  the  imme- 
diate future  is  a  continuation  of  international  economic  rivalry  with 
extensive  political  preparedness.  International  co-operation  re- 
quires the  growth  of  an  InteUIgent  public  opinion  in  all  nations  and 
an.  Insistence  on  the  regulation  of  International  economic  relations 
by  international  administrative  commissions  ^^  in  the  interests  of 
the  people  of  all  nations. 

The  struggle  for  economic  supremacy  that  developed  between 
some  of  the  great  nations  during  the  years  preceding  the  World 
War  was  a  struggle  between  the  economic  interests  of  those  na- 
tions, which  stood  to  gain  in  the  struggle,  and  which  had  the  secret 
or  outspoken  sympathy  and  support  of  their  respective  govern- 

"Kallen,  "The  Structure  of  Lasting  Peace,"  44-56;  Kallen,  "The  League  of  Na- 
tions, Today  and  Tomorrow,"  38. 

^0  Kallen,  "  The  League  of  Nations,  Today  and  Tomorrow,"  95. 

51  Ibid.,  40. 

52  For  the  present  such  a  development  is  prevented  by  the  rivalry  of  capitalistic 
interests  of  different  nations  and  the  resentment  felt  by  financiers  of  one  nation  against 
those  of  another  who  for  the  time  being  have  the  advantage.  As  an  illustration  of 
this  resentment,  in  1919-1920,  when  American  industrial  and  financial  corporations  were 
profiteering  at  the  expense  of  the  whole  world,  an  English  financier  printed  an  ar- 
ticle in  the  Daily  Express  in  which  he  declared  that  "  the  American  people  as  such 
are  not  to  blame  for  the  exploitation  of  Europe  " ;  "  the  real  enemies  of  Europe  are 
the  American  bartks  and  financial  institutions."  "  I  had  considerable  experience  in 
handling  exchange  before  the  war,  during  the  war,  and  after  the  war,  and  I  have  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  your  so-called  money  trust  over  here  is  a  babe  compared  with 
the  giant  ring  ...  in  America  .  .  ."   (N.  Y.  T.,  Feb,  4,   1920.) 

'^^  Dewey,  "  A  League  of  Nations  and  Economic  Freedom,"  The  Dial,  Dec.  14, 
1918,  538. 


176     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

merits.  The  masses  in  each  nation  had  nothing  to  do  with  forcing 
the  increasingly  intense  struggle,  except  as  their  unrestrained  pro- 
duction of  offspring  gave  a  mass  support  to  the  ambitions  of  eco- 
nomic interests.  And  the  masses  stood  to  gain  little  or  nothing 
from  the  realization  of  the  ambitions  of  the  economic  interests. 
"  Those  material  interests  for  which  modern  nations  are  in  the 
habit  of  taking  to  arms  are  commonly  of  a  fanciful  character,  in 
that  they  commonly  have  none  but  an  imaginary  net  value  to  the 
community  at  large.  Such  are,  e.g.,  the  national  trade  or  the  in- 
crease of  the  national  territory.  These  and  the  like  may  serve  the 
warlike  or  dynastic  ambitions  of  the  nation's  masters;  they  may 
also  further  the  interests  of  office-holders,  and  more  particularly 
of  certain  business  houses  or  businessmen  who  stand  to  gain  some 
small  advantage  by  help  of  the  powers  in  control;  but  it  all  signi- 
fies nothing  more  to  the  common  man  than  an  increased  bill  of  gov- 
ernmental expense  and  a  probable  increase  in  the  cost  of  living. 

**  In  case  it  should  happen  that  these  business  interests  of  the 
nation's  businessmen  interested  in  trade  or  investments  abroad  are 
jeopardized  by  a  disturbance  of  any  kind  in  these  foreign  parts  in 
which  these  business  interests  lie,  then  it  immediately  becomes  the 
urgent  concern  of  the  national  authorities  to  use  all  means  at  hand 
for  maintaining  the  gainful  traffic  of  these  businessmen  undimin- 
ished, and  the  common  man  pays  the  cost.  Should  such  an  un- 
toward situation  go  to  such  sinister  lengths  as  to  involve  actual  loss 
to  the  business  interests  or  otherwise  give  rise  to  a  tangible  griev- 
ance, it  becomes  an  affair  of  the  national  honor;  whereupon  no 
sense  of  proportion  as  between  the  material  gains  at  stake  and  the 
cost  of  remedy  or  retaliation  need  longer  to  be  observed,  since  the 
national  honor  is  beyond  price."  ^^ 

The  international  rivalry  of  business  interests  tends  to  threaten 
international  peace  because  of  the  determination  of  the  business 
interests  of  one  nation  to  get  the  advantage  of  those  of  another,''^ 
because  of  the  vast  gains  which  vested  interests  draw  from  inter- 
national trade, ^^  because  of  the  limitation  of  the  basic  raw  ma- 

^*  Veblen,   "  The   Nature  of  Peace,"   24-27. 

55  "  Trade  is  a  competitive  affair,  and  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  the  traders  engaged 
in  any  given  line  of  business  to  extend  their  own  markets  and  to  exclude  competing 
traders.  Competition  may  be  the  soul  of  trade,  but  monopoly  is  necessarily  the  aim  of 
every  trader."     {Ibid.,  74.) 

6« Brailsf ord,  "The  Age  of  Iron,"  Ne<w  Republic,  V:  164-166. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  177 

terials  of  food,  fuel  and  other  necessities  of  life  and  the  conse- 
quent international  struggle  for  these  limited  natural  resources, 
because  such  a  struggle  is  a  means  of  satisfying  the  ambitions  of 
statesmen,  as  well  as  financiers  and  other  business  men,  and  be- 
cause the  support  of  the  mass  of  the  people  may  be  gained  by 
appeal  to  their  strongest  instincts.^^ 

Militarism  thus  rests  on  an  economic  basis,  but  it  has  a  social- 
psychological  aspect.  The  militarist  in  competition  with  the  paci- 
fist for  suggestive  control  of  the  masses  easily  has  the  best  of  it 
because  all  his  attitudes  speak  of  courage,  daring  —  the  qualities 
mankind  most  admires.  His  exhortation  is  to  "  fight  for  your 
country,"  to  "  stand  up  for  your  rights,"  to  "  show  you  are  men," 
and  the  strength  of  this  appeal  to  the  strongest  instincts  of  human 
nature  is  sufficient  to  make  it  unnecessary  to  explain  whose  rights 
or  just  what  rights  men  are  asked  to  fight  for.  The  pacifist,  on  the 
other  hand,  appeals  to  comparatively  weak  instincts,  and  to  reason, 
weak  in  most  people.  When  he  asks  the  people  to  "  consider  who 
owns  this  country  that  you  are  asked  to  fight  for,"  or  "  who  will 
bear  the  brunt  of  this  war?  "  he  is  asking  the  people  to  think,  and 
when  he  reminds  them  of  the  suffering  caused  by  war  he  is  appeal- 
ing to  the  comparatively  weak  instinct  of  pity.  A  militarism  ap- 
peals to  the  fear  of  the  masses,  to  their  pugnacity,  rivalry,  their 
admiration  for  the  physically  superior  man,  the  man  full  of  fight, 
to  their  submissiveness  to  the  commanding  personality.  The  ap- 
peal to  these  strong  instincts  makes  it  possible  for  the  militarists 
to  control  the  minds  of  the  masses  and  to  make  the  pacifist  a  sorry 
spectacle. 

The  militaristic  propaganda,  being  favourable  to  financial  and 
other  economic  interests,  is  voiced  in  the  press,  while  the  pacifist 
propaganda  with  difficulty  gets  any  hearing  at  all.  If  it  is  desired 
to  make  war  on  another  nation,  the  war  may  be  made  to  appear 
a  war  for  needed  economic  advantages,  and  the  appeal  to  arms 
becomes  a  sporting  event  in  which  the  masses  must  support  their 
government's  ambition  for  their  future  ;^^  or  it  may  be  made  to 
appear  a  defensive  war  by  instigating  lawless  elements  in  the  other 
nation  to  violence  and  thus  provoking  an  attack  and  making  war 
seem  inevitable  —  an  affair  of  "  national  honour."  "  In  this  con- 
nection '  honor '  Is  of  course  to  be  taken  in  the  euphemistic  sense 

"■^  Angell,  "  Arms  and  Industry,"  xxxvi-xxxvii. 
''^Lippmann,  "The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,"  74-81. 


178     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

which  the  term  has  under  the  code  duello  governing  '  affairs  of 
honor.'  It  carries  no  connotation  of  honesty,  veracity,  equity, 
liberaHty,  or  unselfishness."  ^^  Men  react  to  an  injury  collectively 
on  much  the  same  provocation  as  they  react  individually;  if  it  is 
done  brazenly,  flagrantly,  they  feel  violent  resentment;  if  done 
deferentially,  under  stress  of  circumstances,  they  may  condone  it.^" 
To  get  collective  or  patriotic  action  the  people's  instincts  must  be 
aroused  and  they  must  be  brought  to  feel,  through  the  utterances 
of  national  leaders  and  the  attitude  of  the  press,  that  the  rights  of 
the  nation  have  been  violated,  and  its  prestige  among  the  powers 
of  the  world  has  been  impaired  by  the  conduct  of  another  nation,^^ 
and  that  the  nation  must  assert  its  superiority  by  force.  This  mo- 
tive to  reassert  the  national  superiority  is  reinforced  by  connecting 
it  with  a  great  variety  of  ideas  which  stimulate  reinforcing  instinc- 
tive impulses  and  with  symbols  of  deep-seated  attitudes.^^  In  this 
way  the  movement  is  given  the  force  of  a  "  moral  "  or  "  just  " 
war.  "  The  requisite  moral  sanction  may  be  had  on  various 
grounds,  and,  on  the  whole,  it  is  not  an  extremely  difficult  matter 
to  arrange.  In  the  simplest  and  not  infrequent  case  it  may  turn 
on  a  question  of  equity  in  respect  of  trade  or  investment  as  be- 
tween the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  several  rival  nations;  .  .  . 
Or  it  may  be  only  an  envious  demand  for  a  share  in  the  world's 
material  resources  — '  A  place  in  the  Sun,'  as  a  picturesque  phrase 
describes  it;  .  .  .  These  demands  are  put  forward  with  a  color 
of  demanding  something  in  the  way  of  equitable  opportunity  for 
the  commonplace  peaceable  citizen ;  but  quite  plainly  they  have  none 
but  a  fanciful  bearing  on  the  fortunes  of  the  common  man  in  time 
of  peace,  and  they  have  a  meaning  to  the  nation  only  as  a  fighting 
unit.  .  .  . 

"  It  is  not  that  the  national  line  of  policies  or  patriotic  enter- 
prise so  entered  upon  with  the  support  of  popular  sentiment  need 
be  right  and  equitable  as  seen  in  dispassionate  perspective  from  the 
outside,  but  only  that  it  should  be  capable  of  being  made  to  seem 
right  and  equitable  to  the  biased  populace  whose  moral  convictions 
are  requisite  to  its  prosecution;  which  is  quite  another  matter. 
Nor  is  it  that  any  such  patriotic  enterprise  is,  in  fact,  entered  on 

"•Veblen,   op.   cit.,  27. 
«o/*W.,  28. 
«i  Ibid.,  31. 
*^Ibid.,  34-36. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  179 

simply  or  mainly  on  these  moral  grounds  that  are  so  alleged  in  its 
justification,  but  only  that  some  such  colorable  ground  of  justi- 
fication or  extenuation  is  necessary  to  be  alleged,  and  to  be  credited 
by  popular  belief."  ^^ 

The  explanations  advanced  to  prove  that  the  military  action  is 
righteous  are  intended  to  stimulate  the  warlike  instincts  of  the 
masses  of  the  nation  and  to  win  the  support  of  neutral  nations. 
Certain  situations  enlist  the  spontaneous  support  of  the  instinctive 
impulses  of  subjects  of  a  nation,  for  instance,  the  necessity  of  self- 
defence.  There  is  less  need  of  invoking  extraneous  moral  sanc- 
tion when  acting  on  the  defensive  because  the  instinct  to  resist  is 
stronger  than  the  instinct  to  aggress;  and  neutral  nations  instinc- 
tively sympathize  with  nations  acting  on  the  defensive.  Hence  the 
manipulation  of  a  situation  ^*  and  the  elaboration  of  secondary  ex- 
planations to  make  it  appear  that  a  war  is  a  defensive  war.  Each 
group  of  allies  in  the  World  War  claimed  to  have  acted  originally 
on  the  defensive  and  to  be  continuing  so  to  act.  The  group  whose 
claim  had  least  basis  in  fact,  the  Teutonic  allies,^^  was  most  verbose 
and  insistent  throughout  the  war  in  repeating  that  the  war  was,  for 
the  Teutonic  allies,  a  defensive  war.  Moral  justification  is  most 
extravagantly  used  where  least  justified,  and,  where  unjustified,  may 
be  very  effective.  For  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  masses 
learn  of  a  situation  only  through  the  press.  Aggression  against  a 
small  nation  may  be  made  to  appear  justified  if  it  suits  the  interests 
that  control  the  press;  conversely,  the  wantonness  of  an  aggression 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  a  rival  nation  may  be  aggravated,  if  it  suits 
those  interests.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  direct  contact  on  the 
part  of  the  masses  with  an  international  situation,  so  that  patriot- 
ism can  be  manufactured  by  the  controlling  interests. 

In  this  connection  it  is  necessary  to  recall  what  was  said  in  the 
preceding  chapter  about  the  connection  of  instinctive  fear  with 
property  ownership.  This  fear  becomes  marked  in  the  behaviour 
of  the  property-owning  class  when  the  leadership  of  a  rival  nation 
shows  or  is  imagined  to  show  a  menacing  attitude.  The  menacing 
attitude  disturbs  first  and  for  the  most  part  the  property  owners 
of  the  nation  menaced,  especially  the  industrial  and  financial  cor- 

^^Ib'td.,  36-38.     See  also  Eastman,  "What  Shall  We  Do  With  Patriotism,"  Survey, 
Jan.    I,   1916. 
•*  Butler,  "Bismarck,"  11:  loi. 
•»  See  the  chapter  entitled,  The  Field  of  Social  Psychology. 


i8o      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

porations  which  are  the  repositories  of  the  interests  of  property 
owners.  The  slightest  menace  to  the  security  of  property  or  of 
markets  or  of  supplies  of  raw  materials  stirs  the  fear  of  industrial 
and  financial  interests.  These  guardians  of  property  occupy  the 
strategic  and  controlling  positions  in  the  group  and  through  the 
press  exercise  the  social  control.  As  contrasted  with  these  inter- 
ests, the  common  man  has  little  to  lose,  and  hence  little  apprehen* 
sion,  because  of  the  intentions  of  another  nation.  But  the  con- 
trolling interests  are  in  a  position  to  make  him  feel  that  his  oppor- 
tunity to  make  a  living  depends  on  the  attitude  of  a  rival  nation. 
The  apprehension  felt  by  the  controlling  interests  may  pass  to  the 
masses  by  social  suggestion,  through  the  press,  though,  in  their 
sober  moments,  workingmen  realize  they  have  nothing  to  lose  and 
hence  nothing  to  fear  on  account  of  the  alleged  menace.  The  ap- 
prehension of  the  masses  is  largely  the  deflected  apprehension  of 
property  ownership.  When  this  apprehension  infects  a  nation  it 
intensifies  the  hostile  attitude  to  another  nation,  which  attitude  in 
turn  stirs  hostility  in  the  latter  whether  it  existed  before  or  not. 
Consequently  there  is  needed  a  public  education  that  will  acquaint 
the  masses  with  the  necessary  conditions  of  national  peace  and 
prosperity  and  free  them  from  the  control,  by  social  suggestion,  of 
reactionary  capitalistic  interests;  and  there  is  needed  also  a  devel- 
opment of  industrial  democracy  that  will  free  the  working  masses 
from  their  sense  of  abject  dependence  on  the  powers  that  be  for  an 
opportunity  to  earn  a  livelihood.  These  reforms  in  public  educa- 
tion and  in  industrial  management  are,  as  indicated  in  a  preceding 
chapter,*^®  the  essential  conditions  of  political  progress, 

°^  The  chapter  entitled,  The  Psychology  of  Nationality, 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    FAILURE    OF    INTERNATIONAL    CO-OPERATION 

A  FOURTH  international  relation  which  has  been  proclaimed 
is  international  co-operation.  Some  of  its  psychological 
^  features  were  incidentally  touched  on  by  President  Wilson 
in  an  address  before  the  Pan-American  Financial  Conference  in 
1915:  "  There  can  be  no  sort  of  union  of  interest  if  there  is  a 
purpose  of  exploitation  by  any  one  of  the  parties  to  a  great  con- 
ference  of  this  sort.  .  .  .  The  basis  of  successful  commercial  inter- 
course is  common  interest,  not  selfish  interest.  It  is  an  actual  inter- 
change of  services  and  of  values;  it  is  based  upon  reciprocal  rela- 
tions and  not  selfish  relations.  .  .  .  We  are  not,  therefore,  trying 
to  make  use  of  each  other,  but  we  are  trying  to  be  of  use  to  one 
another.  It  would  be  a  very  great  thing  if  the  Americas  could 
add  to  the  distinction  which  they  already  wear,  this  of  showing  the 
way  to  peace,  to  permanent  peace. 

"  The  way  to  peace  for  us,  at  any  rate,  is  manifest.  It  is  the 
kind  of  rivalry  which  does  not  involve  aggression.  It  is  the  knowl- 
edge that  men  can  be  of  the  greatest  service  to  one  another,  and 
nations  of  the  greatest  service  to  one  another,  when  the  jealousy 
between  them  is  merely  a  jealousy  of  excellence,  and  when  the 
basis  of  their  intercourse  is  friendship. 

"  There  is  only  one  way  in  which  we  wish  to  take  advantage  of 
you,  and  that  is  by  making  better  goods,  by  doing  the  things  that 
we  seek  to  do  for  each  other  better,  if  we  can,  than  you  do  them, 
and  so  spurring  you  on,  if  we  might,  by  so  handsome  a  jealousy  as 
that  to  excel  us.  I  am  so  keenly  aware  that  the  basis  of  personal 
friendship  is  this  competition  in  excellence,  that  I  am  perfectly 
certain  that  this  is  the  only  basis  for  the  friendship  of  nations  .  .  . 
this  rivalry  in  which  there  is  nothing  but  the  hope  of  a  common 
elevation  in  great  enterprises  which  we  can  undertake  in  common."  ^ 
This  statement  declares  that  international  relations  should  be  essen- 

^  Review  of  Reviews  Company,   "President  Wilson's   State  Papers  and  Addresses," 
X19-I21. 

181 


i82      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

tially  friendly  and  co-operative.  If  there  is  rivalry  it  should  be  a 
rivalry  in  excellence  of  goods  and  services,  not  for  private  or  na- 
tional advantage. 

Instinctive  rivalry  is  satisfied  only  by  the  attainment  of  supe- 
riority and  advantage  over  rivals.  In  instinctive  rivalry  there 
comes  a  time  when,  if  the  rivalry  continues  essential  in  the  rela- 
tion, the  rivals  cease  to  be  friends,  under  the  impulse  of  each  to 
get  the  advantage  over  the  other.  Otherwise  the  rivalry  is  not 
"  in  earnest  " ;  rivalry  is  not  the  instinct  that  is  essential  in  the 
relation.  The  essential  instinct  is  the  playful,  friendly  instinct,^ 
and  the  rivalry  is  sport  between  friends  who  have  pitted  their  intel- 
ligence and  energy  against  one  another.  The  one  who  proves  to 
be  inferior  with  good  will  acknowledges  the  superiority  of  the 
other,  and  the  superior  admires  the  points  of  excellence  in  the 
inferior,  instead  of  contemptuously  noting  his  weaknesses  and  de- 
fects. Each  is  interested,  mainly,  not  in  proving  his  superiority 
over  the  other  but  in  the  increased  strength,  skill  or  prosperity 
which  each  realizes  from  the  effort.  This  sort  of  rivalry  means 
gain  for  all  concerned.  "  Just  so  in  foreign  trade.  International 
commercial  competition  is  not  war,  but  rivalry  in  service,  and  in- 
telligently conducted  for  economic  ends  it  brings  gain  to  all  con- 
cerned." ^  We  see  this  relation  between  the  nations  of  a  group 
of  allied  nations  in  war.  How  eagerly  the  citizens  of  a  nation, 
emulous  for  the  excellence  and  superiority  of  their  own  nation,  note 
the  points  of  excellence  in  their  allies  and  praise  their  efforts.  The 
essential  attitude  of  the  allied  nations  to  one  another  is  friendly, 
not  rivalrous.  The  more  intense  the  rivalry  between  one  group 
of  nations  and  another,  the  stronger  is  apt  to  be  the  friendship  be- 
tween the  nations  in  each  group. 

An  international  relation  of  rivalry  results  either  in  a  national 
ideal  of  power  and  superiority,  which  tends  to  precipitate  a  struggle 
for  supremacy,  or  in  the  development  of  friendly  relations,  in  the 
course  of  rivalry,  so  that  the  impulse  for  national  advantage  falls 
in  abeyance;  and  an  ideal  of  mutually  serviceable  co-operation  di- 
rects the  aims  of  statesmanship.  If  once  the  ultimate  aims  of  in- 
ternational relations  were  sympathetically  and  intellectually  deter- 
mined, then  rivalry  might  accentuate  the  working  out  of  these  aims, 

2  Hocking,  "  Human  Nature  and  Its  Remaking,"  55. 
8  Mussey,  op.  cit.,  12. 


FAILURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CO-OPERATION     183 

as  we  see  when  the  cities  of  a  nation  sometimes  rival  one  another  in 
measures  for  the  general  welfare.*  If  international  rivalry  is  to 
result  in  an  increasing  friendliness  between  nations,  rather  than  in 
a  struggle  for  supremacy,  the  governments  of  nations  must  be  freed 
from  the  control  of  ambitious  kings,  of  military  classes,  and  of  re- 
actionary capitalistic  interests.'  International  economic  rivalry  is 
not  primarily  a  rivalry  of  the  people  of  different  nations,  but  a 
rivalry  between  economic  interests  situated  in  different  nations. 
The  character  of  the  international  relations  will  depend  on  the 
character  of  the  relations  that  are  instigated  by  these  economic 
interests,  not  only  by  the  corporations  and  affiliated  interests  en- 
gaged in  international  trade,  but  also  by  industry  and  finance  more 
widely,  in  so  far  as  the  acquiescence  of  business  men  generally  in 
international  policy  is  required  in  a  democratic  government. 

The  economic  basis  of  international  co-operation  lies  in  that  eco- 
nomic development  whereby  industrial  groups  have  come  to  overlap 
national  boundaries,^  and  whereby  the  mechanism  of  credit  has 
become  world-wide.  Industry  and  finance,  being  international,  re- 
quire, for  the  smooth  and  uninterrupted  working  of  economic  proc- 
esses, peace  between  nations.  An  interruption  of  peaceful  rela- 
tions is  occasioned  when  certain  capitalistic  interests  of  a  nation 
seek  to  protect  property  rights  in  another  nation,  or  to  extend  their 
interests  in  other  nations,  or  otherwise  to  profit,  even  at  the  expense 
of  war,"^  and  are  able  to  influence  the  press  and  the  government  of 
their  nation  for  war;  or  when  the  entire  industry  of  a  nation  has 
outgrown  its  commercial  facilities  and  its  supply  of  raw  materials 
and  has  come  to  believe  that  adequate  facilities  and  materials  can 
be  acquired  only  by  war  and  conquest.  In  the  former  case  a  war 
is  a  speculative  venture  foisted  on  a  nation  by  reactionary  capi- 
talistic interests,  which  are  accustomed  to  speculative  ventures,  and 
which  stand  to  lose  little  or  nothing  and  to  gain  much  from  a  suc- 
cessful outcome.  In  the  latter  case  a  war  is  a  gigantic  speculative 
or  gambling  enterprise  forced,  by  the  organized  industry  and  finance 

*  Pillsburv,   "  The  Psychology  of  Nationality   and   Internationalism,"  287. 

^  Orth,   "  The   Imperial  Impulse,"   Ch.   I. 

^Angell,  "Arms  and  Industry,"  xviii-xix;  Gide,  "Principles  of  Political  Econ- 
omy," 303-307 ;  Taylor,  "  Principles  of  Economics,"  75-77. 

''  Editorial,  "  Oil  and  Intervention  in  Mexico,"  The  Nation,  April  12,  1919,  538- 
539;  de  Bekker,  "The  Plot  Against  Mexico,"  The  Nation,  July  12,  1919,  637,  July 
26,   1919,   107,  Aug,  9,  1919,   165. 


i84     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

of  a  nation,  on  other  nations.  Immense  loss  is  risked,  in  case  of 
defeat,  in  order  to  win  immense  gain  if  the  nation  Is  victorious. 
The  venture  fits  in  with  the  ambitions  of  ruling  cliques  and  poli- 
ticians, and  appeals  to  the  subconscious  impulse  for  national  supe- 
riority of  the  whole  people.  Those  of  the  people  not  thus  moved 
are  persuaded  by  the  argument  that  their  prosperity  is  bound  up 
with  that  of  the  national  industry,^  or  are  moved  to  acquiesce  by 
the  war  agitation  conducted  in  the  press  and  from  various  centres 
of  influence  throughout  the  nation.  This  patriotism  may  be 
worked  up,  throughout  a  nation,  to  further  the  ends  of  ambitious 
economic  and  other  interests,  or  for  the  national  self-defence  against 
the  ambitious  economic  and  other  interests  of  another  nation.  In 
either  case  so  far  as  the  masses  are  concerned,  it  is  largely  a  matter 
of  instinctive  impulses  that  operate  without  any  understanding  of 
the  underlying  situation. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  economic  basis  of  international- 
ism afforded  by  an  economic  system  based  on  private  profits  is  an 
insuflficient  basis  for  international  co-operation.  To  illustrate  more 
concretely  why  this  is  so  let  us  look  into  the  psychological  processes 
of  the  mechanism  of  credit.  An  approach  to  the  subject  is  af- 
forded by  Norman  Angell's  quotation  of  the  remarks  of  an  Ameri- 
can banker  to  a  group  of  his  colleagues  to  this  effect:  "  We  may 
talk  of  bank  reserves,  of  currency  reforms,  of  anything  you  will, 
but  one  of  the  most  important  facts  which  makes  London  the 
centre  of  the  world  of  banking  is  the  psychological  reserve  with 
which  the  bankers  work."  ^  By  the  psychological  reserve  of  a 
bank  is  meant  the  confidence  of  the  public  in  it  and  the  consequent 
willingness  of  the  public  to  deposit  its  funds  in  the  bank,  and  the 
disinclination  to  believe  anything  contrary  to  this  public  attitude  of 
confidence.  Such  confidence  is  a  real  asset  in  that  it  enables  a  bank 
to  make  calculations  with  assurance,  and  possibly  to  do  business 
with  a  lower  money  reserve  than  banks  which  are  in  a  less  secure 
position  as  regards  the  public  confidence.  The  principle  is  the  same 
in  the  case  of  the  banks  of  a  nation  which  have  won,  to  an  unusual 
degree,  the  confidence  of  the  banks  of  another  nation.  In  the  case 
of  the  English  bankers,  their  alleged  superior  psychological  re- 
serve is  said  to  be  due  to  "  the  wisdom,  the  probity,  and  at  times 

8  Johnson,  "The  War,  by  an  Economist,"  Unpopular  Revieiv,  11:419. 
^Angell,  "Arms  and  Industry,"  138. 


FAILURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CO-OPERATION     185 

the  courage  with  which  the  English  bankers  protect  the  interests 
that  are  confided  to  them."  ^^ 

This  delicate  psychological  mechanism  of  confidence  of  which 
bankers  have  oversight  may  be  easily  disturbed,  which  tends  to 
make  them  extremely  cautious  of  progressive  tendencies.  For  it 
is  not  evident  where  such  tendencies  will  lead  and  this  uncer- 
tainty is  annoying  to  the  conservative  mind.  Financiers  want 
to  see  all  business  they  finance  reduced  as  far  as  possible  to  a 
mechanism.  This  requires  that  workmen  everywhere  act  as  well- 
disciplined  hosts.  A  progressive  manufacturer  is  feared  as  one 
who  encourages  labour  to  act  contrary  to  discipline.  Consequently 
bankers  are  apt  to  warn  progressive  young  business  men  to  be  more 
conservative.  Bankers  consider  not  merely  security  but  character 
in  the  making  of  loans  and  are  apt  to  include  in  the  category  of 
unsafe  character  any  man  whose  sympathetic  and  intellectual  im- 
pulses prompt  him  to  endorse  unusual  measures  on  behalf  of  labour. 
Industrial  engineers,  in  the  course  of  their  experiments  in  stimu- 
lating the  creative  Impulse  of  workmen  in  order  to  increase  pro- 
duction, feel  the  heavy  hand  of  the  reactionary  financial  interests. 
Fear,  then,  is  one  cause  of  the  conservatism  of  financial  interests, 
fear  of  some  interference  with  the  mechanism  of  credit.  Another 
cause  is  the  aloofness  of  financiers.  They  do  not  come  into  con- 
tact with  workmen  but  are  concerned  with  the  cold  financial  side 
of  business. ^^  Consequently  the  instinctive  interest  felt  by  business 
men  of  strong  sympathetic  and  intellectual  impulses  in  workmen 
with  whom  they  are  in  close  contact  is  not  aroused  in  financiers. 
Financial  interests  have  reduced  profit-seeking  to  a  mechanism,  and 
their  vision  ranges  over  the  whole  extent  of  this  mechanism  without 
coming  close  to  Its  human  basis.  Consequently  they  have  no  sym- 
pathy with  the  idea  that  the  day's  work  of  the  masses  should  be 
made  a  means  of  development  of  their  personalities.  From  the 
financial  point  of  view  business  is  not  to  be  conducted  for  the  public 
welfare,  In  the  sense  of  fuller  opportunities  for  the  development 

^^Ibid.,  138. 

11  The  progressive  business  man  is  opposed  to  this  cold,  financial  leadership  of 
business.  For  instance,  Mr.  Dennison,  President  of  the  Dennison  Manufacturing  Co., 
Framingham,  Mass.,  says:  "Seriously,  I  look  forward  with  great  hope  to  the  day  .  .  . 
when  the  man  coming  up  through  the  human  side  .  .  .  will  become  the  business 
leader,  and  not  the  man  that  has  come  through  either  the  cold  mechanical  side  or  the 
colder  financial  side."  (Dennison,  "What  the  Employment  Department  should  be  in 
Industry,"  Proceedings  of  the  Employment  Managers'  Conference,  1917,  79-80.) 


i86     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

of  personality,  but  for  private  profit.  Politics,  also,  are  to  be  man- 
aged for  the  welfare  primarily  of  the  propertied  classes.  Because 
the  masterful  type  of  man  rises  to  the  positions  of  authority  in  the 
realm  of  finance,  and  his  attitudes  infiltrate  among  his  subordinates 
and  associates  by  the  process  of  social  suggestion,  modern  business 
has  assumed  a  reactionary  aspect.  Most  business  men  do  business 
on  borrowed  money,  and  the  conservative  manufacturer  or  mer- 
chant is  the  one  who  commends  himself  to  the  financial  powers  and 
thereby  gains  an  advantage  over  a  rival.  Furthermore,  the  spread- 
ing control  of  the  investment  banker  makes  him  a  power  on  the  di- 
rectorates of  corporations  far  and  wide.  The  competitive  spirit  of 
the  enterprising  manufacturer  or  merchant  is  in  marked  contrast 
to  the  more  dominating  attitude  of  the  financier,  for  the  competi- 
tive aspect  of  his  business  is  subordinate  to  the  directive,  controlling 
aspect. 

The  basis  of  this  reactionary  attitude  of  financial  interests  is  the 
necessity,  under  the  system  of  private  credit,  of  extreme  caution  in 
preserving  confidence,  and  the  fear  that  a  proposed  change  in  in- 
dustrial relations  may  unsettle  the  regularly  working  hosts  and  so 
disturb  confidence.  But  this  fear  of  any  change  in  industrial  rela- 
tions may  precipitate  industrial  troubles,  if  a  change  is  necessary 
in  order  to  preserve  industrial  peace.  Conservatism  may  defeat 
its  own  end.  For  the  power  of  a  corporation  to  command  credit 
depends  on  the  contented  and  reliable  action  of  its  working  hosts; 
industrial  troubles  in  a  corporation  impair  the  confidence  of  finan- 
cial interests  and  make  it  more  diflicult  for  that  corporation  to 
borrow  money.  Wherefore,  a  reactionary  industrial  policy  that 
results  in  labour  troubles  may  be  the  very  thing  that  impairs  confi- 
dence. Conservatism  may  cause  the  very  result  that  conservatism 
fears.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  when  conservatism  becomes 
so  irrational  and  reactionary  as  to  defeat  its  own  end,  the  only  way 
to  restore  confidence  in  business,  the  only  way  to  make  business 
suflficiently  progressive  to  make  it  worthy  of  the  confidence  of  in- 
vestors, is  for  the  government  to  take  a  larger  part  in  the  regula- 
tion,  perchance   in   the   issuance,   of   credit. ^^     Investors   have   a 

12  Economic  as  well  as  social-psychological  conditions  call  for  increased  govern- 
mental action  in  the  regulation  and  issuance  of  credit.  See  Fisher,  "  Economists  in 
Public  Service,"  /^mer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX  (supplement):  13-15;  Wolf,  "Securing  the 
Initiative  of  the  Workman,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX  (supplement):  129;  Gantt,  "Or- 
ganizing for  Work,"  Ch.  VI. 


FAILURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CO-OPERATION     187 

stronger  confidence  in  governmental  than  in  private  securities, 
wherefore  the  government  can  borrow  at  a  lower  rate  of  interest 
than  private  corporations.  And  the  progressive  enterprises  which 
receive  credit  will  then  be  free  to  institute  a  labour  policy  that  will 
result  in  a  contented  and  highly  productive  labour  force.  The  re- 
liable and  contented  action  of  the  working  hosts  that  is  the  basis 
of  confidence  can  be  insured  only  by  removing  them  from  under 
the  control  of  reactionary  financial  interests. 

The  control  exercised  by  the  financial  interests  of  a  nation  may 
be  much  weakened  at  those  times  when,  in  their  rivalry  with  the 
financial  interests  of  another  nation,  they  find  themselves  in  a  criti- 
cal condition.  At  such  a  time  the  ultimate  dependence  of  the  eco- 
nomic system  of  a  nation  on  the  productivity  and  economy  of  the 
working  hosts  becomes  evident,  and,  for  the  time  being,  capital 
shows  a  conciliatory  attitude  toward  labour. ^'^  But  the  serious 
obstacle  to  any  considerable  development  of  co-operation  —  the 
profit-seeking  motive  —  again  becomes  prominent  as  soon  as  eco- 
nomic conditions  become  normal. 

The  system  of  private  credit  has  developed  out  of  the  profit- 
seeking  motive.  This  motive,  instead  of  fostering  international  co- 
operation, causes  the  financial  interests  of  a  nation  ( i )  to  take 
advantage  of  the  need  of  capital  of  backward  nations  to  exact  from 
them  an  exorbitant  interest;  ^*  (2)  to  exact  exorbitant  interest  of 
nations  in  which  there  are  progressive  labour  movements  or  to  re- 
fuse such  credit  altogether.  Because  of  the  necessary  uncertainty 
and  greater  risk  of  international  as  compared  with  national  eco- 
nomic operations,  a  profit-seeking  national  economic  system  tends 

^3  At  a  financial  conference  called  in  London  in  February,  1920,  to  consider  meas- 
ures to  relieve  the  financial  situation  caused  by  the  economic  collapse  of  Europe  and 
by  American  profiteering,  labour  leaders  were  for  the  first  time  in  history  invited  to 
attend  such  a  conference ;  and  it  was  decided  that  the  only  remedy  for  the  critical 
situation  was  to  appeal  to  the  working  hosts  to  increase  production  and  to  practise 
economies  in  their  consumption  where  possible,  thus  increasing  exports  and  decreasing 
imports.     (N.  Y.  T.,  Feb.  4,  1920.) 

1*  President  V^ilson,  in  an  address  before  the  Southern  Commercial  Congress,  de- 
clared that  the  Latin-American  states  had  had  "  harder  bargains  driven  with  them  in 
the  matter  of  loans  than  any  other  people  in  the  world.  Interest  has  been  exacted  of 
them  that  was  not  exacted  of  anybody  else,  because  the  risk  was  said  to  be  greater, 
and  then  securities  were  taken  that  destroyed  the  risk — an  admirable  arrangement  for 
those  who  were  forcing  the  terms.  I  rejoice  in  nothing  so  much  as  in  the  prospect 
that  they  will  now  be  emancipated  from  these  conditions  ...  I  think  that  some  of 
these  gentlemen  have  already  had  occasion  to  bear  witness  that  the  Department  of 
State  in  recent  months  has  tried  to  serve  them  in  that  wise."  (President  Wilson's 
State  Papers  and  Addresses,  35.) 


i88      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

to  profiteer  and  to  become  reactionary  in  its  international  relations. ^^ 
Instead  of  international  co-operation  there  is  developing  an  in- 
ternational class  feeling.  On  its  surface  this  is  due  to  economic 
causes.  For  instance,  world-wide  migration  tends  to  equalize 
wages  in  different  nations;  in  so  far  as  the  standard  of  living  de- 
termines wages,  an  influx  of  workmen  from  a  low  standard  nation 
lowers  wages  in  a  high  standard  nation.  Furthermore,  even  with- 
out immigration,  low  wages  and  evil  working  conditions  in  a  nation 
of  industrial  importance  tend  to  prevent  wages  from  rising  in  an- 
other, because  the  business  interests  in  the  latter  assert  that  they 
fear  to  put  themselves  at  a  disadvantage  with  those  in  the  former 
by  granting  better  wages  and  working  conditions.  Economically 
the  fortunes  of  the  working  hosts  of  all  nations  are  becoming  more 
and  more  identical.  In  addition  to  these  economic  aspects  of  inter- 
national working  class  solidarity,  we  find  a  social-psychological 
aspect.  We  note  that  the  socialistic  movement,  which  has  become 
international,  is  essentially  an  instinctive  resistance  on  the  part  of 
the  working  classes  to  capitalistic  domination.  The  socialistic  ideas 
have  gained  a  wide  acceptance  because  of  the  psychological  condi- 
tion of  resistance  in  which  the  working  hosts  of  the  great  nations 
have  been  for  some  decades.  They  have  been  in  a  condition  to 
accept  the  socialistic  suggestion  as  to  the  menace  of  capitalism,  and 
to  draw  together  to  resist  what  was  felt  to  be  the  common  menace.^® 
Drawing  together  before  a  common  menace  is  an  instinctive  process. 
But  this  instinctive  process  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  effectuate  an 
international  drawing  together,  inasmuch  as  those  who  are  to  draw 
together  in  purpose  are  widely  separated  and  therefore  not  sub- 
ject to  an  effective  instinctive  movement,  and,  furthermore,  are 
separated  by  the  hostile  instincts  that  inhere  in  an  intense  national- 
ism. The  drawing  together  process,  if  it  is  to  take  place  between 
workmen  of  different  nations  must,  therefore,  be  reinforced  by 
ideation,  and  to  furnish  the  necessary  ideas  is  one  of  the  functions 

15  Not  only  capitalistic  interests  but  investors  generally  want  a  high  rate  of  interest 
on  foreign  investments.  The  United  States  government  raised,  at  a  low  rate  of  interest, 
during  the  World  War,  funds  to  loan  to  foreign  governments,  while  banking  firms, 
in  the  year  following  the  World  War,  could  not  raise,  at  a  higher  rate  of  interest,  an 
adequate  sum  of  money  to  loan  private  business  enterprises  abroad. 

16  "  "Yhe  workingman  has  become  the  critic.  Here  you  have  the  heart  of  Socialism. 
Whatever  form  its  outward  aspect  may  take,  at  heart  it  is  a  rebellion  against  things 
as  they  are."  (Orth,  "Socialism  and  Democracy  in  Europe,"  35.)  See  also  Lenin,  "A 
Letter  to  American  Workingmen,  pamphlet  published  by  the  Liberator,"  28-39  > 
"  Manifesto  of  the  Spartacus  Group,"  Intern.  Concil.,  No.  137,  Apr.,  1919,  20-25.    • 


FAILURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CO-OPERATION     189 

of  socialistic  theory.  This  emphasizes  the  doctrine  of  the  brother- 
hood of  the  workers  of  the  world  by  indicating  that  they  are  all 
alike  "  slaves  "  of  the  same  "  masters,"  and  by  pointing  out,  first, 
that  a  socialistic  state,  unless  it  developed  in  all  nations,  would  be 
subject  to  the  "  capitalistic  tax  "  exacted  by  the  business  interests 
of  capitalistic  states  in  the  ordinary  course  of  international  trade, 
and  second,  that,  with  some  states  still  capitalistic,  the  socialistic 
states  would  not  be  secure  against  war  foisted  on  the  world  by 
those  capitalistic  states.  Thus  a  system  of  ideas  is  provided  to  re- 
inforce the  instinctive  tendency  to  draw  together  against  the  com- 
mon menace  of  capitalism  and  to  repress  the  thwarting  instincts  of 
nationalism.  In  addition  to  this  cognitive  process  toward  interna- 
tionalism, there  is  an  affective  process  in  the  same  direction.  The 
organized  labour  of  a  nation  is  stimulated  in  aggressive  action 
against  capitalistic  interests  of  the  nation  by  the  conspicuous  suc- 
cess of  organized  labour  in  another  nation;  '^'^  and  employers  in  one 
nation  resist  the  organization  of  labour  in  the  nation  and  the  action 
of  organized  labour  because  they  fear  it  will  result  in  as  aggressive 
resistance  of  their  domination  as  of  capitalistic  domination  in  an- 
other nation. ^^ 

There  is  also  a  social-psychological  basis  for  the  internationalism 
of  propertied  classes.  Just  as,  as  we  saw  in  a  preceding  chapter,^^ 
reactionary  propertied  interests  of  a  nation,  erstwhile  competing, 
draw  together  before  a  common  menace  of  non-propertied  resist- 
ance, so  do  the  reactionary  propertied  interests  of  different  nations 
draw  together  before  the  common  menace  of  an  international  non- 
propertied  resistance.  Though  a  reactionary  propertied  class  in 
one  nation  may  have  no  love  for  a  similar  class  in  another,  its  dis- 
trust of  the  lower  classes  not  only  of  another  nation  but  also  within 
its  own  borders  causes  a  ready  indignation  against  lower  classes 

1^  Unquestionably  the  organization  of  English  trade  unions  into  a  strong  political 
labour  party  stimulated  the  development  of  an  aggressive  trade  unionism  in  the  United 
States  and  the  great  strikes  of  1919.  The  convention  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of 
America  in  Cleveland  in  September,  1919,  inspired  by  the  success  of  English  miners  in 
securing  a  government  report  favouring  nationalization  of  mines,  declared  for  the  na- 
tionalization of  mines  in  the  United  States  and  an  international  alliance  of  coal  miners. 
(Blankenhorn,  "The  Miners  at  Cleveland,"  The  Nation,  Sept.  27,  1919,  436.) 

18  The  president  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  testified  before  the  committee 
of  the  U.  S.  Senate  investigating  the  steel  strike  that  he  had  refused  to  recog- 
nize the  representatives  of  the  steel  workers'  organization  because  that  was  the  only 
way  to  meet  the  menace  of  organized  labour  as  it  had  developed  in  England  and  might 
develop  in  this  country.     (Associated  Press   (R.  D.  C),  Oct.  2,   1919.) 

1*  The  chapter   entitled,  Psychological  Aspects   of  Intra-national  Relations. 


iQo      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

that  are  resisting:  in  another  nation,  and,  therefore,  an  indirect  syin- 
pathy  with  the  upper  class  resisted.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
reactionary  propertied  classes  the  only  way  to  reduce  the  menace 
of  a  non-propertied  resistance  in  another  nation  is  to  aid  the  prop- 
ertied classes  in  that  nation  to  maintain  their  social  control.  This 
attitude  was  reflected  in  the  press  during  the  months  immediately 
following  the  cessation  of  the  World  War.  Bits  of  news  concern- 
insT  radical  political  groups  were  cleverly  turned  to  direct  odium  on 
the  latter.^*'  The  reactionary  propertied  attitude  against  radical 
non-propertied  groups  thus  passed  to  the  whole  people,  and  even 
influenced  the  decisions  of  judges  and  juries  in  this  ^^  and  other 
countries. ^^  This  attitude  was  as  pronounced  against  resisting 
groups  in  distant  nations,  where  a  scientific  knowledge  of  the  situ- 
ation was  impossible,  as  against  groups  near  at  hand.  It  was  an 
impulsive  reaction  against  non-propertied  resistance,  the  reaction 
aggravated,  in  some  cases  almost  to  hysteria,  by  the  apprehension 
of  reactionary  propertied  classes  for  the  security  of  their  interests. 
In  the  absence  of  a  critical  attitude  the  masses  accepted  the  atti- 
tude of  the  reactionary  propertied  classes  to  the  menace  of  non- 
propertied  resistance  as  it  passed  to  them  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
social  suggestion  through  the  press.  What  the  social-psychologist 
is  interested  in  is  the  functioning  of  this  apprehension  of  reactionary 
propertied  classes  in  different  nations;  their  drawing  together  be- 
fore a  common  menace  of  non-propertied  resistance;^'  their  pro- 
tection of  one  another's  reputation,  less  deliberately  to  be  sure  but 
from  the  same  motive  that  solvent  banks  protect  an  insolvent  bank 
lest  the  failure  of  the  insolvent  bank  should  stir  a  lack  of  confidence 

20  The  most  conspicuous  instance  of  this  is  the  newspaper  stories  of  Bolshevist 
cruelty  and  chaos.  Later  when  it  seemed  that  the  Bolshevist  government  could  not 
be  suppressed  bv  force  and  when  business  interests  of  the  allied  nations  wanted  to 
resume  trade  with  Russia  there  began  to  appear  newspaper  stories  of  the  pretty  Bol- 
shevist girls  and  the  perfectly  humane  Bolshevist  men  (Nfiv  York  Times,  Feb.  23, 
1920).  And  a  statement  by  the  editor  of  the  London  Daily  Herald  was  copied  in 
newspapers  of  the  United  States  in  which  he  said  of  Lenin:  "I  never  met  any  states- 
man who  surpasses  him  in  knowledge,  honesty  and  courage  of  purpose.  ...  He  has 
profound  contempt  for  compromises.  ...  It  is  laughable  to  think  Lenine  is  a  lover  of 
bloodshed."     (Geneva  Daily  Times,  March  3,  1920.) 

21  Lanier,  "  An  Open  Letter  to  the  President,"  Ne^  Republic,  Apr.  19,  1919,  383-384. 

22  See  the  London  Nation's  editorial  on  the  acquittal  of  Villian,  the  murderer  of 
Jaures,  in  the  New  York  Nation,  May  3,  1919. 

23  See  the  periodicals  of  employers'  associations,  for  instance,  The  Open  Shop  Review, 
published  by  the  National  Founders'  Association,  April,  1919,  145,  and  May,  1919, 
206;  and  the  proceedings  of  the  seventeenth  annual  meeting  of  the  National  Lumber 
Manufacturers'  Association,  April,  1919,  66-68. 


FAILURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CO-OPERATION     191 

in  banks  generally;  the  dissemination  throughout  a  nation,  by  means 
of  the  press,  of  opinions  thus  originating  in  a  class  attitude,  and 
the  emergence  of  these  opinions  in  the  most  diverse  behaviour. 

The  political  control  maintained  by  propertied  classes  up  to  the 
present  time  has  strengthened  their  tendency  to  reactionary  be- 
haviour. It  is  possession  of  political  power  and  the  assurance  this 
gives  that  confirms  reactionary  propertied  interests  in  their  eco- 
nomic domination.  To  maintain  this  they  are  determined  to  main- 
tain their  political  domination.^*  Wherefore  the  menace  of  re- 
actionary capitalistic  interests,  and  of  the  violent  resistance  they 
provoke,  is  to  be  met  by  the  formation  of  a  progressive  political 
party  which  shall  represent  the  diverse  purposes  of  organized  la- 
bour, organized  agriculture  and  progressive  business,  as  against 
reactionary  capitalistic  interests. 

The  tendency  of  propertied  interests  to  reactionary  behaviour  is 
strengthened  also  by  their  social  power.  This  is  due  to  their  con- 
trol of  the  press  through  which  the  public  largely  gets  its  informa- 
tion and  the  impressions  which  determine  its  feelings  and  beha- 
viour.^^ This  control  gives  propertied  interests  an  assurance, 
which  confirms  the  conservative  impulse  to  keep  things  as  they  are. 
This  social-psychological  condition  of  mass  subservience  to  press 
control  is  due,  obviously,  to  the  ignorance  of  the  masses.  To  es- 
cape the  suggestive  control  exercised  through  the  press  it  is  neces- 
sary only  to  assume  a  critical  attitude  before  which  impressions 
have  no  effect.  But  this  is  a  product  of  training.  The  natural 
attitude  of  man  is  one  of  response  to  social  suggestion.  This  is  the 
natural  attitude  because,  as  will  be  shown  in  a  future  volume,  the 
agencies  that  exercise  social  control  appeal  primarily  to  strong  in- 
stincts of  the  masses.  The  propertied  minority  maintains  its  polit- 
ical control  by  clever  appeal  to  the  instincts  of  the  masses  through 
the  press.  Hence  the  struggle  of  organized  labour  is  to  undo  the 
suggestive  control  that  is  exercised  over  the  public  by  organized  cap- 
ital. Obviously  the  remedy  for  the  intensifying  class  struggle, 
which  has  now  become  international,  is  an  education  of  the  masses 
such  that  neither  organized  labour  nor  organized  capital  can  hope  to 

2*  See  expressions  of  this  determination  in  employers'  magazines,  for  instance,  Laugh- 
lin,  "  British  and  American  Labor  Problems,"  Open  Shop  Review,  Jan.,  1920,  3-18. 

25  This  capitalistic  control  of  the  press  obtains  in  England  (Angell,  "The  British 
Revolution  and  the  American  Democracy,"  244-245),  in  France  ("Some  Astounding 
Diplomatic  Revelations,"  The  Nation,  Aug.  9,  1919,  161),  as  well  as  in  the  United 
States  ("The  Press  and  the  Siberian  Situation,"  The  Nation,  Nov.  8,  1919,  592-598). 


192      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

control  by  social  suggestion.  What  is  needed  is  a  system  of  public 
education  in  each  nation  that  will  stimulate  the  intellectual  and  sym- 
pathetic impulses  of  the  young  of  all  classes  and  give  some  under- 
standing of  economic  and  poHtical  and  other  human  relations,  this 
to  make  possible  an  industrial  management  that  appeals  to  the 
creative  intelligence  and  intelligent  self-control  of  all  concerned, 
and  to  lay  the  foundations  for  an  intelligent  citizenship.  People 
of  all  classes  in  all  nations  continue  to  be  subject  to  suggestive  con- 
trol because  systems  of  public  education  fail  to  develop  intelligence 
and,  in  fact,  were  not  devised  with  that  end  in  view. 

The  control  of  governments  by  reactionary  capitalistic  interests 
and  the  co-operation  of  these  governments  to  crush  resistful  popular 
movements  in  any  one  nation  involve  not  only  the  preservation  of 
systems  of  education  that  perpetuate  the  ignorance  of  the  masses  in 
order  that  they  may  be  subjected  to  propaganda  in  the  interest  of 
reactionary  capitalism,  but  also  the  repression  of  scholarship  and 
the  destruction  of  international  co-operation  in  scholarship.  Schol- 
arship is  essentially  international  for  the  truth  is  true  for  all  scholars 
no  matter  of  what  nation  they  may  happen  to  be.  Furthermore, 
"  Modern  culture  is  drawn  on  too  large  a  scale,  .  .  .  requires  the 
cooperation  of  too  many  and  various  lines  of  inquiry  ...  to  admit 
of  its  being  confined  within  national  frontiers  .  .  .  the  science  and 
scholarship  that  is  the  peculiar  pride  of  civilized  Christendom  is  not 
only  international,  but  rather  it  is  homogeneously  cosmopolitan."  ^^ 
The  beginnings  of  international  co-operation  in  scholarship  were 
rudely  broken  by  the  World  War.^^  This  very  fact,  together  with 
the  repression  of  free  intellectual  inquiry,  of  the  war  period  and 
the  period  that  followed,  shows  that  the  progress  of.  scholarship 
and  popular  enlightenment  calls  for  international  relations  of  co- 
operation instead  of  rivalry  and  a  struggle  for  domination. 

But  education  alone  will  not  insure  sufficient  intelligence  for  in- 
ternational co-operation.  Whatever  education  the  masses  may 
have,  the  sources  of  information  as  to  world  conditions  are  under 
the  control  of  the  press,  wherefore  contact  with  the  facts  never  can 
be  first-hand.^^     The  facts  can  be  gotten  only  through  the  press, 

20Veblen,   "The  Nature  of  Peace,"  38-41. 

2'^  Neilson,  "  Inter  Arraa  Veritas,"  Intern.  Concil.,  Bulletin  105,  5-19. 

28  "  The  news  system  of  the  world  being  what  it  is,  and  education  being  what  it  is, 
it  is  possible  to  fool  most  of  the  public  a  good  part  of  the  time."  (Lippmann,  "  Unrest," 
T/ie  Neiv  Republic,  Nov.  12,  1919,  321.) 


FAILURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CO-OPERATION     193 

which  presents  the  facts  in  a  way  to  further  the  propaganda  that 
is  fostered  by  the  interests  behind  the  press.  For  instance  the 
"  cool  complacency  of  America  "  in  the  presence  of  the  suffering 
and  starvation  in  Russia  in  the  fall  and  winter  of  19 19—1920  was 
due  not  only  to  the  natural  lack  of  compassion  for  misery  that  is 
remote  but  also  to  the  fact  that  the  people  were  kept  in  ignorance 
of  this  starvation  by  failure  of  the  papers  to  mention  it,  and  also 
to  the  fact  that  "  the  population,  having  been  forced  by  propaganda 
to  believe  that  all  this  is  necessary  to  overcome  Bolshevism  and 
pro-Germanism,  is  silent  and  it  acquiesces."  ^^  "  The  plight  of  the 
common  people  is  terrible  beyond  words,"  ^^  but  this  condition  of 
the  Russians,  and  the  fact  that  it  was  due  to  the  Allied  blockade  of 
Russia,  in  which  the  United  States  was  participating^^  by  an  em- 
bargo on  exports  to  Russia,  was  not  generally  known  because  to  let 
it  become  known  was  contrary  to  the  propaganda  of  the  capitalistic 
interests  that  controlled  newspapers  and  governments.  When  the 
discussion  about  lifting  the  blockade  finally  was  officially  opened, 
the  reason  given  for  so  doing  was  that  the  English  Prime  Minister 
had  urged  that  otherwise  the  Russian  revolutionary  ideas  would 
spread  to  the  British  dominions  in  the  East;  also  that  if  Russia  was 
furnished  with  agricultural  implements  and  other  instruments  of 
production  that  were  necessary  to  get  production  under  way  in  Rus- 
sia it  would  enable  England  to  reduce  the  cost  of  living  of  its  people 
by  bringing  food  stuffs  from  Russia  instead  of  America  where  prices 
were  very  high.^^  That  is,  the  motive  for  considering  the  resump- 
tion of  trade  with  Russia  was  to  protect  the  British  Empire  and 
benefit  the  people  of  Great  Britain,  also  fear  of  disorder  and  the 
spread  of  Bolshevism  in  Central  Europe,  which  might  be  prevented 
by  bringing  in  Russian  wheat  to  feed  the  people,^^  not  sympathy  for 
the  people  of  Central  Europe,  much  less  for  the  suffering  Russians. 
A  motive  less  explicitly  stated  than  these  was  the  rivalry  of  British 
and  American  business  interests  for  contracts  to  sell  goods  to 
Russia, ^^  and  the  fear  of  these  rivals  lest  further  hostilities  against 

29 "  Europe's   Misery  and  America's   Complacency,"    The  New  Republic,   Nov.   i2, 

1919,  305- 
30  Ibid.,  307. 

8^  "Reports  of  the  Bullitt  Mission  on  Russia,"  The  Nation,  Oct.  4,  1919,  475. 
^^  Associated  Press,  Jan.  17,  1920. 
83  iV.  y.  Times,  Feb.  23,  1920. 
•4  Ibid.,  Jan.  19,  26,  27,  1920. 


194     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Russia  would  incline  the  Russians  to  commercial  relations  with  the 
reviving  German  business  interests.^^ 

As  long  as  governments  are  so  largely  influenced  by  profit-seek- 
ing capitalistic  interests,  the  exigencies  of  profit-seeking  will  deter- 
mine international  relations.  International  co-operation  in  the 
sense  explained  by  President  Wilson,  will  not  be  possible  until  in- 
ternational relations  are  determined  by  the  working  hosts  of  the  dif- 
ferent nations  —  the  "  plain  people  "  as  President  Wilson  termed 
them.  Their  interests  are  not  the  exclusive  interests  of  profit-seek- 
ing; as  workers  they  have  an  economic  basis  for  friendliness.  In- 
ternational co-operation  requires  this  relation  of  friendliness.  But 
a  friendliness  that  will  stand  the  strain  of  national  animosities  that 
might  arise  requires  the  proper  education,  also  facilities  for  spread- 
ing broadcast  an  adequate  knowledge  of  conditions  in  other  nations, 
also  the  most  open  diplomacy,  and  finally  scrupulous  honesty  in  re- 
porting the  news  on  all  international  situations. 

Therefore,  the  progress  of  democracy  requires  democratic  con- 
trol of  the  agencies  which  furnish  the  news,  on  which  the  formation 
of  public  opinion  depends.  As  Mr.  Lippmann  says,  "  The  mecha- 
nism of  the  news-supply  has  developed  without  plan,  and  there  is 
no  one  point  in  it  at  which  one  can  fix  the  responsibility  for  truth."  ^^ 
The  reporter  gets  his  accounts  of  conditions  in  Russia,  for  instance, 
from  witnesses  who  are  seldom  dependable, ^^  and  selects  what  he 
will  transmit  according  to  his  own  prejudices  and  those  of  the  pow- 
ers above.  When  the  report  reaches  the  editor  "  another  series  of 
interventions  occurs.  The  editor  .  .  .  has  to  decide  the  question 
which  is  of  more  importance  than  any  other  in  the  formation  of 
opinions,  the  question  where  attention  is  to  be  directed.  .  .  .  The 
news  of  the  day  as  it  reaches  the  newspaper  oflUce  is  an  incredible 
medley  of  fact,  propaganda,  rumor,  suspicion,   clues,  hopes  and 

35  Senator  France  of  Maryland  introduced  a  resolution  in  the  United  States  Senate 
proposing  that  the  United  States  government  recognize  Soviet  Russia  and  said :  "  The 
European  statesmen  played  on  our  emotions  and  used  them  to  further  their  own  pur- 
poses when  they  feared  Bolshevism.  Now  that  they  see  Russia  is  to  form  a  coalition 
with  Germany  and  realize  that  she  offers  tremendous  opportunities  for  trade  they  want 
to  find  a  way  to  capture  those  markets.  .  .  .  The  State  Department  apparently  be- 
lieves it  a  crime  for  the  Russian  Soviet  Ambassador  to  the  United  States  to  oflfer  gold 
for  goods  in  this  country.  .  .  .  The  free  people  of  the  United  States  should  welcome 
the  people  of  Russia  as  the  creators  of  another  great  republic."  {International  Neivs 
Service  (G.  D.  T.),  Feb.  28,  1920.) 

38  Lippmann,  "The  Basic  Problem  of  Democracy,"  Atlan.  Mon..  Nov.,  1919,  621. 

^'^  Ibid.,  621. 


FAILURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CO-OPERATION     195 

fears,  and  the  task  of  selecting  and  ordering  that  news  is  one  of  the 
truly  sacred  and  priestly  offices  in  a  democracy.  For  the  news- 
paper is  in  all  literalness  the  bible  of  democracy,  the  book  out  of 
which  a  people  determines  its  conduct.  It  is  the  only  serious  book 
most  people  read.  It  is  the  only  book  they  read  every  day.  Now 
the  power  to  determine  each  day  what  shall  seem  important  and 
what  shall  be  neglected  is  a  power  unlike  any  that  has  been  exer- 
cised since  the  Pope  lost  his  hold  on  the  secular  mind."  ^^  But  this 
duty  is  not  discharged  on  behalf  of  the  public  welfare,  consequently 
it  is  impossible  for  a  thinking  man  to  take  very  seriously  what  he 
reads  in  the  newspapers.  The  "  facts  that  count  are  not  system- 
atically reported  and  presented  in  a  form  we  can  digest."  ^®  The 
result  is  that  the  press  is  beginning  to  be  regarded  among  the  more 
enlightened  of  the  working  masses  as  the  means  of  manufacturing 
propaganda  against  them  and  on  behalf  of  propertied  classes.^^ 
The  secrecy  as  to  the  interests  back  of  the  press,  and  as  to  the 
sources  and  ultimate  reliability  of  what  is  printed  as  news  causes 
among  thoughtful  readers  a  distrust  of  the  whole  news  system. 
This  is  increased  by  the  misrepresentations  for  the  sake  of  propa- 
ganda that  are  plain  to  the  thoughtful  reader,  but  escape  the  more 
careless  mass  of  readers  who,  thereby,  receive  the  impressions  it  is 
intended  to  convey.  This  distrust  may  mark  the  beginning  of  a 
sentiment  for  governmental  regulation  of  the  news  system.  "  For 
sometime  the  community  must  find  a  way  of  making  men  who  pub- 
lish news  accept  responsibility  for  an  honest  effort  not  to  misrepre- 
sent the  facts."  ^^  Obviously,  however,  effective  governmental 
action  against  a  capitalistically  controlled  press  is  not  apt  to  come 
until  governments  themselves  cease  to  be  controlled  by  reactionary 
capitalistic  interests. 

^^Ibid..  622. 

39  Ibid.,  624. 

*"  Lippmann,  "  Liberty  and  the  News,"  Allan.  Mon.,  Dec,  1919,  780. 

« /*!</.,  780-781. 


CHAPTER  X 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    ASPECTS    OF    A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

THIS  chapter  aims  to  present  certain  psychological  aspects 
of  an  effective  League  of  Nations  and  is,  therefore,  only 
incidentally  concerned  with  the  League  provided  by  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.  Important  provisions  of  that  Treaty  warrant 
the  inference  that  commercial  jealousy  was  one  of  the  underlying 
motives  of  the  War,^  and  that  the  Allies  used  their  victory  to  satisfy 
that  pre-war  rivalry  for  advantage.^  Furthermore,  the  League 
of  Nations  Covenant  "  scrupulously  eliminates  from  its  jurisdiction 
everything  that  makes  for  privilege  and  inequality  among  the  peo- 
ples of  the  world  and  perpetuates  as  far  as  lies  in  Its  power  the 
present  International  order."  ^  The  Covenant,  therefore,  does  not 
achieve,  or  purpose  to  achieve,  international  co-operation.  Inter- 
national economic  rivalry  remains  as  before  the  essential  Interna- 
tional process. 

An  effective  League  of  Nations  would  be  not  merely  a  political 
league  to  enforce  peace  or  a  legal  mechanism  for  settling  disputes 
but  an  organization  for  International  co-operation  In  economic  af- 
fairs. Such  a  League  might  have  grown  out  of  the  international 
economic  organization  that  developed  between  the  allied  nations 
during  the  war.  The  need  for  co-operation  which  called  forth  that 
organization  remained  after  the  war  because,  without  It,  there  is 
bound  to  result  disastrous  competition  and  dissatisfaction  among 
nations  over  the  distribution  of  raw  materials,  access  to  markets, 
methods  used  by  rivals  in  the  acquisition  of  markets,  and  immigra- 
tion restrictions.^  An  organization  for  economic  co-operation, 
once  its  benefits  had  been  experienced  would  generate  in  time  the 
requisite  political  means  and  legal  mechanisms.  Such  a  League 
was  not  provided  by  the  treaty  of  peace  because  the  old  relation  of  . 

1  Freund,  "The  Treaty  and  International  Law,"  Nev3  Republic,  Dec.  17,  1919,  75. 

2  Keynes,  "  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,"  Chs.  IV-V. 
"  Freund,   op.   cit.,  76. 

•*  League   of   Free   Nations   Association,   "  Statement   of  Principles,"  Nev)  Republic, 
Nov.  30,  1918,  135. 

196 


A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  197 

rivalry  between  nations  was  too  strongly  entrenched  in  the  capi- 
talistic organization  of  each  nation  to  make  possible  the  unprece- 
dented effort  necessary  to  establish  an  effective  League  of  Nations.*^ 

The  ultimate  aim  of  a  League  of  Nations,  as  stated  by  President 
Wilson  before  the  Peace  Conference  convened,  was  thereby  to 
foster  a  new  psychological  relation  between  nations.  In  an  address 
at  Rome  he  said:  "The  only  thing  that  binds  men  together  is 
friendship  and  by  the  same  token  the  only  thing  that  binds  nations 
together  is  friendship.  Therefore  our  task  at  Paris  is  to  organize 
the  friendship  of  the  world  —  to  see  to  it  that  all  the  moral  forces 
that  make  for  right  and  justice  and  liberty  are  united  and  are  given 
a  vital  organization  to  which  the  peoples  of  the  world  will  readily 
and  gladly  respond.  In  other  words,  our  task  is  no  less  colossal 
than  this:  To  set  up  a  new  international  psychology."^  This 
new  relation  of  international  friendship  and  co-operation  can  be 
fostered  only  by  an  organization  of  the  nations  for  economic  co- 
operation that  will  prevent  the  economic  interdependence  of  na- 
tions being  used  by  dominant  nations  against  a  nation  which  they 
want  to  coerce.  This  "  may  appear  to  exact  a  spirit  not  merely 
of  justice  but  of  altruism  toward  economically  weak  peoples,  which 
is  hopelessly  Utopian  to  forecast."^  Nevertheless, .  unless  eco- 
nomic co-operation  is  honestly  intended,  the  talk  of  international 
friendship  is  merely  empty  words;  what  is  really  meant  instead  of 
friendship  is  community  of  interest  between  the  capitalistic  inter- 
ests of  great  nations,  the  friendship  of  self-interest  (if  such  a  rela- 
tion can  properly  be  termed  friendship) ,  the  warming  of  one  nation 
toward  another  that  can  be  as  much  to  it  as  it  can  be  to  the  other. 
A  league  of  such  nations  will  be  a  menace,  instead  of  a  blessing, 
because  it  will  facilitate  co-operation  of  a  group  of  dominant  na- 
tions against  any  one  that  propertied  interests  desire  to  coerce. 

The  economic  organization  required  for  the  co-operative  rela- 
tion was  not  achieved  by  the  peace  treaty  because  the  masses  in  each 
nation  whom  President  Wilson  assumed  to  be  behind  him  in  his 
purpose  to  establish  a  new  psychological  relation,  were  not  in  con- 
trol of  their  governments  and  of  the  representatives  of  their  gov- 
ernments at  the  Peace  Conference.     Sections  of  the  masses  were  in 

5  Croly,  "The  Obstacle  to  Peace,"  New  Republic,  April  26,  1919,  403-407. 
^Associated  Press   (R.  D.  C),  Jan.  4,   1919. 

^  Dewey,    "  The   League   of   Nations   and   Economic   Freedom,"    The  Dial,  Dec.    14, 
1918,    538. 


198      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

process  of  struggling  for  control,  and,  to  prevent  President  Wilson 
from  "  appealing  a  la  improvisatore  over  the  heads  of  diplomats 
to  the  unorganized,  scattered  and  unenlightened  peoples  of  the 
earth  .  .  .  the  diplomats  had  only  to  point  out  to  him  that  he 
would  thereby  decrease  the  waning  power  of  governmental  author- 
ity, increase  popular  unrest,  and  run  the  risk  of  plunging  Europe 
into  the  chaos  of  political  revolutions.  After  that  he  could  not 
speak  effectually  for  himself,  to  say  nothing  of  '  representing '  the 
unrepresented  peoples  of  the  earth."  ^  Were  the  movements  of 
the  peoples  of  the  earth  toward  industrial  democracy  to  be  con- 
demned because  they  involved  a  temporary  waning  of  the  authority 
of  the  state?  Because  the  Peace  Conference  cared  more  to  main- 
tain the  traditional  authority  of  the  state  than  for  industrial  de- 
mocracy the  Treaty  did  not  provide  a  league  that  effectuates  the 
idealistic  purpose  of  international  co-operation.^ 

Is  the  class  consciousness  in  the  different  nations  really  as  de- 
structive of  an  ordered  social  life  as  is  often  assumed  by  those  who 
fear  for  the  traditional  authority  of  the  state?  Is  there  not  in 
human  nature  a  capacity  of  admiration  for  real  leadership,  which 
is  more  or  less  blindly  seeking  the  real  leadership?  Is  not  class 
consciousness  essentially  a  disowning  of  unworthy  leadership?  In 
spite  of  the  intense  popular  resentment  of  the  domination  exer- 
cised by  certain  capitalistic  interests,  is  not  the  capitalistic  class  in 
the  United  States  regarded  with  adulation  as  essential  to  American 
greatness?  In  their  enjoyment  of  their  superiority  that  is  im- 
plied in  the  superiority  of  the  capitalistic  class  of  their  own  nation 
do  not  the  American  people  generally  ignore  its  short-comings? 
Dewey  writes:  "The  United  States  has  extended  money  and 
credit  almost  '  without  stint '  to  governments  of  Europe  irrespec- 
tive of  whether  they  were  supporting  the  announced  policies  of 
the  United  States,  nay,  even  when  those  governments  were  doing 
what  they  could  to  undermine  American  ends.  And  doubtless  the 
average  American  has  taken  pride  in  this  fact.  We  are  ...  so 
careless  of  our  professed  ideals  that  we  prefer  a  reputation  for 
doing  a  grand  seigneur  act  to  the  realization  of  our  national  aims. 
.  .  .  Our   Christianity  has  become  identified  with  ...  an  opti- 

*  Dewey,  "  The  Discrediting  of  Idealism, "  The  Nnv  Republic,  Oct.  8,  191 9,  386. 
9  Ibid.,  285. 


A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  199 

mism  which  we  think  Is  a  sign  of  a  pious  faith  in  Providence  but 
which  in  reality  is  a  trust  in  luck,  a  deification  of  the  feeling  of 
success  regardless  of  any  intelligent  discrimination  of  the  nature 
of  success."  ^^  The  leadership  that  makes  possible  this  national 
success  is  coming  more  and  more  to  be  popularly  understood  to  be 
the  economic  leadership.  To  the  people  of  the  cities  the  men  of 
prestige  there  are  the  men  who  have  built  up  industries,  given  men 
work  and  caused  the  city  to  grow,  and,  perhaps,  have  enriched  some 
of  the  citizens.  These  are  the  men  whose  names  are  blazoned  in 
the  press  of  the  city  as  the  public  "  benefactors."  So  it  is  in  the 
nation.  The  exceptions,  the  rich  men  who  have  incurred  public 
odium,  do  not  at  all  interfere  with  the  adulation  of  the  capitalistic 
class  generally.  And  public  resentment  against  particular  capi- 
talists wears  off  and  they  later  share  in  the  general  adulation. 
However,  it  is  easy  to  exaggerate  this  tendency.  It  depends  on  a 
tolerable  satisfaction  of  the  essential  instinctive  impulses.  Unem- 
ployment or  rising  prices  may  stir  resentment  that  shakes  the  popu- 
lar adulation  and  threatens  the  institutions  that  rest  upon  it.  A 
class  consciousness  may  develop,  and,  when  once  it  is  well  started, 
it  may  be  fostered  by  the  class  leadership  even  in  a  time  when  eco- 
nomic conditions  would  give  the  instinctive  adulation  free  play, 
until  the  class  antagonism  has  become  fixed. 

The  purpose  of  a  League  of  Nations  which  seeks  to  realize  the 
idealistic  purpose  of  international  co-operation  is  contrary  to  the 
traditional  national  ambition  for  supremacy.  In  the  past  the  es- 
sential aim  of  states  was  to  increase  their  wealth  power  and  their 
military  power.  There  seemed  no  way  to  preserve  their  independ- 
ence but  to  become  ever  stronger.  There  resulted  a  rivalry  in 
armaments,  and  this  inevitably  led  to  a  struggle  for  domination. 
"  If  all  States  increase  their  strength,  the  balance  of  power  is  un- 
changed, and  no  one  State  has  a  better  chance  of  victory  than  be- 
fore. And  when  the  means  of  offence  exist,  even  though  their 
original  purpose  may  have  been  defensive,  the  temptation  to  use 
them  is  likely,  sooner  or  later,  to  prove  overwhelming.  In  this 
way  the  very  measures  which  promote  security  within  the  borders 
of  the  State  promote  insecurity  elsewhere.  It  is  the  essence  of  the 
State  to  suppress  violence  within  and  to  facilitate  it  without.     The 

10  Ibid.,  286-287. 


200      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

State  makes  an  entirely  artificial  division  of  mankind  and  of  our 
duties  toward  them;  toward  one  group  we  are  bound  by  the  law, 
toward  the  other  only  by  the  prudence  of  highwaymen."  ^^ 

The  purpose  of  a  League  of  Nations  is  contrary  also  to  the  tra- 
ditional conception  of  sovereignty  as  involving  the  complete  inde- 
pendence of  nations.*^  For,  inasmuch  as  the  essential  purpose  of 
a  League  of  Nations  is  to  guarantee  to  all  nations  a  secure  national 
existence,  this  requires  that  nations  renounce  that  spirit  of  proud 
independence  that  would  prompt  them  to  refuse  to  relinquish  those 
exclusive  advantages  which  make  the  existence  of  other  nations  in- 
secure.^^  There  will  not  be  the  necessary  equality  of  nations  "  if 
.  .  .  states  are  to  be  shut  out  from  the  sea;  if  rapidly  expanding 
populations  find  themselves  excluded  from  raw  materials  indis- 
pensable to  their  prosperity;  if  the  privileges  and  preferences  en- 
joyed by  the  states  with  overseas  territories  place  the  less  powerful 
states  at  a  disadvantage."  "  Heretofore,  a  nation's  security  and 
prosperity  has  depended  on  its  own  military  and  naval  strength 
and  economic  resources,  and  this  has  caused  statesmen  to  feel  justi- 
fied in  enlarging  armaments  in  order  to  protect  and  increase  the 
national  resources  and  trade  opportunities;  this  competitive  na- 
tionalism has  been  destructive  of  the  security  and  prosperity  of  all 
nations.  The  League  of  Nations  should  substitute  for  this  in- 
secure rivalrous  relation  an  organization  for  the  just  distribution 
of  economic  advantages.^'' 

The  traditional  conception  of  sovereignty  as  absolute  independ- 
ence is  no  longer  true,  inasmuch  as  no  state  of  itself  can  maintain 
its  independence  against  all  others.  The  traditional  conception  of 
sovereignty  as  absolute  power  to  compel  obedience  also  is  no  longer 
true.  Only  under  favourable  conditions  could  a  great  empire  com- 
pel the  obedience  of  its  strongest  dominions.  These  are  bound  to 
the  mother  country  by  loyalty,  not  by  fear  of  subjection.  "  The 
British  Empire  is  a  perpetual  contradiction  to  the  theory  of  sov- 
ereignty on  which  our  jurists  and  statesmen  have  been  nourished."  ^® 

11  Russell,  "  Why  Men  Fight,"  59. 

i2Kallen,   "The   Structure  of  Lasting  Peace,"  87-89. 

18  League  of  Free  Nations  Association,  "Statement  of  Principles,"  135;  Kallen,  "The 
League  of  Nations  Today  and  Tomorrow,"  74-88. 

i*Leaeue  of  Free  Nations  Association,  "Statement  of  Principles,"  135. 

15 //^iV.,  134-135. 

18  McMurray,  "Inter-citizenship:  A  Basis  for  World  Peace,"  Yale  Laiv  Journal, 
XXVII:   306. 


A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  201 

Yet  in  the  face  of  this  waning  traditional  absolutism  of  the  state 
"  publicists  are  proposing  —  and  the  people  are  supporting  the  idea 
—  not  alone  to  have  one  supreme  source  of  authority  in  interna- 
tional  matters,  but  to  enforce  its  decrees  by  the  use  of  an  over- 
whelming aggrandizement  of  internationalized  force.  .  .  .  Unques- 
tionably regarding  specific  questions  of  territorial  division  and  eco- 
nomic adjustment  between  nations  it  may  be  necessary  and  practical 
to  create  temporary  umpires,  exactly  as  we  now  do,  who  will  arbi- 
trate differences  and  hand  down  decisions  to  the  acceptance  of  which 
the  parties  are  committed  before  they  go  to  arbitration.  But  it  is 
a  fair  question  whether  the  transfer  of  absolutism  in  sovereignty 
from  the  State  to  the  super-State  .  .  .  would  not  be  paying  too 
dearly  for  a  very  doubtful  gain."  ^'^ 

Instead  of  a  super-State  of  this  type  Mr.  Tead  proposes  that  it 
be  constructed  along  the  hnes  of  a  reorganized  state.  "  Mr.  G.  D. 
H.  Cole  in  his  *  Self-Government  in  Industry '  proposes  that  within 
the  State  the  problem  of  adjusting  the  claims  of  sovereignty  to  the 
claims  of  personality  can  be  solved  by  dividing  sovereignty  between 
the  supreme  organization  of  the  nation  in  its  producing  capacity 
(an  industrial  parliament)  and  the  supreme  organization  of  the 
consumers  (the  present  political  parliaments).  If  issues  come  to  a 
deadlock  between  these  two  groups,  the  only  recourse,  as  he  con- 
ceives it,  is  to  effect  whatever  ultimate  adjustment  is  possible  with- 
out an  appeal  to  force.  In  the  contest  for  power  between  the  State 
as  producer  and  the  State  as  consumer,  the  individual  gets  his 
chance  to  preserve  and  advance  the  claims  of  personality  and  free- 
dom. Perhaps  his  approach  to  the  problem  has  its  suggestion  for 
our  thinking  in  international  affairs.  Certainly,  as  we  shall  see  in 
succeeding  chapters,  the  sort  of  functional  division  which  his  scheme 
contemplates  seems  inevitably  necessary  and  sound  in  the  building 
of  administrative  machinery  on  a  world  scale.  For  it  becomes 
clearer  each  day  that  if  international  government  means  the  re- 
establishment  of  absolute  sovereignty  on  a  basis  twice  removed 
from  popular  control,  the  weakness  of  that  government  will  be  fun- 
damental and  the  allegiance  it  can  summon  will  diminish  as  soon  as 
its  exercise  of  power  becomes  significant."  ^^  Mr.  Tead  finds  in 
the  mechanisms  that  were  developed  and  which  proved  invaluable 

IT  Tead,  "The  People's  Part  in  Peace,"  23. 
^^Ibid.,  24-^5. 


202     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

for  the  co-operation  of  the  Entente  Allies  in  the  World  War  the 
basis  of  an  effective  international  economic  organization  for  peace. 

Whatever  its  constitution  may  be,  a  League  of  Nations  will  inter- 
nationalize the  class  struggle ;  one  class  will  aim  to  use  the  League 
against  another.  As  capitalistic  classes  for  the  most  part  control 
the  governments  of  the  different  states,  those  classes  will  use  the 
League  against  working  classes,  as  far  as  the  masses  can  be  brought 
to  acquiesce.  In  nations  where  trade  unionism  had  become  a  for- 
midable political  power,  as  in  England,  a  League  of  Nations  was 
hailed  by  opponents  of  trade  unionism  as  a  means  of  repressing 
unionism. ^^  In  England  and  the  United  States  influential  public 
opinion  rapidly  came  to  favour  a  League  when  it  became  evident 
that  it  could  be  used  against  Bolshevism;  inside  of  government  cir- 
cles and  outside,  appeals  were  made  for  support  of  a  League  of 
Nations  which  should  act  to  repress  Bolshevism.  Through  a 
League  of  Nations  the  class  struggle  will  be  internationalized  and 
brought  to  the  fore,  and  nationalism  will,  not  immediately  or  soon 
but  ultimately,  become  less  pronounced.  That  this  inevitable  class 
conflict  may  go  on  without  violence,  under  legal  forms,  "  the  inter- 
national machinery  will  need  democratization.  ...  If  the  League 
of  Nations  is  not  to  develop  into  an  immense  bureaucratic  union 
of  governments  instead  of  a  democratic  union  of  peoples,  the  ele- 
ments of  (a)  complete  publicity  and  (b)  effective  popular  repre- 
sentation must  be  insisted  upon.  The  first  of  these  is  implicit  in 
the  principle  .  .  .  that  in  the  future  there  must  be  an  end  to  secret 
diplomacy.  The  second  can  only  be  met  by  some  representation 
of  the  peoples  in  a  body  with  legislative  powers  over  international 
affairs  —  which  must  include  minority  elements  —  as  distinct  from 
the  governments  of  the  constituent  states  of  the  League."  ^^  The 
minority  parties  as  well  as  the  great  parties  of  the  various  states 
must  be  represented. 

The  effectiveness  of  a  League  will  depend  on  subordinating  the 
rivalry  of  economic  interests  and  that  blind  patriotism  of  the 
masses  which  make  a  state  intensely  nationalistic  ^^  to  the  rational 

1*  Sir  Charles  C.  Allom,  "  Unionism  as  Foe  of  Labor,"  American  Industries,  March, 
1919,  42.  Sir  Charles  C.  Allom  is  "  head  of  an  airplane  and  other  important  manu- 
facturing enterprises  in  England."      {Ibid.,  42.) 

20  League  of  Free  Nations  Association,  "  Statement  of  Principles,"  New  Republic, 
Nov.  30,  1918,  136. 

21  Reeves,  "The  Justiciability  of  International  Disputes,"  Amer^  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  X: 
71-79. 


A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  203 

social  purpose  of  world-wide  industrial  democracy.  On  the  one 
hand  it  is  easy  for  statesmen  and  the  press  to  enlist  the  support  of 
the  masses  in  projects  of  conquest  and  capitalistic  aggrandizement 
because  the  hostile  impulses  are  stronger  among  men  than  the  im- 
pulses to  friendly  co-operation;  and  the  belief  is  widespread  that 
whatever  strengthens  the  nation  and  enriches  the  employing  classes 
must  benefit  the  working  masses.  As  against  this  strong  combina- 
tion of  instinctive  forces  we  have  a  growing  intelligence  in  every 
nation  —  among  employers,  workmen  and  professional  men  —  and 
this  intelligence  can  be  increased  by  education.  Education  will  be 
necessary  to  the  success  of  a  League  ^^  because  the  relations  of  a 
League  are  contrary  not  only  to  traditional  international  relations, 
but  to  the  traditional  relations  throughout  the  social  organization. 
It  is  contrary  to  traditional  family  relations.  The  prevailing  idea 
of  family  duty  —  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  mother  to  bear  as  many 
children  as  possible  —  which  originated  in  the  struggle  for  domi- 
nation of  rival  political  and  sectarian  groups,  which  called  for  as 
high  a  birth  rate  as  possible,  particularly  of  male  children, —  is  con- 
trary to  a  regime  of  universal  peace  and  friendly  relations  between 
nations. ^^  An  overflowing  population  encourages  the  interests  of 
a  nation  that  are  ambitious  for  national  aggrandizement.  As  a 
result  of  "  the  war,  it  is  possible  that  population  questions  will 
attract  more  attention  than  they  did  before,  and  it  is  likely  that 
they  will  be  studied  from  the  point  of  view  of  international  rivalry. 
This  motive,  unlike  reason  and  humanity,  is  perhaps  strong  enough 
to  overcome  men's  objections  to  a  scientific  treatment  of  the  birth- 
rate." 2*  The  ultimate  purpose  of  a  League  of  Nations  is  thus 
contrary  to  the  traditional  family  relation  of  masculine  domination 
and  the  submission  of  the  wife  as  child-bearer. 

The  purpose  of  a  League  of  Nations  is  contrary,  also,  to  the 
domination-submission  attitudes  in  educational  practice,  for  these 
attitudes  are  opposed  to  the  stimulation  and  training  of  the  sympa- 
thetic and  intellectual  dispositions  so  essential  in  co-operation. 
For  the  same  reason  it  is  contrary  to  ecclesiastical  domination  and 
to  dogmas  reinforcing  this  attitude.     The  clergymen  of  some  re- 

22Kallen,  "The  League  of  Nations,  Today  and  Tooiorrow,"  127-133;  Kallen,  "The 
Structure  of  Lasting  Peace,"  172-176. 

2S  Ross,  "  Changing  America,"  32-49 ;  Thompson,  "  Population :  A  Study  in  Mal- 
thusianism,"  156-164. 

«*  RuskH,  "  Why  Men  Fight,"  198-199. 


204     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ligious  sects  endorse  an  unrestricted  increase  of  population ;  ^^ 
obviously  this  is  a  means  of  increasing  the  numbers  and  thus  ad- 
vancing the  superiority  of  the  sect.^^  A  League  of  Nations  is  con- 
trary, also,  to  the  rivalry  of  the  financial  and  industrial  interests  of 
different  nations  for  control  of  the  markets  of  the  world,  except 
through  the  excellence  and  cheapness  of  their  products.  These 
interests  are  apt  to  favour  an  unrestricted  growth  of  population, 
which  gives  them  a  large  supply  of  labour  which  can  be  easily  domi- 
nated and  hired  for  low  wages.^'^  In  short,  a  League  of  Nations 
is  contrary  to  domination-submission  in  family,  educational,  ecclesi- 
astical, and  economic  relations.  However,  domination-submission 
is  the  traditional  and  still  prevailing  attitude  in  all  these  relations. 
All  that  we  can  expect  therefore  is  a  very  gradual  and  halting  de- 
velopment in  the  direction  of  the  great  purpose  of  a  League  of 
Nations. 

Under  present  conditions,  economic  rivalry  is  the  disturbing 
force  in  international  relations. ^^  When  nations,  after  a  war, 
settle  down  to  mutually  recognized  territorial  limits,  the  political 
status  of  each  has  been  decided,  and  the  more  aggressive  forms  of 
rivalry  fall  in  abeyance  for  the  time  being.  But  the  economic 
status  of  each  nation  has  not  by  any  means  been  decided,  and  the 
economic  rivalry  continues  without  any  such  recognition  of  fixed 
status.  National  animosities  give  an  animus  to  this  economic  ri- 
valry.^^  The  economic  interests  of  the  different  nations  are  not 
slow  to  take  advantage  of  national  animosities  and  to  use  these  to 
support  their  own  schemes  of  pecuniary  aggrandizement.^"  Thus, 
while  the  political  status  may  be  settled  for  the  time  being,  the 
economic  status,  under  a  system  of  private  ownership  of  industry, 
never  is  settled,  and  there  is  left  open  a  sphere  of  conflict  which 

25  "  In  choosing  a  state  of  life,  everyone  is  at  full  liberty  either  to  follow  the  counsel 
of  Jesus  Christ  as  to  virginity,  or  to  enter  into  the  bonds  of  marriage.  No  human 
law  can  abolish  the  natural  and  primitive  right  of  marriage,  or  in  any  way  limit 
the  principal  purpose  of  marriage,  ordained  by  God's  authority  from  the  beginning: 
Increase  and  Multiply."  (K.  of  C,  War  Activities  Committee,  "Bolshevism  —  the 
Remedy,"  8.     This  is  a  pamphlet  written  by  Leo  XIII  against  socialism.) 

2«  Russell,  "  Why  Men  Fight,"  193. 

2'^  Fetter,  "  Population  or  Prosperity,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  Vol.  Ill,  Supplement,  March, 
1913.    Reprint,  pp.  14-17. 

28Angell,  "The  Problems  of  the  War  — and  the  Peace,"  58-62;  Kallen,  "The 
Structure  of  Permanent  Peace,"  Chs.  IV-V. 

28  Brailsford,  "  The  Covenant  of  Peace,"   12. 

80  Overstreet,  "  Ethical  Clarifications  through  the  War,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  Apr., 
1918,    327-336. 


A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  205 

may  at  any  time  unsettle  the  political  status.^^  Permanent  peace 
cannot  be  expected  without  a  development  of  industrial  democracy 
in  each  nation.  These  democratized  nations  must  then  subject 
the  economic  interests  of  the  different  nations  to  the  international 
control  that  is  necessary  to  insure  a  lasting  peace. 

31  Keller,  "  Through  War  to  Peace,"  76-77. 


BOOK  II 
SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  JURISPRUDENCE 


CHAPTER  XI 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    ASPECTS    OF    THE    DEVELOPMENT    OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 

THE  traditional  theories  of  the  nature  of  law  are  a  func- 
tioning of  the  attitudes  of  the  jurists  who  contributed  to 
the  development  of  those  theories.  Not  until  recently 
have  attempts  been  made  to  develop  a  severely  inductive  concep- 
tion of  law.  The  assumptions  of  the  theories  were  suggested  by 
the  attitudes  of  jurists,  and  the  method  of  development  of  the 
theories  was  deductive.  Jurists  were  lawyers  and  not  scientists; 
the  professional  method  of  thinking  of  the  lawyer  is  deductive,  not 
the  inductive  method  of  the  scientist.  Thinking  men  not  lawyers 
have  been  accustomed  to  accept  the  lawyer's  deductively  derived 
conception  of  law  because  it  was  thought  that  the  lawyer,  who  knew 
more  law  than  anybody  else,  must  know  more  about  the  nature  of 
law.  However,  the  fact  that  a  man  knows  the  law  and  uses  this 
knowledge  in  his  business  is  no  more  a  valid  reason  why  he  should 
know  the  nature  of  law  than  the  fact  that  a  man  is  a  farmer  is  a 
reason  why  he  should  know  anything  about  scientific  agriculture,  or 
should  have  the  scientific  attitude  that  is  needed  to  be  interested  in 
scientific  agriculture. 

The  lawyer's  definition  of  the  nature  of  law  has  been  a  func- 
tioning of  the  legal  attitude,  the  professional  deductive  attitude,  the 
only  respected  attitude.  The  legal  attitude  is  one  of  deference  to 
law  as  command,  the  meaning  of  which  in  the  particular  case  is 
interpreted  according  to  tradition.  Legal  attitudes  contrary  to 
this  have  gained  increasing  recognition  of  late  years  inside  the  pro- 
fession, and  outside  in  the  appointment  of  progressive  lawyers  to 
judicial  positions.^  But  the  deferential,  deductive  attitude  still 
predominates  in  the  profession  and  is  most  respected.  This  atti- 
tude is  expressed  in  the  phrase  to  "  lay  down  the  law."     The  pre- 

1  See  the  chapters  entitled,  The  Conflict  of  Judicial  Attitudes,  Judicial  Attitudes  and 
the  Nature  of  Lofw,  and  Psychological  Processes  in  the  Development  of  Private  Prop- 
erty. 


210     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

dominant  legal  attitude  is  that  of  a  man  respectfully  receiving  law 
as  traditionally  interpreted  and  laying  it  down  as  command;  he 
has  authority  and  dominates  not  in  his  own  right  but  in  virtue  of 
that  which  he  represents, —  a  command  that  has  behind  it  the 
obedience-compelling  power  of  the  state.  Men  of  a  strong  domi- 
nating disposition  "  take  to  the  law," —  find  the  practice  of  that 
profession  congenial.  And  in  their  practice  they  naturally  develop 
the  attitude  of  laying  down  the  law,  of  accepting  law  as  tradition- 
ally interpreted  and  applying  it  in  particular  cases  as  the  final  word 
in  a  cause. 

Lawyers  have  made  the  mistake  of  believing  that  this  attitude  to 
the  law  indicates  the  nature  of  law.  Definitions  of  the  nature  of 
law  which  were  in  harmony  with  this  attitude  have  been  spontane- 
ously accepted  by  lawyers  and  other  definitions  rejected;  and  think- 
ers in  other  lines  have  accepted,  without  analysis,  the  "  authorita- 
tive "  definitions  made  by  leading  lawyers.  For  instance,  "  prob- 
ably no  definition  ever  had  a  more  pronounced  effect  on  legal  think- 
ing than  has  the  definition  of  law,  given  by  Austin  in  his  work  on 
'  Jurisprudence,'  upon  the  legal  mind  in  England  and  the  United 
States.  According  to  Austin,  '  a  law,  in  the  literal  and  proper  sense 
of  the  word,'  is  '  a  rule  laid  down  for  the  guidance  of  an  intelligent 
being  by  an  intelligent  being  having  power  over  him.'  This  defi- 
nition, according  to  its  author,  embraced  '  laws  set  by  God  to  men  ' 
and  '  law  as  set  by  men  to  men.'  Of  the  latter,  some  were  '  estab- 
lished by  political  superiors  acting  as  such,'  and  constituted  '  posi- 
tive law' — the  appropriate  matter  of  jurisprudence."  ^ 

This  definition  had  a  pronounced  effect  on  legal  thinking  because 
it  was  in  harmony  with  the  predominant  legal  attitude;  also  be- 
cause it  represented,  by  implication,  the  relation  of  the  masses  to 
the  law-making  and  law-enforcing  power  at  the  time  Austin  wrote. 
The  masses  of  England  were  then  without  political  rights ;  the  will 
of  the  propertied  classes,  expressed  through  Parliament,  was  then 
supreme,  so  that  the  masses  were,  in  fact,  in  a  position  of  abject 
obedience  to  laws  "  established  by  political  superiors."  That  is, 
Austin's  definition  of  law  was  effective,  not  only  because  it  was 
congenial  to  the  traditional  legal  attitude  but  also  because  it  repre- 
sented the  social-psychological  condition  that  obtained  at  that  time, 
namely,  the  habitual  obedience  of  unenfranchised  masses  to  law  as 

*  Moore,  "Law  and  Organization,"  Atner.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  IX:  3-4. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  JURISPRUDENCE    211 

the  command  of  political  superiors.  But  the  political  subjection  of 
the  masses  in  England  ceased  fifty  years  ago  and  the  surviving  atti- 
tude of  unquestioning  obedience  to  law  has  gradually  weakened  as 
the  working  masses  have  become  conscious  of  the  conflict  between 
the  existing  laws  and  their  own  interests.  The  sole  surviving  sanc- 
tion of  the  traditional  conception  of  law  is  its  endorsement  by  the 
property-owning  classes  on  the  one  hand  and  the  legal  profession 
on  the  other.  It  is  congenial  to  the  legal  attitude  of  deference  to 
law;  and  it  is  congenial  to  the  attitude  of  those  reactionary  prop- 
ertied interests  which  purpose  to  keep  the  masses  in  subjection. 

Another  reason  why  lawyers  and  property-owning  classes  are 
harmonious  on  this  point  is  that  the  most  lucrative  clients  are  prop- 
erty owners;  wherefore  the  lawyer  of  a  rivalrous  disposition  com^^ 
mends  himself  to  the  class  of  clients  he  most  desires  by  maintaining 
the  traditional  professional  attitude  to  the  law.  There  are  cor- 
poration lawyers  who,  while  ostensibly  maintaining  this  attitude  of 
deference  to  the  law  as  traditionally  interpreted,  make  it  their 
business  to  enable  their  clients  to  "  get  around  the  law."  They 
profess  the  traditional  attitude  of  deference  while  in  their  practice 
aiming  to  place  the  law  at  the  service  of  a  dominant  class.  While 
the  influence  of  the  property-owning  classes  and  the  legal  profes- 
sion has  maintained  Austin's  definition  as  authoritative,  that  defi- 
nition, as  we  shall  see  presently,  whatever  its  social-psychological 
basis  in  the  past,  has  ceased  truly  to  represent  social-psychological 
conditions.  A  true  definition  of  the  nature  of  law  requires  valid 
social-psychological  assumptions,  which  can  be  had  only  by  an 
understanding  of  social  psychology.  Hence  the  close  relation  of 
social  psychology  to  jurisprudence.  Only  as  this  scientific  point  of 
view  replaces  the  deductive  legal  point  of  view  will  conceptions  as 
to  the  nature  of  law  approximate  to  the  truth. 

The  preceding  paragraphs  have  prepared  us  to  understand  why 
the  development  of  jurisprudence  cannot  be  understood  without  the 
aid  of  social  psychology.  That  development  has  been  directly  the 
work  of  lawyers,  acting  as  legislators  and  judges.  Their  conspicu- 
ous mental  processes  have  been  those  of  deductive  reasoning,  but, 
in  addition  to  these  more  conscious  processes  there  has  been  the  sub- 
conscious action  of  attitudes  that  determine  the  assumptions  of  rea- 
soning. It  follows  that  the  development  of  jurisprudence  cannot 
be  understood  without  the  aid  of  the  science  that  studies  the  nature 


212     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and  functioning  of  attitudes,  that  is,  social  psychology.  Social 
psychology  is  necessary,  also,  because,  while  the  development  of 
jurisprudence  has  been  directly  in  the  hands  of  lawyers,^  it  has 
been  indirectly  and  ultimately  under  the  control  of  the  economic 
class  or  classes  that  dominated  the  law-making  organs.  Even  be- 
fore the  rise  of  class  consciousness,  indeed,  even  before  the  period 
of  mass  subservience  to  the  word  of  a  despot  or  an  autocrat  who 
was  backed  by  military  force  and  divine  right,  away  back  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  development  of  jurisprudence,  we  find  ob- 
servance of  custom  and  customary  law  was  due  to  the  action  of 
certain  social-psychological  processes,  which  must  be  explained  in 
order  to  explain  the  origin  and  development  of  jurisprudence. 

The  types  of  behaviour  suggested  in  previous  chapters  as  impor- 
tant in  interpretations  of  the  development  of  the  state  are  essential 
also  in  interpretations  of  the  development  of  jurisprudence.  These 
types  of  behaviour  are  discernible  in  the  functioning  of  law  and 
the  purposes  of  law-making.  As  to  the  effect  of  these  types  on  the 
functioning  of  law:  First,  there  is  the  individualistic  type  of  be- 
haviour which  obtained  among  a  population  where  behaviour  was 
essentially  acquisitive  and  industry  unorganized.  The  function  of 
law  was  to  restrain  violence  and  bring  about  a  peaceful  settlement 
of  disputes  according  to  the  usages  of  immutable  custom.  Law 
was  originally  custom,  customs  were  interpreted  by  the  elders,  and 
men  were  bound  hand  and  foot  by  custom.*  Violation  of  custom 
called  forth  disapproval,  which  was  particularly  effective  in  small 
groups  where  the  members  lived  intimately  and  could  not  get  away 
from  the  communal  disapproval.^     With  the  rise  of  the  kingship, 

'"A  civilized  system  of  law  cannot  be  maintained  without  a  learned  profession  of 
the  law.  The  formation  and  continuance  of  such  a  learned  class  can  be  and  has 
been  provided  for,  at  different  times  and  in  different  lands.  ...  It  is  not  necessary 
for  this  purpose  that  the  actual  administration  of  justice  should  be  wholly,  or  with 
insignificant  exceptions,  in  the  hands  of  persons  learned  in  the  law,  though  such  is 
the  prevailing  tendency  of  modern  judicial  systems.  It  is  enough  that  the  learned 
profession  exists,  and  that  knowledge  of  thie  law  has  to  be  sought  directly  or  indirectly, 
in  the  deliberate  and  matured  opinion  of  its  most  capable  members.  And  the  activity 
of  modern  legislation  makes  little  or  no  difference  to  this  ....  The  office  of  the 
lawyer  is  first  to  inform  the  legislature  how  the  law  stands,  and  then,  if  change  is 
desired,  ...  to  advise  how  the  change  may  best  be  effected.  Every  modern  legis- 
lature is  constantly  and  largely  dependent  on  expert  aid  of  this  kind."  (Pollock, 
"Justice  According  to  Law,"  Harvard  Latv  Revienv,  IX:  307-308.) 

*  Spencer  and  Gillen,  "The  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia,"  11-12;  Boas,  "The 
Mind  of  Primitive  Man,"  220 ;  Webster,  "  Primitive  Secret  Societies,"  60. 

5  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  I:  Chs.  II-V,  VII,  IX;  Hall,  "Crime  in  its  Relation  to 
Social  Progress,"  3-22. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  JURISPRUDENCE    213 

the  king  impartially  enforced  custom.  As  long  as  the  king  in  his 
judgments  followed  custom  exactly,  declaring  the  traditional  rule 
and  applying  it  according  to  the  letter  of  the  law,  he  had  the  popu- 
lar support.  Certainty  and  uniformity  of  rule  and  penalty  were 
the  permanent  contributions  of  this  period.^ 

Whenever,  in  later  stages  of  development,  social  relations  be- 
come thus  individualistic,  the  law  assumes  this  violence-restraining 
and  dispute-settling  function,  for  instance,  in  the  early  American 
rural  township.'^  For  this  period  of  American  development  the 
English  common  law,  developed  from  the  old  German  law,  was 
well  suited  because  of  its  individualistic  character;^  and  the  law 
was  enforced  as  custom  —  by  strong  communal  disapproval.^  The 
effect  of  this  individualistic  period  in  jurisprudence  survives  to  the 
present  day,  as  seen  in  the  prejudice  of  the  farmer  against  legisla- 
tion; ^"  in  the  judicial  theory  of  the  perfection  of  the  common  law,^^ 
causing  it  to  be  given  precedence  by  judges  over  statute  law;*^ 
and  in  the  prejudice  of  the  courts  against  labour  legislation  as  limit- 
ing freedom  of  contract.  Beard  writes  that  "  while  the  United 
States  has  been  transformed  into  an  industrial  nation,  the  notion  of 
the  older  agricultural  life  that  anybody  has  a  right  to  work  as  long 
as  he  pleases,  under  any  conditions  he  is  willing  to  accept,  has  per- 
vaded our  legislatures."  ^^  In  an  agricultural  regime  with  plenty 
of  land  to  be  had  at  a  nominal  price,  "  any  man  can  rise  out  of  the 
working  class.  .  .  ."  ^^  This  has  blinded  the  American  people  to 
new  industrial  conditions,  and  has  caused  jurists  to  oppose  labour 
legislation,  and  to  ignore  the  fact  that,  "  however  great  may  be 
the  opportunity  for  individuals  to  rise,  the  working  class  must  yet 
remain,  and  that  upon  its  standards  of  life,  its  intelligence  and 
physical  vitality  the  very  fate  of  the  nation  depends."  ^^ 

®  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Social.  Sot.,  VII:  151; 
see  also  Pound,  "  The  End  of  Law  as  Developed  in  Legal  Rules  and  Doctrines, 
Harvard  Latn  Review,  XXVII:  198-212. 

''Williams,  "An  American  Town,"  Pt.  I:  Ch.  VI. 

*  Pound,  "A  Feudal  Principle  in  Modern  Law,"  Inter.  Jour.  Ethics,  XXV:  13-15; 
Pound,  "  Readings  on  the  History  and  System  of  the  Common  Law,"  263. 

9  Williams,  op.  cit.,  Pt.  II:  Ch.  XI. 

10  Bernard,  "A  Theory  of  Rural  Attitudes,"  /4/n^r.  Jour.  Sociol.,  XXII:  639. 

1^  Lincoln,  "  The  Relation  of  Judicial  Decisions  to  the  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI : 
121. 

^2  Swift  &  Tyson,  4.1  U.  S.  Peters,  871,  January,  1842;  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Baugh,  149  U.  S.  May,  1893,  778. 

13  Beard,  "  American  Government  and  Politics,"  742. 

14  Ibid.,  742.  15  Ibid.,   74a. 


214     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  second  type  of  behaviour  influencing  the  development  of 
law,  domination-submission,  emerges  with  the  rise  of  despotic  rule. 
Under  despotic  rule  the  kinds  of  crime  punished  and  the  severity 
of  punishments  increased,  with  the  impulse  to  deter  from  crime  by 
arousing  fear  of  punishment. ^^  Violations  of  customs,  which  had 
before  been  left  to  the  action  of  tabu  or  the  chance  of  private 
vengeance,  came  to  be  habitually  punished  by  the  authority  of  the 
king,  in  order  to  put  a  stop  to  the  excesses  and  failures  of  private 
vengeance,  and  also  to  magnify  his  authority.^^  At  the  same  time 
the  king  sought  to  make  it  appear  that  crimes  were  also  sins  against 
the  god,  thus  shifting  the  responsibility  of  punishment,  and  increas- 
ing the  social  abhorrence  of  crime.  Methods  of  ascertaining  guilt 
or  innocence,  as  the  ordeal  and  the  judicial  combat,  were  calculated 
to  give  the  deity  an  opportunity  to  indicate  the  guilty  party,  so  that 
the  judgment  was  apparently  given  the  sanction  of  the  deity.  The 
severity  of  punishments  was  to  inspire  fear  and  also  to  give  the 
king  a  chance  to  relax  the  severity  in  particular  cases. ^^  In  this 
period,  the  motive  behind  the  enforcement  of  law  was  not  only  the 
indignation  of  the  group,  but  also  the  domination  of  a  despotic 
government  which  was  determined  on  weeding  out  all  who  resisted 
the  arbitrary  will  of  the  sovereign.  This  attitude  was  supported 
by  the  rank  and  file  who  were  submissive  to  arbitrary  will  and  in- 
dignant with  one  who  showed  defiance.  Offenders  were  treated 
"  not  only  as  offenders  against  the  individuals  whom  they  injure  or 
against  society  at  large,  but  as  rebels  against  their  sovereign  or 
their  god.  Their  disobedience  to  the  will  of  the  mighty  legislator 
incurs,  or  is  supposed  to  incur,  his  anger,  and  is,  in  consequence, 
severely  resented.  But  however  severe  they  may  be,  the  punish- 
ments inflicted  by  the  despot  on  disobedient  subjects  are  not  re- 
garded as  mere  outbursts  of  personal  anger.  In  the  archaic  state 
the  king  is  an  object  of  profound  regard,  and  even  of  religious 
veneration.  He  is  looked  upon  as  a  sacred  being,  and  his  decrees 
as  the  embodiment  of  divine  justice.  The  transgression  of  any 
law  he  makes  is,  therefore,  apt  to  evoke  a  feeling  of  public  indig- 
nation proportionate  to  the  punishment  which  he  pleases  to  inflict 
on  the  transgressor.     Again,  as  to  the  acts  which  are  supposed  to 

1" W^estermarck,  op.  cit.,  I:  185-186. 
^Tlbid.,  I:  177-185. 
^^Ibid.,   I:    192. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  JURISPRUDENCE    215 

arouse  the  anger  of  Invisible  powers,  the  people  are  anxious  to 
punish  them  with  the  utmost  severity  so  as  to  prevent  the  divine 
wrath  from  turning  against  the  community  itself.  But  the  fear 
which,  In  such  cases,  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  punishment,  is  cer- 
tainly combined  with  genuine  indignation  against  the  offender,  both 
because  he  rebels  against  God  and  religion,  and  because  he  thereby 
exposes  the  whole  community  to  supernatural  dangers."  ^^  In 
this  stage  of  legal  development,  "  law  has  definitely  prevailed  as 
the  regulative  agency  of  society  and  the  state  has  prevailed  as  the 
organ  of  social  control.  Self-help  and  self-redress  has  been  super- 
seded for  all  but  exceptional  causes.  Normally  men  appeal  only 
to  the  state  to  redress  wrongs,"  ^^  The  law  remains  almost  as 
formal  and  immutable  as  in  the  preceding  period  and  its  application 
is  arbitrary  and  without  regard  to  the  justice  of  the  case.^^ 

Then  arose  new  conditions  that  called  for  changes  in  the  law, 
which,  however,  could  not  be  made  as  long  as  the  law  was  regarded 
as  immutable.  Consequently  there  developed  the  fiction  of  natural 
law  to  justify  the  changes  made.  The  changes  were  said  to  arise, 
not  from  the  reason  and  conscience  of  the  judge,  but  from  the  inter- 
pretation by  the  judge  of  a  higher  law,  the  law  of  nature.  '*  Four 
ideas  of  the  first  magnitude  come  into  the  law  "  as  a  result  of  this 
development.  "  The  first  is  that  legal  personality  should  extend 
to  all  human  beings  and  that  incapacities  to  produce  legal  conse- 
quences should  be  rejected  except  where  a  natural  as  distinguished 
from  a  historical  reason  can  be  found  for  them.  The  second  is 
that  the  law  should  look  to  the  substance  and  not  to  the  form,  the 
spirit  and  not  to  the  letter.  .  .  .  Only  the  systems  that  went 
through  this  change  and  came  to  measure  things  by  reason  rather 
than  by  arbitrary  rule  or  arbitrary  formula  have  become  laws  of 
the  world. 

"  The  third  idea  is  good  faith,  the  Idea  that  justice  demands  one 
should  not  disappoint  well  founded  expectations  which  he  has  cre- 
ated; in  other  words,  that  it  is  not  so  much  that  rules  should  be 
certain  as  that  men's  conduct  should  be  certain. 

"  The  fourth  Idea  is  that  one  person  should  not  be  unjustly  en- 
riched at  the  expense  of  another."  ^^ 

^»Ibid.,   I:   194. 

20 Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Sociol.  Soc,  VII:  150. 

^^Ibid.,  I:  194. 

**lbid.j  151-152. 


2i6      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  third  type  of  behaviour  that  impressed  Itself  on  the  develop- 
ment of  jurisprudence  is  that  of  the  free  rivalry  of  propertied 
classes  as  opposed  to  class  domination.  It  arose  when  a  new  prop- 
ertied class  had  arisen  and  had  become  a  formidable  rival  for  social 
control  of  the  class  long  dominant.  In  this  stage  of  legal  develop- 
ment "  the  watch-words  are  equality  and  security.  The  former  in- 
volves equality  in  operation  of  legal  rules  and  equality  of  oppor- 
tunity to  exercise  one's  faculties  and  employ  one's  substance.  The 
latter  involves  the  Idea  that  every  one  is  to  be  secured  in  his  Inter- 
ests against  aggression  by  others  and  that  others  are  to  be  per- 
mitted to  acquire  from  him  or  to  exact  from  him  only  through  his 
will  that  they  do  so  or  because  of  his  infringement  of  rules  devised 
to  secure  others  In  like  interests.  To  this  end,  the  idea  of  indi- 
vidual rights  Is  worked  out  thoroughly  and  is  put  as  the  basis  of 
the  legal  system,  so  that  duties  are  regarded  as  correlative  thereto 
and  remedies  as  vindications  thereof.  Accordingly  the  all-Impor- 
tant legal  institutions  of  this  period  are  property  and  contract  .  .  . 
preservation  of  the  rights  of  private  property  was  the  fundamental 
object  of  the  law."  ^^  This  principle  of  free  rivalry  of  propertied 
classes  and  freedom  of  contract  continued  to  be  essential  In  law- 
making in  England  until  well  into  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  ^^ 

The  fourth  type  of  behaviour  that  expressed  itself  In  the  func- 
tioning of  law  is  that  of  co-operation  for  the  realization  of  public 
welfare.  This  marks  the  stage  of  legal  development  just  begin- 
ning. Dean  Pound  writes,  "  Toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century  signs  of  the  beginnings  of  a  new  stage  of  legal  development 
begin  to  be  manifest  throughout  the  world."  ^^  In  the  preceding 
stage  of  development,  "  the  legal  system  seeks  to  secure  individuals 
in  the  advantages  given  them  by  nature  or  their  station  in  the  world 
and  to  enable  them  to  use  these  advantages  as  freely  as  Is  com- 
patible with  a  like  free  exercise  of  their  faculties  and  use  of  their 
advantages  by  others.  To  accomplish  these  ends  it  reverts  in 
some  measure  to  the  Ideas  of  the  strict  law.  In  consequence  a  cer- 
tain opposition  between  law  and  morals  develops  once  more,  and 
just  as  the  neglect  of  the  moral  aspects  of  conduct  in  the  stage  of 
strict  law  required  the  legal  revolution  through  infusion  of  lay  moral 

2SIbid.,    152-153. 

2*  Dicey,  "  Law  and  Opinion  in  England,"  Lectures  VII-VIIL 

*  Pound,  op.  cit.,  153. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  JURISPRUDENCE    217 

ideas  into  the  law,  which  in  different  legal  systems  we  call  equity 
or  natural  law,  so  the  neglect  of  the  moral  worth  of  the  individual 
and  of  his  claims  to  a  complete  moral  and  social  life  involved  in  the 
insistence  upon  property  and  contract  in  the  maturity  of  the  law 
are  requiring  a  similar  legal  revolution  through  the  absorption  into 
the  law  of  ideas  developed  in  the  social  sciences.  Juristically,  this 
is  beginning  in  the  recognition  of  interests  as  the  ultimate  idea  be- 
hind rights,  duties,  and  remedies.  It  is  seen  that  the  so-called 
natural  rights  are  something  quite  distinct  in  character  from  legal 
rights;  that  they  are  claims  which  human  beings  may  reasonably 
make,  whereas  legal  rights  are  means  which  the  state  employs  in 
order  to  give  effect  to  such  claims.  But  when  natural  rights  are  put 
in  this  form  it  becomes  evident  that  these  individual  interests  are 
on  no  higher  plane  than  social  interests,  and,  indeed,  for  the  most 
part  get  their  significance  from  a  social  interest  in  giving  effect  to 
them.  In  consequence  the  emphasis  comes  to  be  transferred  grad- 
ually from  individual  interests  to  social  interests.  Such  a  move- 
ment is  taking  place  palpably  in  the  law  of  all  countries  today. 
Its  watchword  is  satisfaction  of  human  wants,  and  it  seems  to  put 
as  the  end  of  law  the  satisfaction  of  as  many  human  demands  as 
we  can  with  the  least  sacrifice  of  other  demands."  ^®  This  change 
in  the  function  of  law  came  as  the  result  of  a  change  in  human  na- 
ture, a  passing  of  the  abject  submission  of  the  working  hosts  and 
a  growing  resistance  of  the  control  exercised  by  reactionary  proper- 
tied classes.  Human  wants  have  come  to  the  fore  because  of  this 
situation  that  necessitates  their  satisfaction.  There  has  been,  also, 
a  quickening  of  the  sympathetic  and  intellectual  dispositions  of  many 
of  the  more  fortunately  situated  individuals.  The  present  trend  in 
jurisprudence  is,  therefore,  one  for  the  welfare  of  the  masses,  as 
opposed  to  the  welfare  of  one  class  at  the  expense  of  another. 

Correlative  with  the  development  of  the  functioning  of  law  that 
has  been  outlined  is  a  development  in  the  purpose  of  law-making, 
(i)  "In  the  first  stage  of  legal  development,  law-making  is  wholly 
subconscious.  Historically  the  judge  precedes  the  law  and  the 
court  precedes  the  legislature.  What  we  call  legislation  in  the  be- 
ginnings of  law  is  wholly  declaratory.  It  is  not  an  authoritative 
making  of  new  law,  it  is  an  authoritative  publication  of  law  already 
existing  in  the  form  of  traditional  modes  of  applying  for  judicial 

^^ Ibid.,  153-154.     See  also  Pound,  "The  End  of  Law  as  Developed  in  Legal  Rules 
and  Doctrines,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVII:  225-234. 


2i8     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

action,  traditional  rules  of  decision,  and  traditional  limitations  upon 
self-help."  ^'^  (2)  "  The  first  conscious  making  of  law  takes  place 
when  choice  has  to  be  made  between  conflicting  traditions  or  where 
conflicting  traditions  must  be  harmonized  through  amendment. 
This  necessity  arises  whenever  an  attempt  is  made  to  declare  the 
common  custom  of  a  political  unit  formed  by  the  union  of  hereto- 
fore distinct  tribes  or  peoples  with  customs  of  their  own."  ^® 
Change  was  facilitated  by  the  development  of  the  conception  of 
natural  law  which  made  It  possible  to  preserve  the  theory  that  law 
was  to  be  found  rather  than  made;  when  It  was  not  to  be  found  in 
the  law  of  the  land.  It  was  to  be  found  in  the  principles  of  natural 
law.^®  (3)  A  third  stage  of  law-making  sought  to  Insure  freedom 
of  contract,  as  well  as  security  of  property  and  contract.^*^  (4)  In 
the  fourth  stage  of  law-making  the  reasonable  development  of  law 
for  the  public  welfare  becomes  the  conscious  guiding  purpose.  If 
this  purpose  is  to  be  realized,  "  both  judicial  law-making  and  legis- 
lative law-making  must  know  the  ends  to  which  they  are  employed. 
For  our  trust  Is  in  the  eflicacy  of  Intelligent  effort;  so  far  as  we  can 
make  law  consciously,  we  are  to  make  It  Intelligently.  This  was 
hardly  possible  until  we  had  arrived  at  the  conception  of  interests. 
Our  hope  of  achieving  it  Is  in  definition  of  the  Interests  that  may 
claim  to  be  secured  and  determination  of  the  principles  according 
to  which  they  are  to  be  selected  and  delimited  for  legal  recog- 
nition."^^ 

The  study  of  the  interests  that  may  claim  to  be  secured  is,  in 
part,  a  social-psychological  problem.  Intelligent  law-making  in- 
volves also  a  shrewd  estimate  of  the  limits  of  effective  legal  action, 
which  requires  a  knowledge  of  social  psychology.  "  We  must  re- 
member that  .  .  .  the  legal  system  Is  obliged  to  rely  upon  external 
agencies  to  put  its  machinery  in  motion.  Even  the  best  of  laws  do 
not  enforce  themselves.  Hence  it  is  of  the  first  importance  to 
study  the  social-psychological  limitations  upon  enforcement  of  legal 
rules.  It  needs  very  little  comparison  of  the  law  in  the  books  with 
the  law  in  action  to  demonstrate  that  both  judge-made  and  statu- 
tory rules  fail  continually  because  they  lack  what  has  been  called  the 

2''^  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Sociol.  Soc,  VII:  154. 
^^Ibid..   154. 
i^Ibid.,    155. 
^^Ibid.,   155. 
^^Ibid.,    155-156. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  JURISPRUDENCE     219 

social-psychological  guaranty.  A  rule  may  run  counter  to  the  indi- 
vidual interests  of  a  majority  or  of  a  militant  minority  or  of  a 
powerful  class;  or  it  may  run  counter  to  the  moral  ideas  of  indi- 
viduals, as  in  the  case  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law ;  or  it  may  be  that 
no  immediate  interests  are  involved  and  hence  they  are  indiffer- 
ent." ^^  The  limits  of  effective  legal  action  depend,  therefore,  on 
social-psychological  processes. 

We  may  gather  from  what  has  preceded  that  the  types  of  be- 
haviour discerned  in  political  relations  determine  also  legal  develop- 
ment. For  instance,  in  the  United  States,  the  rural  conditions 
which  long  prevailed  guaranteed  an  approximate  equality  of  eco- 
nomic opportunity;  the  social  differentiation  was  along  occupational 
lines  —  chiefly  between  city  and  country.  There  was  a  sense  of 
individual  independence  and  equality.  The  law  was  individualistic; 
its  essential  function  was  to  restrain  violence  and  to  settle  dis- 
putes.^^  Law  was  essentially  custom  and  there  was  an  aversion 
to  law-making.  In  this  period  also  politics  were  a  partisan  rather 
than  a  class  phenomenon.^^  This  period  of  political  development 
was  followed  by  a  keenly  competitive  struggle  of  business  and  finan- 
cial interests,  which  resulted  in  the  rise  of  semi-monopolistic  cor- 
porations, which,  in  turn,  was  followed  by  a  movement  of  lesser 
business  interests  against  economic  domination  and  for  "  free  com- 
petition," and  this  by  a  progressive  political  movement  for  the 
control  of  great  corporate  interests  for  the  public  welfare.  This 
political  development  enlisted  the  old  individualism  in  law-making, 
which  facilitates  the  domination  and  control  exercised  by  great 
corporate  interests;  and,  opposed  to  this  the  free  rivalry  principle 
which  calls  for  the  restraint  of  ruthless  monopoly  in  the  interest 
of  free  competition;^^  and  opposed  to  both  the  principle  of  the 
extensive  use  of  the  police  power  on  behalf  of  the  public  welfare. 

^^Ibid.,  159. 

^3  Williams,  op.  cit.,  57-59. 

^Ibid.,  60. 

'*5  Adams,  Bigelow  and  others,  "  Centralization  and  the  Law,"  64-65. 


CHAPTER  XII 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    ASPECTS    OF    THE    JURISTIC    PROBLEM 

THE  preceding  chapter  has  suggested  the  social-psychologi- 
cal aspects  of  the  juristic  problem.  We  need  to  know  in 
how  far  law  can  free  itself  from  its  traditional  aspects, 
in  assisting  adaptation  to  changing  conditions  that  necessitate  new 
social  adjustments,  and  still  remain  law,  that  is,  a  rule  of  conduct 
infractions  of  which,  in  so  far  as  the  law  is  understood  and  the  in- 
fractions made  public,  stir  an  effective  public  disapproval.  In  the 
first  and  second  periods  of  the  development  of  law,  law  was  custom 
arbitrarily  applied,  because  of  the  rigidly  conventional  character  of 
the  people.  The  customary  law  of  this  early  period  was  originally 
unwritten,  and  the  first  codifications  merely  stated  as  exactly  as  pos- 
sible the  customary  law.  Codification  gives  customs  a  definite 
statement  which,  like  the  codification  of  religious  dogma,  hampers 
progressive  interpretation.  For  instance,  the  Institutes  of  Jus- 
tinian abound  in  explanations  based  on  supposed  derivations  of 
words,  as  do  commentaries  on  the  Talmud  and  the  Bible.  "  A 
'  system  of  unwritten  law,'  said  Chief  Justice  Cockburn,  '  has  at 
least  this  advantage,  that  its  elasticity  enables  those  who  administer 
it  to  adapt  it  to  the  requirements  and  habits  of  the  age  in  which 
we  live,  so  as  to  avoid  the  inconsistencies  and  injustice  which  arise 
when  the  law  is  no  longer  in  harmony  with  the  habits  and  usages 
and  interests  of  the  generation  to  which  it  is  immediately  ap- 
pHed.'  "  1 

Positive  enactment  of  laws,  as  distinguished  from  mere  codifica- 
tion of  custom,  does  not  come  "  until  reverence  for  ancestors  has 
been  so  much  weakened  that  it  is  no  longer  thought  wrong  to  inter- 
fere with  traditional  customs  by  positive  enactment.  Even  then 
there  is  reluctance  to  make  enactments,  and  there  is  a  stage  of  tran- 
sition  during  which  traditional  customs  are  extended  by  interpreta- 
tion to  cover  new  cases  and  to  prevent  evils."  ^     This  use  of  tra- 

1  Quoted  by  Smith,  "  The  Use  of  Maxims  in  Jurisprudence,"  Harvard  Laio  Review, 
IX:  23. 
"  Sumner,  "  Folkways,"  55. 

220 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  221 

ditional  formulas  continues  on  into  and  through  the  period  of  posi- 
tive enactment,  in  the  form  of  the  use  of  legal  maxims.  The 
social-psychological  cause,  here,  is  the  conventional  attitude  of 
lawyer  and  judge.  It  "  should  be  noticed  that  '  many  of  the  say- 
ings that  are  dignified  by  the  name  of  maxims  are  nothing  but  the 
obiter  dicta  of  ancient  judges  who  were  fond  of  sententious  phrases, 
and  sometimes  sacrificed  accuracy  of  definition  to  tenseness  of  ex- 
pression.' Moreover,  a  statement  intended  as  a  maxim  may  have 
gained  currency  as  such  out  of  deference  to  the  reputation  of  its 
author,  rather  than  by  reason  of  its  intrinsic  correctness  as  a  faith- 
ful representation  of  existing  law.  ...  It  is  not  unreasonable  to 
suppose  that  the  old  sagas,  in  some  instances,  intentionally  over- 
stated a  truth  for  the  purpose  of  attracting  attention.  .  .   . 

"'Legal  maxims  do  not  change;  they  are  the  fundamental 
principles  of  law,  and  therefore  no  alterations  in  them  can  be 
noted.  .  .  .'  Such  is  the  claim  made  in  the  preface  to  a  recent 
collection  of  maxims.  This  statement  apparently  assumes,  first, 
that  all  prominent  legal  maxims  are  correct  representations  of  fun- 
damental principles  of  law;  second,  that  these  so-called  '  funda- 
mental principles  of  law '  never  change.  The  first  assumption  is 
not  well  founded,  as  appears  from  the  extracts  we  have  already 
given  from  high  authorities.  Nor  is  the  second  assumption  cor- 
rect, unless  the  term  '  fundamental  principles  of  law  '  is  so  defined 
as  to  restrict  the  class  to  a  very  small  number.  .  .  . 

"  If  the  foregoing  criticisms  are  well  founded,  how  shall  we 
account  for  the  fact  that  various  objectionable  maxims  keep  their 
place  in  the  books,  and  are  daily  quoted  by  eminent  jurists.  One 
answer  to  this  inquiry  is  suggested  by  the  remark  of  Sir  Henry 
Maine  that  *  legal  phraseology  is  the  part  of  the  law  which  is  the 
last  to  alter.'  The  most  ardent  law  reformers,  in  spite  of  the 
scriptural  warning  against  putting  new  wine  in  old  bottles,  some- 
times prefer  to  give  a  new  interpretation  to  an  old  phrase  rather 
than  attempt  the  almost  '  impossible  task  of  blotting  it  out  of  our 
jurisprudence.'  Even  Austin,  who  did  not  hesitate  to  apply  to 
some  existing  terms  such  an  epithet  as  '  jargon,'  is  not  inclined  to 
unnecessarily  *  engage  in  a  toilsome  struggle  with  the  current  of 
ordinary  speech.'  "  ^  Most  "  legal  maxims  are  clothed  in  the 
words  of  a  dead  language."  *     They  are  put  forward  as  the  reason 

3  Smith,  op.  cit.,  22-24   (quoted  without  foot-notes). 
4^  Ibid.,  25. 


222     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

for  a  ruling  when  they  are  merely  "  dogma,  not  reasoning."  '^ 
This  use  of  maxims,  and  the  conservative  attitude  which  fosters 
it  in  judicial  reasoning,  is  contrary  to  progress  in  jurisprudence, 
which  requires  that  the  law  be  given  greater  definiteness  as  to  its 
meaning.  "  As  our  law  develops  it  becomes  more  and  more  im- 
portant to  give  definiteness  to  its  phraseology;  discriminations  mul- 
tiply, new  situations  and  complications  of  fact  arise,  and  the  old 
outfit  of  ideas,  discriminations,  and  phrases  has  to  be  carefully 
revised.  Law  is  not  so  unlike  all  other  subjects  of  human  contem- 
plation that  clearness  of  thought  will  not  help  us  powerfully  in 
grasping  it.  If  terms  in  common  legal  use  are  used  exactly,  it  is 
well  to  know  it;  if  they  are  used  inexactly,  it  is  well  to  know  that, 
and  to  remark  just  how  they  are  used."  ® 

The  conventional  judicial  attitude  is  encouraged  by  the  conven- 
tional character  of  the  mass  of  the  people.  For  the  rank  and  file 
of  people,  law  remains  today  what  it  was  in  the  beginning;  people 
conform  to  law  as  to  custom.  "  The  laws  themselves,  in  fact,  com- 
mand obedience  more  as  customs  than  as  laws.  A  rule  of  conduct 
which,  from  one  point  of  view,  is  a  law,  is  in  most  cases,  from  an- 
other point  of  view,  a  custom;  .  .  .  the  ordinary  citizen  stands 
in  no  need  of  studying  the  laws  under  which  he  lives,  custom  being 
generally  the  safe  guiding  star  of  his  conduct."  '^  Law  which  is 
custom  has  the  force  both  of  custom  and  of  law,  while  it  is  a 
social-psychological  problem  in  how  far  laws  which  are  not  custom 
can  be  enforced.* 

Owing  to  the  fact  that,  until  modern  times,  the  law-making  and 
law-declaring  machinery  was  controlled  by  an  hereditary  aristoc- 
racy, with  the  conventional  acquiescence  of  other  classes,  the  law 
was  little  subject  to  change,  and  judges  regarded  —  and  most  of 
them  do,  to  the  present  day,  continue  to  regard  —  themselves  not 
as  legislators,  but  as  discoverers  of  rules  logically  pre-existing  in 
the  law.  It  is  maintained  today,  by  one  school  of  jurists,  that 
"  the  effort  of  the  judge  is  to  find  the  best  rule  by  which  the  case 

8  Ibid.,  25. 

'  Thayer,  "  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,"  190. 

'''  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  I:  164. 

8  Pound,  op.  cit.,  159;  Pound,  "Law  in  Books  and  Law  in  Action,"  Amer.  Laiv  Rev., 
XLIV:  12-36;  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  I:  163;  Sumner,  "Folkways,"  55.  See  also  the 
testimony  of  Louis  D.  Brandeis  before  Committee  on  Interstate  Commerce  of  United 
.  States  Senate  investigating  the  Desirability  of  changing  the  Laws  regulating  and  con- 
trolling Corporations,  Persons  and  Firms  engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce,  1912,  in 
Ortb,  "  Readings  on  the  Relation  of  Government  to  Property  and  Industry,"  607H608. 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  223 

may  be  determined.  In  this  search  the  things  considered  are  the 
ordinary  ways  in  which  the  business,  the  intercourse,  and  the  con- 
duct of  Hfe  are  conducted;  and  whether  the  conduct  in  question  is 
in  harmony  with  them,  or,  if  not,  in  what  particular  it  is  dis- 
cordant. .  .  . 

"  Even  where  the  question  is  one  of  the  interpretation  of  written 
law,  involving  the  meaning  of  words  and  the  legislative  intent,  the 
things  contended  about  in  argument  and  decision  are  the  customary 
employment  of  language,  the  customary  motives  of  action,  and  the 
mischievous  departures  from  established  custom,  which  the  statute 
was  probably  intended  to  remedy."  ^  Although  this  theory  of  the 
proper  judicial  attitude  was,  as  Dean  Pound  says  in  his  review  of 
Carter's  book,  twenty-five  years  behind  the  times  when  it  was  pub- 
lished,^"  yet  the  theory  is  held  by  many  of  the  leading  lawyers  and 
judges  of  the  country  today,  who  regard  Carter's  book  as  the  final 
word  on  the  subject.  The  conception  of  a  progressive  jurispru- 
dence which  seeks  rationally  to  promote  the  public  welfare  is  not 
new,  but  not  until  recently  has  the  conception  become  influential  in 
some  law  schools. 

The  prominence  of  the  customary  aspect  of  law  has  prompted 
some  sociologists  to  treat  law  as  an  evolution  of  custom,  with  a 
minimum  of  purposeful  development;  ^^  and  it  has  led  some  jurists 
to  find  in  sociology,  as  the  science  of  institutions  in  their  customary 
as  distinguished  from  their  dynamic  aspects,  the  basis  of  their  sci- 
ence. For  instance.  Professor  Ehrlich  has  shown  at  great  length 
that  the  law  applied  by  the  courts  is  by  no  means  identical  with  the 
jural  relations  of  a  group,  that  those  relations  also  include  customs 
not  recognized  by  law  and  which  often  could  not  be  enforced  in  a 
law  court  but  yet  determine  social  relations. ^^  He  generalizes  that 
law  is  therefore  the  settled  form  of  the  social  order,  instead  of 
rules  imposed  from  above,  and  that  the  nature  of  law  cannot  be 
deduced  from  the  fiction  of  sovereignty  as  an  omnipotence  of  the 
state.  He  maintains  that  the  new  powerful  economic  organiza- 
tions, as  trusts  and  trade  unions,  have  discredited  the  old  theory 
of  sovereignty  as  absolute  obedience-compelling  power.  He  like- 
wise minimizes  the  effect  on  law  of  conscious  directing  purpose. 

•  Carter,  "  Law,  Its  Origin,  Growth  and  Function,"  172-173. 
1°  See  Pound's  review  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly,  XXIV:  317-320. 
^1  Keller,  "  Law  in  Evolution,"  Yale  Law  Journal,  XXVIII :  775-776. 
^2  Ehrlich,  "  Grundlegung  einer  Soziologie  des  Rechts,"  396-398. 


224     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Consequently  he  exaggerates  the  difference  between  his  point  of 
view  and  that  of  Ihering,  both  of  whom  emphasized  the  necessity 
of  a  social  background  for  the  study  of  jurisprudence  but  empha- 
sized different  aspects  of  that  background,  and  both  of  whom  suf- 
fered from  lack  of  a  sufficiently  developed  science,  either  of  soci- 
ology or  of  social  psychology,  for  that  reconstruction  of  juris- 
prudence which  each  sought  to  achieve. 

The  customary  nature  of  law  and  the  divergence  of  law  from 
custom  raises  problems  which  are  essentially  social-psychological. 
Jurists  and  legal  philosophers  have  explained  and  justified  the  di- 
vergence of  law  from  custom  under  five  conceptions,  the  conception 
of  natural  law,  the  conception  of  the  sovereign  will,  the  conception 
of  the  right  of  the  individual  to  pursue  his  interests  unhampered  by 
legal  restrictions,  the  conception  of  justice  on  behalf  of  those  that 
need  some  assistance  from  the  strong  arm  of  the  state,  and  the 
conception  of  the  public  welfare.  These  conceptions  have  a  social- 
psychological  basis.  Natural  law  is  a  figment  of  the  imagination, 
used  to  give  a  sanction  to  certain  persistent  dispositions  and  neces- 
sary interests  of  man.  The  sovereign  will  is  a  mere  phrase  until 
we  understand  the  psychological  processes  involved  in  the  relation 
of  sovereign  and  subjects.  The  conception  of  individual  liberty 
refers  primarily  to  impulses  for  the  acquisition  of  property,  and 
the  freedom  to  be  given  these  impulses  depends  on  social-psycho- 
logical conditions.  The  conception  of  justice  on  behalf  of  the 
weak  and  the  conception  of  the  public  welfare  imply  an  assumption 
of  human  wants,  and  of  a  human  personality  that  is  entitled  to 
opportunities  for  development,  assumptions  which,  in  both  cases, 
involve  conceptions  of  social  psychology. 

Distinct  from  juristic  explanations  that  justify  the  divergence  of 
law  from  custom  is  the  problem  of  the  causes  of  that  divergence. 
One  cause,  of  which  we  have  abundant  evidence,  is  the  will  of  a 
dominant  class.  The  will  of  a  dominant  class  is  evident  in  changes 
in  the  law  early  in  the  history  of  jurisprudence,  for  instance,  in  the 
substitution  of  Roman  law  for  the  older  German  customary  law  in 
continental  Europe.  The  public  welfare  required  a  law  more 
suited  than  the  German  law  to  the  needs  of  developing  industry, 
but  this  public  welfare  aspect  of  the  change  does  not  explain  it. 
It  was  due  to  the  influence  of  a  dominant  class,  working  in  its  own 
interest.     Thus  we  find  that,  as  a  result  of  the  development  of 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  225 

commerce  and  the  handicrafts  in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  of  the 
decreasing  importance  of  the  agrarian  class,  that  is,  the  lower  no- 
bility, the  tendency  in  Germany  was  "  toward  princely  centraliza- 
tion, at  the  expense  of  the  empire  on  t^e  one  hand  and  the  lower 
nobility  on  the  other.  .  .  .  The  knights,  impoverished  by  high 
prices  and  the  fall  of  land  values,  their  fighting  status  made  lower 
by  gunpowder,  rose  in  rebellion,"  ^^  but  in  vain.  The  princes  mas- 
tered the  situation.  To  make  good  their  domination,  as  well  as  to 
facilitate  the  development  of  the  rising  commercial  class,  they 
sought  to  replace  the  old  German  with  the  Roman  law.  "  The 
old  German  law  was  a  vast  array  of  uncodified  local  laws  and  cus- 
toms, varying  with  the  principality,  commune,  town,  village  or 
manor.  .  .  .  The  new  economy  demanded  uniformity  and  preci- 
sion, and  the  highly-developed  and  comprehensive  system  of  Roman 
law  which  was  ready  at  hand,  suited  it  admirably."  ^^  "  The 
princes  counted  on  the  assistance  of  the  Roman  jurists  to  legitimize 
what  they  had  accomplished  by  force.  .  .  .  Jacob  Wimpheling 
complains  that  '  according  to  the  abominable  axioms  of  the  jurists 
the  princes"  must  be  everything  in  the  land  and  the  people  noth- 
ing.' "  ^^  And  again:  "  '  Who  would  not  rejoice  if  the  knights, 
burghers  and  peasants,  loyal  to  the  old  customs,  were  to  unite 
themselves  and  war  manfully  against  these  enemies,  whose  deceit 
and  sophistry  has  done  so  much  to  undermine  them?  '  "^^  "In 
spite  of  denunciation  .  .  .  the  jurists  continued  to  find  lucrative 
employment.  Their  services  were  too  valuable  to  those  in  power 
to  cause  a  really  serious  effort  to  be  made  to  oust  them.  Roman 
law  continued  to  develop  in  Germany  undisturbed,  and  by  the  end 
of  the  sixteenth  century  the  old  German  law  had  practically  dis- 
appeared." ^^ 

This  change  took  place  gradually,  under  the  influence  of  the 
dominant  class.  "  The  method  of  procedure  according  to  German 
law,  or  rather  local  customs  and  traditions,  largely  unwritten,  was 
in  sharp  contrast  to  that  of  the  Roman.  Every  case  tried  under 
German  law  was  brought  before  a  sort  of  jury-court,  called  the 
Schoffen,  composed  of  the  free  inhabitants  of  the  district.     This 

^^  Schapiro,  "  Social  Reform  and  the  Reformation,"  41. 
14  Ibid.,  40. 
'^^  Ibid.,  41-42. 
^^Ibid.,  51-52. 
^Ubid.,   52-53. 


226     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

body  tried  the  case  and  rendered  the  verdict  which  was  pronounced 
by  a  presiding  judge  who  was  merely  their  mouthpiece.  .  .  . 
Roman  jurists  were  gradually  introduced  into  these  jury-courts  in 
the  following  manner.  The  lord  would  appoint  one  ...  to  sit 
with  the  Schoffen  and  advise  with  them.  He  soon  made  his  influ- 
ence felt,  however,  being  generally  much  abler  and  more  learned 
than  his  associates."  ^^  He  finally  displaced  these  German  judges. 
"  The  jurist,  now  the  sole  arbiter,  was  appointed  by  the  prince  or 
lord,  and  his  duty  was  to  interpret  a  written  code  promulgated  by 
the  same  authority.  The  machinery  of  justice  being  in  complete 
control  of  the  ruling  powers,  the  subserviency  of  the  jurists  to  the 
latter's  interests  was  but  natural.  The  lord  could  now  easily  work 
his  will  in  the  administration  of  justice  since  he  both  proclaimed 
the  law  and  controlled  the  judge."  ^^  "  Roman  law  was  appro- 
priate to  an  economic  system  based  on  a  few  great  land-owners 
and  a  horde  of  slaves  and  dependents.  Its  ideal  was  that  every 
individual  was  to  seek  his  own  advantage  protected  by  the  power 
of  the  state.  The  German  law  on  the  contrary  was  tinctured  with 
communal  ethics  and  emphasized  the  welfare  of  the  group  as 
against  that  of  the  individual.  .  .  .  The  new  jurisprudence  had 
the  effect  of  undermining  the  personal  status  of  the  German  peasant. 
.  .  .  The  tendency,  already  strong,  to  reduce  a  comparatively  free 
and  prosperous  peasantry  to  a  state  of  hopeless  serfdom  by  increas- 
ing dues  and  services,  confiscating  common  lands  and  enforcing 
severe  game  laws,  received  a  fresh  impetus.  .  .  .  The  jurists  were 
of  great  service  to  the  lords  in  getting  up  legal  quibbles  to  despoil 
the  peasant  of  his  rights.  .  .  .  The  legal  tyranny  of  the  lord  could 
be  more  easily  exercised  now  that  he  was  dominus  under  Roman 
law."  20 

Thus  did  a  dominant  class  gradually  do  away  with  the  customary 
law  of  the  land,  which  was  "  either  discarded  or  absorbed  by  the 
foreign  code."  ^^  Even  though  this  development  was  resisted  by 
so  strong  a  conservative  force  as  the  Roman  Church,  because  it  fa- 
voured the  claims  of  the  princes  as  against  those  of  the  pope  to 
temporal  sovereignty, ^^  it  gradually  prevailed.     It  was  in  line  also 

^»Ibid.,  46. 
^^Ibid.,  47. 

20/*,V.,    47-49. 

21 7*1^.,  S3.  1 

^^Ibid.,    42-43. 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  227 

with  the  intellectual  enthusiasm  of  the  time,  which  found  satisfac- 
tion in  its  "  logical  reasoning,  subtle  distinctions  and  comprehen- 
sive principles."  ^^  These  intellectuals  became  the  ready  servants 
of  the  dominant  class. 

Another  cause  of  changes  in  law  is  changing  requirements  for 
the  public  welfare.  This  is  seen  in  the  history  of  criminal  law, 
from  its  beginning  in  the  attempt  of  a  central  authority  in  the 
interest  of  public  order  to  punish  crimes  heretofore  left  to  private 
vengeance,  to  the  modern  emphasis  on  the  necessity  of  adequate 
penalties  for  the  protection  of  the  public  from  predatory  capitalistic 
interests.  The  development  of  criminal  law  in  the  direction  of  the 
public  welfare  has  been  thwarted  by  the  influence  of  a  dominant 
class.  This  influence  has  acted  on  the  law  indirectly,  through  af- 
fecting public  sentiment,  which  determines  penalties.  Penalties 
were  at  first  determined,  not  by  an  intelligent  purpose  to  deter  from 
crime,  but  by  an  impulsive  reaction  against  the  criminal  because  of 
the  crime,^*  which  reaction  depended  on  the  class  standing  of  the 
criminal.  For  instance,  among  barbarian  peoples,  the  higher  the 
class  of  the  criminal,  the  smaller  the  fine  he  had  to  pay;  the  higher 
the  class  of  the  victim  of  the  crime,  the  larger  the  fine  exacted  of 
the  criminal. 2^  Even  at  the  present  time  the  influence  of  a  domi- 
nant class  makes  itself  felt  in  the  determination  of  penalties,  con- 
trary to  the  public  welfare.  Laws  which  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
will  apply  only  to  wealthy  offenders  have  ridiculously  low  penalties, 
in  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  offence  and  the  marginal  utility  of 
money  to  the  rich;  and  some  of  those  laws  are  made  devoid  of  as- 
pects of  criminality,  and  have  no  penalties  at  all  until  experience 
proves  that,  without  penalties,  such  laws  are  ineffective.^^  Fur- 
thermore, the  anti-social  action  of  the  "  respectable  and  strong  "  is 
often  not  forbidden  by  law,  and,  where  forbidden,  the  law  is  often 
not  enforced.^''^  Where  the  social  reaction  against  anti-social  ac- 
tion is  weakened  by  the  prevailing  attitude  of  admiration  for  or 
fear  of  the  wealthy,  an  effective  adjustment  of  penalty  to  crime 
is  prevented. 

^^Ibid.,   42. 

24  Smith,   "  Criminal  Law  in  the  United  States,"  60-61. 

25  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  II:  19-20;  Jastrow,  "The  Civilization  of  Babylonia  and 
Assyria,"  293-296. 

28Brandeis,  "The  Constitution  and  the  Minimum  Wage,"  Survey,  Feb.  6,  1915,  492. 
27  Henderson,  "The  Cause  and  Cure  of  Crime,"  36-39. 


228      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Where  the  aggressive  special  interests  have  no  traits  that  cause 
them  to  be  admired  but  are  disliked  and  detested,  the  popular  re- 
action against  them  is  most  effective.  This  is  illustrated  by  the 
movement  to  prohibit  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  liquor  for  bev- 
erage purposes.  In  the  United  States  this  movement  has  been 
strongest  in  rural  districts  in  which  the  inhabitants  had  personal 
experience  of  the  effect  of  the  liquor  traffic  in  debauching  neighbours 
and  relatives,  in  causing  poverty,  disorder,  crime,  insanity  and  all 
kinds  of  misfortune,  so  that,  outside  his  own  circle  the  saloon- 
keeper was  the  most  detested  man  in  the  neighbourhood.  In  the 
South  there  was  the  added  motive  of  fear  of  liquor-crazed  Negroes. 
But  in  the  great  cities,  with  their  lack  of  neighbourhood  feeling, 
the  evil  developed  until  the  aggressive  liquor  interests  encountered 
another  aggressive  class, —  business  men  who,  especially  during  the 
war,  feared  the  disorder  that  might  be  caused  by  liquor-drinking 
and  regretted  the  economic  waste  of  the  traffic  which  consumed  so 
much  food  products,  and  also  regretted  the  diminished  productivity 
of  labour  caused  by  liquor-drinking.  This  was  the  period  of  the 
passage  of  the  Eighteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  forbid- 
ding the  manufacture  and  sale  of  liquor  for  beverage  purposes. 
The  aggressive  liquor  interests  were  successfully  curbed,  so  far  as 
the  fundamental  law  was  concerned,  but  persisted  wherever  public 
sentiment  permitted.  After  the  war  was  over  business  interests  — 
no  longer  fearful  of  the  traffic  because  it  interfered  with  the  war 
activities,  and  prosperous  and  therefore  more  favourable  to  the 
use  of  liquor  as  a  beverage,  and  inclined  to  allow  workmen  any- 
thing that  would  allay  discontent  —  were  less  inclined  to  prohibi- 
tion, so  that  in  the  manufacturing  states  there  was  a  strong  reaction 
against  it.  The  prohibition  movement  is,  therefore,  an  example 
of  the  successful  curbing  of  a  detested  aggressive  interest  by  the 
effective  action  of  public  opinion,  unorganized,  and  also  organized, 
for  instance,  in  the  Anti-Saloon  League.  The  movement  has  been 
for  the  most  part  opposed  by  organized  labour,  officially  at  least, 
and  it  is  doubtful  if  national  prohibition  would  have  been  achieved 
unless  public  opinion  had  had  the  powerful  support  of  business  in- 
terests during  the  war  period.  The  prestige  of  the  committees, — 
which  included  prominent  business  men, —  that  were  formed  in  the 
various  cities  to  secure  favourable  legislative  action  on  the  proposed 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  229 

amendment  often  converted  an  indifferent  public  opinion  into  a 
positive  force  for  the  Amendment. 

One  of  the  weaknesses  of  a  prohibitory  law  lies  in  the  fact  that 
when  the  detested  saloon-keeper  disappears  from  view,  the  senti- 
ment against  the  traffic  weakens.  On  the  other  hand,  a  law  has 
the  effect  of  weakening  the  forbidden  behaviour,  not  only  because 
of  fear  of  penalty  but  also  because  the  existence  of  the  law  strength- 
ens the  social  abhorrence  of  that  behaviour.  For  the  law  puts 
the  obedience-compelling  power  of  the  state  —  which  to  most  peo- 
ple means  so  much, —  with  all  its  prestige,  on  the  side  of  the  ab- 
horrence. And  the  greater  the  state,  the  greater  its  support  — 
hence  the  preference  of  prohibitionists  for  national,  instead  of  state 
laws.  The  evil  of  the  disrespect  for  law  which  may  be  occasioned 
by  passing  a  law  that  can  be  only  partially  enforced  may,  it  is  main- 
tained, be  more  than  compensated  by  diminishing  the  evil  behaviour 
through  removing  the  temptation  thereto,  and  through  strengthen- 
ing the  social  abhorrence  thereof. 

The  harm  done  by  statutes  that  are  "  in  advance  of  public  opin- 
ion "  is  usually  over-estimated  because  statutes  are  interpreted  by 
the  courts  according  to  legal  tradition,  and  law  is,  in  the  last  analy- 
sis, as  judges  interpret  it.  Consequently  the  degree  of  deliberate 
purpose  that  is  involved  in  law-making  depends,  in  the  last  analysis, 
on  the  judge.  If  extremely  conventional  he  may  so  interpret  —  or 
ignore  —  a  statute  as  to  make  it  practically  identical  with  tradition; 
if  extremely  rational  he  may  interpret  it  from  the  point  of  view  of 
a  rational  social  purpose  with  a  minimum  of  attention  to  legal 
tradition;  or,  between  the  two  extremes,  he  may  use  the  practical 
reasoning  of  business  men  who  are  often  unable  to  give  an  intelli- 
gent account  of  their  mental  processes,  even  to  themselves,^^  but  are 
nevertheless  successful  business  men. 

The  public  welfare  purpose  in  legal  regulations  of  industrial  rela- 
tions is  most  in  evidence  In  laws  affecting  women  and  children. 
This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  sympathetic  Impulses  are  more  easily 
enlisted  on  behalf  of  women  and  children  ^^  than  of  men.  For  this 
reason  legal  changes  have  been  marked  also  in  the  treatment  of 
juvenile  delinquents.     This  tendency  has  been  accelerated  by  the 

28  Brown,   "  Law   and  Evolution,"   Yale  Laiv  Journal,  Feb.,   1920,   397. 
^^  Higgins,   "  A   New   Province   for  Law    and    Order,"   II,  Harvard  Law  Reviev), 
XXXII:  191. 


230     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

fact  that  adult  criminals  tend  to  begin  their  careers  as  juvenile  de- 
linquents. Consequently  the  analysis  of  the  causes  of  crime  begins 
with  a  study  of  the  motives  of  juvenile  delinquents.  And  where 
there  are  social-psychological  studies  of  this  kind  there  are  most 
apt  to  be  changes  in  law.  The  most  careful  studies  of  the  causes 
of  crime  "  show  very  clearly  the  immense  importance  of  studying 
the  causation  of  delinquency  at  the  only  time  when  it  really  can 
satisfactorily  be  studied,  namely,  during  the  years  when  delinquency 
begins.  All  of  our  experience  goes  to  show  that  the  many  writers 
who  insist  that  practically  all  criminal  careers  begin  during  youth 
are  entirely  correct.  Not  only  is  the  high  point  for  crime,  accord- 
ing to  ages,  well  within  the  later  years  of  adolescence,  but  very 
many  delinquents  begin  their  careers  even  younger."  ^^  The  study 
of  the  causes  of  crime  must  be  made  during  these  early  years  be- 
cause, later,  the  individual  has  drifted  away  from  his  home  and 
home  town  in  which  his  criminal  career  began.  He  is  a  criminal 
from  different  impulses  than  at  first  and  shows  deterioration  from 
dissipation,  which  is  difficult  to  distinguish  from  innate  mental  de- 
fect; and  besides  this,  "  the  many  interesting  and  more  subtle  psy- 
chological considerations  concerning  the  earliest  growth  of  crimi- 
nalism steadily  become  more  difficult  to  discern."  ^^  In  delinquents 
the  instinctive  impulses  of  conduct  are  less  covered  "  with  added 
experiences  and  their  accumulation  of  memories."  ^^  It  is  neces^ 
sary  to  know  these  essential  motives  of  criminal  behaviour  if  the 
courts  are  to  act  wisely  in  their  treatment  of  delinquents.  For, 
"  to  help  the  adjudicating  authorities  in  their  decisions  they  must 
not  be  given  a  mere  bald  statement  of  what  the  individual  is  on  the 
physical  side  and  on  the  mental  side  from  the  psychiatric  stand- 
point; there  is  much  more  at  the  foundations  of  delinquency  than 
that."  ^^  "  Our  whole  work  shows  nothing  more  certainly  than 
that  no  satisfactory  study  of  delinquents,  even  for  practical  pur- 
poses, can  be  made  without  building  sanely  upon  the  foundations 
of  all  that  goes  to  make  character  and  conduct."  ^* 

Analysis  of  the  psychological  causes  of  crime  has  already  worked 
some  radical  changes  in  punishment.     However,  these  changes  did 

^0  Healy  and  Bronner,  "Youthful  OflFenders,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social.,  July,  1916,  38. 

8i/*iW.,    38. 

82  Healy,  "  Mental  Conflicts  and  Misconduct,"  55. 

88  Healy  and  Bronner,  "Youthful  Offenders,"  Amer.  Jour,  Social.,  July,  1916,  39. 

»*Ibid.,  S2. 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  231 

not  wait  upon  painstaking  studies  of  the  causes  of  crime  but  were 
initiated  by  men  of  discrimination  and  insight  like  Judge  Ben  B. 
Lindsey.  He  discerned  the  non-criminal  nature  of  much  juvenile 
delinquency,^^  before  scientific  investigations  emphasized  the  pre- 
dominant effect  of  environmental  conditions  upon  character,^®  and 
wrought  reforms  in  criminal  law  and  procedure  with  a  view  to  cre- 
ating a  favourable  environment  under  the  fostering  care  of  the 
court  and  thereby  reforming  delinquents  instead  of  confirming  their 
criminal  development  by  the  usual  judicial  attitude  ^"^  and  the  con- 
ventional punishments.^^  That  is,  progressive  changes  in  methods 
of  punishment  sprang  originally  not  from  reasoned  conviction  as 
to  just  what  results  would  follow  from  such  changes  but  from  the 
disposition  of  the  judge,  which  varied  from  that  of  the  prevailing 
type  of  judge.  This  exceptional  judge  was  predominantly  sympa- 
thetic and  intellectual  in  disposition  and  altered  procedure  and  pun- 
ishment In  line  with  his  sympathetic  and  penetrating  analysis  on 
behalf  of  the  delinquent  and  of  society.  Facilities  for  analysis  of 
the  causes  of  crime  were  then  developed  by  these  courts  and  further 
alterations  In  procedure  and  In  treatment  of  the  delinquent  were 
made  as  the  result  of  scientific  analysis. 

Social  psychology  is  necessary,  also,  for  an  understanding  of  the 
motives  of  adult  criminals.  Criminal  cases  usually  involve  ques- 
tions of  motive  and  Intention.  It  is  said  that  "  As  to  the  nature  of 
will  and  of  the  control  exercised  by  It,  It  is  not  for  lawyers  to  dis- 
pute, this  being  a  problem  of  psychology  or  physiology,  not  of  juris- 
prudence." ^^  In  the  legal  definition  of  motive  and  intention,  so- 
cial-psychology Is  still  more  intimately  related  to  jurisprudence;  the 

35  Lindsey,  "  The  Reformation  of  Juvenile  Delinquents  Through  the  Juvenile  Courts," 
"National  Conference  of  Charities  and  Corrections,"  1903,  210-228;  Lindsey,  "The 
Boy  and  the  Court,"  Charities,  XIII:  350-357;  "The  Beast,"  74-152. 

36  Goldmark,  "Boyhood  and  Lawlessness";  True,  "The  Neglected  Girl." 

37  Healy  writes  that  "  we  may,  even  at  the  risk  of  reiteration,  emphasize  once  more 
the  importance  of  attitude  towards  the  offender.  ...  It  is  most  interesting  to  note 
that  even  young  delinquents  assume  towards  the  law  that  sporting  attitude  which  they 
conceive  to  be  its  own  towards  them.  Even  a  little  lad  says,  '  I'll  take  my  medicine 
when  the  judge  hands  it  out,'  and  an  older  fellow  blurts  out,  '  It's  one  to  ten  (years) 
for  assault  with  a  deadly  weapon  and  that's  all  there  is  to  it.  I  took  my  chance 
and  lost.'  Set  rules  induce  just  this  give-and-take  attitude,  not  only  on  the  part  of 
the  offender,  but  also  on  the  part  of  the  officers  of  the  law."  ("The  Individual  Delin- 
quent," 171.) 

38  Lindsey,  "The  Problem  of  the  Children  and  How  the  State  of  Colorado  Cares 
for  Them,"  1904;  Lindsey,  "Children's  Courts  in  the  United  States,"  Document  701, 
58th  Congress,  2nd  Session,  28-132. 

••  Salmond,  "  Jurisprudence,"  325-326. 


232      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

difference  of  opinion  between  jurists  as  to  the  meaning  to  be  given 
to  these  terms  is  due,  in  part,  to  defective  psychological  analysis."*® 

The  problem  of  the  enforcement  of  law  and  the  punishment  of 
crime  is  a  social-psychological  problem.  It  is  said  that  punishment 
should  be  for  some  intelligent  purpose,  for  the  purpose  of  deterring 
from  crime  or  of  reforming  the  criminal.  But,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  society  does  not  punish  from  either  of  these  purposes;  punish- 
ment is  an  impulsive  expression  of  society's  hostile  attitude.*^ 
The  comparative  seriousness  of  punishments  is  determined  not  ac- 
cording to  the  amount  of  punishment  that  is  necessary  to  deter  from 
particular  crimes,  but  according  to  the  impulsive  reaction  of  the 
people.*^  As  degree  of  punishment  depends  on  popular  impulse 
so  the  enforcement  of  law  depends  on  popular  impulse.  Again 
take  the  case  of  a  law  prohibiting  the  manufacture  and  sale  of 
liquor.  In  Maine  the  law  was  rigorously  enforced  only  when  its 
violation  was  open  and  flagrant  and  the  violators  angered  the  peo- 
ple by  their  open  selling  in  defiance  of  the  law.*^  Periods  of  rigor- 
ous enforcement  were  followed  by  periods  of  laxity.**  But  popular 
impulse  can  be  turned  to  good  account  by  an  intelligent  leadership. 
With  a  prohibitory  law  on  the  books,  it  is  there  to  use  when  the 
people,  awakened  by  an  alert  leadership,  will  to  use  it.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  a  law  is  not  on  the  books,  the  people  cannot  meet  an 
evil  when  they  will  to  meet  it.  The  idea  that  an  evil  must  first  be 
generally  recognized  and  condemned  before  a  law  forbidding  it  is 
enacted  is  not  adapted  to  this  day  of  trained  leadership  and  of  the 
quick  development  of  social  evils  into  serious  proportions. 

The  same  situation  is  becoming  increasingly  prevalent  in  modern 
industry.  Modern  industry  gives  rise  to  abuses  which  do  not  stir 
public  resentment  except  occasionally  when  they  become  known. 
They  may  arise  from  a  motive  which  everywhere  obtains  in  the 
business  world  and  is  not  generally  condemned.  For  instance, 
raising  prices  by  agreement  does  not  stir  pubhc  resentment  among 
the  masses  when  done  very  cautiously,  without  marked  effect,  and 
without  publicity.  The  profiteering  that  stirs  resentment  is  the 
marked  raising  of  prices,  like  that  which  took  place  during  the  years 

*o  See  the  discussion  in  Cook,  "  Act,  Intention  and  Motive  in  Law,"  Yale  Law  Jour- 
nal, XXVI:  658-663. 

"Mead,  "The  Psychology  of  Punitive  Justice,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social.,  XXIII:  590. 
•*2  Westerraarck,  "The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  Ideas,"  I:  198-200. 
*3  W^ines  and  Koren,  "  The  Liquor  Problem  in  its  Legislative  Aspects,"  38. 
**Ibid.,  38. 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  233 

following  the  World  War.  Before  the  war  there  was  much  raising 
of  prices  by  agreement  but  it  was  more  cautious  and  less  conspicu- 
ous. This  practice  was  condoned  by  business  men  on  the  ground 
that,  as  one  business  man  put  it,  "  Those  fellows  are  doing  no  more 
than  you  or  I  would  do  in  our  line.  They  want  all  there  is  in  it. 
So  do  we.  You  can't  blame  them  and  I  don't  see  how  you  can  do 
anything  about  it."  That  is,  cautiously  holding  goods  by  agree- 
ment for  a  moderate  rise  in  price  is  so  widely  prevalent  and  arises 
from  a  motive  that  is  so  universal  that,  from  the  business  point  of 
view,  "  you  can't  blame  them."  There  can  be  no  resentment,  and 
hence  —  so  it  is  maintained  —  law  can  do  nothing  to  remedy  the 
evil.  That  is,  without  public  resentment  against  an  act,  there  can 
be  no  law  prohibiting  the  act.  This  is  the  subconscious,  traditional 
conception  of  effective  legal  action.  It  is  contrary  to  the  effective 
regulation  of  modern  industry,  for,  if  industry  is  to  serve  the  public 
welfare,  it  requires  legal  regulations  devised  by  experts,  which  the 
rank  and  file  do  not  understand.  These  laws  will  forbid  evil  prac- 
tices with  penalties  adequate, to  deter  from  their  violation.  When 
we  come,  therefore,  to  the  constructive  regulation  of  modern  in- 
dustry, we  have  laws  that  call  forth  little  or  no  popular  reaction. 

The  development  of  law  for  the  expert  direction  of  economic 
processes  will  be  slow  because  of  the  lack  of  strong  popular  sanction, 
and  also  because  of  the  adverse  influence  of  a  dominant  class.  The 
prevailing  tendency  among  business  men  has  been  and  still  is  to 
distrust  every  extension  of  state  regulation  to  industry  as  apt  to 
interfere  with  their  opportunities  to  make  money.  Moreover  they 
realize  that  the  strength  of  all  business  interests  is  in  union,  that  one 
line  of  business,  by  favouring  the  regulation  of  another  business, 
weakens  its  own  position  against  the  public  insistence  on  the  regula- 
tion of  business.  It  is  realized  that  the  rivalry  of  different  prop- 
ertied interests  in  England,  causing  one  interest  to  grant  conces- 
sions to  labour  and  to  the  public  in  order  to  get  votes,  has  weakened 
the  position  of  all  propertied  interests,*^  and  that  this  mistake 
should  not  be  made  by  propertied  interests  in  this  country.  Prop- 
ertied interests  should  stand  together  against  governmental  inter- 
ference with  business  operations.  This  strong  opposition  to  gov- 
ernmental regulation  for  the  public  welfare  suggests  that  law  should 
be  the  command  of  the  sovereign  people  which  must  over-ride  all 

^5  Beard,  "  American  Government  and  Politics,"  742. 


234     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

opposition  of  a  would-be  dominant  class.    How  far  law  does  exercise 
this  function  is  a  question  of  fact. 

The  assumption  of  economic  functions  by  the  state  has,  there- 
'  fore,  brought  to  the  fore  again  the  principle  of  law  as  the  command 
of  the  sovereign.  This  principle  was  maintained  by  Hobbes  on 
behalf  of  the  absolute  monarch  and  against  the  jurists  who  re- 
garded law  as  the  logical  perfection  of  customary  law.  He  de- 
clared that  custom  is  not  law  because  it  has  long  prevailed  or  be- 
cause it  is  reasonable,  but  because  the  sovereign  wills,  either 
expressly  or  through  his  will  manifested  by  his  silence,  that  it  shall 
be  binding.  With  the  development  of  constitutional  government, 
which  emphasizes  the  legislature  as  the  supreme  organ  of  the  sov- 
ereign will,  the  theory  of  law  as  command  lost  the  odium  which  at- 
tached to  that  theory  as  long  as  the  ruler  was  still  the  supreme 
organ  of  the  sovereign  will.  Austin,  who  wrote  with  the  sover- 
eignt}'^  of  the  legislature  in  mind,  declared  that  customary  law 
becomes  positive  law  only  when  endorsed  as  a  command  of  the 
sovereign  power.*®  Finally,  with  the  assumption  of  economic  func- 
tions by  the  state  and  the  increasing  role  of  investigating  and  ad- 
ministrative commissions,  the  findings  and  regulations  of  which  are 
little  understood  and  supported  by  public  sentiment,  there  has  re- 
sulted a  new  emphasis  on  law  as  the  command  of  the  sovereign 
power.  But  this  means  something  entirely  different  from  the  tra- 
ditional conception  of  law  as  command.  Both  Hobbes  and  Austin 
meant  that  people  submit  impulsively,  without  question,  without 
thinking  that  they  may  consider  the  purpose  and  reasonableness  of 
the  command.  Law  as  command  implied  the  servility  of  a  con- 
ventional people.  This  attitude  to  law  still  widely  prevails  in  the 
United  States.  But  there  has  been  developing  a  distrust  of  that 
part  of  law  that  has  to  do  with  the  protection  of  privileged  classes, 
a  resentment  on  account  of  the  aggressive  special  interests  which 
very  evidently  regard  law  in  quite  a  different  light  than  command 
imposed  on  all.  To  those  of  the  public  who  are  cognizant  of  the 
way  in  which  the  recommendations  of  expert  commissions  are  ig- 
nored by  a  government  predominantly  influenced  by  corporate  in- 
terests,*"^ and  of  the  way  in  which  corporations  ignore  the  regula- 

*" Austin,  "Lectures  on  Jurisprudence,"  II:  Lecture  XXX:  555. 

*7  For  instance,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  long  insisted  on  being  given 
power  to  define  the  purpose  for  which  stocks  and  other  securities  should  be  issued  by 
railway  corporations,  and  to  confine  the  expenditure  of  money  realized  to  that  purpose. 


THE  JURISTIC  PROBLEM  235 

tions  of  commissions,^^  it  is  evident  how  seriously  the  will  of  a 
dominant  class  conflicts  with  law  as  a  command  of  the  sovereign 
people.  Wherefore,  thoughtful  citizens  are  driven  to  reject  the 
irresponsibility  of  the  people  implied  in  the  old  theory  of  law  as 
command,  and  to  admit  the  plain  fact,  namely,  that  if  the  law  is 
to  satisfy  pubhc  needs,  which  is  manifestly  its  function, ^^  if  it  is  to 
cease  to  be  an  instrument  through  which  aggressive  special  interests 
have  their  will,  contrary  to  the  public  welfare,  then  the  citizen  is 
responsible  for  fitting  the  law  to  public  needs  and  enforcing  it;  and, 
unless  he  realizes  his  responsibility,  law  will  continue  predominantly 
to  serve  the  interests  of  a  dominant  class. 

(Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  the  New  England  Investigation,  616-617.)  This 
power  was  withheld.  {Ibid.,  582-592.)  Again,  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  pointed 
out  the  exploitation  practised  by  coal  companies,  but  up  to  1920  nothing  had  been 
done  to  stop  it.  (Report  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  on  Anthracite  and  Bi- 
tuminous Coal,  1917,  13-20,  27-31,  40-43,  118-119.)  See  also  Jones,  "The  Anthracite 
Coal  Combination  in  the  United  States,"  Chs.  IV-VII. 

*®  For  instance,  see  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  In  Re  —  investigation  of 
Accident  on  the  New  York,  New  Haven,  and  Hartford  Railroad  Near  North  Haven, 
Conn.,  on  Sept.  2,   1913,  31,  35. 

*^  Duguit,  "  Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  trans,  by  Laski,  Ch.  II.  Introduction  by 
Laski,  XX. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    IMPLICATIONS    OF    THE    THEORY    OF 
NATURAL    RIGHTS 

WE  have  seen  that,  in  spite  of  the  judicial  tendency  to  in- 
terpret law  according  to  precedent,  judges  have  been 
forced  to  recognize  social-psychological  processes;  that, 
for  a  long  period,  they  justified  deviations  from  precedent  under 
the  conception  of  a  law  of  nature,  a  higher  law  from  which  the 
deviations  were  deductions.  With  the  rise  of  popular  government 
and  the  forced  recognition  on  the  part  of  judges  of  changes  in  pub- 
lic opinion,  the  raison  d'etre  of  a  law  of  nature  passed  away.  Gov- 
ernment by  the  people  has  forced  the  consideration  of  public  opin- 
ion in  the  making  of  judicial  decisions,  as  well  as  in  legislation;  it 
has  come  to  be  recognized  that  judges  have  a  legislative  function, 
and  that  interpretations  of  law  may,  in  some  instances,  be  more 
largely  legislative  than  logical  deductions  from  precedent.  The 
conception  of  natural  rights  ^  and  natural  law  has  accordingly 
passed,  except  in  so  far  as  impulses  of  human  nature  act  with  a 
regularity  and  an  insistence  for  legal  recognition  that  justifies  the 
analogy  of  a  legal  demand. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  government  by  the  people  is  a  recent 
achievement,  there  was,  until  recently,  no  conception  of  interests 
which  the  people  were  entitled  to  have  satisfied  through  legal  pro- 
visions. Deviations  from  precedent  that  were  forced  by  social 
conditions  were  explained  as  deductions  from  natural  law  which 
was  immutable  and  above  the  customary  and  positive  law.  Among 
the  Greeks  natural  law  was  conceived  as  in  origin,  impersonal, 
showing  itself  in  individual  reason  and  conviction.^  Through  the 
exercise  of  reason  in  accordance  with  natural  law,  the  individual 
promoted  _thp  intf"r^fT^^«^-^^  <-hp  S-^lt£  Natural  law  was  conceived, 
therefore,  as  the  higher  law  of  the  state.     The  laws  of  physical 

1  For   the   different   senses   in    which   the   word   "  right "   is   used   in    law  books   see 
Pound,   "Legal   Rights,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  Oct.,   1915,  92-116. 

2  Windelband,  "  A  History  of  Philosophy,"  73. 

236 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  237 

and  of  human  nature  were  vaguely  conceived  as  aspects  of  this 
higher  law.  When  the  Greek  states  fell  before  the  Macedonian 
conqueror,  natural  law  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  law  of  the  reason 
of  man  and  of  the  universe,  whereby,  through  the  exercise  of  rea- 
son in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  the  universe,  the  individual  was 
enabled  to  remain  imperturbable  in  the  presence  of  injustice  and 
despotism  and  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  universe.^  With  the  rise 
of  the  Roman  Empire,  Cicero  identified  this  eternal  and  universal 
law  of  nature  with  the  Roman  law,*  which  made  the  rule  of  the 
emperor  supreme;  whereby  the  idea  of  natural  law  as  universal 
reason  and  as  opposed  to  despotic  rule  was  replaced  by  the  identi- 
fication of  the  law  of  nature  with  the  command  of  a  world  emperor. 
Cicero's  idea  of  natural  law  was  adopted  by  Thomas  Aquinas,  but 
Aquinas  declared  that  natural  law  was  subject  to  correction  by  the 
divine  law  of  revelation  which  is  the  expression  of  the  will  of  God.^ 
Bodin,  an  apologist  of  absolutism,  maintained  that  the  sovereign 
of  a  state  must  rule  rationally,  that  is,  in  accordance  both  with  the 
law  of  God  and  with  the  law  of  nature,  which  represents  the  man- 
dates of  justice.^  Hobbes,  also  an  apoloojist  of  absolutism,  de- 
clared that  "  law,  properly,  is  the  word  of  him  that  by  right  hath 
command  over  others." '''  In  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  will  of 
the  ruler  and  the  alleged  divine  law  "  subjects  are  bound  to  obey 
that  for  divine  law  which  is  declared  to  be  so  by  the  laws  of  the 
commonwealth."  ^  And,  as  for  the  law  of  nature,  this  becomes 
law  proper  only  when  it  is  embodied  in  commands  of  the  ruler. ^ 
Locke  rejected  Hobbes'  conception  and  declared  the  legislature 
to  be  the  supreme  governmental  organ,  though  not  absolute,  for  it 
is  bound  to  legislate  according  to  the  law  of  nature.  Of  this  law 
he  says :  "  To  understand  political  power  rightly  and  derive  it 
from  its  original,  we  must  consider,  what  state  all  men  are  naturally 
in,  and  that  is  a  state  of  perfect  freedom  to  order  their  actions,  and 
dispose  of  their  possessions  and  persons,  as  thev  think  fit,  within 
the  bounds  of  the  law  of  nature,  without  asking  leave,  or  depend- 
ing upon  the  will  of  any  other  man."     "  The  state  of  nature  has  a 

3  Dunning,  "  Political  Theories,"  Ancient  and  Mediaeval,  104. 

4  Ibid.,    163-164. 

"  Ibid.,    19^,    196-197. 

6  Bodin,  "Six  Books  Concerning  the  State"  (1576),  translated  by  Knolles,  104-106. 

7  "  Leviathan,"  Ch.  XV. 

8  Ibid.,  Ch.  XXVI. 
» Ihid..  Ch.  XXVI. 


238      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

law  of  nature  to  govern  it  .  .  .  and  reason,  which  is  that  law, 
teaches  all  mankind  .  .  .  that  being  all  equal  and  independent,  no 
one  ought  to  harm  another  in  his  life,  health,  liberty,  or  posses- 
sions; for  men  being  all  the  workmanship  of  one  omnipotent,  and 
infinitely  wise  maker  .  .  .  are  his  property  .  .  .  made  to  last 
during  his  .  .  .  pleasure.  .  .  .  Every  one,  as  he  is  bound  to  pre- 
serve  himself,  and  not  to  quit  his  station  wilfully,  so  .  .  .  may  not 
.  .  .  impair  the  Hfe  .  .  .  the  liberty,  health,  limb  or  goods  of  an- 
other." ^^  If  the  legislature  fails  thus  to  preserve  the  political  in- 
dependence of  the  individual  that  is  guaranteed  by  the  law  of 
nature,  "  the  community  perpetually  retains  a  supreme  power  of 
saving  themselves  from  the  attempts  and  designs  of  any  body,  even 
of  their  legislators,  whenever  they  shall  be  so  foolish,  or  so  wicked, 
as  to  lay  and  carry  on  designs  against  the  liberties  and  properties  of 
the  subject."  " 

The  natural  law  was  held  to  be  contrary  not  only  to  class  domi- 
nation within  the  nation  that  subverted  individual  liberty  but  also 
to  the  struggle  for  domination  between  nations.  Thus  Grotius 
declared  war  to  be  contrary  to  human  nature  which  has  a  "  natural 
impulse  to  social  life."  ^^  He  discussed  international  relations  in 
the  light  of  his  principle  of  "  abstract  justice  "  which  he  declared 
to  be  a  "  fixed  and  eternal  law  of  nature."  This  principle  "  em- 
bodies merely  his  own  personal  ideal  —  wise  and  noble,  indeed,  but 
nevertheless  purely  subjective  —  of  the  principles  which  would 
conduce  most  to  the  happiness  of  mankind."  The  chief  value  of 
the  idea  of  natural  law  seems  to  lie  in  the  facility  it  affords  for 
sheltering  his  own  opinions  under  the  more  dignified  category  of 
natural  law.^^ 

This  individualistic  aspect  of  the  theory  of  natural  rights  was 
again  emphasized  by  Rousseau  who,  in  his  reaction  against  the 
exploiting  class  rule  of  eighteenth  century  France,  declared  that  all 
men,  as  individuals,  are  endowed  by  the  Creator  with  natural 
rights,  and  that  from  these  develop  natural  law  on  which  all  law  is 
based.  The  state  was  said  to  have  originated  in  a  compact  be- 
tween governors  and  governed  in  which  the  latter  gave  the  former 
their  powers  to  govern  but  did  not  surrender  their  natural  rights 

10 "Two  Treatises  of  Government,"  Bk.  II:  Ch.  II. 

11  Ibid.,  II :  sec.  149. 

12  Dunning,  "  Political  Theories,  From  Luther  to  Montesquieu,*'  174. 
"^^  Ibid.,  170. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  239 

which  they  had  as  men,  and  of  which  they  might  not  be  deprived 
by  the  governors.^^  This  emphasis  on  the  rights  of  the  individual 
has  continued  in  French  thought  to  the  present  day,  but  the  rights 
are  no  longer  emphasized  as  natural  rights.  They  are  rights  which 
the  individual  possesses  in  virtue  of  his  personality,  and  which 
cannot  be  taken  away  from  him  without  his  ceasing  to  be  a  man. 
This  principle  of  individual  rights  is  said  to  rest  "  on  faith  in  the 
absolute  value,  in  the  inimitable  originality,  of  the  human  will.  .  .  . 
The  idea  of  the  sublime  dignity  of  the  human  person  is  what  the 
eighteenth  century  has  bequeathed  to  us."  ^°  "  Justice  lies  in  the 
will  and  the  effort  to  assure  to  moral  persons  the  effective  enjoy- 
ment of  rights  which  have  previously  been  recognized  for  them; 
and  it  is  possible  to  reduce  these  to  two,  namely,  the  right  to  live 
and  the  right  to  develop  one's  self  through  culture.  A  just  citizen 
would  be  one  who  wishes  to  manage  social  and  political  institu- 
tions in  such  a  way  that  this  double  right  would  be  recognized  in 
principle  —  assured  in  fact  —  to  his  fellow  citizens."  ^®  The 
Frenchman  likes  to  associate  with  individual  desires  that  are  widely 
felt  some  semblance  of  legal  right,  while  the  American,  less  inclined 
to  look  to  the  state  for  protection,  is  content  with  letting  such  desires 
remain  private  interests  until  there  is  a  general  demand  that  they 
be  provided  for  by  the  state. 

Social  classes  like  individuals  have  shown  an  inclination  to  give 
their  desires  a  legal  dignity  by  identifying  them  with  natural  rights. 
Thinkers  who  sympathized  with  a  rising  class  have  been  more  apt 
to  appeal  to  natural  law  as  sanctioning  the  alleged  rights  of  that 
class  than  have  those  who  represented  an  aristocracy  long  in  con- 
trol, because  the  alleged  rights  of  the  latter  had  weight  from  the 
mere  fact  that  they  were  in  accord  with  tradition.  Those  who  re- 
sisted autocracy  justified  their  resistance  on  the  theory  of  natural 
rights.  Thus  the  American  revolutionists,  in  their  defiance  of  the 
autocratic  king,  relied  on  the  concept  of  the  law  of  nature  as  used 
by  Locke,  ^^  and  made  this  central  in  their  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, which  began  as  follows:  "When,  in  the  course  of 
human  events,  it  becomes  necessary  for  one  people  to  dissolve  the 
political  bonds  which  have  connected  them  with  another,  and  to 

1* Rousseau,  "The  Social  Contract,"  Bk.  I,  Chs.  II-VII. 

IB  Michel,  "  L'Idee  de  L'Etat,"  60,  644. 

^•Ibid.,  646. 

^''Merriani,  "American  Political  Theories,"  89-92. 


240      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

assume,  among  the  powers  of  the  earth,  the  separate  and  equal 
station  to  which  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  nature's  God  entitle 
them,  a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind  requires  that 
they  should  declare  the  causes  which  impel  them  to  the  separation. 

"  We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self-evident :  That  all  men  are 
created  equal;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their  creator  with  certain 
unalienable  rights;  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness.  That,  to  secure  these  rights,  governments  are 
instituted  among  men,  deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  consent 
of  governed;  that,  whenever  any  form  of  government  becomes  de- 
structive of  these  ends,  it  is  the  right  of  the  people  to  alter  or  to 
abolish  it,  and  to  institute  a  new  government,  .  .  ."  In  the  state 
constitutions  of  the  time  the  same  natural  right  ideas  occur,  ex- 
pressed in  different  language. ^^ 

While  autocracy  was  still  firmly  in  control  in  England,  judges 
and  juries  maintained  that  the  autocrat's  will  was  limited  by  the 
requirements  of  the  law  of  nature.  Blackstone  defined  law  as  "  a 
rule  of  civil  conduct  prescribed  by  the  supreme  power  in  a  state, 
commanding  what  is  right  and  prohibiting  what  is  wrong."  ^^  By 
right  and  wrong  Blackstone  meant  whether  or  not  in  harmony  with 
those  natural  rights  "  which  God  and  nature  have  established." 
Later,  Austin  opposed  Blackstone's  definition  and  maintained  that 
whatever  a  sovereign  commands  is  law,^*^  regardless  of  whether  or 
not  it  conforms  to  custom  or  natural  law  or  divine  law;  and  that 
sovereignty  rests  on  the  fact  that  "  the  bulk  of  the  given  society 
are  in  a  .  .  .  habit  of  obedience  or  submission  to  a  determinate 
and  common  superior."  ^^  This  represented  the  condition  of  Eng- 
land at  the  time  Austin  wrote.  The  struggle  between  Parliament 
and  the  arbitrary  king  was  now  settled;  "  the  king  in  Parliament," 
or,  practically.  Parliament,  was  now  sovereign  and  "  that  is  the 
only  power  which  can  issue  supreme  and  uncontrolled  legal  com- 
mands." ^^  A  law  of  Parliament  is  recognized  as  supreme  even 
over  the  English  common  law  and  constitution.^^  Parliament  was 
the  sovereign  which  Austin  had  in  mind;  and  with  the  sovereignty 

^^Ibid.,  54-59. 

"Blackstone,  "Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  England"   (edition  of  1791),  53-54. 
20  Austin,  "Lectures  on  Jurisprudence,"  I:  Lecture  L 
^^Ibid.,  I:  226. 

22 Pollock,  "Sovereignty  in  English  Law,"  Harvard  La<w  Review,  VIII:  248. 
23  Lowell,  "The  Government  of  England,"  I:  8-10;  Dicey,  "The  Law  of  the  Con- 
stitution," 36. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  241 

of  Parliament  undisputed,  there  was  no  further  use  for  the  concep- 
tion of  natural  law,  so  far  as  Austin  was  concerned;  for  he  acqui- 
esced in  the  political  control  of  the  propertied  classes  which,  alone, 
Were  represented  in  Parliament,  and  did  not  take  seriously  the 
aspirations  for  political  rights  of  the  non-propertied  masses. 

The  juristic  theory  of  the  eighteenth  century  was,  then,  based  on 
the  fiction  of  natural  rights.  "  Eighteenth-century  juristic  theory, 
down  to  Kant,  holds  to  four  propositions :  ( i )  There  are  natural 
rights  demonstrable  by  reason.  These  rights  are  eternal  and  abso- 
lute. They  are  valid  for  all  men  in  all  times  and  in  all  places. 
(2)  Natural  law  is  a  body  of  rules,  ascertainable  by  reason,  which 
perfectly  secures  all  of  these  natural  rights.  (3)  The  state  exists 
only  to  secure  men  in  these  natural  rights.  (4)  Positive  law  is  the 
means  by  which  the  state  performs  this  function,  and  it  is  obliga-- 
tory  only  so  far  as  it  conforms  to  natural  law.  The  appeal  is  to 
individual  reason.  Hence  every  individual  is  the  judge  of  this 
conformity.  Also  on  this  theory  natural  rights  alone  are  legal 
rights,  for  law  is  only  a  means  of  securing  them.  Pushed  to  its 
logical  limits,  this  leads  straight  to  anarchy,  and,  indeed,  the  philo- 
sophical anarchist  still  proceeds  upon  this  line.  But  the  eighteenth- 
century  writers  who  taught  that  every  man's  conscience  was  the 
measure  of  the  obligatory  force  of  legal  rules  assumed  a  sort  of 
standard  conscience,  a  standard  man's  or  conscientious  man's  con- 
science analogous  to  the  prudence  of  the  reasonable  man  in  our  law 
of  torts."  ^*  Natural  law  was,  thus,  assumed  to  have  as  its  end  to 
maintain  and  protect  individual  interests;  and  this  was  also  the 
end  of  the  English  common  law.  "  Hence  the  Americans  of  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century  argued  for  either  or  both.  The 
declaration  of  rights  of  the  Continental  Congress  in  1774  asserted 
the  legal  rights  of  Englishmen.  The  Declaration  of  Independence 
two  years  later  asserted  the  natural  rights  of  man.  Yet  each 
claimed  the  same  things. 

"  From  this  identifying  of  common-law  rights  with  natural  rights 
it  followed  that  the  common  law  was  taken  to  be  a  system  of  giving 
effect  to  individual  natural  rights.  It  was  taken  to  exist  in  order 
to  secure  individual  interests  not  merely  against  aggression  by 
other  individuals  but  even  more  against  arbitrary  invasion  by  state 

2*  Pound,  "  The  End  of  the  Law  as  Developed  in  Juristic  Thought,"  Harv.  L.  Rev., 
XXVII:  623-624  (quoted  without  footnotes). 


242     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

or  society."  ^^  This  attitude  to  the  common  law  has  survived,  in 
the  United  States,  in  the  attitude  to  the  Constitution,  which  has 
been  assumed  by  the  judiciary  to  protect  individuals  against  gov- 
ernmental interference  in  their  economic  activity;  and  some  judges 
have  even  alleged  that  the  constitutional  rights  of  the  individual, 
as  interpreted  by  them,  were  natural  rights.  Thus  "  these  rights 
obtained  a  judicial  protection  which  prevented  their  violation  by 
any  other  governmental  authority."  ^* 

After  independence  from  Great  Britain  had  been  achieved,  the 
impulse  of  property  owners  to  dominate  the  national  situation  ^^ 
succeeded  the  impulse  of  resistance  against  the  domination  of  the 
English  government;  and  there  came  a  reaction  against  theories  of 
natural  rights  and  natural  law.^^  The  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  in  its  original  form  contained  few,  if  any,  provisions  relative 
to  these  natural  rights.  But  it  "  was  ultimately  adopted  only  on 
condition  that  they  should  be  enumerated  in  a  bill  of  rights  to  be 
appended  to  the  Constitution  as  adopted.  This  was  subsequently 
done,  and  they  appear  as  Amendments  I  to  IX.  The  Ninth 
Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution  is  an  expression  char- 
acteristic of  the  feeling  of  the  time  that  these  natural  rights  existed 
independently  of  all  law.  It  reads :  '  The  enumeration  in  the 
Constitution  of  certain  rights  shall  not  be  construed  to  deny  or  dis- 
parage others  retained  by  the  people.'  "  ^^  The  prejudice  against 
the  idea  of  natural  rights  pertaining  to  all  individuals  continued 
after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  and  was  one  of  the  essential 
attitudes  which  characterized  the  federalist  party  in  its  opposition 
to  the  party  of  Jefferson.  Leaders  of  the  former  party  stood  for 
the  alleged  natural  right  of  an  upper  class  to  dominant  political 
rule;  Jefferson,  author  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  stood 
for  the  natural  rights  of  the  individual  which  made  all  men  politi- 
cally equal.  John  Adams  declared  that  social  classes  rested  on 
necessary  distinctions  in  ability,  wealth  and  influence,  and  that  the 
upper  classes  are  the  natural  governing  class.^'*  These  ideas  were 
opposed  by  Jefferson,  who  asserted  the  supremacy  of  natural  law, 

'^^  Ibid.,  625  (quoted  without  footnotes). 

20  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  260. 

27  Beard,   "  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the   Constitution  of  the  United   States," 
Chs.  V-VII. 

28  Merriam,  op.  cit.,  99-103. 
28  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  260-261. 

80  Beard,  "  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian  Democracy,"  Ch.  XI. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  243 

and  maintained  that  men  surrender  none  of  their  natural  rights  by 
the  formation  of  government  but  rather  make  them  more  secure. ^^ 
He  admitted  men  were  by  nature  unequal  in  ability  and  declared: 
"  That  form  of  government  is  the  best  which  provides  the  most 
effectively  for  a  pure  selection  of  these  natural  aristoi  into  the 
offices  of  government."  ^^  He  regarded  the  influence  of  the  "  ar- 
tificial aristocracy  "  of  wealth  and  birth  as  dangerous  but  believed 
that  generally  only  natural  aristoi  would  be  chosen  to  office. ^^ 
To  this  end  he  emphasized  the  necessity  of  the  education  of  the 
electorate.^^  Political  leaders  he  regarded  as  of  two  classes,  those 
who  distrust  the  people  and  believe  they  must  be  dominated  or  ca- 
joled, and  those  who  regard  the  people  as  intelligent  beings  and 
susceptible  to  intellective  control.^^  This  confidence  in  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  people  was  essential  in  Jefferson's  democratic  attitude. 
His  attitude  throughout  his  political  career  was  one  of  resistance  to 
the  larger  propertied  interests  on  behalf  of  the  smaller  propertied 
interests  and  the  classes  without  property.^^ 

The  doctrine  of  the  natural  rights  of  the  individual  has  con- 
tinued to  affect  the  development  of  jurisprudence  in  the  United 
States  down  to  the  present  time.  The  judicial  inclination  to  regard 
natural  law  as  above  positive  law  has  survived  in  American  juris- 
prudence in  the  form  of  the  inclination  to  regard  as  unconstitu- 
tional, laws  which,  in  the  opinion  of  judges,  in  any  way  interfere 
with  that  natural  right  of  a  citizen  to  acquire  wealth  which  the 
judges  assume  to  be  guaranteed  by  certain  provisions  of  the  Con- 
stitution.^''' And  certain  judicial  decisions  have  even  assumed  free- 
dom of  economic  contract  to  be  guaranteed  by  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  and  therefore  binding.^^     Natural  law  has  been  used 

'31  Merriam,  op.  cit.,  147. 

32 /^zV.,  156. 

^^Ibid.,  156. 

^*  Ibid.,  159. 

^'^Ibid.,  162-163. 

3'  Beard,  op.  cit.,  227,  387. 

s^Goodnow,  "Social  Reform  and  the  Constitution,"  336;  Goodnow,  "Principles  of 
Constitutional  Government,"  259-269. 

38  Instance  the  opinion  delivered  by  Justice  Field:  "I  cannot  believe  that  what  is 
termed  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  a  God-given  and  inalienable  right  can  be 
thus  ruthlessly  taken  from  the  citizen.  .  .  .  The  right  to  follow  any  of  the  common 
occupations  of  life  is  an  inalienable  right;  it  was  formulated  as  such  under  the  phrase 
'pursuit  of  happiness'  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence."  (Butchers'  Union,  Co.  v. 
Crescent  City  Co.,  iii  17.  S.  746,  756.  1883.  Quoted  by  Haines,  "The  Law  of  Nature 
in  State  and  Federal  Judicial  Decisions,"  Yale  Laiv  Journal,  XXV:  632.)     For  the  in- 


244      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

to  guarantee  the  inviolability  of  vested  propertied  rights  and  free- 
dom of  contract,  and  to  forbid  legislatures  to  exercise  "  arbitrary 
power  "  against  these  rights. ^^  Both  these  rights  work  for  the 
advantage  of  reactionary  capitalistic  interests  against  the  workers. 
Judicial  insistence  on  freedom  of  contract  has  annulled  much  labour 
legislation.  This  judicial  action  culminated  in  the  dictum  of  Jus- 
tice Harlan  that  "  the  employer  and  the  employee  have  equal  right, 
and  any  legislation  that  disturbs  that  equality  is  an  arbitrary  Inter- 
ference with  the  liberty  of  contract,  which  no  government  can 
legally  justify  in  a  free  land."  ^°  The  prejudice  of  judges  in  favour 
of  the  individualistic  attitude  to  property,  which  has  prevailed 
among  business  men  up  to  the  present  time,^^  subconsciously  in- 
clined judges  to  the  acceptance  of  the  conception  of  natural  rights, 
which  served  legally  to  justify  that  attitude. ^^  This  judicial  atti- 
tude, thus  justified,  gave  its  direction  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  "  When  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
first  came  before  the  court  in  the  Slaughterhouse  cases,^^  the  four 
dissenting  justices,  under  the  lead  of  Mr.  Justice  Field,  sought  to 
pour  into  the  general  words  of  the  Due  Process  clause  the  eight- 
eenth century  '  law  of  nature  '  philosophy.  This  attempt  gradually 
prevailed  and  Mr.  Justice  Field's  dissent  in  effect  established  itself 
as  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court.^*  In  Allgeyer  v. 
Louisiana, ^^  we  reach  the  crest  of  the  wave.  The  break  comes 
with  the  Lochner  case.^^     Mr.  Justice  Holmes  has  given  us  the 

fluence  of  the  above  opinion  in  the  development  of  the  constitutional  doctrine  of  liberty 
of  contract  see  Pound,  "Liberty  of  Contract,"  Yale  La<w  Journal,  XVIII:454.  Haines 
notes  that  in  support  of  this  contention  of  Justice  Field,  Justice  Brewer  claimed  that  the 
first  ten  amendments  to  the  Federal  Constitution  enacted  those  rights  of  person  and 
property  which  by  the  Declaration  of  Independence  were  affirmed  to  be  inalienable 
rights.  {Ibid.,  632-633.) 
3"  Haines,  op.  cit.,  639-648. 

40  Adair  v.  United  States,  208  U.  S.  161,  175. 

41  Mr.  J.  A.  Emery,  in  an  address  before  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers, 
1908,  said  of  the  Adair  decision:  "A  great  decision,  in  terse,  vigorous  and  illuminat- 
ing language,  vindicated  in  the  most  striking  manner  these  original  and  inalienable 
natural  rights  which  are  the  first  possession  of  each  individual."  "  I  am  sure  we  all 
realize  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  think  of  personal  liberty  without  also  thinking 
of  personal  property.  For  the  moment  a  man  begins  to  exercise  his  mental  faculties, 
their  application  results  in  some  reward  to  him,  and  whether  it  be  little  or  great,  the 
fruit  of  this  activity  is  property."     (Reprint  of  address,  15-16.) 

^^  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  266-267. 

43  16  Wall   (U.  S.)   36. 

44  See  Dean  Pound,  "Liberty  of  Contract,"  i8,  Yale  L.  J.,  454-470. 
4B  165  U.  S.,  578. 

4«  198  U.  S.,  45. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  245 

explanation  for  this  attempt  to  make  a  permanent  prohibition  of  a 
temporary  theory.  '  It  is  a  misfortune  if  a  judge  reads  his  con- 
scious or  unconscious  sympathy  with  one  side  or  the  other  prema- 
turely into  the  law,  and  forgets  that  what  seem  to  him  to  be  first 
principles  are  believed  by  half  his  fellow  men  to  be  wrong.  I 
think  we  have  suffered  from  this  misfortune,  in  State  Courts  at 
least,  and  that  this  is  another  and  very  important  truth  to  be  ex- 
tracted from  the  popular  discontent.  When  twenty  years  ago  a 
vague  terror  went  over  the  earth  and  the  word  socialism  began  to 
be  heard,  I  thought  and  still  think  that  fear  ^'^  was  translated  into 
doctrines  that  had  no  proper  place  in  the  Constitution  or  the  com- 
mon law.  Judges  are  apt  to  be  naif,  simple-minded  men,  and  they 
need  something  of  Mephistopheles.  We  too  need  education  in 
the  obvious  —  to  learn  to  transcend  our  own  convictions  and  to 
leave  room  for  much  that  we  hold  dear  to  be  done  away  with  short 
of  revolution  by  the  orderly  change  of  law.'  "  ^^ 

On  the  whole,  therefore,  the  influence  of  the  conception  of  nat- 
ural rights  on  legal  development  in  the  United  States  has  been  to 
support  the  position  of  a  reactionary  dominant,  propertied  class. 
Under  the  subconscious  influence  of  their  upper  class  bias,  judges 
have  assumed  that  the  employer  has  a  natural  right  to  be  protected, 
in  the  use  of  his  property,  from  attempts  of  the  legislature  to  re- 
strict that  use  for  the  welfare  of  employes  and  for  the  public  wel- 
fare.'*''  The  result  of  "  the  attempt  on  their  part  to  fix  the  rela- 
tions between  employer  and  employed  through  their  postulation  of 
these   substantive  rights  has  precipitated  them  into  the  struggle 

^7  That  this  fear  has  been  an  unconscious  factor  he  has  told  us  elsewhere.  "  When 
socialism  first  began  to  be  talked  about,  the  comfortable  classes  of  the  community  were 
a  good  deal  frightened.  I  suspect  that  this  fear  has  influenced  judicial  action  both 
here  and  in  England,  yet  it  is  certain  that  it  is  not  a  conscious  factor  in  the  decisions 
to  which  I  refer.  I  think  that  something  similar  has  led  people,  who  no  longer  hope 
to  control  the  legislatures  to  look  to  the  Courts  as  expounders  of  the  Constitution,  and 
that  in  some  courts  new  principles  have  been  discovered  outside  the  bodies  of  those  in- 
struments, which  may  be  generalized  into  acceptance  of  the  economic  doctrines  which 
prevailed  about  fifty  years  ago,  and  a  wholesale  prohibition  of  what  a  tribunal  of  law- 
yers does  not  think  about  right.  I  cannot  but  believe  that  if  the  training  of  lawyers 
led  them  habitually  to  consider  more  definitely  and  explicitly  the  social  advantage  on 
which  the  rule  they  lay  down  must  be  justified,  they  sometimes  would  hesitate  where 
now  they  are  confident,  and  see  that  really  they  were  taking  sides  upon  debatable  and 
often  burning  questions."     "  The  Path  of  the  Law,"  lo,  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  457,  467. 

^^  "  Speeches  of  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  '  Law  and  the  Court,'  speech  at  a  dinner  of 
the  Harvard  Law  School  Association  of  New  York  on  February  15,  19 13,  98-102."  The 
entire  quotation  with  the  notes  is  from  Frankfurter,  "  The  Constitutional  Opinions  of 
Justice  Holmes,"  Harvard  Laiv  Revieiu,  XXIX:  690-691. 

**  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  266-267. 


246     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

between  capital  and  labour.  The  courts  in  the  United  States  have 
thus  become  important  factors  in  the  determination  of  questions 
elsewhere  usually  regarded  as  questions  of  legislative  pohcy,  and 
to  the  extent  that  they  have  taken  sides  in  the  bitter  political  strug- 
gles incident  to  the  settlement  of  these  questions  have  lost  the  po- 
sition of  impartial  arbiters  between  man  and  man  on  the  base  of 
the  rule  of  law  to  be  made  by  the  legislative  authorities  of  the 
country."  ^'^ 

As  distinguished  from  this  judicial  use  of  the  fiction  of  natural 
rights  "  to  consecrate  the  existent  state  of  affairs,  whatever  its  dis- 
tribution of  advantages  and  disadvantages,"  ^^  the  use  of  the  fiction 
to  justify  departures  from  legal  precedent  on  behalf  of  justice  and 
in  accordance  with  reason,  is  seen  in  the  grounds  implied  for  the 
judicial  application  of  the  test  of  reasonableness  to  legislative  acts 
passed  under  the  police  power  of  the  legislature."^^  Natural  law 
has  been  used,  therefore,  in  the  jurisprudence  of  the  United  States, 
mainly  for  the  protection  of  propertied  interests,  but  has  been 
used  also  for  the  protection  of  the  working  classes  against  capi- 
talistic exploitation. 

It  has  been  used  also,  against  legal  tradition,  in  the  adjustment  of 
the  rights  of  foreign-born  citizens  naturahzed  in  the  United  States, 
and  in  the  slavery  controversy.  Let  us  take,  first,  its  use  in  the  ad- 
justment of  the  rights  of  foreign-born  citizens.  International  law 
has  maintained  that  a  citizen  has  no  natural  right  of  expatriation. 
He  cannot  renounce  his  allegiance  to  his  native  land  without  the  ex- 
press permission  of  the  laws  of  that  land,  consequently  he  cannot 
swear  allegiance  to  another  country  unless  permitted  by  the  laws 
of  the  land  of  his  former  allegiance.  Nevertheless,  during  the 
nineteenth  century,  our  statesmen  more  than  once  acted  on  the  im- 
plicit assumption  of  a  natural  right  of  expatriation.^^  And,  in 
1868,  Congress  passed  a  law  declaring  the  right  of  expatriation  to 
be  "  the  natural  and  inherent  right  of  all  people,  indispensable  to 
the  enjoyment  of  the  rights  of  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  hap- 
piness." ^^  By  this  action  the  government  of  the  United  States 
contradicted  the  legal  doctrine  of  its  own  jurists  from  the  begin- 

«o  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  268;  Adams,  "The  Theory  of  Social  Revolutions,"  in-117. 
"1  Dewey,  "Nature  and  Reason  in  Law,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  XXV:  31. 
■^2  Haines,  op,  cit.,  648-651. 

•*'  Moore,  "  The  Doctrine  of  Expatriation,"  Harper's  Magazine,  January,  1905,  226- 
232. 
•**  Ibid.,  232.  * 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  247 

ning.^^  The  law  of  Congress  was  contrary  to  international  law 
and  to  the  law  and  custom  of  all  nations  up  to  that  time;  hence  the 
appeal  to  natural  law.  It  was  passed  under  the  patriotic  impulse 
of  the  people  and  the  government  to  protect  naturalized  foreigners 
as  American  citizens  against  the  coercion  of  the  government  of 
their  native  land,  if  they  returned  there. ^® 

Another  occasion  on  which  the  natural  law  conception  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  was  invoked,  in  opposition  to  the  law 
of  the  land,  was  the  slavery  controversy.  Throughout  the  slavery 
controversy  those  opposed  to  slavery  appealed  to  natural  rights 
while  those  for  slavery  denounced  the  idea  of  natural  rights.  Cal- 
houn, the  leader  in  the  formulation  of  the  pro-slavery  argument, 
said  concerning  the  assertions  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence: 
"  Nothing  can  be  more  unfounded  and  false  than  the  opinion  that 
all  men  are  born  free  and  equal."  ^'^  The  anti-slavery  protago- 
nists, on  the  other  hand,  asserted  a  "  higher  law,"  ^^  holding  that 
the  inalienable  rights  named  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
belonged  to  all  men.  Seward  declared  that  "  there  is  a  higher  law 
than  the  Constitution,"  and  that  slavery  was  contrary  to  the  laws 
of  God.^^  Lincoln  would  not  accept  Seward's  idea  of  a  higher 
law,^^  but  maintained  that  the  Declaration  of  Independence  applied 
in  the  slavery  controversy.  "  I  have  said  that  I  do  not  understand 
the  Declaration  to  mean  that  all  men  were  created  equal  in  all 
respects.  They  are  not  our  equal  in  color;  but  I  suppose  that 
it  does  mean  to  declare  that  all  men  are  equal  in  some  respects; 
they  are  equal  in  their  right  to  '  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  '  ...  in  the  right  to  put  into  his  mouth  the  bread  that 
his  own  hands  have  earned,  he  is  the  equal  of  any  other  man,  white 
or  black."  ^^ 

The  theory  of  absolute  and  eternal  natural  rights,  which  en- 
tered into  and  became  the  foundation  of  our  political  and  juristic 
system,  was  at  that  early  day  discredited  by  the  criticism  of  Kant. 

^^  Ibid.,  225-226. 

'^^  Ibid.j  228-232. 

57  Cralle,  "The  Works  of  John  C.  Calhoun,"  II  (New  York,  1853-56),  630,  quoted  by 
Dodd,  "The  Social  Philosophy  of  the  Old  South,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social.,  May,  1918,  741 

BS  Hosmer,  "  The  Higher  Law,"  Chs.  II-V. 

"^  Merriam,  op.  cit.,  212. 

•"  Hapgood,  "Abraham  Lincoln,"  157. 

•'1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  "Complete  Works  of  Abraham  Lincoln,"  III:  i86.  See  also 
III :  46-49, 


248     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

"  While  we  were  receiving  the  eighteenth-century  theory  in  Amer- 
ica and  were  making  it  the  foundation  of  our  political  and  juristic 
structures,  the  theory  was  about  to  get  its  death-blow  at  the  hands 
of  Immanuel  Kant.  If  in  fact  the  individual  conscience  was  made 
the  sole  test,  the  theory  could  be  practically  tolerable  only  at  a 
time  when  absolute  theories  of  morals  prevailed.  .  .  .  When  abso- 
lute theories  began  to  be  discarded  and  ultimate  authorities  were 
no  longer  recognized;  when,  moreover,  classes  with  divergent  in- 
terests came  to  hold  diverse  views  upon  fundamental  points,  nat- 
ural law  in  the  eighteenth-century  sense  became  impossible.  .  .  . 
Kant  sought  to  find  the  basis  of  rights  and  of  justice  as  a  means 
of  securing  rights  in  some  ultimate  metaphysical  principle,  some 
ultimate  datum  from  which  rights  might  be  deduced.  He  found 
this  fundamental  idea  in  freedom  of  will.  He  conceived  that  the 
problem  of  law  was  to  reconcile  conflicting  free  wills.  He  held 
that  the  principle  by  which  this  reconciliation  was  to  be  effected 
was  equality  in  freedom  of  will,  the  application  of  a  universal  rule 
to  each  action  which  would  enable  the  free  will  of  the  actor  to  co- 
exist along  with  the  free  will  of  every  one  else.  The  whole  course 
of  nineteenth-century  juristic  theory  was  determined  by  this  con- 
ception." ^^  Kant's  postulate  of  the  free  wiUing  man  had  no  more 
scientific  foundation  than  had  the  man  of  the  standard  conscience 
of  natural  law.  "  Man  in  abstracto,  as  assumed  by  philosophies 
of  law,  has  never  actually  existed  at  any  point  in  time  or  space."  ^^ 
This  change  of  base  of  jurisprudence,  therefore,  did  not  free  it 
from  the  errors  of  unanalysed  assumptions.  There  remained,  as 
before,  the  necessity,  though  unrecognized,  of  a  correct  psychologi- 
cal basis  for  juristic  assumptions. 

The  terms  natural  rights  and  natural  law  are  no  longer  used  by 
philosophers  and  jurists;  but  the  conception  continues  operative 
in  the  attitude  of  the  courts  to  the  constitution,  in  the  way  above 
indicated.  As  we  have  seen,  the  conception  of  natural  rights  has 
had  several  distinct  functions.  It  has  been  used  to  justify  a  formu- 
lation of  international  relations  contrary  to  the  customary  form; 
to  justify  the  resistance  of  subjects  to,  and  constitutional  limita- 
tions on,  autocratic  rule;  to  justify  autocratic  rule;  to  justify 
changes  in  the  interpretation  of  law  for  the  sake  of  a  nearer  ap- 

^2  Pound,   "  The   End   of  Law   as   Developed    in  Juristic  Thought,"  Harv.  L.  Rev., 
XXVII:  627-628. 

«3  Wundt,  "Ethics,"  trans,  by  Gulliver,  Washburn  and  Titchener,  III:  160. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  249 

proximatlon  to  justice  under  changed  conditions;  to  justify  the 
resistance  of  the  domination  of  an  aristocratic  class  by  a  new  and 
increasingly  powerful  propertied  class;  to  justify  the  assertion,  by 
a  dominant  class,  of  a  right  to  be  protected.  In  the  use  of  its  prop- 
erty, from  attempts  of  the  legislature  to  restrict  that  use  for  the 
welfare  of  employes  and  for  the  public  welfare;  and  to  justify  the 
right  of  the  legislature  to  pass  laws  on  behalf  of  a  class  without 
political  rights,  or  which,  with  political  rights  but  without  property, 
is  too  weak  to  resist  exploitation  without  the  help  of  the  strong 
arm  of  the  state.  The  conception  of  natural  rights  was  used  orig- 
inally to  justify  the  individual  in  rational  behaviour  contrary  to 
custom  and  customary  law.  It  was  conceived  as  the  higher  law  of 
the  state;  whereupon  the  individual  who  acted  in  accordance  with 
reason  and  with  this  law  was  a  more  truly  patriotic  and  efficient 
citizen  than  one  who  acted  according  to  customary  law.  But,  like 
other  conceptions,  after  it  acquired  prestige  It  came  to  be  used  to 
endorse  the  alleged  rights  of  an  autocrat,  and  of  a  dominant  class. 
The  conception  of  natural  law  Is  essentially  different  from  the 
modern  idea  of  law  which  assumes,  not  an  individual  with  a  God- 
given  original  nature,  protected  in  his  self-expression  by  God-given 
natural  rights,  but  a  conflict  of  groups  for  the  control  of  the  laW' 
making  power,  and  law  as  the  outcome  of  this  conflict.  The  orig- 
inal natures  of  the  members  of  the  conflicting  groups  are  modified 
by  the  group  attitudes  they  have  acquired,  and  they  act  according 
to  those  attitudes.  The  meaning  of  justice  always  depends,  there- 
fore, on  the  exigencies  of  the  group  conflict,  out  of  which  comes 
the  demand  for  justice.  For  Instance,  a  rising  propertied  class 
may  seek  to  abolish  the  legal  privileges  with  which  the  old  aris- 
tocracy buttressed  its  political  and  economic  dominance.  The  jus- 
tice which  the  rising  propertied  class  seeks  is  freer  political  and 
economic  opportunity  for  itself.  This  conflict  determines  that  the 
"  just  "  principle  of  the  law  shall  be  that  of  the  free  rivalry  of 
propertied  classes.  But  a  class  without  property  cannot  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  opportunities  for  free  rivalry  legally  guaranteed  to 
the  rising  propertied  class.  For  the  non-propertied  class  the  law 
does  not  guarantee  free  rivalry.  Hence  justice  may  mean  at  least 
two  entirely  different  things.  It  may  mean  giving  to  one  proper- 
tied class  the  same  political  privileges  enjoyed  by  another  or,  what 
is  the  same  thing,  taking  away  from  a  propertied  class  exclusive 


250     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

privileges;  or  it  may  mean  improving  the  economic  position  of  a 
class  which  is  without  property  and  hence  without  the  means  of 
free  rivalry  In  political  affairs,  and  which  is,  on  this  account,  in  a 
position  to  be  exploited  by  the  propertied  classes  In  the  course  of 
their  political  and  economic  rivalry.^*  The  reahzatlon  of  the  first 
type  of  justice  was  sought  in  the  third  stage  of  legal  development 
referred  to  In  a  preceding  chapter;  the  second  type  of  justice  is 
beginning  to  be.  sought  in  the  fourth  stage  of  legal  development. 
The  first  type  of  justice  does  not  Involve  a  rational  conception 
of  pubhc  welfare;  the  second  type  does.  For,  inasmuch  as  the 
great  mass  of  citizens  belong  to  the  class  without  property,  public 
welfare  requires  that  the  masses  be  protected  In  their  work  to 
the  extent  of  providing  conditions  of  labour  and  remuneration  suf- 
ficient for  their  maximum  vitality  and  progressive  self-develop- 
ment.*'^ But  judges  are  slow  to  grasp  the  national  welfare  Ideal 
and  the  Importance  of  the  protection  and  self-development  of  the 
workers.  Being  ignorant  of  the  living  conditions  of  the  workers, 
they  are  still  largely  bound  by  traditional  juristic  principles.  As 
Mr.  Roosevelt  said  of  a  bill  to  prohibit  the  manufacture  of  cigars 
in  tenement  houses,  which  he  championed  when  a  member  of  the 
New  York  legislature :  "  The  Court  of  Appeals  declared  the  law 
unconstitutional,  and  in  their  decision  the  judges  reprobated  the  law 
as  an  assault  upon  the  '  hallowed  '  Influences  of  '  home,'  It  was 
this  case  which  first  waked  me  to  a  dim  and  partial  understanding 
of  the  fact  that  the  courts  were  not  necessarily  the  best  judges  of 
what  should  be  done  to  better  social  and  industrial  conditions. 
The  judges  who  rendered  this  decision  were  well-meaning  men. 
They  knew  nothing  whatever  of  the  needs,  or  of  the  life  and  labor, 
of  three-fourths  of  their  fellow-citizens  in  great  cities.  They  knew 
legahsm,  but  not  life.     Their  choice  of  the  words  '  hallowed '  and 

"* "  As  the  doctrines  of  divine  right  formerly  had  no  permanent  validity  for  the 
rising  middle  class,  so  the  doctrines  of  individual  liberty  —  trial  and  indictment  by 
jury  and  due  process  of  law  —  do  not  have  the  same  reality  to  the  working-man  that 
they  have  to  members  of  the  possessing  group.  Freedom  of  contract  between  an  em- 
ployer and  an  employe  with  a  few  days'  supplies  behind  him  obviously  cannot  have  the 
same  meaning  that  it  has  between  persons  similarly  situated  as  far  as  economic  goods 
are  concerned.  To  discourse  on  the  liberty  afforded  by  jury  trial  to  a  man  who  has 
never  appeared  in  a  court  but  often  suffers  from  considerable  periods  of  unemployment 
is  to  overlook  the  patent  fact  that  liberty  has  economic  as  well  as  legal  elements." 
(Beard,  "American  Government  and  Politics,"  732-733.) 

•5  Goldmark  and  Frankfurter,  "  The  Case  for  the  Shorter  Work  Day,"  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court,  Bunting  vs.  State  of  Oregon,  1915,  471-605. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  251 

*  home,'  as  applicable  to  the  revolting  conditions  attending  the 
manufacture  of  cigars  in  tenement-houses,  showed  that  they  had  no 
idea  what  it  was  they  were  deciding.  Imagine  the  '  hallowed '  as- 
sociations of  a  '  home  '  consisting  of  one  room  where  two  famihes, 
one  of  them  with  a  boarder,  live,  eat,  and  work!  This  decision 
completely  blocked  tenement-house  reform  legislation  in  New  York 
for  a  score  of  years,  and  hampers  it  to  this  day.  It  was  one  of  the 
most  serious  setbacks  which  the  cause  of  industrial  and  social  prog- 
ress and  reform  ever  received."  ^^  In  their  interpretations  of 
law,  "  lawyers  and  judges  should  have  an  extensive  knowledge  of 
economic  conditions.  The  acquisition  of  such  knowledge  should 
be  a  part  of  their  training  for  their  profession.  It  may  be  added 
that  just  as  the  lawyer  must,  to  be  successful,  keep  up  his  legal 
studies  after  admission  to  the  bar,  so  the  really  great  and  successful 
lawyer  and  judge  must  keep  up  his  economic  studies,  if  he  is  to  wield 
the  proper  influence  he  should  have  on  the  development  of  the 
law."  ^' 

Though  there  is  no  longer  any  belief  in  an  existing  natural  law, 
jurists  recognize  extra-legal  forces  that  voice  themselves  in  de- 
mands for  justice  and  cause  changes  in  the  law.  Some  of  these 
jurists  have  attempted  to  make  a  conception  of  these  extra-legal 
forces  central  in  their  science  of  jurisprudence.  Among  these  is 
the  brilliant  French  jurist,  Leon  Duguit.  A  brief  statement  of  his 
theory  will  suggest  the  intimate  relation  of  social  psychology  to 
jurisprudence.  His  essential  assumption  is  that  of  the  solidarity  of 
the  members  of  a  social  group.  This  arises  from  a  sense  of  com- 
mon needs  that  can  be  satisfied  only  by  co-operation,  and  of  diverse 
needs  that  can  be  best  satisfied  by  an  exchange  of  products  and 
services  requiring  different  aptitudes.*'^  From  the  social  solidarity 
thus  originating  springs  law.  Law  is  not  the  command  of  a  sov- 
ereign will  imposed  upon  an  inferior  will.*'®  Nevertheless,  citi- 
zens must  obey  law."^*^  For,  since  social  solidarity  is  necessary  to 
man's  self-development,  it  follows  that  the  impulse  for  self-develop- 
ment obliges  men  to  behave  in  a  way  to  promote  the  social  soii- 

^'"  Theodore  Roosevelt  —  An  Autobiography,"  89-90. 

®^  Goodnow,  "The  Relation  of  Economics  to  the  Law."  Survey,  March  4,  1911,  937. 
•*  Duguit,  "L'fitat,  de  droit  objectif  et  la  loi  positive,"  Ch.  I;  Duguit,  "Manuel  de 
droit  constitutionnel,"  9. 
*">  Duguit,  "  Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  trans,  by  Laski,  70. 
'^^  Ibid.,  70-71. 


252      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

darity.  This  is  not  a  moral  but  a  legal  obligation.  "  The  moral 
law  considers  man  in  the  fulness  of  his  being,  both  with  respect  to 
his  mental  states  and  his  outward  conduct.  The  jural  principle 
{la  regie  de  droit)  looks  only  to  the  outward  manifestations  of  the 
human  will.  It  applies  only  to  wills  entering  into  relation  with 
other  wills."  ^^  This  rule  of  conduct  is  a  rule  of  law  {le  droit 
objectif)  which  is  binding  on  every  individual;  ^^  rulers  must  em- 
ploy the  force  at  their  disposal  to  promote  the  social  solidarity."^^ 
Duguit  distinguishes,  therefore,  between  what  he  calls  "  norma- 
tive "  law  —  the  obligatory  rules  of  conduct  —  and  "construc- 
tive "  law — rules  that  have  been  given  a  formal  legal  sanction.'^^ 
He  writes  that  the  ideal  of  normative  law  "  has  been  remarkably 
worked  out  by  Professor  Dicey  in  his  fine  book  on  '  Law  and  Pub- 
lic Opinion.'  ''^  '  There  exists  at  any  given  time  a  body  of  beliefs, 
convictions,  sentiments,  accepted  principles,  or  firmly  rooted  preju- 
dices, which,  taken  together,  make  up  the  public  opinion  of  a  par- 
ticular era,  .  .  .  and  .  .  .  the  influence  of  this  dominant  current 
of  opinion  has,  in  England,  .  .  .  determined,  directly  or  indirectly, 
the  course  of  legislation.'  "  '^^  By  normative  law,  therefore, 
Duguit  has  reference  to  the  social-psychological  basis  of  jurispru- 
dence, at  least  part  of  it.  He  maintains  that  there  are  no  natural 
rights  of  the  individual  independent  of  normative  law.  But  his 
theory  of  normative  law  would  function,  in  juristic  thinking,  not 
very  differently  from  the  theory  of  natural  law."^^  However, 
Duguit  denies  the  existence  of  rights,  natural  and  legal,  and  asserts 
the  existence  of  duties,  which  follow  from  the  individual's  position 
in  society.  It  is  the  duty  of  individuals  not  to  seek  to  satisfy  their 
personal  impulses  unless  these  are  common  to  many;  then  they  ought 
to  be  satisfied  in  order  to  preserve  the  social  solidarity.  And  every 
one  who  can  contribute  to  such  satisfaction  is  bound  so  to  do  by 
le  droit  objectif  J'^  The  basis  of  the  sense  of  duty  is  in  the  im- 
pulse of  the  individuals  of  a  group  to  disapprove  of  one  of  their 
number  who  acts  in  a  way  to  weaken  the  social  solidarity,  and  In 

Ti  Duguit,  "  The  Law  and  the  State,"  Harvard  Law  Review,  XXXI :  4. 

^^2  Duguit,  "  L'fitat,  le  droit  objectif  et  la  loi  positive,"  116. 

^3  Duguit,  "  L'Etat,  les  Gouvernants  et  les  Agents,"  153. 

''*  Duguit,  "Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  71-74. 

""Law  and  Public  Opinion"   (2nd  ed.)   p.  19. 

''  Duguit,  "  Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  72. 

''"'  Laski,  Introduction  to  Duguit,  "  Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  xxx. 

^8  Duguit,  "Manuel  de  droit  constitutionnel,"  i8. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS         253 

the  impulse  to  avoid  this  disapproval  by  conforming  to  the  laws 
of  the  group.  These  motives  are,  says  Duguit,  the  basis  of  all 
law  and  are  found  in  groups  which  have  not  yet  passed  under  the 
domination  of  rulers  and  become  part  of  a  state,  as  well  as  in  a 
stated®  In  a  state  the  rulers  must  rule  according  to  the  law  of 
social  solidarity,®"  and  any  legislative  measure,  judicial  decision,  or 
executive  order  contrary  thereto  is  not  law  and  no  one  is  bound 
to  obey  it,®^  Thus  it  is  denied  that  law  is  a  command  of  a  sov- 
ereign will.®^  But  Duguit  gives  no  suggestion  for  ascertaining 
definitely  what  the  law  of  social  solidarity  is  in  any  instance.  He 
says  it  is  in  perpetual  evolution;  ®^  and  he  suggests  the  creation  of 
a  tribunal,  made  up  of  representatives  of  all  classes,  which  shall 
determine  the  legality  of  law.®*  Thus  his  final  appeal  is  from 
the  mass  psychology  of  group  solidarity  to  a  rational  theory  of 
progress  administered  by  the  intellectual  elite  of  the  group.  And 
he  seems  to  incline  to  a  written  constitution  which  will  give  authori- 
tative formulation  to  normative  law.®^ 

Duguit's  theory  is  an  effort  to  base  jurisprudence  on  scientific 
assumptions  as  to  the  extra-legal  forces  which  determine  law.  It 
is  a  revolt  against  the  prevailing  practice  of  jurists  of  reasoning 
from  dogmatic  assumptions  as  to  these  extra-legal  forces.  Thus 
English  law  makes  of  the  individualistic  economic  relation  a  legal 
dogma,  which  is  sanctified  by  a  long  line  of  precedents  and  justi- 
fied with  the  sweeping  generalization  that  "  free  competition  is 
worth  more  to  society  than  it  costs,"  ®®  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
"  this  is  denied  by  an  important  school."  ^'^  Duguit  denies  the 
fact  of  free  competition  between  the  parties  to  a  labour  contract, 
and  declares  that  "  what  is  called  a  collective  labor  contract  is 

''^  He  extends  this  principle  to  both  private  (Les  Transformations  generales  du  droit 
prive  depuis  le  code  Napoleon)  and  public  (Les  Transformations  du  droit  public)  law. 
He  believes  that  this  socialistic  (as  distinguished  from  individualistic)  development  of 
law,  which  was  accentuated  during  the  World  War,  is  bound  to  go  on.  (Duguit,  "  Col- 
lective Acts  as  Distinguished  from  Contracts,"  Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVII:  768.) 

s°  Duguit,  "  Le  Droit  social,  le  Droit  individuel  et  la  Transformation  de  I'fitat,"  73; 
Duguit,  "The  Law  and  the  State,"  Harvard  Laiv  Revie<w,  XXXI:  183-184. 

81  Duguit,  "L'fitat  de  droit  objectif  et  le  loi  positive,"  423,  424. 

«^Ibid.,  366,  502. 

83  Ibid.,  428. 

8*  Duguit,  "Le  Droit  social,  le  Droit  individuel  et  la  Transformation  de  L'fitat,"  58. 

85  Laski,  op.  cit.,  xxii. 

88  Holmes,  "Privilege,  Malice,  and  Interest,"  Harvard  La<w  Review,  VIII.  3. 

»Ubid.,  VIII:  7. 


254     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

.  .  >^an  agreement  or  law  regulating  the  relations  of  two  social 
classes  .  .  .  according  to  which  the  individual  contracts  between 
members  of  these  two  groups  are  to  be  concluded."  ®*  Duguit's 
purpose  is  to  base  legal  reasoning  on  correct  juristic  assumptions. 
However,  the  assumptions  do  not  need  to  be  regarded  as  implying 
a  distinct  kind  of  law.  With  the  development  of  popular  govern- 
ment, judges  have  been  forced  to  recognize  that  there  are  extra- 
legal forces  that  must  be  taken  account  of  in  the  interpretation  of 
the  law.  The  judge  does  not  need  to  concern  himself  with  conceal- 
ing changes  in  law,^^  nor  to  represent  departures  from  precedent  as 
deductions  from  a  higher  law.  This  gives  no  added  sanction  to 
such  departures.  The  law-abiding  attitude  of  the  masses  from 
henceforth  is  to  be  preserved,  not  by  surrounding  law  and  deci- 
sions with  a  legal  sanctity,  but  by  making  law  and  decisions  square 
with  the  requirements  for  social  progress  as  viewed  by  an  intelli- 
gent citizenship. 

What  was  implied  in  the  vague  conception  of  natural  law  ^^  is 
becoming  more  concrete  with  the  development  of  social  psychology. 
This  science  will  indicate  the  interests  of  human  nature  of  which 
legislation  must  be  cognizant.  "  A  legal  system  attains  its  end 
by  recognizing  certain  interests.  .  .  ."  ^^  "  It  is  perfectly  true 
that  neither  the  law  nor  the  state  creates  these  interests.  But  it  is 
destructive  of  sound  thinking  to  treat  them  as  legal  conceptions. 
Rights  in  the  legal  sense  are  among  the  devices  of  the  law  to  secure 
these  interests.  Legal  rights  are  the  creatures  of  law,  although 
the  interests  secured  or  which  ought  to  be  secured  by  legal  rights 
are  independent  of  law  and  of  state."  ^^  The  final  period  of  law- 
making will  set  itself  especially  to  securing  the  social  interests.®* 
These  are,  in  the  last  analysis,  satisfactions  of  instinctive  impulses 
felt  to  be  imperative,  so  that,  at  this  vital  point,  social  psychology 
has  the  closest  possible  relation  to  jurisprudence. 

The  first  interests  recognized  by  law  were  primarily  class  inter- 
ns Duguit,   "  Collective   Acts   as   Distinguished   from   Contracts,"   Yale  Lain  Journal, 
XXVII:765;  Duguit,  "Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  120. 

89  Smith,  "The  Use  of  Maxims  in  Jurisprudence,"  Harvard  Laiu  Revieiu,  IX:  23; 
Smith,  "Surviving  Fictions,"  Yale  Laiu  Journal,  XXVII:  154. 
9°  Dunning,  "Political  Theories,  From  Luther  to  Montesquieu,"  175-176. 
^1  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Social  Soc,  VII:  156. 
®2  Pound,  "  The  End  of  the  Law  as  Developed  in  Juristic  Thought."  Harv.  L.  Rev., 
XXVII:6i9. 
88  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Social  Soc,  VII:  156. 


THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS  255 

ests.  The  individual  was  subordinated  to  the  dominant  class  of 
the  group.  With  economic  development,  individual  interests  grad- 
ually came  to  be  recognized.^^  "  We  may  say,  then,  that  the  law 
slowly  worked  out  a  conception  of  private  rights  as  distinguished 
from  group  rights.  This  culminated  in  the  eighteenth  century  in 
a  working  out  of  individual  interests  as  distinguished  from  public 
interests,  to  which  our  bills  of  rights,  in  which  the  natural  rights 
of  the  individual  are  solemnly  asserted  against  the  state,  still  bear 
witness.  Next  the  law  began  to  work  out  social  interests  as  such 
and  to  endeavor  to  reach  a  balance  between  individual  interests 
and  social  interests.  But  there  is  a  social  interest  in  the  individual 
moral  and  social  life.  In  securing  individual  interests  to  this  end, 
the  law  is  securing  a  social  interest.  Therefore  the  problem  ulti- 
mately is  not  to  balance  individual  interests  and  social  interests,  but 
to  balance  this  social  interest  with  other  social  interests.  .  .  ."  ^^ 
Merely  individual  or  class  interests  are  not  entitled  to  legal  recog- 
nition. "  The  moral  criterion  by  which  to  try  social  institutions 
and  political  measures  may  be  summed  up  as  follows :  The  test 
is  whether  a  given  custom  or  law  sets  free  individual  capacities  in 
such  a  way  as  to  make  them  available  for  the  development  of  the 
general  happiness  or  the  common  good.  The  formula  states  the 
test  with  the  emphasis  falling  upon  the  side  of  the  individual.  It 
may  be  stated  from  the  side  of  associated  life,  as  follows:  The 
test  is  whether  the  general,  the  public,  organization  and  order,  are 
promoted  in  such  a  way  as  to  equalize  opportunity  for  all."  ^® 
The  emphasis  is  thus  on  the  common  welfare.  Individual  inter- 
ests are  to  be  secured  by  law  only  "  to  the  extent  that  they  are 
social  interests,"  and  the  law  is  to  "  secure  at  all  times  the  greatest 
number  of  interests  possible,  with  the  least  possible  sacrifice  of 
other  interests."  ^'^ 

The  individual  interests  which  have  gained  legal  recognition  are 
immunity  from  bodily  injury,  preservation  of  health,  immunity 
from  coercion,  immunity  from  mental  injury,  preservation  of  men- 
tal health.^^     The  expansion  of  the  legal  recognition  of  the  mental 

9*  Pound,  "  Interests  of  Personality,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVIII :  348. 

^5  Ibid.,  349. 

»6  Dewey  and  Tufts,  "Ethics,"  482-483. 

97  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Social  Soc,  VII:  158-159; 
Pound,  "Interests  of  Personality,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVIII:  354-355. 

98  Pound,  "Interests  of  Personality,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVIII:  355-356;  Terry,  "The 
Correspondence  of  Rights  and  Duties,"  Yale  Laiv  Journal,  XXV:  177-178. 


255      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Interests  waits  upon  the  development  of  social  psychology.®®  The 
legal  recognition  at  present  includes  recognition  of  a  right  to  pri- 
vacy,^"*^  to  reputation/'^^  and  to  freedom  of  thought  and  speech/*^^ 
the  degree  of  right  in  each  case  depending  on  compromise  between 
conflicting  interests. 

The  progressive  recognition  of  social  interests  by  the  law  is 
possible  only  as  legislators  and  judges  appreciate  the  necessity  of 
studying  the  problem  of  what  interests  must  be  satisfied  for  the 
common  welfare. ^°^  Law  is  no  longer  a  command  set  by  a  domi- 
nant class  to  subjects  whose  economic  condition  is  unchanging. 
The  law  must  change  as  conditions  and  interests  change.  Law- 
maker and  judge  must  recognize  "  that  there  can  be  no  final  word 
on  any  point  of  the  law.  The  legal  system  must  be  kept  flexible 
and  law-making  must  accommodate  itself  perennially  to  shiftings 
in  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  interests  it  has  to  meet."  "^ 
This  new  view  of  the  function  of  law  makes  law-making  and  inter- 
pretation according  to  precedent  inadequate,  and  will  increase  the 
role  of  the  legislature  as  against  the  judiciary,  unless  the  latter 
equips  itself  for  the  task  by  that  training  in  the  social  sciences  which 
is  necessary  for  inductive  legal  interpretation. ^*^^  The  law-maker 
is  not  asked  to  accept  principles  of  social  science  in  place  of  legal 
principles,  for  deductive  interpretation.  He  is  asked  to  give  atten- 
tion to  the  analyses  and  facts  of  social  science  bearing  on  the  case 
and  inductively  to  reach  a  legal  Interpretation.  "  The  modern 
theory  of  natural  law,  with  the  ethical  and  psychological  assump- 
tions on  which  It  Is  based,  does  not  lay  down  any  eternal  or  im- 
mutable laws  of  human  conduct;  it  simply  urges  that  the  research 
of  reason  cannot  help  reaching  conclusions  which  are  valid  so  long 
as  the  conditions  they  resume  obtain.  Such  a  generalization  must 
be  the  necessary  basis  of  all  political  action."  ^^®  It  Is  "  necessary 
to  the  functioning  of  any  legal  system."  ^*^^ 

89  Pound,  op.  cit.,  362. 

10®  Warren  and  Brandeis,  "The  Right  to  Privacy,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  IV:  193-220. 

101  Pound,  "Interests  of  Personality,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVIII:  449-453. 

^o^Ibid.,  453-456. 

103 Brandeis,  "Business  —  A  Profession,"  liv-lvi. 

10*  Pound,   "Legislation   as   a   Social    Function,"   Pub.  Amer.  Social  Soc,   VII:   159. 

^^Ibid.,  160-161. 

108  Laski,  Introduction  to  Duguit,  "  Law  in  the  Modern  State,"  xxviii. 

107  Ibid. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE    CONFLICT    OF    JUDICIAL    ATTITUDES 

THE  law  of  a  nation  is  in  the  last  analysis  determined  by 
the  judges.  This  is  true  not  only  in  the  United  States 
where  judges  have  the  power  of  constitutional  veto  but 
also  in  the  British  Empire  where  they  have  no  such  power.  There 
judges  distinguish  "  between  the  ostensible  and  the  real  law.  .  .  . 
To  speak  of  an  act  of  the  legislature  as  ostensible  law  may  seem 
a  contempt  of  the  '  High  Court  of  Parliament,'  but  it  is  a  recog- 
nition of  the  fact  that  what  the  legislature  enacts,  judges  interpret. 
The  sociologist  may  say  that  a  statute  is  an  expression  of  a  gen- 
eral will;  the  lawyer  is  bound  to  say  that  the  law  is  as  the  judges 
decide.  He  knows  from  practical  experience  that  the  metamor- 
phoses which  take  place  in  the  process  of  applying  an  enactment 
to  the  infinitely  varying  groups  of  facts,  are  such  as  to  warrant  the 
statement  that  the  enactment  is  but  ostensible  law."  ^  The  fact 
that  judges  are  the  ultimate  makers  of  law  ^  may  seem  to  cut  the 
law  loose  from  a  social-psychological  basis.  However,  the  previ- 
ous chapters  have  shown  us  that  judges  differ  in  their  interpreta- 
tions according  to  their  judicial  attitudes.  These  are  social-psycho- 
logical phenomena  for  analysis. 

One  does  not  have  to  go  far  in  an  analysis  of  judicial  decisions 
to  see  that  there  is  something  in  a  decision  back  of  the  ideas  given, 
even  back  of  the  expressed  or  implied  principles  to  justify  which 
the  ideas  are  advanced.     A  study  of  a  court  decision  in  connection 

1  Brown  (President  of  the  Industrial  Court,  South  Australia),  "Law  and  Evolution," 
Yale  Laixj  Journal,  Feb.,  1920,  394. 

2  There  are  three  distinct  theories  of  judicial  interpretation:  (i)  That  judges  may 
not  make  law;  they  may  merely  discover  and  apply  the  existing  laws  (Carter,  "Law. 
Its  Origin,  Growth  and  Function,"  172-173)  ;  (2)  that  judges  may  make  law  on  sub- 
jects not  covered  by  previous  decisions,  but  may  not  change  the  previous  judge-made 
law  (Dicey,  "The  Relation  between  Law  and  Public  Opinion  in  England,"  Ch.  XI: 
481-493;  Pollock,  "Expansion  of  the  Common  Law,"  15);  (3)  that  judges  may  also 
change  previous  judge-made  law,  whether  made  by  themselves  or  their  predecessors 
(Justice  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  in  Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Jensen,  37  Sup.  Ct.  Rep., 
531;  Gray,  "The  Nature  and  Sources  of  Law,"  ss.  215-231,  465-512,  545-550,  626- 
628). 

257  .: 


258     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

with  which  a  dissenting  opinion  has  been  filed  makes  it  evident  that 
judges  differ  in  their  attitudes  and  hence  in  their  assumptions,  and, 
therefore,  in  the  ideas  advanced  and  cases  cited  as  proof.  Expla- 
nations in  terms  of  constitutional  formulations  or  legal  maxims  ^ 
are  advanced,  that,  as  basic  legal  formulations,  are  thought  to  serve 
as  justifications  of  the  opposite  assumptions.  Occasionally,  how- 
ever, the  attitudes  themselves,  which  ordinarily  determine  subcon- 
sciously the  trend  of  legal  interpretation,  are  clearly  indicated  by 
the  decision  or  dissenting  opinion.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  dis- 
senting opinion  of  Justice  Holmes  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  the  case  in  which  the  Court  found  that  the  New  York 
law  providing  that  no  employe  should  be  required  or  permitted  to 
work  in  bakeries  more  than  sixty  hours  a  week  or  ten  hours  a  day, 
was  not  "  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state,  but 
an  unreasonable,  unnecessary,  and  arbitrary  interference  with  the 
right  and  liberty  of  the  individual  to  contract,  in  relation  to  la- 
bor." ^  "  The  mere  assertion,"  declares  the  decision  of  the  court, 
"  that  the  subject  relates  though  but  in  a  remote  degree  to  the  pub- 
lic health  does  not  necessarily  render  the  enactment  valid.  .  .  . 
There  must  be  more  than  the  mere  fact  of  the  possible  existence  of 
some  small  amount  of  unhealthiness  to  warrant  legislative  inter- 
ference with  liberty."  "  Here  is  an  invasion  of  individual  liberty. 
The  employee  may  desire  to  earn  the  extra  money,  which  he  would 
be  paid  for  working  more  than  the  prescribed  time,  but  this  statute 
forbids  the  employer's  permitting  the  employee  to  earn  it." 

Dissenting,  Justice  Holmes  said:  "This  case  is  decided  upon 
an  economic  theory  which  a  large  part  of  the  country  does  not  en- 
tertain. If  it  were  a  question  whether  I  agreed  with  that  theory, 
I  should  desire  to  study  it  further  and  long  before  making  up  my 
mind.  But  I  do  not  conceive  that  to  be  my  duty,  because  I  strongly 
believe  that  my  agreement  or  disagreement  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  right  of  a  majority  to  embody  their  opinions  in  law.  It  is  set- 
tled by  various  decisions  of  this  court  that  state  constitutions  and 
state  laws  may  regulate  life  in  many  ways  which  we  as  legislators 
might  think  as  injudicious,  or  if  you  like  as  tyrannical,  as  this,  and 
which,  equally  with  this,  interfere  with  the  liberty  to  contract.  .  .  . 
Some  of  these  laws  embody  convictions  or  prejudices  which  judges 

8  Smith,  "The  Use  of  Maxims  in  Jurisprudence,"  Harvard  Lav:  Review,  IX:  14-25. 
*  Lochner  v.  New  York,  198  U.  S.,  75. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     259 

are  likely  to  share.  Some  may  not.  But  a  Constitution  is  not 
intended  to  embody  a  particular  economic  theory,  whether  of  pa- 
ternalism and  the  organic  relation  of  the  citizens  of  the  state  or  of 
laissez  faire.  It  is  made  for  people  of  fundamentally  differing 
views,  and  the  accident  of  our  finding  certain  opinions  natural  and 
familiar  or  novel,  and  even  shocking,  ought  not  to  conclude  our 
judgment  upon  the  question  whether  statutes  embodying  them  con- 
flict with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States."  ^  "  The  14th 
Amendment,"  declares  Justice  Holmes,  "  does  not  enact  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer's  Social  Statics."  He  warns  that  a  judicial  "  de- 
cision will  depend  on  a  judgment  or  intuition  more  subtle  than  any 
articulate  major  premise."  ^  Thus  Justice  Holmes  distinguishes 
between  the  formulations  of  the  Constitution  and  the  economic 
theory  and  attitude  of  the  judge.  In  virtue  of  his  attitude  a  judge 
may  find  congenial  this  or  that  economic  theory  and  consciously  or 
subconsciously  use  it  as  an  assumption  to  justify  a  decision  as  to 
the  constitutionality  of  a  law.  Judicial  attitudes  and  theories,  it  is 
maintained,  should  not  be  allowed  to  determine  the  interpretation 
of  constitutional  formulations. 

This  opinion  of  Justice  Holmes,  as  indicated  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  marks  a  break  in  the  development  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  whereby  the 
court  had  sought  "  to  make  a  permanent  prohibition  of  a  temporary 
theory  "  and  thus  to  protect  propertied  interests  against  feared  en- 
croachments by  non-propertied  classes.  His  opinion  was  based  on 
the  proposition  that  a  judicial  opinion  should  not  be  deduced  from 
some  economic  theory  but  should,  in  each  case,  be  the  result  of  an 
inductive  study  of  the  facts  in  the  case.  As  judge  he  affirmed  the 
constitutionality  of  statutes  that  happened  to  be  in  line  with  eco- 
nomic theories  that  he  did  not  himself  share,''^  maintaining  that  a 
judge  should  not  declare  a  law  unconstitutional  just  because  he 
does  not  accept  the  economic  theory  it  Implies.  In  the  course  of 
one  opinion  he  said:  "  In  present  conditions  a  workman  not  un- 
naturally may  believe  that  only  by  belonging  to  a  union  can  he  se- 
cure a  contract  that  shall  be  fair  to  him.  ...  If  that  belief, 
whether  right  or  wrong,  may  be  held  by  a  reasonable  man,  it  seems 

5  Lochner  v.  New  York,  198  U.  S.,  74-76. 

8  Ibid.,  74-76. 

7  Frankfurter,  op.  cii.,  694.  •  , 


26o      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

to  me  that  It  may  be  enforced  by  law  in  order  to  establish  the 
equality  of  position  between  the  parties  in  which  liberty  of  con- 
tract begins.  Whether  in  the  long  run  it  is  wise  for  workingmen 
to  enact  legislation  of  this  sort  is  not  my  concern,  but  I  am  strongly 
of  the  opinion  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  to  prevent  it,  and  that  Adair  v.  United  States,  208  U.  S. 
.  .  .  and  Lochner  v.  New  York,  198  U.  S.  .  .  .  should  be  over- 
ruled." « 

The  judicial  attitude  which  predominates  in  legal  decisions  is 
that  of  the  individualistic  property  owner, ^  which  long  ago  was 
written  into  the  law  and  which  has,  therefore,  determined  legal  tra- 
dition and  interpretation.  It  determined  the  interpretation  of  the 
court  in  Lochner  v.  New  York.  As  Professor  Ely  says:  "The 
majority  decision  of  the  court  is  based  upon  a  primitive  theory  of 
individualism.  The  bakers  were  without  liberty  in  the  true  sense 
for  they  were  without  the  right  to  health.  The  statute  represents 
their  struggle  for  liberty,  for  freedom  from  restraint  and  oppres- 
sion. And  this  liberty  sought  for  the  bakers  was  a  liberty  posi- 
tive, constructive,  and  substantial,  liberty  for  them  to  employ  their 
powers,  liberty  to  improve  their  faculties.  .  .  ."  ^^  The  law 
sought  to  relieve  them  from  the  domination  and  oppression  inci- 
dent to  the  individualistic  conception  of  property  right  and  to  pro- 
vide a  more  adequate  freedom  to  contract.  It  forbade  bakers 
working  under  conditions  in  which,  by  so  doing,  they  would  deprive 
themselves  of  health  and  the  capacity  to  keep  a  contract  to  do  effi- 
cient work.  In  so  far  as  judicial  decisions  depend  on  "  public  senti- 
ment," such  a  decision  as  this  wins  approval  from  employers  and 
from  the  rank  and  file  of  the  legal  profession,  who  reason  from 
precedent,  and,  therefore,  approve  or,  at  least,  do  not  disapprove 
such  a  decision.  Its  effect  among  labour  leaders  is  to  cause  resent- 
ment and  distrust  of  government,  and  to  cause  indignation  among 
intelligently  philanthropic  citizens;  ^^  "such  a  decision  deeply  im- 

8  Coppage  V.  Kansas,  236  U.  S.,  249. 

»See  the  chapter  entitled,  Psychological  Processes  in  the  Development  of  Private 
Property. 

10  Ely,  "Property  and  Contract  in  their  Relations  to  the  Distribution  of  Wealth," 
11:675. 

"This  public  distrust  of  the  reactionary  majority  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  has  deepened  as  one  decision  declaring  unconstitutional  labour  legislation  has 
succeeded  another.  In  some  cases  the  law  so  declared  void  was  passed  by  a  large 
majority  of  Congress  and  was  supported  by  every  section  of  the  body  politic  except 
yeactionary  propertied  interests.     (Mitchell,  "The  End  of  Child  Labor,"  The  Survey, 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     261 

pairs  that  public  confidence  upon  which  the  healthy  exercise  of  judi- 
cial power  must  rest."  ^^  The  attitude  to  the  law  which  it  implies 
and  the  acquiescence  of  the  legal  profession  in  this  attitude  also  im- 
pairs the  confidence  of  the  public  in  the  legal  profession. ^^ 

The  Lochner  decision  rests  on  a  long  line  of  similar  interpreta- 
tions. The  attitude  of  the  judges  who  thus  decided  is  not  congenial 
to  the  judge  who  looks  at  a  case  involving  property  right  inductively 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a  rational  theory  of  progress.  The  ra- 
tional or  progressive  attitude  is  that  a  statute  should  not  be  de- 
clared unconstitutional  as  long  as  a  legislature  might  reasonably 
think  such  a  statute  would  further  the  public  welfare.  This  ra- 
tional attitude  has  estabhshed  itself  in  certain  decisions  in  cases  in- 
volving controversies  between  capital  and  labour.  For  instance, 
"  The  legislature  has  also  recognized  the  fact,  which  the  experience 
of  legislators  in  many  states  has  corroborated,  that  the  proprietors 
of  these  establishments  (mines)  and  their  operatives  do  not  stand 
upon  an  equality,  and  that  their  interests  are,  to  a  certain  extent, 
conflicting.  The  former  naturally  desire  to  obtain  as  much  labor 
as  possible  from  their  employees,  while  the  latter  are  often  induced 
by  the  fear  of  discharge  to  conform  to  regulations  which  their  judg- 
ment,, fairly  exercised,  would  pronounce  to  be  detrimental  to  their 
health  or  strength.  ...  In  such  cases  self-interest  is  often  an  un- 
safe guide,  and  the  legislature  may  promptly  interpose  its  author- 
ity." ^^  "  The  question  in  each  case  is  whether  the  legislature  has 
adopted  the  statute  in  exercise  of  a  reasonable  discretion,  or 
whether  its  action  be  a  mere  excuse  for  an  unjust  discrimination,  or 
the  oppression,  or  spoliation  of  a  particular  class."  ^^  By  a  rea- 
sonable discretion  is  not  meant  what  appears  reasonable  to  "  the 
common  understanding,"  though  certain  judicial  decisions  assume 
this  standard  of  reasonableness,^^  but  what  appears  reasonable 
from  scientific  studies  of  the  questions  involved,  as  a  result  of  atten- 
tion to  which  legislation  must  be  progressive.     In  "  passing  upon 

Aug.  23,  1919,  748-749.)  This  attitude  of  distrust  toward  the  highest  court  in  the 
land  is  one  of  the  psychological  elements  in  the  increasing  opposition  to  the  state,  as  at 
present  constituted,  as  an  undemocratic  institution. 

12  Frankfurter,  "  Hours  of  Labor  and  Realism  in  Constitutional  Law,"  Harvard  Law 
Revie<w,  XXIX:  371. 

13  Wehle,  "Social  Justice  and  Legal  Education,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  July,  1917,  498. 
i*Holden  v.  Hardy,  169  U.  S.,  397. 

^^  Ibid.,  398. 

16  Lochner  v.  New  York,  198  U.  S.,  45,  59. 


262     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  validity  of  state  legislation  under  that  (Fourteenth)  Amend- 
ment, this  court  has  not  failed  to  recognize  the  fact  that  the  law  is 
to  a  certain  extent  a  progressive  science."  ^^  "They  (statutory 
changes  passed  in  review)  are  mentioned  only  for  the  purpose  of 
calling  attention  to  the  probability  that  other  changes  of  no  less  im- 
portance may  be  made  in  the  future.  ...  Of  course  it  is  impos- 
sible to  forecast  the  character  or  extent  of  these  changes,  but  .  .  . 
it  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  they  will  not  continue,  and  the  law 
be  forced  to  adapt  itself  to  new  conditions  of  society,  and,  particu- 
larly, to  the  new  relations  between  employers  and  employees,  as 
they  arise."  ^^  In  short,  "  In  the  Holden  v.  Hardy  case  it  was 
.recognized  that  Inequality  of  bargaining  power  was  a  public  disad- 
vantage, that  the  state  is  concerned  in  having  equal  powers  among 
individuals.  Where  they  are  unequal,  if  a  public  purpose  is  served 
thereby,  the  employers  may  be  deprived,  without  compensation,  of 
their  greater  liberty,  power  and  property  rights."  ^^ 

The  reasoning  of  the  rational  judge  is  bound  to  include,  therefore, 
considerations  of  public  policy.  Justice  Holmes  long  ago  proved 
the  necessity  of  judges  considering  questions  of  policy  in  decisions 
that  involve  questions  of  how  far  one  party  has  the  privilege  of  act- 
ing in  a  way  that  injures  another  party;  and  in  this  connection  he 
referred  Incidentally  to  the  functioning  of  subconscious  attitudes, 
and  the  necessity  of  assuming  a  rational  attitude  If  questions  of 
policy  were  to  be  wisely  determined.  He  said:  *'  The  danger  Is 
that  such  considerations  (of  public  pohcy)  should  have  their  weight 
in  an  articulate  form  as  unconscious  prejudice  or  half  conscious  in- 
clination. To  measure  them  justly  needs  not  only  the  highest  pow- 
ers of  a  judge  and  a  training  which  the  practice  of  the  law  does  not 
Insure,  but  also  a  freedom  from  prepossessions  which  is  very  hard 
to  attain.  It  seems  to  me  desirable  that  the  work  should  be  done 
with  express  recognition  of  Its  nature.  The  time  has  gone  when 
law  is  only  an  unconscious  embodiment  of  the  common  will.  It 
has  become  a  conscious  reaction  upon  Itself  of  organized  society 
knowingly  seeking  to  determine  Its  own  destinies."  ^*^  He  does  not 
confine  himself  to  explanations  of  his  own  rational  attitude  but  occa- 

IT  Holden  v.  Hardy,  385-388. 
18 /*,W.,  385-388. 

18  Commons,  "  Industrial  Goodwill,"  34. 

20  Holmes,  "  Privilege,  Malice,  and  Intent,"  Harvard  Law  Review,"  VIII   (Apr.  25, 
1894) '  9- 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     263 

slonally  ventures  a  bit  of  incisive  psychological  analysis  of  the  con- 
servative judicial  attitude.  For  instance,  how  far  a  party  can  go 
in  action  that  injures  another  without  the  action  constituting  mali- 
cious damage,  "  is  a  question  of  policy.  Questions  of  policy  are 
legislative  questions,  and  judges  are  shy  of  reasoning  from  such 
grounds.  Therefore,  decisions  for  or  against  the  privilege,  which 
really  can  stand  only  upon  such  grounds,  often  are  presented  as 
hollow  deductions  from  empty  general  propositions  ...  or  else 
are  put  as  if  they  themselves  embodied  a  postulate  of  the  law  and 
admitted  of  no  further  deduction."  ^^ 

The  alternative  to  introducing  into  a  case  involving  a  considera- 
tion of  privilege,  questions  of  policy  is  to  argue  deductively  from 
'maxims  that  have  been  given  the  force  of  legal  dogmas  by  long 
judicial  usage.  One  such  dogma  —  the  one  used  in  the  Lochner 
case  —  is  the  economic  postulate  of  free  competition.  This  dogma 
is  justified  on  the  ground  that  "  free  competition  is  worth  more  to 
society  than  it  costs."  ^^  Thus  justified  it  has  been  used  as  a  legal 
principle  deductively  by  judges  in  the  effort  to  avoid  questions  of 
policy  in  decisions  on  the  constitutionality  of  labour  legislation,  and 
to  give  their  decisions  the  effect  of  incontrovertible,  logical  conclu- 
sions. Justice  Holmes  criticizes  this  judicial  attitude  as  follows: 
"  Perhaps  one  of  the  reasons  why  judges  do  not  like  to  discuss  ques- 
tions of  policy,  or  to  put  a  decision  in  terms  upon  their  views  as  law- 
makers, is  that  the  moment  you  leave  the  path  of  merely  logical 
deduction  you  lose  the  illusion  of  certainty  which  makes  legal  rea- 
soning seem  like  mathematics.  But  the  certainty  is  only  an  illusion, 
nevertheless.  Views  of  policy  are  taught  by  experience  of  the  in- 
terests of  life.  Those  interests  are  fields  of  battle.  Whatever  de- 
cisions are  made  must  be  against  the  wishes  and  opinions  of  one 
party,  and  the  distinctions  on  which  they  go  will  be  distinctions  of 
degree.  Even  the  economic  postulate  of  the  benefit  of  free  compe- 
tition, which  I  have  mentioned  above,  is  denied  by  an  important 
school."  ^^  This  criticism  of  emphasis  on  logic  does  not,  of  course, 
imply  that  logic  is  not  to  be  used  in  reaching  judicial  decisions. 
"  The  settlement  of  any  legal  question  must,  of  course,  be  reached 

21  Ibid.,  3.  See  also  Smith,  "  The  Use  of  Maxims  in  Jurisprudence,"  Harvard  Law 
Revieiv,  IX:  14-25.  For  the  conservative  attitude  to  questions  of  policy  see  Clark,  "The 
Constitutional  Opinions  of  Justice  Harlan,"  J.  H.  U.  S.  H.  P.  S.,  Series  XXXIII:  aoi-ao2. 

22  Holmes,  op  cit.,  3. 
^^Ibid.,1. 


264      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

by  logical  processes.  The  error  which  the  learned  writer  appar- 
ently had  In  mind  consists,  at  least  In  some  Instances,  In  the  assump- 
tion without  sufficient  consideration  of  certain  alleged  general  prin- 
ciples .  .  .  and  then  arguing  from  them  by  means  of  reasoning 
purely  deductive  In  form."  ^^  The  best  corrective  Is  a  reform  In 
the  training  of  lawyers  such  that  they  will  be  better  trained  (i) 
for  analysis  of  prior  cases;  (2)  for  analysis  of  the  essential  features 
of  the  case  before  them  in  all  Its  bearings,  economic  and  social- 
psychological  as  well  as  legal;  (3)  for  understanding  the  meaning 
of  such  legal  terms  as  right,  duty,  etc.,  a  training  commonly  known 
as  "  Analytical  Jurisprudence  "  ^^;  (4)  and  finally  for  understand- 
ing the  functioning  of  law,^*^  and  In  "  a  clearer  conception  of  just 
what  the  function  of  judges  In  deciding  cases  really  is."  ^^ 

The  rational  attitude  requires  that  the  judge  know  intimately 
the  social  and  economic  conditions  with  which  the  law  has  to  do;  or 
at  least  realize  his  Ignorance  of  social  and  economic  conditions  in 
the  various  states  and  be  willing  to  assume  that  the  legislature 
might  reasonably  suppose  the  statute  would  further  the  public 
welfare.  As  Professor  Frankfurter  points  out,  it  Is  the  lack  of 
knowledge  of  social  and  economic  conditions,  and,  we  might  add, 
the  lack  of  a  consciousness  of  a  necessity  of  such  knowledge  —  the 
lack  of  a  consciousness  of  Ignorance  and  of  a  proper  humility  — 
that  has  caused  judges  to  follow  the  Lochner  case  up  to  the  present 
time.  In  criticizing  such  an  Instance,  he  points  out,  with  numerous 
citations,  that  it  "  is  now  clearly  enough  recognized  that  each  case 
presents  a  distinct  issue  "  which  "  must  be  determined  by  the  facts 
relevant  to  it  ";  that  the  "  groundwork  of  the  Lochner  case  has  by 
this  time  been  cut  from  under.  The  majority  opinion  was  based 
upon  '  a  common  understanding '  as  to  the  effect  of  work  in  bake- 
shops  upon  the  pubhc  and  upon  those  engaged  In  it.  '  Common 
understanding  '  has  ceased  to  be  the  rehance  In  matters  caUIng  for 
essentially  scientific  determination  " ;  and  an  Influential  body  of  pro- 
fessional opinion  "  has  been  impressively  arrayed  against  this  de- 

24  Cook,  "  Privileges  of  Labor  Unions  in  the  Struggle  for  Life,"  Yale  Lmv  Journal, 
XXXVII:784. 
25/^irf.,  785. 
28  Wehle,   "  Social  Justice   and  Legal   Education,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  July,   1917, 

505-5"- 
27  Cook,  op.  cit.,  785. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     265 

cision."  2^  Because  of  the  necessity  of  considering  the  facts  in 
each  case,  and  the  difficulty,  in  the  stress  of  judicial  work,  of  mak- 
ing an  investigation  as  to  the  facts,  courts  must  decide  cases  on  the 
facts  as  presented  by  the  counsel  in  the  case.  This  "  throws  the 
decision  of  the  courts  largely  upon  those  chances  which  determine 
the  selection  of  counsel."  ^^  Consequently  it  is  necessary  "  that  the 
profession  realize  the  true  nature  of  the  issues  involved  in  these 
constitutional  questions  and  the  limited  scope  of  the  reviewing 
power  of  the  courts.  With  the  recognition  that  those  questions 
raise,  substantially,  disputed  questions  of  fact  must  come  the  in- 
vention of  some  machinery  by  which  knowledge  of  the  facts,  which 
are  the  foundation  of  the  legal  judgment,  may  be  at  the  service  of 
the  courts  as  a  regular  form  of  the  judicial  process.  This  need  has 
been  voiced  alike  by  jurists  and  judges.  Once  the  need  shall  be 
felt  as  the  common  longing  of  the  profession  the  inventive  powers 
of  our  law  will  find  the  means  for  its  satisfaction."  ^^  Thus  the 
development  of  a  rational  judicial  attitude  requires  a  development 
of  that  attitude  throughout  the  legal  profession. 

It  is  to  the  increase  in  the  number  of  judges  of  a  rational  atti- 
tude that  progressive  tendencies  in  jurisprudence  are  due.  In  this 
development  the  letter  of  the  constitution  remains  the  same ;  inter- 
pretations change  not  only  because  social  and  economic  conditions 
change  but  also  because  judicial  attitudes  change.  The  conserva- 
tive judicial  attitude  emphasizes  the  letter  of  the  law,  that  is,  its 
meaning  as  determined  by  precedent.  The  rational  or  progressive 
judge,  on  the  other  hand,  declares :  The  "  provisions  of  the  Con- 
stitution are  not  mathematical  formulas  having  their  essence  in 
their  form;  they  are  organic  living  institutions  transplanted  from 
English  soil.  Their  significance  is  vital  not  formal;  it  is  to  be 
gathered  not  simply  by  taking  the  words  and  a  dictionary,  but  by 
considering  their  origin  and  the  line  of  their  growth."  ^^ 

The  functioning  of  judicial  attitudes  in  determining  judicial  de- 
cisions is  evident  not  only  where  the  court  is  divided  on  questions  of 
the  constitutionality  of  legislation,  but  also  where  the  court  is  di- 

28  Frankfurter,  "  Hours  of  Labor  and  Realism  in  Constitutional  Law,"  Harvard  Laiu 
Review,  XXIX:  369-371. 

2^  Ibid.,  371. 

^'^  Ibid.,  372-373  (quoted,  like  the  preceding  quotations,  without  the  citations  and 
footnotes). 

'1  Justice  Holmes  in  Gompers  v.  United  States,  34  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.,  695. 


266      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

vided  on  a  question  of  a  justifiable  use  of  the  injunction  in  labour 
disputes.  Take  the  case  of  the  Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Company 
vs.  John  Mitchell,  T.  L.  Lewis,  and  W.  B.  Wilson.  The  defend- 
ants were  officials  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  which 
organization  attempted  to  unionize  the  employes  of  the  Hitchman 
Company.  The  company  obtained  a  perpetual  injunction  forbid- 
ding the  officials  to  pursue  their  purpose;  the  injunction  was  af- 
firmed by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,^^  ^jj-j^  ^  dissenting 
opinion  by  Justices  Brandeis,  Holmes,  and  Clarke.  This  case  is 
particularly  favourable  for  a  comparison  of  the  rational  and  the 
conservative  judicial  attitudes  because  it  is  one  in  which  a  rational 
attitude  was  especially  called  for.  For  "  it  seems  that  there  was  no 
case  in  any  state  involving  facts  substantially  identical  with  that  be- 
fore the  court.  In  other  words,  the  court  had  to  '  find '  the  law 
applicable  to  a  new  case.^^  In  spite  of  this,  the  opinion  of  the 
majority  of  the  court  does  not  reveal  that  the  question  for  decision 
is  actually  a  novel  one.  Following  the  prevailing  fashion  in  judi- 
cial opinions,  it  proceeds  to  its  conclusions  chiefly  by  a  process  of 
deductive  reasoning  from  apparently  fixed  premises  supposed  to  be 
established  by  prior  cases.  The  fact  that  in  the  last  analysis  the 
decision  really  turns  upon  notions  of  policy  entertained  —  more  or 
less  consciously  or  unconsciously  —  by  the  members  of  the  court  is 
thus  thrown  into  the  background.  Where  policy  is  mentioned,  it 
is  rather  as  a  justification  for  existing  law  than  as  basis  for  a  new 
rule."  34 

The  majority  opinion  points  out  that  the  case  resolved  itself  into 
a  problem  of  conflicting  rights.  The  right  of  the  employer  to  run 
his  mine  non-union  conflicted  with  the  right  of  workmen  to  organize 
and  prevent  his  doing  so.  In  the  prefatory  discussion  of  these  con- 
flicting rights  the  opinion  of  the  majority  uses  the  term  "  right  " 
first  in  one  sense  and  then  in  another,  asserting  one  proposition  after 
another  in  the  process  of  deductive  reasoning,  and  relying  for  proof 

32  Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Company  vs.  John  Mitchell,  Individually;  T.  L.  Lewis, 
Individually;  W.  B.  Wilson,  Individually,  et  al.  U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  No.  ii, 
October  Term,  1917.  See  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Justices  Brandeis,  Holmes,  and 
Clarke.  See  also  a  similar  decision.  Eagle  Glass  &  Mfg.  Co.  vs.  Thomas  W.  Rowe 
(U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  No.  23,  October  Term,  1917)  and  the  dissenting  opinion  of 
Justices  Brandeis,  Holmes,  and  Clarke. 

33  The  writer's  note  reads :  "  Some  of  the  cases  supposed  to  be  in  point  will  be 
discussed  later,  either  in  the  text  or  in  the  notes." 

34  Cook,  "  Privileges  of  Labor  Unions  in  the  Struggle  for  Life,"  Yale  Lav:  Journal^ 
XXXVII:783. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     267 

on  a  plausible  use  of  precedents.^^  The  attitude  of  the  majority- 
was  plainly  the  individualistic  insistence  on  freedom  of  contract, 
which  the  court  interpreted  in  the  interest  of  the  employers,  on  the 
ground  that,  while  the  union  officials  might  legally  attempt  to 
unionize  the  mine,  the  attempt  in  this  case  involved  "  unfair  meth- 
ods "  which  were  construed  as  illegal.^^  The  decision  of  the  court 
implies  an  acceptance  of  the  individualistic  attitude, —  of  the  busi- 
ness man's  individualistic  insistence  on  freedom  from  interference 
in  his  quest  for  private  profits,  this  dignified  by  having  been  made 
the  economic  postulate  of  free  competition,  and  by  having  been 
given  the  sanctity  of  the  legal  doctrine  of  freedom  of  contract. 
From  the  judges  who  held  this  attitude  in  this  case  explanations  in 
the  form  of  legal  justifications  are  forthcoming,  which  justify  the 
attitude  by  finding  the  action  of  the  labour  organizers  unlawful  in 
one  respect  or  another. 

The  dissenting  opinion,  on  the  other  hand,  finds  no  legal  ground 
for  interfering  with  the  action  of  the  union  organizers.  Their 
"  purpose  .  .  .  was  confessedly  ...  to  strengthen  the  union,  in 
the  belief  that  thereby  the  condition  of  workmen  engaged  in  min- 
ing would  be  improved;  the  bargaining  power  of  the  individual 
working  man  was  to  be  strengthened  by  collective  bargaining;  and 
collective  bargaining  was  to  be  insured  by  obtaining  the  union  agree- 
ment. It  should  not,  at  this  day,  be  doubted  that  to  induce  work- 
ingmen  to  leave  or  not  to  enter  an  employment  in  order  to  advance 
such  a  purpose,  is  justifiable  when  the  workmen  are  not  bound  by 
contract  to  remain  in  such  employment."  ^'^  The  dissenting  opin- 
ion holds  that  there  could  be  no  breach  of  their  contract  by  the  men 
until  they  had  formally  joined  the  union.  The  majority  opinion 
held  that  there  could  be  and  was  a  breach  of  contract.^^  This  dif- 
ference of  opinion  is  plainly  due  to  a  difference  of  judicial  attitude 
in  the  case.  The  attitude  of  the  majority  is  on  behalf  of  the  right 
of  employers  to  be  free  of  interference  from  employes  and  is  there- 
fore against  the  employes ;  that  of  the  minority  is  on  behalf  of  free- 
dom of  the  employes  in  this  case  to  organize  against  their  em- 
ployers. 

35  Ibid.,  786-795 ;  see  also  Powell,  "  Collective  Bargaining  before  the  Supreme  Court," 
Pol.  Sc.  Quart.,  XXXIII:  420. 
^^  Reprint  of  decision,  20. 
^^  Reprint  of  dissenting  opinion,  9. 
8*  See  Professor  Cook's  discussion  of  this  point,  op.  cit,  796. 


268      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Another  evidence  of  the  difference  of  judicial  attitude  lies  in  the 
"  remarkable  scope  of  the  injunction  "  ^^  as  approved  by  the  de- 
cision of  the  court,  and  dissented  from  in  the  minority  opinion. 
The  injunction  enjoins  the  union  organizers  not  only  from  trying  to 
organize  the  employes  of  the  mine  but  also  from  making  the  for- 
bidden representations  to  "  any  person  who  might  become  an  em- 
ployee of  the  plaintiff."  ^^  Commenting  on  this  remarkable  scope 
of  the  injunction  Professor  Cook  writes:  "Apparently  this  por- 
tion of  the  injunction  is  based  upon  the  notion  expounded  by  some 
judges  that  employers  have  a  '  right  to  a  free  flow  of  labor.'  In 
the  whole  opinion  of  the  majority  of  the  court  there  is  no  discussion 
of  the  '  free  flow  of  labor  '  doctrine,  and  no  attempt  to  justify 
any  such  sweeping  prohibition.  Noteworthy  also  is  the  character 
of  the  prohibited  representations.  The  defendants  are  not  to 
represent  '  that  such  person  .  .  .  is  likely  to  suffer  some  loss  or 
trouble  in  continuing  in  or  in  entering  the  employment  of  plaintiff, 
.  .  .  by  reason  of  plaintiff  not  recognizing  the  United  Mine  Work- 
ers of  America,  or  because  plaintiff  runs  a  non-union  mine.'  Ap- 
parently statements  to  persons  contemplating,  or  who  might  at  any 
time  in  the  future  contemplate,  entering  plaintiff's  employment,  to 
the  effect  that  they  were  likely  to  lose  financially  in  the  long  run 
and  have  '  some  trouble  '  because  of  the  non-union  character  of  the 
plaintiff's  mine,  would  be  forbidden  if  made  '  for  the  purpose  of 
unionizing  plaintiff's  mine  without  its  consent.'  If  we  are  to  judge 
from  the  decree  and  not  merely  from  the  opinion,  it  is  clear  that  the 
court  is  holding  that  almost  any  acts  of  labor  unions  done  for  the 
purpose  of  unionizing  an  employer's  business  without  his  consent, 
are  illegal,  even  where  the  members  of  the  union  are  not  and  never 
have  been  employees  of  the  employer  concerned."  ^^ 

The  decision  of  the  court,  therefore,  shows  a  "  policy  "  of  re- 
straining the  action  of  employes  in  order  to  protect  the  interests  of 
employers  —  whose  rights  have  been  adjudged  deserving  of  protec- 
tion by  the  court  — ,  as  contrasted  with  the  minority  opinion,  which 
inclines  to  the  policy  of  not  finding  the  action  of  employes  unlaw- 
ful except  in  case  such  acts  explicitly  have  been  declared  unlawful, 
and  of  not  favouring  the  use  of  the  injunction  to  anticipate  and 
prevent  alleged  impending  unlawful  behaviour.     This  implied  ac- 

39  Ibid.,  7g6. 

*<*  Reprint  of  decision,  23 ;  Reprint  of  dissenting  opinion,  3. 

*i  Cook,  op.  cit.,  797-798. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     269 

ceptance,  in  the  minority  opinion,  of  the  fact  of  a  class  struggle 
which  a  court  must  not  hasten  to  restrain  in  the  interest  of  the  em- 
ployer is  opposed  by  the  decision  of  the  court.  The  decision  ex- 
plicitly states  that  "  the  defendants'  acts  cannot  be  justified  by  any 
analogy  to  competition  in  trade.  They  are  not  competitors  of 
plaintiff;  .  .  ."  ^^  The  reply  to  this  was  made  long  ago  by  Justice 
Holmes,  as  follows :  "  I  have  seen  the  suggestion  made  that  the 
conflict  between  employers  and  employed  is  not  competition.  But 
I  venture  to  assume  that  none  of  my  brethren  would  rely  on  that 
suggestion.  If  the  policy  on  which  our  law  is  founded  is  too  nar- 
rowly expressed  in  the  term  free  competition,  we  may  substitute 
free  struggle  for  life.  Certainly  the  policy  is  not  limited  to  strug- 
gles between  persons  of  the  same  class  competing  for  the  same  end. 
It  applies  to  all  conflicts  of  temporal  interests."  ^^  A  similar  atti- 
tude was  taken  by  the  dissenting  opinion  as  follows:  "  Both  the 
plaintiff  and  defendant  insisted  upon  exercising  the  right  to  secure 
contracts  for  a  closed  shop.  The  plaintiff  sought  to  secure  the 
closed  non-union  shop  through  individual  agreements  with  em- 
ployees. The  defendants  sought  to  secure  the  closed  union  shop 
through  a  collective  agreement  with  the  union.  Since  collective  bar- 
gaining Is  legal  .  .  .  defendants'  efforts  to  unionize  the  mine  can 
be  illegal,  only  if  the  methods  or  means  pursued  are  unlaw- 
ful; .  .  ."  ^^  Here  we  have  an  implicit  recognition  of  a  relation 
of  class  struggle  for  income  in  which  the  mere  fact  that  workmen, 
by  united  action,  may  divert  some  of  the  income  of  an  industry 
from  the  owner  to  themselves,  as  service  income,  does  not  consti- 
tute an  unlawful  act. 

The  dissenting  opinion  takes  up  the  argument  that  union  re- 
straint on  the  liberty  of  the  property  owner  —  which  might  pre- 
sumably result  in  such  diverting  of  income  —  In  this  case  injures 
the  employer  In  a  way  that  the  law  forbids.  "  It  is  urged  that  a 
union  agreement  curtails  the  liberty  of  the  operator.  Every  agree- 
ment curtails  the  liberty  of  those  who  enter  Into  it.  The  test  of 
legality  Is  not  whether  an  agreement  curtails  liberty,  but  whether 
the  parties  have  agreed  upon  something  which  the  law  prohibits  or 
declares  otherwise  to  be  inconsistent  for  the  public  welfare.     The 

*2  Reprint  of  decision,  21. 

*3  Dissenting  opinion  in  Vegelalin  v.  Guntner  (1896),  167  Mass.  92,  107. 

^*  Reprint  of  dissenting  opinion,  6,  7. 


270      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

operator  by  the  union  agreement  binds  himself:  (i)  to  employ 
only  members  of  the  union;  (2)  to  negotiate  with  union  officers 
instead  of  with  employees  individually  the  scale  of  wages  and  the 
hours  of  work;  (3)  to  treat  with  the  duly  constituted  representa- 
tives of  the  union  to  settle  disputes  concerning  the  discharge  of  men 
and  other  controversies  arising  out  of  the  employment.  These  are 
the  chief  features  of  a  '  unionizing '  by  which  the  employer's  lib- 
erty is  curtailed.  Each  of  them  is  legal.  To  obtain  any  of  them 
or  all  of  them  men  may  lawfully  strive  and  even  strike.  And,  if 
the  union  may  legally  strike  to  obtain  each  of  the  things  for  which 
the  agreement  provides;  why  may  it  not  strike  or  use  equivalent 
economic  pressure  to  secure  an  agreement  to  provide  them? 

"  It  is  also  urged  that  the  defendants  are  seeking  to  '  coerce ' 
plaintiff  to  '  unionize  '  its  mine.  But  coercion,  in  a  legal  sense,  is 
not  exerted  when  a  union  merely  endeavors  to  induce  employees 
to  join  a  union  with  the  intention  thereafter  to  order  a  strike  unless 
the  employer  consents  to  unionize  his  shop.  Such  pressure  is  not 
coercion  in  the  legal  sense.  The  employer  is  free  either  to  accept 
the  agreement  or  the  disadvantage.  Indeed,  the  plaintiff's  whole 
case  is  rested  upon  agreements  secured  under  similar  pressure  of 
economic  necessity  or  disadvantage.  If  it  is  coercion  to  threaten 
to  strike  unless  plaintiff  consents  to  a  closed  union  shop,  it  is  coer- 
cion also  to  threaten  not  to  give  one  employment  unless  the  appli- 
cant will  consent  to  a  closed  non-union  shop.  The  employer  may 
sign  the  union  agreement  for  fear  that  labor  may  not  be  otherwise 
obtainable;  the  workman  may  sign  the  individual  agreement,  for 
fear  that  employment  may  not  be  otherwise  obtainable.  But  such 
fear  does  not  imply  coercion  in  a  legal  sense. ^'^ 

The  divided  court,  in  the  above  case,  was  due,  therefore,  to  a 
difference  of  attitude.  The  majority  of  the  judges  accepted  the 
traditional  individualistic  attitude  of  the  employer  to  his  workmen, 
endorsed  by  the  weight  of  economic  and  legal  tradition.  The  in- 
dividualistic employer  insists  that  he  be  permitted  to  run  his  own 
business  as  he  sees  fit,  without  the  interference  of  workmen,  and  the 
individualistic  judge  insists  that  such  interference  is  illegal.  Judges 
who  subconsciously  assume  this  attitude  plausibly  give  it  legal  justi- 
fication and  thus  supplement  the  domination  exercised  by  employers 
with  domination  exercised  on  their  behalf  by  the  government.  The 
*^  Ibid.,  7-i. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     271 

dissenting  opinion  implicitly  rejects  the  traditional  relation  of  domi- 
natlon-submision  of  employer  and  workmen  and  recognizes  a  class 
struggle  between  employers  and  employes  in  which  workmen  may 
resist  the  domination  of  employers  in  all  ways  which  have  not  been 
explicitly  declared  illegal. 

There  are  able  jurists  who  think  it  doubtful  whether  our  courts 
ever  will  show  themselves  capable  of  taking  a  rational  attitude  in 
cases  involving  controversies  between  labour  and  capital.  The  tra- 
ditional legal  development  on  behalf  of  the  employer,  and  the  ten- 
dency of  judges,  who,  as  lawyers,  had  property  owners  for  their 
clients,  to  seek  first  to  guard  the  interests  of  employers,  tends  to 
make  a  rational  attitude  in  questions  of  policy  difficult  to  assume. 
Professor  Cook  writes:  "Whether  our  courts  will  show  them- 
selves competent  to  settle  rightly  the  questions  of  policy  involved 
is  perhaps  doubtful.  If  not,  we  have  our  legislative  bodies  to 
fall  back  upon.  In  making  our  decision  we  shall  have  to  bear  in 
mind  that  if  we  do  not  give  organized  labor  a  fair  chance  to  assert 
itself  in  competition  with  organized  capital  in  this  '  free  struggle 
for  life,'  the  only  alternative  will  be  a  larger  and  larger  measure  of 
direct  governmental  interference  in  fixing  wages  and  conditions  of 
employment.^®  "  ^^ 

Judicial  attitudes  as  the  basis  of  court  decisions  and  opinions 
stand  out  most  conspicuously  in  decisions  which  involve  no  complex 
legal  reasoning  and  in  which  there  is  a  dissenting  opinion.  Such  a 
decision,  for  instance,  is  that  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
in  Jacob  Abrams  et  al.  vs.  United  States.^^  This  was  a  case  under 
the  Espionage  Act  in  which  the  defendants  were  found  guilty  of  vio- 
lating the  act  and  the  decision  was  affirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court 
on  the  ground  that,  by  the  publication  and  circulation  of  a  pamphlet, 
the  defendants  proposed  to  stir  up  a  revolution  in  the  United 

^^The  author's  note  is  as  follows:  "This  of  course  is  what  has  been  going  on  in 
Australia.  See  The  Judicial  Regulation  of  Industrial  Conditions,  by  W.  Jenthro 
Brown  (1918)  27,  Yale  La<m  Journal,  427.  Minimum  wage  laws,  the  Adamson  law, 
and  similar  legislation  suggest  the  possibility  of  greater  developments  along  this  line  in 
our  own  country.  Undoubtedly  the  experiences  we  are  now  going  through  in  the  great 
war  will  have  much  eflFect  upon  our  notions  of  what  it  is  feasible  for  the  government 
to  undertake  in  the  way  of  the  regulation  of  matters  heretofore  regarded  as  *  private ' 
and  exempt  from  governmental  interference.  The  recent  program  of  the  British  Labor 
Party  is  perhaps  another  sign  of  the  times." 

<7  Cook,  op.  cit.,  XXVII:  800-801. 

*8  Decided  Nov.  10,  1919.  I  use  the  text  of  the  decision  and  dissenting  opinion  as 
printed  in  The  Neiv  Republic,  Nov.  26,  1919,  377-383. 


272      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

States  which  would  interfere  with  the  success  of  the  American  arms 
in  the  World  War.  The  dissenting  opinion,  written  by  Justice 
Holmes  and  concurred  in  by  Justice  Brandeis,  held  that,  while  the 
immediate  purpose  was  to  stir  up  a  revolution,  the  ultimate  purpose 
was  not  to  interfere  with  the  success  of  the  American  arms  against 
Germany  but  to  prevent  the  United  States  government  interfering 
with  the  revolution  in  Russia,  and  that  "  An  intent  to  prevent  in- 
terference with  the  revolution  in  Russia  might  have  been  satisfied 
without  any  hindrance  to  carrying  on  the  war  in  which  we  were  en- 
gaged." *^  Wherefore  the  dissenting  opinion  does  not  see  how  any 
one  can  find  the  intent  required  by  the  statute  in  any  of  the  defend- 
ant's words."  ^°  Furthermore,  "  nobody  can  suppose  that  the  sur- 
reptitious publishing  of  a  silly  leaflet  by  an  unknown  man,  without 
more,  would  present  any  immediate  danger  that  its  opinion  would 
hinder  the  success  of  the  government  arms."  ^^  The  minority  opin- 
ion maintained  that  the  decision  of  the  lower  court  violated  the 
First  Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  which  is  that  Congress  shall 
make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech.  For,  while  Con- 
gress may  hmit  freedom  of  speech  because  of  "  the  present  danger 
of  immediate  evil  .  .  .  Congress  certainly  cannot  forbid  all  effort 
to  change  the  mind  of  the  country 

"  Persecution  for  the  expression  of  opinions  seems  to  me  per- 
fectly logical.  If  you  have  no  doubt  of  your  premises  or  your 
power  and  want  a  certain  result  with  all  your  heart  you  naturally 
express  your  wishes  in  law  and  sweep  away  all  opposition.  .  .  .  But 
when  men  have  realized  that  time  has  upset  many  fighting  faiths, 
they  may  come  to  believe  even  more  than  they  believe  the  very  foun- 
dations of  their  own  conduct  that  the  ultimate  good  desired  is  bet- 
ter reached  by  free  trade  in  ideas  —  that  the  best  test  of  truth  is 
the  power  of  thought  to  get  itself  accepted  in  the  competition  of  the 
market  and  that  truth  is  the  only  ground  upon  which  their  wishes 
safely  can  be  carried  out.  That  at  any  rate  is  the  theory  of  our 
Constitution."  ^^ 

Here,  then,  is  a  difference  of  judicial  opinion  which  can  be  ex- 
plained only  on  the  basis  of  a  difference  of  judicial  attitude.     The 

48/^li.,  381. 

60  7^.,  381. 
"  Ibid.,  381. 
e2/W</.,  383. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  JUDICIAL  ATTITUDES     273 

facts  in  the  case,  the  law,  and  the  situation  before  the  country  ap- 
peared differently  to  the  justices  because  they  took  different  attitudes 
to  the  facts,  the  law  and  the  situation.  The  interpretation  of  the 
two  dissenting  justices  was  in  accord  with  legal  tradition.  The  test 
of  the  constitutionality  of  limitations  on  free  speech  laid  down  by 
Justice  Holmes  — "  present  danger  of  immediate  evil  or  intent  to 
bring  it  about  " —  was  that  of  common-law  incitement  to  crime, 
which  doubtlessly  is  the  test  intended  by  the  Constitution.^^  The 
interpretation  of  the  majority,  on  the  contrary,  made  the  mere  use 
of  words  criminal,  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  evidence  of  intent  and 
without  regard  to  whether  there  was  present  danger  of  immediate 
evil.^"*  The  two  dissenting  justices  are  men  who  throughout  their 
careers  have  been  distinguished  for  a  discriminating  interpretation 
of  law.  Their  pronounced  attitude  is  the  intellectual,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  dominating,  order-preserving  attitude  of  the  judge 
who  feels  his  part  as  the  exponent  of  the  will  of  his  group,  whether 
conservative,  as  that  will  usually  is,  or  impulsive,  as  in  the  decision 
under  discussion.  This  type  of  judge  emphasizes  the  traditional 
function  of  the  court, —  that  of  the  exponent  of  criminal  law.  This 
judicial  attitude  is  in  accordance  with  the  attitude  to  law  and  the 
courts  of  the  common  man,  who  commonly  thinks  of  law  in  the 
form  of  criminal  law.'^^  The  behaviour  of  judges  of  this  type 
varies  all  the  way  from  that  of  judges  who,  like  the  majority  of  the 
Supreme  Court  in  the  above  case,  over-emphasize  the  traditional 
function  of  the  court  as  the  order-preserving  organ  of  government, 
especially  when  such  action  is  in  line  with  popular  sentiment  or  the 
sentiment  of  a  dominant  class,  to  that  of  the  judge  who  uses  this 
function  as  a  subterfuge  for  indulging,  in  his  judicial  behaviour,  his 
class  bias  and  dominating  disposition.^^  The  progressive  judge, 
on  the  contrary,  in  accordance  with  a  rational  social  purpose  inter- 
prets law  in  a  way  to  effectuate  community  ideals  of  progress.  Con- 
stitutional provisions  are,  to  him,  formulations  of  such  ideals,  the 
meaning  of  which  changes  from  age  to  age.     He  follows,  primarily, 

53  K.  N.  L.,  "  Free  Speech  in  Time  of  Peace,"  Yale  Laiu  Journal,  Jan.,  1920,  338 ;  Hart, 
"Power  of  Government  over  Speech  and  Press,"  Yale  Laiu  Journal,  Feb.,  1920,  422-428. 

5*K.  N.  L.,  "  Free  Speech  in  Time  of  Peace,"  Yale  Laiu  Journal,  Jan.,  1920,  338. 

S5  Pound,  "Juristic  Problems  of  National  Progress,"  Amer.  Jour.  SocioL,  May,  1917, 
728. 

S8  Hard,  "  In  Judge  Anderson's  Courtroom,"  The  Neio  Republic,  Nov.  26,  191 9,  373- 
377.    See  also  The  Survey,  March  25,  1916,  763. 


274     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

not  the  conservative  or  impulsive  public  sentiment,  but  the  more  in- 
telligent public  opinion.  Because  of  his  intellectual  attitude  he  be- 
lieves that  "  we  should  be  eternally  vigilant  against  attempts  to 
check  the  expression  of  opinions  that  we  loathe  and  beheve  to  be 
fraught  with  death  unless  they  so  imminently  threaten  immediate 
interference  with  the  lawful  and  pressing  purposes  of  the  law  that 
an  immediate  check  is  required  to  save  the  country."  ^"^ 

^■^  Justice  Holmes'  dissenting  opinion,  op.  ctt.,  383. 


CHAPTER  XV 

JUDICIAL    ATTITUDES    AND    THE    NATURE    OF    LAW 

JUDGES  usually  state  in  their  decisions  and  opinions  merely  the 
legal  reasons  for  their  attitude  without  making  more  explicit 
the  attitude  itself.  A  study  of  judicial  attitudes  is,  therefore, 
largely  a  matter  of  inference  from  the  reasoning  of  decisions  and 
opinions.  In  the  case  of  a  divided  bench,  a  difference  of  attitude 
is  plainly  the  deciding  cause  of  the  difference  of  opinion;  for  all 
judges,  at  least  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  are  men 
of  ability  and  learned  in  the  law.  The  reason  for  the  difference  of 
opinion  lies  not  in  the  law,  which  is  the  same  for  all  judges,  but  in 
the  theories  and  subconscious  assumptions  that  constitute  the  prem- 
ises from  which  they  reason.  Decisions  would  be  more  enlighten- 
ing, therefore,  if  judges  would  be  more  explicit  as  to  their  economic 
and  other  theories,  and  would  delve  more  deeply  into  their  subcon- 
scious assumptions  and  state  the  essential  reasons  for  an  important 
difference  of  opinion.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  judicial  decisions 
do  not  make  more  clear  than  they  usually  do  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  opinion,  especially  when  there  is  a  divided  court.  Those  who 
commend  a  judge  for  keeping  his  own  economic  theories  in  the 
background  in  his  legal  opinions  unwarrantedly  assume  that  the 
fact  that  he  does  so  shows  that  he  has  eliminated  them  from  the 
premises  from  which  he  reasons.^  He  may  think  he  has  kept  his 
theories  in  the  background  in  the  formation  of  his  opinions,  when 
all  the  time  they  are  subconsciously  influencing  his  opinions;  or  he 
may  keep  them  in  the  background  because  he  fears  to  expose  them 
to  scientific  scrutiny,  while  he  conservatively  clings  to  them  as  valid 
assumptions.  Instead  of  keeping  theories  and  assumptions  in  the 
background  it  is  much  safer  to  bring  them  into  the  light  of  day  and 
subject  them  to  scientific  scrutiny  and  thereby  make  the  judicial  atti- 
tude a  thoroughly  rational  one.  Says  Justice  Holmes:  *T  think 
that  the  judges  themselves  have  failed  adequately  to  recognize  their 

1  Allen,  "The  Opinions  of  Justice  Hughes,"  Columbia  Law  Review,  XVI:  579. 

375 


276      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

duty  of  weighing  considerations  of  social  advantage.  The  duty  is 
inevitable,  and  the  result  of  the  often  proclaimed  judicial  aversion 
to  deal  with  such  considerations  is  simply  to  leave  the  very  ground 
and  foundation  of  judgments  inarticulate  and  often  unconscious."  ^ 
The  rational  judge  is  more  apt  to  be  explicit  as  to  his  premises  than 
is  the  conservative  judge,  because  his  attitude  is  inductive  and  ana- 
lytical, and  he  is,  therefore,  critical  of  the  traditional  elements  in 
his  premises;  and  because  his  opinions  are  apt  to  vary  more  widely 
from  traditional  decisions  than  those  of  the  conservative  judge  so 
that  he  naturally  is  more  explicit  in  justifying  his  opinions.  It  is 
therefore,  easier  for  the  student  of  judicial  attitudes  to  analyse  the 
rational  than  the  conservative  attitude. 

Judges  who  are  moved  by  a  rational  attitude  may  differ  in  their 
economic  views  and,  therefore,  may  have  contrary  opinions  in  a 
particular  case.^  But  the  differences  of  such  judges  are  less  funda- 
mental than  are  those  of  the  rational  and  the  conservative  judge. 
Judges  themselves  are  conscious  of  a  difference  of  attitude  as  essen- 
tial in  determining  a  difference  of  judicial  opinion;  rational  judges, 
especially,  as  above  indicated,  feel  called  upon  to  justify  their  opin- 
ions by  justifying  their  unusual  attitude,  as  compared  with  the  usual, 
conservative  judicial  attitude.  Judge  Learned  Hand  of  New  York 
writes  as  follows:  "  Conservative  political  opinion  in  America 
cleaves  to  the  tradition  of  the  judge  as  passive  interpreter,  believing 
that  his  absolute  loyalty  to  authoritative  law  is  the  price  of  his 
immunity  from  political  pressure^  and  of  the  security  of  his  tenure. 
Therefore,  since  he  should  have  no  aim  but  to  understand  the  law 
as  he  finds  it,  conservative  opinion  finds  it  monstrous  to  require  of 
him  results  which  shall  suit  the  changing  popular  aspirations,  .  .  . 
In  its  passionate  adherence  to  this  tradition  such  opinion  is  not  dis- 
interested; it  would  as  eagerly  encourage  judicial  initiative,  if  the 
laws  were  framed  by  labor  unions,  as  it  insists  upon  rigid  obedience 
in  a  system  framed  for  the  most  part  for  the  protection  of  property 
and  for  the  prevention  of  thorough  going  social  regulation.   .  .   . 

"  This  attitude  is  in  part  right  and  in  part  wrong.  Much  of  the 
law  is  indeed  written  in  formal  shape,  the  authoritative  emanation 
of  the  state.  .  .  .  Nevertheless,  the  judge  has,  by  custom,  his  own 

2  Holmes,  "  The  Path  of  the  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  X:4S7,  467. 

s  See  the  comparison  of  the  economic  attitudes  of  Justice  Holmes  and  Justice  Hughes 
m  Allen,  op.  cit.,  XVI:  569-581. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  277 

proper  representative  character  as  a  complementary  organ  of  the 
social  will,  and  in  so  far  as  conservative  sentiment,  in  the  excess  of 
caution  that  he  shall  be  obedient,  frustrates  his  free  power  of  inter- 
pretation to  manifest  the  half-framed  purposes  of  his  time,  it  mis- 
conceives the  historical  significance  of  his  position  and  will  in  the  end 
render  him  incompetent  to  perform  the  very  duties  upon  which  it 
lays  so  much  emphasis.  The  profession  of  the  law  of  which  he  is 
a  part  is  charged  with  the  articulation  and  final  incidence  of  the 
successive  efforts  toward  justice ;  it  must  feel  the  circulation  of  the 
communal  blood  or  it  will  wither  and  drop  off,  a  useless 
member.   .   .   . 

"  Two  conditions  are  essential  to  the  realization  of  justice  ac- 
cording to  law.  The  law  must  have  an  authority  supreme  over  the 
will  of  the  individual,  and  such  an  authority  can  arise  only  from  a 
background  of  social  acquiescence,  which  gives  it  the  voice  of  in- 
definitely greater  numbers  than  those  of  its  expositors.  Thus,  the 
law  surpasses  the  deliverances  of  even  the  most  exalted  of  its 
prophets;  the  momentum  of  its  composite  will  alone  makes  it  effec- 
tive to  coerce  the  individual  and  reconcile  him  to  his  subserviency. 
The  pious  traditionalism  of  the  law  has  its  roots  in  a  sound  convic- 
tion of  this  necessity;  it  must  be  content  to  lag  behind  the  best  in- 
spiration of  its  time  until  it  feels  behind  it  the  weight  of  such  general 
acceptance  as  will  give  sanction  to  its  pretension  to  unquestioned  dic- 
tation. Yet  with  this  piety  must  go  a  test  for  courageous  experi- 
ment, by  which  alone  the  law  has  been  built  as  we  have  it,  .  .  ."  * 
Modern  conditions  have  increased  the  necessity  of  experimentation. 
It  was  less  called  for  while  the  propertied  classes,  which  law-makers 
represented,  were  the  only  classes  which  had  political  power  so  that 
"class  grievances  were  inaudible."  "All  this  has  changed;  the 
profession  is  still  drawn,  and  so  far  as  we  can  see,  will  always  be 
drawn,  from  the  propertied  class,  but  other  classes  have  awakened 
to  conscious  control  of  their  fate,  their  demands  are  vocal  which 
before  were  dumb,  and  they  will  no  longer  be  disregarded.  If 
justice  be  a  passable  accommodation  between  the  vital  and  self- 
conscious  interests  of  society,  it  has  taken  on  a  meaning  not  known 
before.  But  the  profession  has  not  yet  learned  to  adapt  itself  to 
the  change;  that  most  diflicult  of  adjustments  has  not  been  made, 
an  understanding  of  and  sympathy  with  the  purposes  and  ideals  of 

*Hand,  "The  Speech  of  Justice,"  Harvard  Law  Review,  XXIX:  617-6x8. 


iyS     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

those  parts  of  the  common  society  whose  interests  are  discordant 
with  its  own."  ^  The  rational  type  of  lawyer  is  indeed  the  rare 
exception.  This  is  the  essential  reason  for  the  recent  agitation  for 
a  more  responsible  judiciary,  and  for  making  the  regulations  of  ad- 
ministrative departments  and  commissions  final  and  not  subject  to 
judicial  review,  and  for  "  an  increasing  body  of  minute  formularies 
which  leave  no  option  and  permit  no  latitude.  ...  A  large  part  of 
the  tendency  towards  such  meticulous  prolixity  rests  in  the  very 
inability  of  the  profession  to  show  a  more  enlightened  sympathy 
with  the  deeper  aspirations  of  the  time."  ^ 

Judge  Hand's  conception  of  "  sympathy  with  the  deeper  aspira- 
tions of  the  time  "  is  not  a  vague  conception.  He  means  under- 
standing in  the  most  thoroughly  scientific  sense  of  that  term.  A 
satisfying  understanding  of  the  cases  that  come  before  him  the  busy 
judge  finds  it  very  difficult  to  attain,  as  indicated  in  a  previous  chap- 
ter. In  one  instance,  Judge  Hand  exclaimed :  "  How  long  we 
shall  continue  to  blunder  along  without  the  aid  of  unpartisan  and 
authoritative  scientific  assistance  in  the  administration  of  justice  no 
one  knows;  but  all  fair  persons  not  conventionalized  by  provincial 
legal  habits  of  mind  ought,  I  should  think,  unite  to  effect  some  such 
advance."  "^ 

Judge  Young  of  New  Hampshire  likewise  conceives  of  law  as 
effectuating  social  adjustment  to  changing  conditions;  he  considers 
the  sanction  of  law  to  be,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  assent  of  the  com- 
munity, and  the  law  as  effectuating  the  ideals  of  the  community. 
He  says,  while  "  I  cannot  show  just  what  the  community  mind  is, 
...  I  shall  assume  for  the  purpose  of  this  discussion  that  there  is 
such  an  entity.  .  .  ."  ^  "I  think  that  whenever  two  or  more  per- 
sons associate  themselves  together  for  any  purpose,  their  minds  in- 
terpenetrate one  another  in  such  a  way  as  to  form  ...  a  commu- 
nity mind  in  so  far  as  the  common  purpose  is  concerned."  ^  He 
holds  that  not  only  statute  law  but  also  the  common  law  as  inter- 
preted by  judges  is  determined  by  community  ideals  of  justice  or,  in 

8  Ibid.,  619-620. 
*  Ibid.,  620. 

7  Park-Davis  &  Co.  v.  H.  K.  Mulford  Co.,  189  Fed.,  115. 

8  Young,   "  The  Law   as  an  Expression  of   Community   Ideals   and  the  Lawmaking 
Functions  of  Courts,"  Yale  Lanv  Journal,  XXVII:i7. 

^Korkunov,  "General  Theory  of  Law"   (1909),  276.    The  quotation  and  note  are 
from  Young,  op.  cit.,  17. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  279 

short,  public  opinion.  He  says :  "  Just  what  part  public  opinion 
plays  in  formulating  the  rules  of  the  common  law  is  very  difficult  to 
say.  It  is  the  final  test  with  many  judges,  or  what  a  judge  has  in 
mind,  when  he  says  that  a  particular  rule  does  not  apply  because  of 
the  results  it  would  produce.  It  is  obvious  that  it  dominates  the 
minds  of  all  judges  to  a  greater  or  less  extent;  for  whenever  the 
results  a  rule  produces  are  ...  unjust  as  the  ordinary  man  under- 
stands justice,  the  court  will  find  a  way  of  distinguishing  the  case  it 
is  considering  from  the  one  it  was  considering  when  the  rule  was 
announced.  In  other  words,  the  court  will  overrule  the  rule  while 
professing  to  follow  it.  It  is,  therefore,  in  a  sense  true  that  public 
opinion  is  the  final  arbiter  of  right  and  wrong  in  so  far  as  the  rules 
of  the  common  law  are  concerned,  as  well  as  in  the  case  of  stat- 
utes." ^^  Judge  Young  distinguishes  his  theory  of  law  from  that  of 
those  who  assume  an  objective  standard:  "  By  law,  as  that  term  is 
sometimes  used,  the  standard  of  justice  or  the  yard  stick  determin- 
ing right  from  wrong,  is  intended:  and  an  attempt  to  define  it  re- 
solves itself  into  an  attempt  to  define  the  standard  of  justice. 

"  I  think  that  that  standard  is  subjective,  or  to  be  found  in  the 
mind  of  the  lawmakers;  but  many,  perhaps  the  majority,  think  that 
it  is  objective  or  to  be  found  outside  of  the  consciousness  of  the  law- 
makers. In  other  words,  I  think  the  yard  stick  to  determine  right 
from  wrong  for  each  of  the  communities  into  which  the  race  is 
divided  is  to  be  found  in  its  consciousness.  .  .  .  While  this  is  my 
view  .  .  .  the  majority  believe  that  the  standard  is  objective,  or 
that  it  is  to  be  found  somewhere  in  space  rather  than  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  .  .  .  the  community.  ...  If  we  are  to  understand 
what  law  is  and  its  office  in  the  social  scheme,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  determine  which  of  these  views  is  sound;  .  .  ."  ^^  Evidently, 
under  Judge  Young's  view,  social  psychology  is  closely  related  to 
jurisprudence  in  that  it  must  explain  the  operation  of  the  ideals  of 
the  community,  and  of  public  opinion,  and  of  the  attitudes  of  law- 
makers in  determining  the  law  of  the  community  and  its  interpreta- 
tion in  a  particular  case. 

To  the  judge  who  takes  a  rational  attitude  to  law,  law  becomes 
very  closely  dependent  on  public  opinion.     But,  because  most  judges 

loPrye  v.  Hubbell   (1907),  74  N.  H.  358,  68  Atl.  325.    The  quotation  and  note  are 
from  Young,  op.  cit.,  30. 
11  Young,  op.  cit.,  3-4. 


28o      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

are  deductive  in  their  mental  processes,  they  rarely  recognize  the 
influence  on  law  of  public  opinion  and  of  considerations  of  public 
policy.  "  The  very  considerations  which  judges  most  rarely  men- 
tion, and  always  with  an  apology,  are  the  secret  root  from  which 
the  law  draws  all  the  juices  of  life,  I  mean,  of  course,  considera- 
tions of  what  is  expedient  for  the  community  concerned.  Every 
important  principle  which  is  developed  by  litigation  is  in  fact  and  at 
bottom  the  result  of  more  or  less  definitely  understood  views  of  pub- 
lic policy;  most  generally,  to  be  sure,  under  our  practice  and  tradi- 
tions, the  unconscious  result  of  instinctive  preferences  and  inarticu- 
late convictions,  but  none  the  less,  traceable  to  views  of  public  policy 
in  the  last  analysis."  ^^  "  The  true  grounds  of  decisions  are  consid- 
erations of  policy  and  of  social  advantage,  and  it  is  vain  to  suppose 
that  solutions  can  be  attained  merely  by  logic  and  general  proposi- 
tions of  law  which  nobody  disputes.  Propositions  as  to  public 
policy  rarely  are  unanimously  accepted,  and  still  more  rarely  if  ever, 
are  capable  of  unanswerable  proof.  They  require  a  special  training 
to  enable  any  one  even  to  form  an  intelligent  opinion  about  them. 
In  the  early  stages  of  law,  at  least,  they  generally  are  acted  on  rather 
as  inarticulate  instincts  than  as  definite  ideas  for  which  a  rational 
defence  is  ready."  ^^ 

The  conventional  judge,  in  his  thinking  about  the  nature  of  law, 
differs  from  the  rational  judge  chiefly  in  his  indiscriminating  predi- 
lection for  tradition.  This  is  seen  in  his  inclination  to  the  use  of 
legal  fictions.  The  rational  judge  emphasizes  induction  and,  there- 
fore, opposes  such  use.^^  The  inductive  attitude  insists  on  an  ex- 
amination of  the  social-psychological  and  other  facts  assumed  by 
the  fictions  without  examination.  Thus  it  is  the  inductive  legal 
attitude  that  emphasizes  the  close  connection  between  social-psy- 
chology and  jurisprudence.  Take,  for  instance,  the  fiction  "  that 
every  man  intends  the  natural  and  probable  consequences  of  his 
acts."  ^'^  This  legal  presumption  arbitrarily  does  away  with  the 
necessity  of  an  inductive  inquiry  as  to  intent.  However,  there  is 
no  valid  reason  for  the  elimination  of  such  an  inquiry.     The  justi- 

12  Holmes,  "The  Common  Law,"  35-36. 

18  Dissenting  opinion  in  Vegelahn  v.  Guntner  (1896),  167  Mass,,  106. 

1*  "  If  the  fiction  is  not  founded  on  truth,  its  use  is  unjustifiable.  If  it  is  founded  on 
truth,  its  use  is  foolish."  (Smith,  "Surviving  Fictions,"  Yale  Laiu  Journal,  XXVII. 
152.)     For   the   opposite   view   see   Pollock,    "The   Extension   of  the   Common   Law," 

135-136- 
15  Smith,  op.  cit.,  156. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  281 

fication  offered  for  these  legal  shortcuts  Is  merely  the  claim  that 
Induction  is  unnecessary  because  of  the  existence  of  the  legal  rule; 
but  the  use  of  such  a  rule  Is  unjustified  because  It  Is  not  a  duly  au- 
thorized rule  but  merely  a  legal  fiction  use  of  which  is  prompted  by 
the  penchant  of  the  deductive  mind  for  shortcuts  that  eliminate  the 
annoyance  Incidental  to  the  more  laborious  process  of  Induction. 
From  the  Inductive  point  of  view  Intent  may  be  Inferred  only  when 
the  facts  warrant  such  an  Inference.  "  In  many  cases,  undoubt- 
edly, the  facts  are  such  as  to  justify  a  jury  in  finding  intent.  And,  If 
the  facts  are  so  strong  that  no  other  finding  could  reasonably  be 
made,  the  judge  may  be  justified  in  assuming  the  existence  of  intent 
without  submitting  that  Issue  to  the  jury.  But  whenever  Intent  Is 
thus  inferred,  '  the  process  is  one  of  Inference  from  facts,  not  of 
pre-determination  by  law,'  or,  in  other  words,  *  the  process  Is 
Induction  from  fact,  not  deduction  from  arbitrary  law.'  "  ^®  Fic- 
tion, because  it  assumes  something  which  is  not  necessarily  true,^^  in 
a  particular  case,  "  tends  not  only  to  impair  in  a  general  way  rever- 
ence for  truth;  but  also  to  diminish  the  respect  which  would  other- 
wise be  felt  for  the  courts  and  for  the  law  itself.  These  objections, 
in  substance,  have  been  urged,  not  by  mere  theorists,  but  by  experi- 
enced lawyers  and  judges."  ^^  The  averseness  to  Inductive  legal 
thinking  is  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  cases  Involving  the  use  of 
legal  fictions  often  involve  questions  of  the  motives  of  the  parties  to 
the  case;  and  questions  of  motives  are  so  obscure,  and  lawyers  so 
lack  the  social-psychological  training  necessary  to  conduct  such  in- 
quiries and  to  make  unerring  inferences  as  to  motives,  that  they 
have  easily  drifted  into  the  habit  of  covering  such  Inquiries  by  legal 
fictions. 

Conservative  and  rational  judges  differ,  also.  In  their  attitudes  to 
the  common  law.  The  conservative  attitude  Is  that  the  common 
law  Is  a  complete  body  of  law,  which  judges  apply  to  particular 
cases  by  deductive  reasoning.     "  The  theory  that  law  Is  a  complete 

^^  Ibid.,  157,  quoting  2  V^^harton,  Evid.  (3d  ed.)   ss.  1258,  1261,  1262. 

1^  The  deductive  thinker,  lacking  analytical  power,  confuses  ideas  with  terras.  "  No 
doubt  this  psychological  and  linguistic  principle  —  what  might  be  called  'the  principle 
of  linguistic  contamination '  —  explains  why  certain  well-known  legal  authors  have 
assumed,  with  unfortunate  effect  on  their  reasoning  and  argument "  that  contrasted 
pairs  of  terms  have  the  same  intrinsic  meaning  in  diflFerent  cases.  (Hohfeld,  "  Funda- 
mental Legal  Conceptions  as  Applied  in  Judicial  Reasoning,"  Yale  Law  Journal,  XXVI: 
716.) 

18  Smith,  op.  cit.,  154. 


282      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

existing  body  discovered  or  interpreted  by  the  courts  is  a  natural 
result  of  the  tendency  or  desire  which  impels  every  thinker  to  seek 
to  form  abstractions."  ^^  The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has 
asserted  that  its  function  is  to  apply  the  principles  of  the  common 
law  to  particular  cases  even  though  this  may  conflict  with  the  tradi- 
tional law  of  a  particular  state. ^^  In  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad 
V.  Baugh,^^  it  was  decided  that  the  traditional  law  of  the  state  of 
Ohio  concerning  employers'  hability  for  accidents  should  be  set  aside 
and  the  case  decided  according  to  the  common  law.^^  It  was  im- 
plied that  in  the  absence  of  statutes  the  common  law  covers  every 
emergency.^^  The  rational  judge,  on  the  other  hand,  declares: 
"  The  common  law  is  not  a  brooding  omnipresence  in  the  sky,  but 
the  articulate  voice  of  some  sovereign  or  quasi  sovereign  that  can  be 
identified;  although  some  decisions  with  which  I  have  disagreed 
seem  to  me  to  have  forgotten  the  fact.  It  is  always  the  law  of 
some  state."  ^^  Says  Justice  Holmes:  "  It  is  revolting  to  have  no 
better  reason  for  a  rule  than  that  so  it  was  laid  down  in  the  time  of 
Henry  IV.  It  is  still  more  revolting  if  the  grounds  upon  which  it 
was  laid  down  have  vanished  long  since,  and  the  rule  simply  per- 
sists from  blind  imitation  of  the  past."  ^^  "  It  does  not  follow,  be- 
cause we  all  are  compelled  to  take  on  faith  at  second  hand  most  of 
the  rules  on  which  we  base  our  action  and  our  thought,  that  each  of 
'us  may  not  try  to  set  some  corner  of  his  world  in  the  order  of  rea- 
son, or  that  all  of  us  collectively  should  not  aspire  to  carry  reason 
as  far  as  it  will  go  throughout  the  whole  domain  ...  a  body  of 
law  is  more  rational  and  more  civilized  when  every  rule  it  contains 
is  referred  articulately  and  definitely  to  an  end  which  it  subserves, 

18  Lincoln,  "The  Relation  of  Judicial  Decisions  to  the  Law,"  Harv.  L,  Rev.,  XXI:  121. 

20  Swift  V.  Tyson,  41  U.  S.,  Peters,  871,  January,  1842. 

21  149  U.  S.,  May,  1893. 

22  Ibid.,  778. 

23  In  a  dissenting  opinion  Justice  Field  maintained  that  "There  is  no  unwritten 
general  or  common  law  of  the  United  States  on  the  subject.  Indeed,  there  is  no 
unwritten  general  or  common  law  of  the  United  States  on  any  subject.  .  .  .  The  com- 
mon law  could  be  made  a  part  of  our  Federal  system  only  by  legislative  adoption." 
{Ibid.,  784.)  "  I  am  aware  that  what  has  been  termed  the  general  law  of  the  country 
—  which  is  often  little  less  than  what  the  judge  advancing  the  doctrine  thinks  at  the 
time  should  be  the  general  law  on  a  particular  subject  —  has  been  often  advanced  in 
judicial  opinions  of  this  court  to  control  a  conflicting  law  of  a  state.  I  admit  that 
learned  judges  have  fallen  into  the  habit  of  repeating  this  doctrine  as  a  convenient 
mode  of  brushing  aside  the  law  of  a  state  in  conflict  with  their  views."   {Ibid.,  786.) 

2*  Justice  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  in  Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Jensen,  37  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.,  531. 

25  Holmes,  "  The  Path  of  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  X-.^e^. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  283 

and  when  the  grounds  for  desiring  that  end  are  stated  or  are  ready 
to  be  stated  in  words."  ^^ 

The  conservative  attitude  to  the  common  law  results  in  a  preju- 
dice against  statute  law  and  a  contempt  for  the  action  of  legislatures, 
as  indicated  in  a  preceding  chapter.  Dean  Pound  distinguishes 
four  possible  attitudes  to  statute  law,  varying  from  a  thoroughly  ra- 
tional attitude  on  the  one  hand  to  a  thoroughly  conservative  attitude 
on  the  other.  "  Four  ways  may  be  conceived  of  in  which  courts  in 
such  a  legal  system  as  ours  might  deal  with  a  legislative  innovation. 
( I )  They  might  receive  it  fully  into  the  body  of  the  law  as  affording 
not  only  a  rule  to  be  applied  but  a  principle  from  which  to  reason, 
and  hold  it,  as  a  later  and  more  direct  expression  of  the  general  will, 
of  superior  authority  to  judge-made  rules  on  the  same  general  sub- 
ject; and  so  reason  from  it  by  analogy  in  preference  to  them.  (2) 
They  might  receive  it  fully  into  the  body  of  the  law  to  be  reasoned 
from  by  analogy  the  same  as  any  other  rule  of  law,  regarding  it, 
however,  as  of  equal  or  co-ordinate  authority  in  this  respect  with 
judge-made  rules  upon  the  same  general  subject.  (3)  They  might 
refuse  to  receive  it  fully  into  the  body  of  the  law  and  give  effect  to 
it  directly  only;  refusing  to  reason  from  it  by  analogy  but  giving  it, 
nevertheless,  a  liberal  interpretation  to  cover  the  whole  field  it  was 
intended  to  cover.  (4)  They  might  not  only  refuse  to  reason  from 
it  by  analogy  and'apply  it  directly  only,  but  also  give  to  it  a  strict 
and  narrow  interpretation,  holding  it  down  rigidly  to  those  cases 
which  it  covers  expressly.  The  fourth  hypothesis  represents  the 
orthodox  common  law  attitude  toward  legislative  innovations. 
Probably  the  third  hypothesis,  however,  represents  more  nearly  the 
attitude  toward  which  we  are  tending.  The  second  and  first  hypo- 
theses doubtless  appeal  to  the  common  law  lawyer  as  absurd.  He 
can  hardly  conceive  that  a  rule  of  statutory  origin  may  be  treated 
as  a  permanent  part  of  the  general  body  of  the  law.  But  it  is  sub- 
mitted that  the  course  of  legal  development  upon  which  we  have 
entered  must  lead  us  to  adopt  the  method  of  the  second  and  eventu- 
ally the  method  of  the  first  hypothesis."  ^'^ 

The  difference  of  attitude  in  legal  interpretation  is  seen  not  only 
in  the  work  of  practising  lawyers  and  in  the  opinions  of  judges  but 
also  in  theories  as  to  the  proper  method  of  teaching  law.     On  the 

28  Ibid.,  468. 

27  Pound,  "Common  Law  and  Legislation,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI:  385-386. 


284      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

one  hand  it  is  maintained  that  in  the  teaching  of  law,  emphasis 
should  be  laid  on  the  inculcation  of  legal  principles,  particularly  of 
the  common  law,  which  "  existed,  In  theory  at  least,  before  any  case 
in  which  it  may  be  applied."  ^^  On  the  other  hand,  It  Is  maintained 
that  principles  of  law  are  not  the  formal  principles  of  the  common 
law  but  pragmatic  principles  derived  from  a  study  of  the  function- 
ing of  law  In  human  society.^® 

The  premises  of  the  judge  who  reUes  on  pre-existing  rules  are  as 
truly  individual  assumptions  as  are  those  of  the  rational  judge. 
Deduction  is  never  used  to  the  exclusion  of  Induction,  nor  induction 
to  the  exclusion  of  deduction.  The  conservative  judge  is  one  who 
uses  deduction  extremely  and  thinks  thereby  he  is  eliminating  the 
personal  element.  "  In  a  superficial  aspect,  the  application  of  rules 
to  cases  may  seem  to  be  a  deductive  process ;  a  pre-existing  general 
rule  Is  the  major  premise  from  which  the  judge  arrives  at  a  partic- 
ular conclusion  applicable  to  John  Doe.  In  fact,  however,  the  .  .  . 
supposed  general  rule  is  an  Inductive  conclusion  on  the  part  of  the 
judge  from  preceding  Individual  instances.  His  decision  of  the  case 
is  a  new  instance  which  later  judges  and  theorists  will  use  as  the 
basis  of  a  new  Induction.  In  all  cases  the  judge  must  construct  his 
own  major  premise,  and  this  he  does  not  find  an  easy  matter.  Who 
can  tell  to-day  just  how  far  a  combination  of  laborers  may  lawfully 
go  in  attempting  to  secure  higher  wages?  Who  can  construct  an 
indisputable  rule  for  determining  whether  or  not  a  contract  is  an  il- 
legal restraint  of  trade?  .  .  .  Cases  involving  these  questions  can- 
not be  decided  merely  by  constructing  a  syllogism."  ^°  The  reason- 
ing of  the  conservative  judge  necessarily  involves  some  Induction  In 
the  construction  of  his  major  premise,  and  that  of  the  rational  judge 
involves  some  deduction  from  general  principles.  The  degree  in 
which  the  rational  judge  will  use  deduction  In  a  particular  case  de- 
pends on  "  the  degree  of  difference  between  the  state  of  facts  before 
the  court  and  states  of  fact  passed  upon  in  previous  decisions.     If 

28  Baldwin,  "  Education  for  the  Bar  in  the  United  States,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  IX: 447. 

29  Pound,  "  Mechanical  Jurisprudence,"  Columbia  Laiv  Re^ie1v,  VIII:  614-623  ;  Pound, 
"Common  Law  and  Legislation,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI:  383-407;  Pound,  Note  to  Fowler, 
"  The  New  Philosophies  of  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVII:  734;  Pound,  "  The  End  of  Law 
as  Developed  in  Legal  Rules  and  Doctrines,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVII:  195-198;  Pound, 
"The  End  of  Law  as  Developed  in  Juristic  Thought,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXVII:  619; 
Pound,  "Juristic  Science  and  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXXI:  1050-1060. 

soCorbin,  "The  Law  and  the  Judges,"  Yale  Review,  N.  8.,  Vol.  111:239-240. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  •       285 

this  difference  be  sufficiently  great  the  case  cannot  fairly  be  regarded 
as  covered  by  the  previous  cases.  If  on  the  other  hand  the  differ- 
ence is  sufficiently  small,  so  that  no  reason  of  policy  can  fairly  be 
said  to  exist  for  differentiating  the  present  situation  from  those  pre- 
viously passed  upon,  we  may  fairly  regard  the  case  in  hand  as  gov- 
erned by  '  settled  legal  principles,'  The  chief  practical  difference 
is,  that  in  the  one  case  the  court  has  for  the  first  time  to  pass  upon 
the  policy  of  a  decision  one  way  or  the  other,  while  in  the  other  it 
has  previous  determinations  as  to  the  policy  to  rely  upon.  Inas- 
much, however,  as  the  court  may  in  any  case  refuse  to  follow  the 
past  adjudications,  ultimately  the  function  of  the  court  in  both  cases 
is  the  same."  ^^ 

From  the  different  legal  attitudes  indicated  in  the  preceding  para- 
graphs, the  conservative  and  the  rational,  there  have  developed  two 
fundamentally  different  conceptions  of  law.  "  The  law  rests  on 
two  fundamental  and  contradictory  concepts  of  society,  .  .  .  the 
absolutistic  and  the  evolutionary  concepts.  The  absolutistic  con- 
cept assumes  a  fixed  social  constitution,  fixed  social  relationships 
.  .  .  resting  upon  a  natural  order  in  which  exist  the  natural  and 
inalienable  rights  of  private  property,  individual  liberty,  free  con- 
tract and  free  competition.  .  .  .  The  evolutionary  concept  assumes 
a  developing  social  constitution  and  changing  social  relations.  ,  .  . 
It,  therefore,  assumes  that  social  right,  justice  and  welfare  consist 
in  changing  or  adapting  .  .  .  law  to  meet  the  particular  needs  .  .  . 
of  developing  .  .  .  relationships,  and  that  this  is  best  secured  when 
the  people  are  allowed  through  their  legislators  to  make  the  laws 
with  regard  to  present  and  developing  needs,  .  .  . 

"  As  yet  the  law  as  it  stands,  in  its  fundamental  assumptions, 
...  is  predominantly  representative  of  the  first  of  these  conflict- 
ing concepts.  The  second  shows  its  influence  mainly  in  laws  where 
it  can  be  made  to  appear  that  the  persons  primarily  affected  are  not 
complete  individuals,  e,g.,  women,  minors,  children,  dependents,  de- 
fectives and  delinquents;  or  where  it  can  be  made  to  appear  that 
the  public  is  more  concerned  than  the  employers  and  workers,  e.g., 
in  cases  related  to  public  health  and  safety.  ...  So  far,  then,  as 
the  labor  field  is  concerned,  with  the  exception  of  laws  relating  to 
women's    work,     child     labor  .   .   .  sanitation     and     safety,  .  .  . 

31  Cook,  op.  cit.j  796,  note. 


286     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

where  there  Is  a  struggle  on  between  the  two  principles,  with  the 
latter  rapidly  gaining,  the  law  in  principle,  .  .  .  still  reflects  the 
absolutistic  principle."  ^^ 

The  conservative  lawyer  and  judge  regards  the  law  as  a  body  of 
relatively  fixed  principles  while  the  rational  lawyer  and  judge  re- 
gards it  as  a  means  of  progressive  adjustment  in  particular  cases  of 
social  conflict.  The  more  vigorously  intellectual  the  lawyer  or 
judge  "  the  more  he  distrusts  broad  general  principles  and  theories, 
and  the  more  important  he  thinks  It  to  confine  the  decision  to  the 
particular  case."  ^^  However,  the  rational  judge  does  not  consider 
it  his  function  to  read  into  the  law  his  own  private  ethical  stand- 
ards,^^ but  to  adjust  the  conflicts  involved  in  the  cases  before  him 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a  rational  social  purpose.^^  Justice 
Holmes  declares:  "  While  the  courts  must  exercise  a  judgment  of 
their  own,  It  by  no  means  Is  true  that  every  law  is  void  which  may 
seem  to  the  judges  who  pass  upon  It  excessive,  unsuited  to  its  osten- 
sible end,  or  based  upon  conceptions  of  morality  with  which  they 
disagree.  Considerable  latitude  must  be  allowed  for  differences 
of  view  as  well  as  for  possible  peculiar  conditions  which  this  court 
can  know  but  Imperfectly  If  at  all.  Otherwise  a  constitution,  in- 
stead of  embodying  only  relatively  fundamental  rules  of  right,  as 
generally  understood  by  all  English-speaking  communities,  would  be- 
come the  partisan  of  a  particular  set  of  ethical  or  economical  opin- 
ions, which  by  no  means  are  held  semper  uhique  et  ah  omnibus^  ^^ 
This  rational  attitude  requires  a  rational  social  purpose  and  a  con- 
sideration of  questions  of  policy  In  a  particular  case  with  reference 
thereto.  Under  this  attitude  general  legal  principles  "  are  recog- 
nized but  settle  few  controversies.  Claim  or  denial  of  govern- 
mental power,  of  '  individual  rights,'  reveal  themselves  not  as  log- 
ical antitheses,  but  as  demands  of  clashing  '  rights.'  .  .  .  Choice 
must  be  exercised.  The  choice  Is  not,  however,  capricious;  it  In- 
volves judgment  between  defined  claims,  each  of  recognized  validity, 

32Hoxie,  "Trade  Unionism  in  the  United  States,"  212-213  (quoted  without  footnotes). 

33  Swayze,  "  The  Growing  Law,"  Yale  Laiv  Journal,  XXV:  14. 

34  Pound,  "The  End  of  Law  as  Developed  in  Legal  Rules  and  Doctrines,"  Harv.  L. 
Rev.,XXyU:2i7. 

35  Pound,  "Do  we  need  a  Philosophy  of  Law?"  Columbia  Law  Revieiv,  V:352; 
Pound,  "Common  Law  and  Legislation,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI 1385-407;  Pound,  "Me- 
chanical Jurisprudence,"  Columbia  Laiv  Revieixi,  VIII:  608-623 ;  Pound,  "The  Scope 
and  Purpose  of  Sociological  Jurisprudence,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXV:  503-516. 

88  Otis  v.  Parker,  187  U.  S.,  607-609. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  287 

each  with  a  pedigree  of  its  own,  but  all  of  which  necessarily  cannot 
be  satisfied  completely."  ^"^ 

The  insistence  of  Justice  Holmes  on  the  discretionary  power  of 
the  judge,  and  his  use  of  that  power  to  introduce  questions  of  policy 
manifested  itself  in  the  two  great  fields  of  constitutional  law,  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  and  the  Commerce  Clause.  His  interpre- 
tation of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  has  already  been  explained. 
He  interpreted  the  Commerce  Clause  as  giving  Congress  power  to 
legislate  concerning  not  only  transportation  but  also  "  the  human 
relations  involved  in  commerce,"  ^^  and,  in  accordance  with  this  in- 
terpretation, in  a  memorable  opinion  against  the  majority  of  the 
Court,  asserted  the  power  of  Congress  to  legislate  concerning  in- 
dustrial relations  on  interstate  roads  to  guarantee  industrial 
peace.^® 

Essential  in  Justice  Holmes'  rational  attitude  are  these  princi- 
ples: that  "  Life,  as  a  fact,  is  a  stern,  endless  struggle  of  interests, 
and  government  can  merely  mitigate  and  regulate  its  conditions; 
and.  Life,  as  a  purpose  and  a  career,  is  an  effort  to  reach  an  unat- 
tainable ideal;  the  ideal  (not  the  actual)  must  be  the  aim,  we  must 
strive,  yet  it  is  never  attainable."  *^  There  are,  in  the  rational  per- 
sonality, three  kinds  of  conflicts.  The  first  is  the  conflict  between 
the  egoistic  and  the  altruistic  self.  A  perfect  resolution  of  this 
conflict  is  unattainable  because  one  can  never  be  sure,  however  much 
of  money,  position  or  other  value  he  has  sacrificed  for  higher  ends, 
that  the  longings  for  family,  for  leisure,  for  influence  may  not  self- 
ishly prevail.  The  second  is  the  never  ending  experience  of  the 
intellectual  self  that  just  when  clearness  on  a  certain  problem  is 
reached,  another  greater  problem  challenges  the  attention.  There 
is,  therefore,  the  conflict  between  the  impulse  to  rest  content  with 
clearness  already  achieved,  and  the  impulse  to  respond  to  the  chal-' 
lenge  of  still  other  problems.  An  ideal  intellectual  comprehension 
is,  therefore,  in  the  nature  of  the  case  never  attainable.  The  third 
conflict  of  the  rational  personality  arises  from  its  position  in  human 
society.^^     The  rational  man  identifies  himself  with  the  progressive 

37  Frankfurter,  "  The  Constitutional  Opinions  of  Justice  Holmes,"  Har<v.  L.  Rev., 
XXIX:  687. 

38  Ibid.,  689. 

39  Adair  v.  United  States,  208  U.  S.,  286-287. 

40 wigmore,  "Justice  Holmes  and  the  Law  of  Torts,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXIX: 602. 
*i  Hayden,  "  The  Social  Will,"  Psy.  Rev.,  X,  No.  2,  78. 


288      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

section  of  his  profession,  or  his  party,  and  the  more  he  accomplishes 
the  more  opportunities  for  progress  open  up.  This  conflict  is  not 
distinct  from  the  conflict  in  his  Intellectual  personality  because  it  is 
his  intellect  that  Is  at  work  on  the  professional  or  political  problems. 
These  do  not  present  themselves  to  the  conservative  section  of  the 
profession  or  party  because  of  their  lack  of  intellectual  Initiative,  or 
because  of  selfishness.  There  is,  then,  this  third  never-ending  con- 
flict between  the  Impulse  to  acquiesce  in  the  conservative  view  of 
things  and  the  Impulse  to  accept  the  challenge  of  new  problems. 

As  the  rational  judge  Interprets  the  law.  It  Is  a  means  of  a  reason- 
able compromise  between  clashing  rights.  With  the  rise  of  con- 
flicting clauses,  the  clashing  rights  come  to  be  more  and  more  the 
claims  of  conflicting  classes.  But  the  decision  is  not  merely  a  com- 
promise between  conflicting  classes;  rather  the  rational  judge  takes 
advantage  of  the  conflict  presented  for  adjudication  to  advance 
as  far  as  possible  the  welfare  of  the  whole.^^  Consequently,  "  we 
find  a  growing  extension  of  this  sphere  of  law,  a  gradual  displace- 
ment of  force  by  law,  bringing  not  only  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
controversies  as  isolated  instances,  each  on  its  own  bottom,  but 
settlement  based  on  certain  common  considerations  beyond  the  mere 
avoidance  of  force."  *^  These  common  considerations  constitute 
the  legal  basis  of  organized  society,  and  the  basis  of  a  rational  ac- 
quiescence In  the  power  of  the  state  as  distinguished  from  fearful 
submission  to  it  as  an  obedience-compelling  power.  Legal  right 
thus  assumes  the  aspect,  to  use  President  Goodnow's  reconstruction 
of  Brooks  Adams'  definition,  of  "  the  determination,  reached  as  the 
result  of  compromise  between  social  classes  whose  Interests  are  con- 
flicting, of  the  relations  which  those  classes  shall  have  to  one  an- 
other, so  far  as  concerns  the  recognition  which  shall  be  accorded  to 
them  by  the  supreme  social  power,  i.e.,  the  state."  ^^  Those  who 
identify  the  will  of  a  dominant  class  with  the  supreme  power  de- 
clare: "  Legal  right,  broadly,  is  what  the  dominant  force  in  soci- 
ety, deflected  more  or  less  by  opposition,  requires  or  authorizes."  ^^ 
If  the  judge  has  a  rational  social  purpose  and  is  eminently  wise,  the 

*2  Ely,  op.  cit.,  1: 176-179. 

*3  Frankfurter,  "  The  Constitutional  Opinions  of  Justice  Holmes,"  Harvard  Laiv  Re- 
view, XXIX:  683;  Justice  Higgins,  "A  New  Province  for  Law  and  Order,"  Harvard 
Laiu  Revietv,  XXIX:  15-39. 

44Goodnow,  "The  Relation  of  Economics  to  the  Law,"  Survey,  March  4,  1911. 

*5  Adams,  Bigelow,  and  others,  op.  cit.,  154,  23,  45,  63-64. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  289 

decision  will  be  more  highly  rational  than  a  mere  deflected  reflection 
of  an  impulsive  claim  of  a  dominant  class.  For  instance,  in  Aus- 
tralia, the  court  had  to  decide  what  should  constitute  a  legal  mini- 
mum wage,  and  it  did  not  take  the  low  figure  suggested  by  the  pre- 
vailing sentiment  among  the  employers  affected.^^  It  deduced  a 
reasonable  minimum  wage  from  a  concept  of  a  reasonable  standard 
of  living  of  labour,  and  the  court  was  surprised  "  to  find  how  often, 
as  the  principles  of  the  court's  action  come  to  be  understood  and 
appreciated  they  guide  parties  disputing  to  friendly  collective  agree- 
ments, without  any  award  made  by  the  Court."  ^"^  In  dealing  with 
conflicting  classes,  what  the  jurist  has  to  do  is  "  to  overcome  in- 
stinctive action  and  put  in  its  place  conscious  direction  of  the  human 
will  toward  an  ideal  justice."  ^^ 

Before  the  rise  of  the  rational  judicial  attitude,  law-making  pro- 
ceeded with  an  eye  largely  to  the  adjustment  of  conflicting  interests 
within  or  between  propertied  classes.  With  the  establishment  of 
popular  government  judges  and  legislators  were  forced  to  consider 
public  opinion,  but  class  prejudice  still  continued  operative,  and  the 
deductive  attitude  was  adhered  to  because  this  attitude  accorded 
with  the  impulse  to  protect  propertied  interests.  The  struggle  of 
propertied  interests  to  prevent  the  confirmation  of  the  appointment 
of  Mr.  Brandeis  to  be  Associate  Justice  of  the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court  ^^  showed  the  anxiety  of  those  interests  for  the  per- 
petuation of  their  traditional  influence  over  the  courts;  it  proved  the 
difficulty  of  getting  appointed  to  office  a  judge  with  a  rational  social 
purpose  and  demonstrated  why  such  a  purpose  has  not  been  more 
effective  in  the  development  of  jurisprudence.  The  fact  that  juris- 
prudence shows  some  development  in  the  direction  of  overcoming 
instinctive  action  for  an  ideal  justice  does  not  by  any  means  contra- 
dict the  fact  that  that  development  has  been  retarded  by  the  influ- 
ence of  reactionary  propertied  classes. 

Under  the  conception  of  legal  right  as  a  right  enjoyed  as  the  re- 
sult of  an  adjustment  of  conflicting  interests,  law  that  regulates 
economic  behaviour,  whether  made  by  judge  or  legislature,  repre- 

*^  Justice  Higgins,  op.  cit.,  16-17. 

^'^  Ibid.,  16.  See  also  Higgins,  "A  New  Province  for  Law  and  Order,  II,"  Harv.  L. 
Rev.,  XXXII:  199-200. 

*8  Pound,  "Juristic  Science  and  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXXI:  1058. 

*^  Reports  from  the  Subcommittee  to  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  U.  S.  Senate, 
64th  Congress,  ist  Session,  on  the  Nomination  of  Louis  D.  Brandeis  to  be  an  Associate 
Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  1916,  59-60. 


290     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

sents  a  compromise  between  conflicting  classes,  which  is  apt  to 
favour  the  interests  of  a  dominant  class.  Some  interesting  social- 
psychological  objections  are  urged  against  the  conception  of  law  as 
compromise.  One  of  these  is  that  it  robs  law  of  the  proper  re- 
spect for  it,  which  is  necessary  to  its  effective  functioning.  For,  to 
a  compromise  between  classes,  it  is  said,  one  cannot  have  an  atti- 
tude either  of  respect  or  obedience.  However,  we  cannot  define 
law  from  the  point  of  view  of  what  ought  to  be  the  attitude  to  it. 
Let  us  ask,  what  is  the  attitude  to  law?  Is  not  the  attitude  of  cor- 
porations to  laws  that  limit  what  they  regard  as  their  rights  one 
of  a  determination,  first,  to  test  the  constitutionahty  of  such  laws, 
and,  if  this  fails,  to  get  them  repealed  or,  very  often,  to  evade 
them?  Does  a  monopoly  actually  dissolve  in  obedience  to  the  law 
and  the  command  of  the  court?  Again,  is  not  the  attitude  of  trade 
unions  to  laws  that  limit  what  they  regard  as  their  rights  that  of  a 
determination  to  get  those  laws  repealed  as  soon  as  possible? 
Evasion  is  not  as  pronounced  in  the  attitude  of  trade  unions  as  in 
that  of  corporations  because  the  former  lack  financial  resources  to 
test  the  constitutionahty  of  laws,  and  they  have  more  respect  for 
the  obedience-compelling  power  of  the  state  than  have  corpora- 
tions.^" But  in  neither  case  is  there  any  respect  for  law  as  such; 
It  is  regarded  by  each  class  as  a  means  of  protecting  its  interests, 
or  as  an  obstacbe  to  the  realization  of  its  interests.  It  fixes  limits 
for  the  time  being  to  the  behaviour  of  the  conflicting  parties  in  the 
class  struggle. 

Another  objection  to  the  theory  of  law  as  compromise  is  that  it 
makes  law  uncertain.  From  time  immemorial,  jurists  have  in- 
sisted that  it  is  more  important  for  law  to  be  made  certain  than  for 
it  to  be  just.  Hence  adherence  to  precedent  was  justified  even 
though  it  involved  injustice,  because  such  adherence  made  the  law 
certain.  The  "  paramount  social  interest  in  the  general  security  has 
dictated  orderliness,  certainty,  system  and  rule  in  the  administration 
of  justice  so  that  men  rely  on  appearances  and  act  with  assurance 
in  their  every  day  activities  unworried  by  the  aggressions  of  others 
and  unharassed  by  the  caprice  of  their  rulers.  The  intense  desire 
to  exclude  the  personality  of  the  magistrate  for  the  time  being  at 
almost  any  cost  has  left  its  mark  on  the  law  beyond  any  other  fac- 

ooLindsey  and  O'Higglns,  "Thie  Beast,"  247-250. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  291 

tor  in  law  making."  ^^  The  Interest  in  security  is  especially  strong 
in  the  case  of  the  property  owner,  whose  secure  ownership  and 
quiet  enjoyment  of  his  property  depends  on  the  protection  given  by 
the  law.  Property-owning  classes  in  the  nature  of  the  case  are 
more  interested  in  perpetuating  a  strong  obedience-compelling 
power  of  the  state  than  are  non-propertied  classes.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  non-propertied  need  protection  from  oppression  by  em- 
ployers. According  as  they  look  upon  law  as  protecting  them  or 
as  protecting  the  propertied,  a  non-propertied  class  is  for  strong 
authority  of  the  state  —  socialistic,  or  against  strong  authority, 
and  perhaps  against  government  altogether  —  anarchistic.  Both 
propertied  and  non-propertied  classes,  therefore,  value  law  if  it 
protects  them,  yet  the  tendency  of  classes  to  try  to  do  away  with 
laws  that  protect  the  other  and  are  contrary  to  their  interests  pro- 
vokes an  inevitable  uncertainty.  There  is  uncertainty  as  to  the  per- 
manency of  the  law,  and  an  uncertainty  as  to  its  interpretation 
while  it  endures,  since  in  a  democracy  public  opinion  affects  the 
interpretation  of  law.  "  It  took,  for  instance,  nearly  twenty  years, 
with  the  aid  of  our  judicial  authorities,  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of 
the  so-called  Sherman  Law,  and  when  the  Supreme  Court  at  length 
applied  to  it  '  the  rule  of  reason,'  there  were  those  who  felt  so 
much  or  so  little  regard  for  the  wisdom  of  Congress  as  to  assert 
that  the  effect  of  the  statute  had  been  misinterpreted.  And  even 
yet  its  bearing  upon  some  of  our  most  important  companies  remains 
to  be  determined."  ^^  As  indicated  in  a  preceding  chapter,  the  ulti- 
mate effect  of  the  statute  was  eminently  satisfying  to  the  dominant 
capitalistic  class.  It  did  not  break  up  monopoly  or  prevent  monop- 
lies  from  profiteering. 

The  uncertainty  of  law,  because  subject  to  the  exigencies  of  class 
conflict,  may,  however,  be  over-emphasized.  When  a  law  regulat- 
ing this  conflict  comes  to  be  generally  accepted  as  essential  for  the 
public  welfare,  it  is  apt  to  become  a  fairly  certain  addition  to  our 
jurisprudence.  For  instance,  when  the  bailiffs  of  capitalistic  inter- 
ests purposed,  at  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  World 
War,  to  do  away  with  the  labour  legislation  of  the  State  of  New 
York  for  the  period  of  the  war,  clothing  their  exploiting  intent 
under  the  resplendent  garb  of  patriotism,  they  failed  to  accomplish 

^1  Pound,  "Juristic  Science  and  Law,"  Haw.  L.  Rev.,  XXXI :  1059-1060. 
52  Moore,  "Law  and  Organization,"  Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.,  IX:  10. 


292      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

their  purpose  because  of  the  opposition  of  thinking  men  and  women 
of  the  State.  Though  there  will  be  constant  change  in  labour  laws, 
there  will  remain  a  body  of  legislation  of  increasing  certainty  as  to 
its  meaning  and  its  value  for  social  progress.  In  the  last  analysis, 
the  only  desirable  ground  of  certainty  in  law  is  its  wisdom  from  the 
point  of  social  progress.  We  would  reverse  the  traditional  juristic 
maxim  and  say  that  it  is  not  so  important  that  law  should  be  certain 
as  that  it  should  be  just.^^ 

The  essential  obstacle  to  this  development  is  the  wilfulness  of 
the  "  aggressive  particular  interests  "  that  have  been  generalized 
under  the  term  "  dominant  class."  "  Legislation  is  too  much 
at  the  mercy  of  aggressive  particular  interests  .  .  .  any  statute 
book  will  show  how  completely  our  legislation  may  be  moulded  by 
any  aggressive  particular  interest  that  does  not  come  into  conflict 
with  a  well-defined  permanent  group  of  voters."  '^^  To  combat 
these  interests  Dean  Pound  declares  that  we  need  "  a  real  min- 
istry of  justice  charged  with  the  duty  of  active  and  continuous 
effort  to  make  the  law  effective  for  its  purpose,  as  the  courts  are 
charged  with  the  duty  of  effective  administration  of  the  law  .  .  . 
so  long  as  this  is  everybody's  business  it  is  nobody's  business,  and 
so  much  of  the  pressure  for  legislation  comes  from  purely  selfish 
motives  that  one  who  essays  a  real  improvement  out  of  pure  public 
spirit  is  not  unlikely  to  be  met  with  suspicion.  Thus  he  becomes 
discouraged  and,  lacking  any  selfish  motive  for  persistence,  gives 
up  where  the  advocate  of  legislation  for  some  particular  group  or 
class  continues  the  pressure  and  succeeds."  ^^ 

What  shall  be  the  nature  of  the  rational  social  purpose  that  is 
to  guide  a  ministry  of  justice?  The  interpretations  for  such  a  pur- 
pose, says  Dean  Pound,  are  lacking.^^  The  development  of  law 
shows  an  effort  to  withstand  the  wilfulness  of  aggressive  particular 
individuals  and  interests  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  autocratic  control 
on  the  other  by  "  conscious  attempts  to  attain  an  absolute  objective 
standard  of  justice."  ^"^  But  we  are  as  far  as  ever  from  agreement 
on  a  workable  standard.     Lack  of  such  a  standard  and  of  the  posi- 

53  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  226. 

54 Pound,  "Juristic  Problems  of  National  Progress,"  Amer.  Jour.  Socio!.,  May,  1917, 
730. 
"/ii^.,  731, 

68  Ibid.,  724. 

67  Pound,  "Juristic  Science  and  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXXI:  1060. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  293 

tive  action  that  depends  on  clear  conviction  is  doubtless  one  reason 
for  the  ineffectual  legal  restraint  of  aggressive  particular  interests. 
In  the  economic  sphere  no  reliable  principle  of  the  distribution  of 
income  has  been  arrived  at,  wherefore  there  is  no  principle  to  guide 
in  legal  adjustments  of  the  economic  phases  of  the  class  conflict. 
Those  adjustments  are  compromises  that  tend  to  lie  in  the  direction 
of  the  interests  of  the  dominant  class. 

Lest  the  criticism  be  made  that  the  analysis  is  left  without  any 
constructive  suggestion  as  to  a  standard  of  justice,  it  may  be  well  at 
this  point  to  suggest  the  theory  of  the  relativity  of  social  adjust- 
ment. As  the  problem  for  the  individual  life  is  one  of  so  adjusting 
the  satisfactions  of  the  different  dispositions  as  to  attain  and  main- 
tain a  maximum  readiness  for  satisfaction  of  the  entire  instinctive 
nature,  and,  therefore,  a  maximum  will  to  power,^^  so  the  social 
problem  is  that  of  so  adjusting  the  conflicting  instinctive  interests 
of  the  population  as  to  attain  a  maximum  social  power.  The  indi- 
vidual problem  is  not  merely  analogous  to  the  social  problem  but 
Is  a  part  of  it,  for  the  social  problem  involves  so  adjusting  the  in- 
stinctive interests  of  the  population  as  to  make  possible  the  maxi- 
mum will  to  power  of  each  individual.  What  we  actually  have, 
however,  is  not  this  rational  adjustment  of  conflicting  groups  but 
classes  divided  against  one  another  in  an  instinctive  struggle  for  the 
material  means  of  self-development,  with  little  or  no  conception  of 
the  rational  end.  Such  a  conception  would  react  upon  the  be- 
haviour to  acquire  the  means.  As  it  is  the  behaviour  is  essentially 
instinctive  and,  like  all  instinctive  behaviour,  the  instinctive  im- 
pulses are  exercised  without  foresight  or  rational  purpose. 

The  traditional  division  of  the  state  is  into  those  who  have  risen 
to  power  by  means  of  a  strong  rivalrous  and  dominating  disposition, 
and  the  acquisitive  and  submissive  masses.  Those  who  have 
risen  to  power  bequeath  to  their  descendants  and  others  of  their 
number  who  may  be  without  power  the  means  whereby  they  main- 
tain their  traditional  position  in  the  dominant  class.  When  indi- 
viduals of  intellectual  power  and  sympathy  arise  in  the  working 
class,  or  in  the  dominant  class  and  take  up  the  cause  of  the  working 
class,  this  leadership  encourages  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  work- 
ing class.  The  reactionary  leadership  of  the  dominant  class  at- 
tempts indiscriminately  to  repress  all  resistance  and  the  resisting 

68 Hocking,  "Human  Nature  and  Its  Remaking,"  Chs.  X-XIV.  . 


294     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

class,  therefore,  as  indiscriminately  condemns  the  entire  dominant 
class.  This  is  the  class  struggle.  It  is  an  instinctive  phenomenon 
and  prevents  the  adjustment  of  the  instinctive  interests  of  conflict- 
ing groups  for  the  sake  of  the  development  of  the  personality  of 
the  individual.  But  it  may  be  a  necessary  prelude  to  rational  ad- 
justment. For,  if  a  dominant  class  insists  on  maintaining  its  posi- 
tion by  force,  social  progress  requires  resistance  by  force. 

Progress  begins  with  the  conception,  vague  at  first  and  confined 
to  the  few,  of  the  relativity  of  social  adjustment.  It  is  seen  that 
no  perfect  development  of  personality  is  possible  for  any  individual, 
for  he  must  live  in  society  where  the  material  means  are  limited  and 
conditions  are  always  imperfect.  In  the  ideal  world  —  in  religion 
and  art  —  he  may  create  the  mental  means  of  personal  develop- 
ment, and  this  has  been  the  idealistic  function  of  religion  and  art.^^ 
But  still  the  development  of  personality  remains  imperfect  by  rea- 
son of  the  short-comings  of  objective  conditions;  —  the  religious 
man  is  never  satisfied  with  mere  contemplation  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God  but  aims  to  bring  it  to  pass  and  complete  satisfaction  can  come 
only  with  that.  For  the  great  mass  of  people  the  possibilities  of 
ideal  satisfaction  are  limited,  and  the  development  of  personality 
depends  largely  on  social  adjustment.  We  have,  then,  this  situa- 
tion: (i)  the  need  of  religion  and  art  for  all;  (2)  the  need  of  a 
progressive  social  adjustment;  (3)  the  need  of  grasping  the  concep- 
tion of  relativity,  that  is,  that  both  ideal  adjustment  and  social  ad- 
justment are  relative  to  the  social  condition  in  which  we  are. 

These  principles  of  progress,  once  vitally  active  in  the  popula- 
tion, will  work  these  changes :  ( i )  The  instinctively  dominant 
class,  and  therefore,  the  instinctively  resisting  class  will  disappear; 
(2)  the  state  will,  then,  change  its  form.  There  will  be  substi- 
tuted for  the  present  form  a  state  based,  not  on  classes  whose  atti- 
tudes to  one  another  are  determined  by  instinctive  impulses  that  have 
become  habitual,  but  on  economic  groups  which  have  cultivated  a 
tradition  of  their  relation  to  the  whole  which  is  handed  down  as  is 
craft  or  professional  knowledge.  Only  as  men  act  as  economic 
groups  is  law  within  their  reach,  for,  at  the  present  time,  between 
eight  and  thirty-five  million  individuals  In  the  United  States,  in  their 
"  struggle  for  law  "  ^°  find  the  law  beyond  their  reach  because  of 

6»/*lV.,  Pt.  VI. 

80  Ihering,  "  The  Struggle  for  Law,"  trans,  by  Lalor,  49-50. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  295 

their  poverty,^^  and  are  dependent  on  the  uncertain  aid  of  philan- 
thropic legal  aid  societies.®^  Obviously  the  proper  agency  to  invoke 
the  law  on  behalf  of  a  man  is  not  a  charitable  organization  but  his 
own  economic  group.  Furthermore,  in  the  clash  of  collective  wills 
that  gives  rise  to  industrial  problems,  men  are  coming  more  and 
more  to  act  as  groups. 

The  group's  tradition  of  its  relation  to  the  social  whole,  as 
worked  out  in  its  economic  details,  will  be  different  for  different 
groups,  but  will  be  determmed  according  to  a  standard  which  is  the 
same  for  all  groups  —  the  development  of  personality  of  each  in- 
dividual. For  instance,  the  development  of  the  personality  of  min- 
ers requires  a  shorter  work  day  than  that  of  farmers,  for  the  former 
work  underground,  in  the  dark,  heat  and  dust,  while  farmers  work 
in  the  open.  The  income  of  groups  working  in  unhealthful  or 
hazardous  occupations  will  be  greater  than  that  of  those  working 
in  healthful  and  safe  occupations.  Those  differences  of  occupation 
will  require  governmental  investigations  by  experts.^^  There  will 
be  great  differences  in  income,  hours  of  work  and  other  economic 
conditions,  but  the  differences  will  be  determined  intelligently  ac- 
cording to  a  standard  that  is  the  same  for  all  and  not  according  to 
the  exigencies  of  instinctive  rivalry  and  class  domination-submission 
as  at  present.  But  the  day  of  the  full  realization  of  this  ideal 
standard  of  justice  is  doubtlessly  far  in  the  future.  The  method  of 
class  conflict  and  compromise  will  long  continue.  The  ideal  stand- 
ard will  gradually  appear,  first,  as  the  directive  principle  of  compro- 
mise, and  then  as  a  positive  standard  before  which  class  pretensions 
must  fall  in  abeyance. 

This  positive  standard  of  justice  that  is  the  same  for  all  groups 
is  a  relative  standard.  No  economic  group  may  raise  prices  at  the 
expense  of  the  whole  on  the  ground  that  the  income  of  the  group 
even  at  those  prices  is  not  sufficient  for  the  development  of  person- 
ality of  the  members.  For  there  is  an  inevitable  economic  scarcity 
which  all  alike  must  suffer.^^     Even  with  the  greatest  increase  in 

81  Smith,  "  Justice  and  the  Poor,"  33. 

62  Ibid..  Pt.  III. 

63  For  instance,  see  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  "  Preventable  Death  in  Cotton 
Manufacturing  Industry,"  Bulletin  No.  251. 

6*  As  a  result  of  the  war  this  scarcity  meant,  for  Europe,  a  subsistence  level  for  all. 
If  some  had  more  than  they  needed,  others  must  starve.  Failure  to  appreciate  this 
essential  economic  fact  and  to  found  the  Treaty  of  Peace  on  a  standard  of  just  dis- 
tribution of  the  means  of  production  and  of  products  is  the  essential  defect  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace.     (Keynes,  "  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,"  Chs.  IV-VII.) 


296      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

production  of  which  we  could  conceive  this  scarcity  will  continue.^'^ 
We  have  to  accept  this  fact  of  economic  scarcity  and  the  Hmitation  it 
places  on  capacity  for  self-development.  We  must  accept,  also,  the 
further  fact  that  population  is  increasing  while  natural  resources 
are  being  exhausted,  causing  an  inevitably  increasing  scarcity.  Fac- 
ing these  facts,  the  principle  of  relativity  becomes  fundamental. 
As  in  the  individual's  organization  of  his  instinctive  dispositions, 
the  degree  of  satisfaction  to  be  given  each  is  never  absolute  but 
always  relative  to  the  demands  of  the  others,  so  in  the  adjustment 
of  social  groups,  the  degree  of  opportunity  for  development  of  per- 
sonality to  be  accorded  each  is  always  relative  to  the  opportunity 
to  be  given  others.  Who  is  to  decide  the  degree  of  opportunity  to 
be  given  each?  It  can  be  decided  only  in  a  parliament  of  repre- 
sentatives of  all  groups,  and  only  if  those  chosen  as  representatives 
are  men  who  have  grasped  the  principle  of  relativity  in  their  own 
lives,  and  for  their  own  group  in  its  relation  with  other  groups. 

According  to  the  theory  of  relativity  the  standard  of  justice 
does  not  imply  merely  that  the  masses  shall  have  the  means  of  es- 
caping physical  want  and  the  humiliation  of  submission;  they  are  to 
be  provided  with  the  means  not  merely  of  escaping  evil  but  of  posi- 
tive self-development.  Nor  does  the  standard  look  merely  to  an 
equalization  of  means  of  satisfaction, —  that  one  shall  not  have 
more  and  another  less — ;  for  the  motive  of  such  an  equalization 
is  merely  the  instinct  of  rivalry  which  demands  that  one  shall  not 
be  superior  to  or  better  off  than  another.  The  standard  assumes 
that  the  individual  has  an  impulse  for  self-development  broader  than 
any  one  instinctive  impulse,  and  that  the  function  of  law  is  to  or- 
ganize individuals  for  self-development.  So  organized  they  consti- 
tute a  state.  As  this  theory  of  ideal  justice  implies  a  clear,  positive 
ethical  purpose  for  one's  own  life,  which,  as  yet,  few  men  possess, 
so  it  implies  a  rational  social  purpose  for  the  state,  which  few  men 
have.  But  let  us  not  be  misled  by  the  scarcity  of  men  of  ethical 
and  social  purpose.  These  variant  types,  apparently  insignificant, 
may  prove  to  be  immensely  significant  for  the  future.  We  must 
admit  that  there  never  was  a  time  when  statesmen  seemed  so  utterly 
devoid  of  clear  purpose,  so  content  to  temporize  and  drift  as  in  these 
years  following  the  World  War.  But  we  must  not  ignore  the  vol- 
untary political  groups  that  are  forming  with  very  clear  and  positive 

«"  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  396-397. 


THE  NATURE  OF  LAW  297 

purposes,  and  with  a  leadership  that  stands  for  intellectual  freedom 
In  the  realm  of  thought  and  for  equality  of  opportunity  for  self-de- 
velopment. To  be  sure  these  motives  are  Idealistic  —  in  an  age 
when  most  men,  in  the  Instinctive  pursuit  of  satisfactions,  bow  to, 
admire  and  follow  those  who  have  amassed  the  means  of  such  sat- 
isfactions. But  the  social  control  of  a  dominant  class  can  last  only 
as  long  as  the  masses  continue  Instinctive;  and  our  hypothesis  Is 
that  this  period  will  be  followed  by  a  development  of  Intelligence 
—  that  it  is  beginning  already,  as  seen,  for  instance,  in  a  movement 
for  more  vital  education,  in  a  vigorous  labour  movement  with  a 
high-minded  purpose,  as  defined  in  a  preceding  chapter,  and  In  the 
progressive  political  groups.  These  movements  mean  that  men 
are  becoming  conscious  of  a  rational  social  purpose,  and  are  organ- 
izing for  concerted  action  in  its  realization,  and  are  demanding  that 
the  state  adopt  and  progressively  realize  in  its  laws  an  ideal  stand- 
ard of  justice. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    IMPLICATIONS    OF    INTERPRETATIONS    OF 
PRIVATE    RIGHTS 


THE  nature  of  private  rights  is  determined  not  merely  by 
legal  provisions  but  more  fundamentally  by  the  impulses, 
attitudes  and  ideas  that  constitute  the  public  opinion  of 
the  day.  Rights  may  be  guaranteed  in  the  Constitution  and  yet 
nullified  by  failure  of  public  opinion  to  stand  effectively  for  them, 
as  the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by  jury  often  has  been  nullified 
by  their  abuse  of  their  enjoining  power  by  the  courts  with  the  ac- 
quiescence of  public  opinion;  and  as  the  constitutional  right  of  free 
speech  has  recently  been  abridged  by  the  coercion  exercised  by 
city,  state  and  federal  governments  against  socialists. 

That  private  rights  have  a  social-psychological  as  well  as  a  legal 
basis  may  be  shown  by  comparing  the  conception  of  private  rights 
underlying  the  constitutional  system  of  the  United  States  with  that 
underlying  the  English  constitutional  system.  Englishmen  always 
have  regarded  their  private  rights  as  more  fundamental  than  their 
form  of  government.  These  were  nowhere  explicitly  stated  but 
consisted  of  certain  vaguely  conscious  attitudes  which  vigorously 
asserted  themselves  whenever  conditions  arose  which  thwarted 
those  attitudes.  The  English  have  made  no  attempt  to  give  legal 
definition  to  their  private  rights.  What  they  have  developed  in 
law  is  a  series  of  measures  safeguarding  them.  President  Good- 
now  writes:  "The  English  were  always  a  practical  people.  .  .  . 
Far  from  believing  that  there  was  an  inherent  virtue  in  any  form 
of  government,  the  English  hardly  knew  that  they  had  any  peculiar 
form  of  government  until  a  foreign  observer,  the  French  philoso- 
pher, Montesquieu,  called  their  attention  to  it.  What  the  English- 
man had  always  in  mind  was  certain  rights,  which  he  often  called 
the  rights  of  an  Englishman,  and  upon  whose  existence  and  recog- 
nition he  insisted  with  all  the  strength  of  his  character.  .  .  .  The 
form  of  government  which  the  French  philosopher  told  him  that 
he  had  was  a  matter  of  indifference  to  him,  except  in  so  far  as  it 

298 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS      299 

was  a  means  through  which  he  could  secure  the  end  for  which  he 
had  always  fought.  That  end  was  the  recognition  of  what  he  be- 
lieved to  be  his  '  rights.' 

"  Furthermore,  when  it  came  to  the  determination  of  those  rights, 
that  is,  to  the  statement  of  what  they  were  and  of  the  methods  by 
which  he  was  to  secure  them,  his  attitude  was  just  as  practical,  just 
as  non-philosophical.  He  never  consciously  formulated  a  system 
of  rights  any  more  than  he  framed  a  system  of  government,"  ^ 
The  rights  of  Englishmen  "  were  of  extreme  importance,  but  it 
was  difficult  to  find  out  what  they  were.  Indeed,  in  many  cases, 
the  only  way  to  find  out  what  they  were  was  to  fight  for  what  it 
was  believed  they  were.  .  .  .  The  rights  of  Englishmen  have  in 
large  measure  been  ascertained  through  attempts  that  have  been 
made  to  violate  them."  ^  "  Thus  the  right  to  a  special  kind  of  trial 
for  crime,  that  is,  the  trial  by  jury,  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  most 
sacred  rights  of  an  Englishman.  This  insistence  on  particular 
methods  of  procedure  is,  of  course,  due  to  the  fact  that  these  meth- 
ods have  shown  themselves,  as  the  result  of  a  long-continued  experi- 
ence, to  be  valuable  in  securing  the  end  desired.  This  end  was 
freedom  from  arbitrary  autocratic  action  on  the  part  of  those  to 
whom  political  power  had  been  intrusted.  It  was  the  rule  of  law 
—  that  is,  the  rule  of  a  principle  of  general  application  as  opposed 
to  the  rule  of  a  person  arbitrary  and  capricious  —  which  the  Eng- 
lishman sought.  It  was  to  secure  his  rights  through  this  rule  of 
law  that  he  originated  the  form  of  government  which  has  been 
called  constitutional."  ^ 

Resistance  to  autocratic  domination  and  deference  to  law  are, 
therefore,  attitudes  essential  in  the  English  national  character;  and 
out  of  this  social-psychological  basis  developed  the  English  form 
of  government  and  the  English  conception  of  private  rights.  The 
analysis  of  the  national  attitudes  that  determine  the  political  in- 
stitutions is  one  of  the  services  which  social  psychology  should  per- 
form for,  or  with,  the  student  of  jurisprudence.  In  the  case  of  the 
English  it  must  be  shown  how  men  living  in  a  relatively  secure  en- 
vironment and  subsisting  largely  through  agriculture  devoted  them- 
selves to  the  acquisition  of  wealth  without  any  of  that  fearfulness 
which  prompts  men  hot  thus  securely  situated  to  submit  to  a  dynas- 

1  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  246-248. 

2  Ibid.,  248. 

3  Ibid.,  249. 


300     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

tic  absolutism.  Thus  devoting  themselves,  with  a  sense  of  security, 
to  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  they  were  impatient  with  any  form  of 
domination  which  interfered  with  free  acquisition.  Resistance  to 
domination  or  a  "  love  of  liberty  "  became  a  conspicuous  national 
trait.  This  attitude  of  resistance,  reinforced  by  memories  of  suc- 
cessful resistance  to  political  domination  in  the  past,  resulted  in 
the  gradual  development  of  constitutional  limitations  on  absolut- 
ism,^ and  has  continued  essential  when  manufacturing  and  com- 
merce have  become  more  important  than  agriculture,  and  when  there 
is  required  a  less  dogged  and  a  more  intelligent  ideal  of  liberty. 
We  find  that,  in  England,  those  legal  guarantees  which  served  the 
Englishman  in  his  impulse  for  free  acquisition  and  in  his  resistance 
of  domination  and  exploitation  on  the  part  of  the  king  and  the 
higher  ranks  of  the  social  order,  represent  that  for  which,  above 
all  else,  he  has  a  sentiment  of  deference.  An  absorption  in  prop- 
erty-getting conduces  to  an  exceeding  respect  for  law  and  deference 
thereto  as  the  bulwark  of  the  security  of  the  institution  of  private 
property.  In  a  nation  less  securely  situated,  the  protection  of  the 
frontier  of  which  requires  a  large  standing  army,  there  is  less  ex- 
clusive attention  to  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  a  greater  feeling  of 
Insecurity,  and  a  tendency  to  turn  to  the  ruler  as  the  protecting  organ 
of  government.  And  the  masses  are  inclined  to  obey  the  arbitrary 
command,  and  have  a  weaker  regard  for  law  which  obligates  all, 
including  the  ruler. 

In  both  types  of  nations  the  masses  have  a  personal  deference; 
in  the  nation  that  suffers  a  sense  of  insecurity,  the  deference  is  felt 
toward  the  strong  ruler  and  military  leader;  in  the  nation  that, 
with  a  sense  of  security,  devotes  itself  to  the  acquisition  of  prop- 
erty, the  deference  is  felt  toward  the  class  of  large  property  owners. 
No  hesitancy  is  felt  in  entrusting  the  government  to  this  class  be- 
cause it  is  felt  that,  on  account  of  their  large  holdings,  they  will  be 
especially  zealous  in  maintaining  the  safeguards  against  political 
domination. 

Compare  with  this  social-psychological  basis  of  the  English  con- 
stitutional system  that  of  the  constitutional  system  of  the  United 
States.  The  separation  of  the  American  colonies  from  the  mother 
country  was  justified  on  the  basis  of  natural  rights.  This  emphasis 
on  the  natural  rights  passed  into  the  state  constitutions  of  the  Amer- 

*lbid.,%s- 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS     301 

ican  states  and  later  Into  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which  included  bills  of  rights  that  formulated  the  ideas  then  preva- 
lent with  regard  to  natural  rights,  and  with  which  legislators  were 
forbidden  to  tamper,^  "  The  rights  so  enumerated  .  .  .  are  as- 
sumed to  exist  —  they  never  are  expressly  granted  to  the  people,  as 
such  a  grant  would  have  been  inconsistent  with  their  character  as 
natural  rights  —  and  the  government  is  forbidden  to  violate 
them."  °  "  In  this  respect  the  American  conception  of  civil  lib- 
erty differs  considerably  from  the  English  conception.  In  England 
the  exact  meaning  of  a  right  which  may  be  recognized  is  determined 
by  the  law,  that  is,  by  the  legislature.  In  the  United  States  these 
rights  are  recognized  by  the  Constitution,  and  their  precise  meaning 
is  to  be  fixed  by  the  courts  as  the  occasion  arises."  "^ 

The  significance  of  this  distinction  is  seen  on  the  examination  of 
particular  rights.  For  instance,  the  legal  principle  of  freedom  of 
contract  is,  in  England,  modified  by  statutes  as  occasion  arises,  while, 
in  the  United  States,  the  courts  have  read  into  certain  constitutional 
provisions  natural  rights  doctrines  which  have  caused  them  to  de- 
clare unconstitutional  laws  that  limited  freedom  of  contract.  Presi- 
dent Goodnow  explains  the  relation  of  the  natural  rights  theory  to 
the  Constitution  as  follows:  "  The  rights  of  man  as  an  individual 
human  being  are  set  forth  in  a  written  constitution  which  it  is  beyond 
the  power  of  the  legislature  to  change.  If  an  attempt  is  made  to 
make  such  a  change  it  may  be  prevented  by  the  courts,  which  may 
thus  protect  the  individual  in  his  rights  recognized  in  the  constitu- 
tion. ...  As  the  constitution  may  be  changed  by  the  sovereign 
people,  the  rights  recognized  are  not  in  fact  natural  rights  which 
have  an  existence  apart  from  the  law.  But  the  law  which  recog- 
nizes them  is  the  constitution,  which  is  finally  interpreted  by  courts 
independent  of  both  executive  and  legislature.  Judicial  interpreta- 
tion of  the  provisions  affecting  private  rights  in  the  United  States 
has  been  much  influenced  by  the  philosophical  ideas  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  and  therefore,  though  these  rights  find  their  origin  in  con- 
stitutional law,  their  actual  legal  extent  resembles  that  of  the  natural 
rights  described  by  an  extremely  individualistic  poHtlcal  philosophy, 
and  Is  much  the  same  as  that  held  by  the  natural-rights  philosophers 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  Owing  to  the  power  of  interpretation 
5 /^iW.,  259-261. 

« Ibid.,  261. 
''Ibid.,  26s. 


302      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

possessed  by  the  courts,  and  to  the  system  of  remedies  which  the 
Americans  Inherited  with  the  English  law,  the  provisions  in  their 
constitutions  with  regard  to  private  rights  are  not,  however,  more 
general  theoretical  statements  as  to  what  ought  to  be,  but  are  rules 
of  law  interpreted  and  defined  by  the  court  and  protected  by  them  in 
specific  concrete  judicial  decisions."  ^  On  the  same  point  Dean 
Pound  writes :  "  Eighteenth  century  jurists  conceived  that  certain 
principles  were  inherent  in  nature,  were  necessary  results  of  human 
nature,  and  that  these  principles  were  discoverable  a  priori.  They 
held  that  it  was  the  business  of  the  jurist  to  discover  these  princi- 
ples, and,  when  discovered,  to  deduce  a  system  therefrom  and  test 
all  actual  rules  thereby.  Such  is  even  now  the  orthodox  method  in 
our  constitutional  law.  Our  bills  of  rights  are  regarded  as  merely 
declaratory  of  fundamental  natural  rights.  Eminent  judges  assert 
that  legislation  is  to  be  judged  by  those  rights  and  not  by  the  con- 
stitutional texts  in  which  they  are  declared."  ^ 

The  effect  of  this  procedure  has  been  to  fortify  the  attitude  of 
the  individualistic  property  owner  in  America  as  it  could  not  have 
been  fortified  under  the  English  system.  Our  system  has  perpetu- 
ated "  an  individualistic  rather  than  a  social  conception  of  man."  '^^ 
This  development  was  due,  essentially,  not  to  the  individualistic 
philosophy  of  natural  rights  but  to  the  fact  that  the  attitude  of  the 
individualistic  American  business  man  which  moved  the  judge  re- 
ceived endorsement  from  the  individualistic  philosophy.  Judges 
are  apt  to  be  prejudiced  on  behalf  of  the  property-owning  classes, 
owing  to  the  fact  that,  as  lawyers,  they  were  for  the  most  part  em- 
ployed by  those  classes  to  defend  their  interests,  and  owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  law,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  their  stock  in  trade,  is 
for  the  most  part  occupied  with  defining  and  safeguarding  property 
rights.  On  account  of  this  prejudice  for  the  property  owner, 
judges  have  interpreted  the  formulation  of  private  rights  in  the  Con- 
stitution in  a  way  to  satisfy  this  prejudice.  For  instance,  note  the 
extensive  use  by  the  courts  of  the  injunction  on  behalf  of  employers 
against  workmen.  This  nullifies  the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by 
jury  inasmuch  as  the  violation  of  an  injunction  is  summarily  pun- 
ished by  the  judge  as  contempt  of  court.  Nevertheless  such  use 
of  the  injunction,  as  indicated  in  a  preceding  chapter,  has  received 

8  Ibid.,  278-279. 

8 Pound,  "Law  in  Books  and  Law  in  Action,"  American  La<w  Review,  XLIV:28. 

10  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  278. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS     303 

the  sanction  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  Note  also 
the  reactionary  attitude  of  courts  in  declaring  labour  legislation  un- 
constitutional. In  bargaining  between  an  employer  and  individual 
workmen  the  latter  are  at  such  a  disadvantage  that  free  contract, 
under  those  conditions,  does  not  exist  except  in  the  mind  of  the 
judge;  yet  he  uses  a  constitutional  provision  to  perpetuate  bargain- 
ing between  individuals  and  to  prevent  collective  bargaining  on  the 
assumption  that  individual  bargaining  is  freedom  of  contract.  But 
he  is  not  unmindful  of  the  fact  that  this  individual  bargaining 
favours  the  interest  of  employers  and  that  its  perpetuation  is  ve- 
hemently demanded  by  employers'  associations.^^  It  is  because  of 
this  prejudice  on  behalf  of  the  property  owner  that  judges  have 
readily  interpreted  constitutional  provisions  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  eighteenth  century  philosophy  of  inherent  natural 
rights.  ^^ 

The  bias  of  judges  for  the  protection  of  property  rights  is  seen 
in  at  least  two  different  reactions  of  the  courts:  in  the  judicial 
prejudice  against  legislation  on  behalf  of  labour,  and  the  readiness 
to  use  the  injunction  against  labour;  and  in  the  denial  of  free  speech 
to  those  who  would  express  sentiments  against  property  rights  as 
recognized  in  legal  tradition.  Let  us  look  at  the  question  of  free 
speech.  The  First  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  provides  that 
"  Congress  shall  make  no  law  .  .  .  abridging  the  freedom  of 
speech  or  of  the  press;  or  the  right  of  the  people  to  assemble.  .  .  ." 
This  was  "  an  express  mandatory  prohibition,  absolute  in  its 
terms."  ^^  No  exception  was  made  of  opinions  the  evident  tend- 
ency of  which  might  be,  in  the  mind  of  the  judge,  to  instigate  illegal 
violence  against  the  government.  It  was  because  judicial  discre- 
tion had  been  used  in  England  against  those  who  publicly  disagreed 
with  the  autocracy  ^^  that  the  First  Amendment  was  made  manda- 
tory and  absolute. ^^  The  meaning  of  the  constitutional  prohibi- 
tion is  the  common-law  test,  which  is  variously  interpreted  today,  ^® 

11  See  the  following  pamphlets  published  by  the  National  Association  of  Manu- 
facturers of  the  United  States:  "Closed  vs.  Open  Shop  Unionism,"  "What  Does  the 
Closed  Shop  Mean  to  You  ? "  "  Closed  Shop  Unionism,"  "  Class  Legislation  for  In- 
dustry." 

12  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  267. 

13  Hart,  "  Power  of  Government  Over  Speech  and  Press,"  Yale  Laiv  Journal,  Feb., 
1920,  422. 

^^  Ibid.,  414-417. 

"Jephson,  "The  Platform,"  1:135-139;  Schofield,  "Freedom  of  Press  iu  the  United 
States,"  Pub.  Amer.  Sociol  Soc,  IX.  71-73. 
^*  Hart.  op.  cit.,  423-427. 


304      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  most  liberal  interpretation  being  that  by  Judge  Hand  in  in- 
terpreting the  Espionage  Act  of  19 17,  in  which  he  maintained  that 
words  which  in  the  forum  of  public  discussion  "  might  not  them- 
selves amount  to  advice  or  counsel  to  violate  the  law,  could  neverthe- 
less make  their  author  criminally  responsible  if  they  were  in  fact  the 
cause  of  the  results  forbidden  (by  a  law),  and  if  they  were  uttered 
with  the  specific  intent  of  producing  those  results."  ^'^  He  stated 
the  right  of  free  speech  thus :  "  Political  agitation,  by  the  passions 
it  arouses  or  the  convictions  it  engenders,  may  in  fact  stimulate  men 
to  the  violation  of  law.  .  .  .  Yet  to  assimilate  agitation,  legitimate 
as  such,  with  direct  incitement  to  violent  resistance,  is  to  disregard 
the  tolerance  of  all  methods  of  political  agitation  which  in  normal 
times  is  a  safeguard  of  free  government.  The  distinction  is  not  a 
scholastic  subterfuge,  but  a  hard-bought  acquisition  in  the  fight  for 
freedom."  ^^ 

Judge  Hand's  interpretation  and  similar  ones  were  condemned 
by  the  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States  as  taking  the  teeth 
out  of  the  statute;  ^^  and  the  prevailing  tendency  of  courts  was  to 
give  it  a  much  more  repressive  interpretation  than  that  permitted 
by  the  common  law  test,^*^  especially  when,  after  the  war  was  over, 
the  statute  came  to  be  used  to  repress  utterances  which  threatened 
property  rights.  In  19 19-1920  socialists  were  convicted  under  the 
war  time  sedition  act  when,  in  many  cases  there  was  no  intent  to  in- 
cite to  violation  of  laws  and  no  violation  followed  their  words. 
The  mere  inference  in  the  mind  of  the  judge  of  the  possible  tendency 
of  their  words  was  regarded  as  sufficient  to  convict.  This  is  the  tes- 
timony of  a  brilliant  and  scholarly  young  lawyer  who  took  a  prom- 
inent part  in  the  defence  of  those  accused  of  sedition  in  19 19,  and  I 
may  quote  at  length  from  his  testimony  because  it  reveals  certain 
phases  of  the  social-psychological  basis  of  jurisprudence  which  are 
rarely  brought  to  view,  namely,  the  emotional  aspect  of  beliefs, 
which  usually  is  hidden  under  a  circumspect  official  decorum. 
What  "  the  Inquisitors  are  after,"  says  Mr.  Hale,  "  is  not  the 
finding  of  a  person  who  actually  preaches  immediate  violent  acts 
—  he  is  almost  non-existent  —  but  the  chance  to  put  up  to  a  mag- 
istrate,  an   immigration   official,   or   an  upper-class,   special-panel 

"United  States  v.  Nearing  (1918,  S.  D.  N.  Y.)  252  Fed.,  223. 

18  Masses  Publishing  Co.  v.  Patten,  244  Fed.  (1917),  535,  540. 

19  Amer.  Bar  Assoc.  Jour.,  306. 

20Chafee,  "Freedom  of  Speech  in  War  Time,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXXII:  964-966. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS     305 

jury,  the  legal  question  whether  extremist  doctrines  do  not  in  them- 
selves imply  "  force  and  violence,"  and  so  make  their  holder  jail- 
able  or  deportable.  The  answer  to  which  question  depends  on  one 
fact  only,  a  fact  outside  the  record,  namely  the  conservative  or 
liberal  temper  of  the  person  who  has  to  answer  it.  In  one  of  my 
cases  the  District  Attorney  challenged  a  prospective  juror  because 
he  had  once  upon  a  time  had  something  to  do  with  an  association 
for  ameHorating  the  condition  of  children  of  the  poor."  ^^  The 
fallacy  of  the  "  force  and  violence  "  test  Hes  in  the  fact  that  con- 
clusions of  judge  and  jury  as  to  whether  or  not  force  or  violence 
is  implied  in  the  opinons  of  the  alleged  criminal  depends  less  on 
the  words  and  opinions  of  the  latter  than  on  the  attitude  of  the 
officials,  or  "temper"  as  Mr.  Hale  terms  it;  and,  perhaps,  in  a 
period  of  excitement  like  that  of  which  he  was  writing,  temper  was 
a  more  apt  term  for  the  mental  condition  of  many  officials.  For, 
as  Mr.  Hale  says,  the  prosecuting  officials  even  attempted  to  elimi- 
nate from  a  jury,  on  one  pretext  or  another,  those  who  appeared 
to  them  not  to  share  their  impulsive  attitude.  In  addition  to  the 
attitude  against  the  alleged  Reds  there  was,  as  Mr.  Hale  showed 
by  citations  of  facts,  much  excitement  among  judges  and  prosecuting 
officers,  but  there  was  no  talk  of  punishing  them  for  language  that 
incited  to  illegal  violence  against  alleged  Reds.  *'  But  let  an 
I.  W.  W.  or  an  alien  or  a  Communist  get  one-half  as  excited,  and 
what  happens  to  him?  We  take  him  in  dead  seriousness  and  run 
for  the  hand-cuffs."  The  result  was,  as  Mr.  Hale  shows,  that 
in  very  many  cases  those  taken  for  deportation  were  simply  the 
victims  of  the  excitement  of  officials,  which  affected  the  behaviour 
and  determined  the  ideas  even  of  the  highest  officials  of  the  national 
government  ^^ —  this  shameful  injustice  being  possible  because  of 
the  power  vested  in  those  officials  to  punish  free  speech  that  seemed 
to  them,  in  their  excitement,  to  imply  some  force  and  violence 
against  the  government.  Hence  the  First  Amendment  is  practically 
nullified,  in  a  time  of  excitement,  for  all  those  whose  speech  is  suf- 
ficiently displeasing  to  a  dominant  class  ^^  and  its  zealous  and  excited 
representatives. 

When  a  non-propertied  class  begins  to  aspire  for  political  power, 
the  rights  of  free  speech  and  assemblage,  which  propertied  classes 

21  Hale,  "The  'Force  and  Violence'  Joker,"  Neiu  Republic,  Jan.  21,  1920,  231. 

22  Ibid.,  232.    See  also  Lane,  "  The  Buford  Widows,"  The  Survey,  Jan.  10,  1920,  392. 

23  Hale,  op.  cit.,  231-232. 


3o6     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

gained  in  the  course  of  their  resistance  to  autocratic  repression,^* 
and  which  were  made  legal  rights  of  all  citizens,  are,  by  reactionary 
propertied  interests  that  control  governments,  denied  non-proper- 
tied classes,  under  the  impulse  to  protect  property  rights.  A  strug- 
gle then  ensues  between  those  who  would  re-affirm  those  private 
rights  for  all  classes  and  those  who  would  nulhfy  them.  If  they  are 
re-affirmed  those  rights  must  cease  to  be  associated  mainly  with 
property  rights  and  must  become  rights  in  their  own  right,  so  to 
speak,  that  is,  rights  springing  directly  from  a  government  by  pub- 
lic opinion,  which  can  function  only  through  perfectly  free  discus- 
sion in  the  open  forum.  Only  with  such  free  discussion  is  it  pos- 
sible to  ascertain  what  the  public  opinion  is.  Those  who  advocate 
freedom  of  speech  on  any  other  ground  miss  the  fundamental 
principle.  The  protests  of  individuals  and  organizations  against 
the  unconstitutional  repression  of  freedom  of  speech  and  assem- 
blage of  groups  of  striking  workmen  and  of  socialists,  in  the 
United  States,  in  19 19-1920,  were  generaly  grounded  on  the  fact 
that,  without  these  rights,  the  only  action  open  to  them  was  illegal, 
violent  propaganda.  But,  even  if,  instead  of  conducting  violent 
propaganda,  they  submitted,  and  even  if  the  mass  of  the  people 
acquiesced  in  this  exercise  of  domination  by  reactionary  propertied 
interests,  there  would  still  be  an  argument  for  free  speech  for 
the  socialists,  and  that  argument  would  be,  not  the  legal  argument 
that  the  Constitution  guarantees  free  speech,  for  the  Constitution 
might  be  amended,  but  the  social-psychological  argument  that  wise 
political  policy,  in  a  government  by  public  opinion,  depends,  in  the 
first  instance,  on  knowing  what  the  people  think  and  also  what  the 
people  feel  —  what  all  the  people  think  and  feel.  This  is  im- 
possible unless  all  the  people  enjoy  perfect  freedom  publicly  to 
express  their  opinions.  With  no  political  repression  this  sense  of 
freedom  always  will  be  imperfect  enough,  because  most  men  are 
timid  about  expressing  their  views  in  pubhc,  and  also  because  most 
men  fear  to  express  their  views  if  these  are  contrary  to  those  of 
employers,  customers,  clients,  boards  of  trustees  or  others  on  whom 
they  are  economically  dependent.  In  the  nature  of  the  case  there 
is  no  real  sense  of  free  speech  anywhere,  and  political  repression 
only  makes  a  bad  matter  worse.  In  a  government  by  public  opin- 
ion it  is  necessary  to  promote  the  greatest  possible  freedom,  and 

24  Hart,  "  Power  of  Government  Over  Free  Speech,"  Yale  Lata  Journal,  Feb.,  1920, 
414-^4.17. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS      307 

because  some  people  think  and  feel  what  is  contrary  to  the  preju- 
dices of  propertied  classes  is  no  reason  why  the  power  of  the  state 
should  intimidate  them  into  silence.  Indeed,  it  is  all  the  more 
reason  why  they  should  speak  out, —  that  views  that  are  the  oppo- 
site of  the  prevailing  views  may  see  the  light  of  day  and  error  be 
dissipated  under  intellectual  scrutiny.  No  man  knows  he  is  right 
until  he  has  answered  every  possible  claim  that  he  is  wrong;  and 
no  man  can  be  convinced  that  he  is  wrong  until  he  has  had  his 
chance  freely  to  discuss  his  views  with  those  who  think  they  are 
right.  The  private  right  of  absolutely  free  speech  is  thus 
grounded  in  its  necessity  for  a  government  that  rests  on  public 
opinion. 

In  addition  to  this  social-psychological  argument  for  free  speech 
there  is  the  further  social-psychological  fact,  which  has  been  so 
frequently  mentioned  in  the  public  protests,  that  if  a  part  of  the 
public  opinion  is  suppressed  it  tends  to  move  under  the  surface 
and  ultimately  to  take  the  course  of  a  reaction  of  suppressed  im- 
pulses. "  Repression  of  expression  has  in  the  past  meant  dis- 
order; stern  repression,  long  continued,  has  meant  revolution."  ^-^ 
Repression  thus  produces  all  those  evils  which  it  is  the  function  of 
law  and  government  to  prevent.  Because  the  principle  of  entire 
freedom  of  speech  has  a  sound  social-psychological  basis,  it  should 
be  made  a  legal  right. 

If  the  jurist  accepts  the  principle  stated  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
preceding  chapter,  that  the  purpose  of  law  is  to  enable  the  indi- 
viduals of  a  population  to  organize  for  self-development,  then  the 
right  of  entire  freedom  of  speech  and  assemblage  follows.  For 
self-development  is  impossible  without  free  expression  and  inter- 
change of  thought.  Organization  for  self-development  involves 
the  organization  of  men  of  different  views  into  opposing  political 
parties,  and  the  right  of  these  parties  freely  to  appeal  to  the  voters 
with  their  propaganda.  The  development  of  political  freedom 
has,  however,  sprung  not  from  the  impulse  for  development  of 
personality  but,  especially  among  Anglo-Saxons,  for  security  of 
property.  Hence  the  Englishman's  lack  of  interest  in  the  concep- 
tion of  natural  law  and  natural  rights,  that  is,  the  rights  to  which 
man  is  entitled  as  a  human  being  —  the  right  to  full  development 
of  personality.  "  The  Englishman  has  .  .  .  never  claimed  that 
he  has  natural  rights;  that  is,  rights  to  which  he  is  entitled  by 

25  K.  N.  T.,  "  Free  Speech  in  Time  of  Peace,"  Yale  Law  Journal,  Jan.,  1920,  343. 


3o8      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

reason  of  the  fact  that  he  is  a  man,  a  human  being."  "^^  Free 
speech  has  been  valued  especially  because  of  the  impulse  to  resist 
autocratic  encroachments  on  private  property,  and  later  to  protest 
against  state  regulation  of  property-getting  as  paternalistic;  where- 
fore reactionary  propertied  interests  as  readily  deny  freedom  of 
speech  to  socialists  in  the  twentieth  century  as  our  forefathers  as- 
serted the  right  against  the  English  autocracy  in  the  eighteenth.^^ 
And  this  repressive  attitude  of  reactionary  propertied  interests  is 
made  effective  because  of  the  bias  of  the  courts  on  behalf  of  prop- 
ertied classes. 

The  bias  of  courts  for  the  protection  of  property  rights  is  not 
necessarily  due  to  the  direct  or  indirect  influence  of  property  own- 
ers on  the  judge,  but  to  the  fact  that  the  law  is  largely  concerned 
with  property  rights.  The  law  makes  the  propertied  classes  the 
respected  classes,  because  it  makes  them  the  classes  to  be  protected, 
as  contrasted  with  the  non-propertied  classes.  Consequently  mere 
legal  conservatism  gives  a  judge  a  strong  bias  on  behalf  of  proper- 
tied classes.  This  is  true  both  in  England  and  in  the  United 
States.  But  where,  as  in  the  United  States,  a  bench  of  judges  is 
given  a  veto  on  legislation,  their  conservative  bias  on  behalf  of 
propertied  classes  has  a  profound  effect  on  the  development  of 
private  rights. 

The  analysis  of  the  psychological  basis  of  private  rights  in  the 
United  States  takes  us,  therefore,  finally  into  the  problem  of  the 
causes  of  judicial  conservatism.  The  tendency  of  the  judge  to 
adhere  to  precedent  is  due  to  the  professional  attitude  of  the  legal 
profession,  which  in  turn  is  congenial  to  men  of  the  disposition  and 
type  of  mind  that  attain  unusual  success  in  that  profession.  But 
the  mind  of  the  judge  often  is  still  more  inflexible  than  was  his 
mind  as  a  lawyer.  This  is  due,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  traditional 
function  of  the  judge.  As  shown  in  a  previous  chapter  his  func- 
tion in  the  first  periods  of  legal  development  was  inexorably  to  de- 
clare the  custom  bearing  on  the  case.  And  this  traditional  function 
has  determined  his  attitude  to  the  present  day.  His  attitude  is  not 
that  of  arbiter  ^^  or  of  progressive  legal  interpreter,^'^  but  that  of 
a  bench  applying  legal  commands  in  particular  situations  by  logical 

2'  Goodnow,  op.  cit.,  249-250.  f 

27  Becker,  "  The  Eve  of  the  Revolution,"  Chs.  I-IV. 

28  Dicey,  "  Law  and  Opinion  in  England,"  483-484. 
28 /*jV.,  364-365. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS     309 

deduction  from  precedent.  "  Men  trained  in  and  for  this  kind  of 
employment  acquire  a  logical  conscience;  they  come  to  care  greatly 
—  in  some  cases  excessively — for  consistency."^"  Habitually 
thinking  deductively,  the  judge  finds  it  impossible  to  appreciate 
changes  in  social  and  economic  conditions  and  to  reason  inductively 
from  these  facts  in  his  interpretation  of  law.  For  the  inductive 
reasoning  and  application  might  work  changes  in  the  law  and  cause 
it  to  conflict  with  the  logical  perfection  of  the  legal  tradition.  In 
the  development  of  English  judge-made  law,  the  rules  laid  down  for 
the  application  of  precedents  were  regarded  as  binding  judges  for  all 
future  time,  unless  over-ruled  by  a  higher  court  or  declared  no 
longer  a  law  by  the  legislature.  This  prideful  adherence  to  rules 
once  laid  down  is  characteristic  of  the  dominating  impulse  wherever 
observed.  It  is  seen  in  the  father  of  the  family  who  believes  that 
he  must  carry  out  his  command  and  not  change  it,  else  he  will  lose  his 
authority  in  the  family.  As  he  says,  "  Unless  I  stick  to  what  I  say, 
my  children  won't  respect  me."  This  action  of  the  dominating  im- 
pulse with  respect  to  commands  springs  from  the  nature  of  the 
submissive  attitude,  that  is,  from  the  respect  of  the  submissive 
person  for  one  who  never  changes  his  command  and  who  Insists 
that  it  be  obeyed.  One  reason,  therefore,  for  logical  adherence 
to  precedent  is  that  in  the  exercise  of  Its  order-preserving  function, 
the  court  feels  that  its  decisions  are  more  apt  to  subdue  human 
wilfulness,  as  well  as  to  call  forth  the  unqualified  assent  of  a  con- 
ventional people  if  decisions  are  logical  deductions  from  tradition. 
The  judge  feels  that  he  represents  the  conventional  people,  that 
legal  tradition  represents  their  will,  that  he  Is  the  exponent  of  that 
will,  and,  therefore,  that  his  function  is  logically  to  apply  the  law 
in  a  particular  case  as  the  command  of  the  people  against  a  wilful 
individual  or  class.  Another  reason  for  logical  adherence  to  pre- 
cedent is  that  by  adhering  strictly  to  precedent  a  judge  shuts  him- 
self off  from  Influences  that  might  otherwise  tempt  him  to 
favouritism,  or  to  placate,  or  cultivate  the  favour  of,  feared  in- 
dividuals or  powerful  Interests.  Another  reason,  the  one  usually 
given  by  judges,  is  that  judgments  must  be  made  certain. ^^  It  is 
said  to  be  more  important  that  judgments  should  be  more  certain 
than  that  they  should  be  just.^^     The  justice  that  may  have  to  be 

^°Ibid.,  364. 
81  Ibid.,  360. 
*2  Goodnow,  "The  Court  of  Appeals  Decision,"  Survey,  Apr.  29,  1911,  191. 


310      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

sacrificed  in  particular  cases  to  certainty  is  said  to  be  "  part,  and 
not  a  large  part,  of  the  price  which  the  individual  has  to  pay  the 
state  for  the  general  protection  afforded  by  its  power,  .  .  ."  ^^ 
But  all  these  reasons  given  for  adherence  to  precedent  are  in  the 
nature  of  justifications  of  the  deductive  attitude  itself,  which  does 
not  depend  on  the  reasons  but  on  the  position  of  the  judge  as  ex- 
ponent of  the  law  of  a  conventional  people  against  human  wilful- 
ness. Obviously  the  man  who  will  rise  to  such  a  position  will  gen- 
erally be  a  man  of  unusually  strong  dominating  disposition.  People 
want  a  masterful  man  in  such  a  position,  and  such  a  position  is 
congenial  to  a  masterful  man. 

Throughout  the  history  of  the  law  the  commanding,  deductive 
attitude  of  the  judge  has  repeatedly  brought  the  development  of 
jurisprudence  to  a  standstill.  In  the  history  of  English  law,  the 
development  of  the  logical  perfection  of  the  law  produced  a  closed 
system  which,  with  changing  conditions,  made  impossible  the  at- 
tainment of  justice  under  the  law.  In  order  that,  despite  changing 
conditions,  justice  might  be  done  and  the  logical  perfection  of  the 
law  still  not  be  broken,  there  evolved  the  equity  courts  with  equity 
law  developing  alongside  of  but  divergent  from  the  law  of  the 
regular  courts.^*  But,  as  Blackstone  said,  the  equity  courts  de- 
veloped "  a  laboured  connected  system,  governed  by  established 
rules,  and  bound  down  by  precedents,  from  which  they  do  not  de- 
part, although  the  reason  of  some  of  them  may  perhaps  be  liable 
to  objection."  ^^  Blackstone  pointed  out  injustices  involved  in  ap- 
plying the  precedents  of  the  equity  law  which,  however,  were  al- 
lowed to  stand,  he  said,  because  of  the  "  reverence  "  for  these  pre- 
cedents.^® 

The  judicial  attitude  of  strict  logical  deduction  from  preced- 
ent was  rendered  more  extreme  in  England  by  the  rivalry  of  the 
judiciary  with  the  other  organs  of  government  for  social  control. 
The  king  invoked  the  divine  right;  the  legislature,  the  law  of 
nature  and  popular  right;  while  the  judge  invoked  the  logical  per- 
fection of  the  law  as  authority  for  the  right  of  the  courts  finally 
to  interpret  the  law.^'^      President  Goodnow,  after  tracing  the  de- 

33  Pollock,  "Justice  According  to  Law,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  IX:  307. 

3*  Dicey,  op.  cit.,  375-398. 

^^  Blackstone,  "  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  England,"  Bk.  Ill :  432. 

38/*zV.,  Bk.  111:432. 

37  Pollock,  "  A  First  Book  of  Jurisprudence,"  236-243. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS      311 

velopment,  in  English  history,  of  judicial  independence  of  the 
crown,  writes  that  "  the  experience  of  the  English  people,  in  their 
struggle  for  constitutional  government,  had  led  them  to  believe 
that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  the  continued  existence  of  that 
form  of  government,  that  the  judges  who  were  to  determine  the 
legality  of  the  actions  of  the  agents  of  the  executive  must  be  inde- 
dependent  of  that  executive. 

"  English-speaking  people,  therefore,  accepted  with  eagerness 
the  principle.  They  were  proud  of  and  had  confidence  in  their 
courts.  They  believed  that  the  English  courts  had  developed  the 
English  common  law.  .  .  .  They  remembered  the  many  instances 
in  which  the  English  judges,  notwithstanding  their  dependence 
upon  the  Crown,  had  opposed  the  royal  wish,  and  had  endeavoured 
to  stand  for  the  rule  of  law  against  autocracy.  The  historic  re« 
mark  of  one  English  judge  who,  on  being  pressed  by  the  King  to 
decide  in  a  particular  way,  had  said,  '  Sire,  you  may  perhaps  find  a 
judge  who  will  reach  that  decision,  but  you  will  hardly  find,  a 
lawyer,'  is  indicative  both  of  the  belief  of  the  English  people  in 
the  necessity  for  the  rule  of  law,  and  of  their  conviction  that  the 
rule  of  law  could  be  secured  only  if  the  judges  were  independent  of 
the  executive."  ^^  Against  the  arbitrary  monarch,  backed  in  his 
Insistence  by  the  military  and  police  forces  of  the  nation,  the  judges 
plausibly  evaded  personal  responsibility  for  their  decisions  —  and 
so  escaped  the  bias  that  fear  gives  —  by  making  these  impersonal, 
—  logically  plausible  applications  of  precedents  coming  down  from 
the  past  and  having  the  authority  of  hoary  tradition.  The  people, 
conventional  in  type  of  mind,  were  impressed  by  the  traditional 
aspect  of  decisions,  and  had  a  reverential  regard  for  the  learning 
and  the  non-capricious,  impressive  attitude  of  the  repositories  of 
those  traditions,  as  compared  with  the  capricious,  arbitrary  mon- 
arch. Thus  the  judiciary  prevailed  over  the  king,  because  of  its 
superior  social  control.  For  the  same  reason  Parliament,  after  a 
long  rivalry  with  the  Crown  for  the  dominant  position  in  the  gov- 
ernment, ultimately  won  the  dominant  position. ^^ 

The  English  judiciary  is  the  conservative  governmental  organ. 
Most  of  the  English  judges  have  been  Tories.  But  its  conserva- 
tism has  not  interfered  as  much  with  the  progress  of  jurisprudence 
in  England  as  has  judicial  conservatism  in  the  United  States,  be- 

88  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional   Government,"  224-225. 

89  Ibid.,  202. 


312      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

cause  Parliamentary  statutes  are  not  subject  to  judicial  veto.  Even 
in  England,  however,  the  conservatism  of  the  judiciary  has  ham- 
pered the  development  of  jurisprudence,  though  judges  are  more  in- 
fluenced by  public  opinion  than  they  used  to  be.  Says  Dicey: 
"  The  Courts  or  the  judges,  when  acting  as  legislators,  are  of 
course  influenced  by  the  beliefs  and  feelings  of  their  time,  and  are 
guided  to  a  considerable  extent  by  the  dominant  current  of  public 
opinion;  .  .  .  But  whilst  our  tribunals,  or  the  judges  of  whom 
they  are  composed,  are  swayed  by  the  prevailing  beliefs  of  a  par- 
ticular time,  they  are  also  guided  by  professional  opinions  and  ways 
of  thinking  which  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  independent  of  and  pos- 
sibly opposed  to  the  general  tone  of  public  opinion.  The  judges 
are  the  heads  of  the  legal  profession.  .  .  .  They  are  men  ad- 
vanced in  life.  They  are  for  the  most  part  persons  of  a  conserva- 
tive disposition.  They  are  in  no  way  dependent  .  .  .  upon  the 
favor  of  the  electors.  .  .  .  They  are  more  likely  to  be  biased  by 
professional  habits  and  feeling  than  by  the  popular  sentiment  of 
the  hour."  ^^  The  result  is  that  "  judge-made  law  has,  owing  to 
the  training  and  age  of  our  judges,  tended  at  any  given  moment  to 
represent  the  convictions  of  an  earlier  era  than  the  ideas  repre- 
sented by  parliamentary  legislation.  If  a  statute,  as  already  stated, 
is  apt  to  reproduce  the  public  opinion  not  so  much  today  as  of 
yesterday,  judge-made  law  occasionally  represents  the  opinion  of 
the  day  before  yesterday."  *^ 

In  the  rivalry  of  governmental  organs  in  English  history,  the 
judiciary  has  relied  not  on  force,  as  did  the  king  who  wielded  the 
military  power,  nor  on  appeals  for  popular  support,  but  on  com- 
mending itself  to  the  conventional  in  human  nature,  especially  to 
the  conventional  property  owner  and  the  legal  profession.  The 
result  is  that,  in  England,  where  the  people  are  unusually  conven- 
tional,^^  "  law  means  a  body  of  rules  enforced  by  the  courts.  For 
this  purpose  it  is  unimportant  whether  the  function  of  the  courts 
be  regarded  as  making  or  declaring  law,  because  the  question  is 
not  about  the  source  or  origin,  but  simply  about  the  criterion  of 
law.  The  essential  point  is  that  what  the  courts  recognize  and 
enforce  is  law,  and  what  they  refuse  to  recognize  is  not  law."  *' 
In  the  United  States  this  popular  deference  to  the  judiciary  has 

**>  Dicey,  op.  cit.,  363-364. 

*^  Ibid.,  369  (quoted  without  footnote). 

*2  Lowell,  "  The  Government  of  England,"  1 :  12-14. 

43/*iV.,II:473. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS      313 

been  equally  marked,^*  and  has  resulted  in  popular  acquiescence  in 
the  judiciary's  power  of  constitutional  veto,  through  which  the 
judiciary  has  become  the  final  authority  in  the  determination  of 
private  rights.  The  respect  for  the  judiciary,  as  compared  with 
the  legislative  and  executive  branches,  has  been  greater  in  the 
United  States  than  in  other  countries,  perhaps,  among  other  rea- 
sons, because  of  our  not  having  an  hereditary  upper  class  which 
is  habitually  deferred  to  politically.  The  influence  of  professional 
politicians  over  the  nomination  and  election  of  legislators  and 
executives  has  inclined  the  tendency  in  human  nature  that  looks  for 
something  it  can  respect  in  government  to  feel  extraordinary  re- 
spect for  the  judiciary,  as  contrasted  with  "  wire-pulling  "  legisla- 
tors and  executives ;  and  this  popular  attitude  has  been  fostered 
by  the  property-owning  classes  who  look  to  the  judiciary  as  the 
bulwark  of  the  security  of  their  property  rights. 

A  further  aspect  of  the  rivalry  of  the  legislature  and  the  judi- 
ciary, in  the  United  States,  is  more  largely  juristic,  yet  closely  con- 
nected with  social-psychological  processes:  "American  courts, 
unrestrained  by  any  doctrine  of  parliamentary  supremacy,  such  as 
was  established  in  England  in  1688,  found  themselves  opposed  to 
legislatures,  just  as  English  courts  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries  had  been  opposed  to  the  crown.  They  found  in  the 
books,  over  and  above  express  constitutional  limitations,  vague 
doctrines  of  inherent  limitations  upon  every  form  of  law-making 
and  of  the  intrinsic  invalidity  of  certain  laws.  They  soon  wielded 
a  conceded  power  over  unconstitutional  legislation.  .  .  .  But  the 
determining  factor  in  the  attitude  of  our  courts  toward  legislation 
is  doubtless  to  be  found  in  the  coincidence  of  a  period  of  develop- 
ment through  judicial  decisions  with  one  of  great  legislative  ac- 
tivity. Usually  legislative  activity  has  succeeded  juristic  or  judicial 
activity.  With  us  they  happened  to  be  coincident.  Roughly 
speaking,  the  first  century  of  American  judicature  was  taken  up 
with  determining  the  applicability  of  the  several  doctrines  of  the 
common  law  to  this  country  and  working  out  the  potential  applica- 
tions of  common  law  principles  to  American  conditions.  Hence 
it  was  marked  by  fresh  and  living  juristic  thought  and  vigorous 
judicial  law-making.  For  once,  legislation  had  to  contend  with 
living  and  growing  law  of  the  discursive  type  instead  of  with  the 

**  Ibid.,  II:  ^72. 


314      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

feeble  off-spring  of  a  period  of  juristic  decadence."  ^^  The  result 
was  the  development  of  the  American  system  of  private  rights. 

The  rivalry  between  the  judiciary  and  the  legislature  in  the 
United  States  has  been  most  keen  on  those  occasions  when  judges, 
in  their  decisions,  have  plainly  shown  a  tendency  to  favour  prop- 
ertied interests  as  against  the  legislature  seeking  to  enact,  and  the 
executive  to  enforce,  laws  on  behalf  of  the  public  welfare.  This 
rivalry  of  governmental  organs,  with  its  profound  influence  on  the 
development  of  private  rights,  indicates  underlying  social-psycho- 
logical conditions  that  must  be  apprehended  in  order  to  understand 
the  development  of  jurisprudence.  This  knowledge  can  be  had 
only  imperfectly  for  the  past,  with  the  meagre  documentary 
sources;  but,  in  the  present,  investigations  can  be  carried  out  more 
thoroughly. 

The  rivalry  of  governmental  organs  was  once  approved  as  a 
condition  alleviating  the  burden  of  arbitrary  rule.  It  was  felt  that 
any  one  governmental  organ  tended  to  become  despotic  if  its 
power  was  undisputed,  and  that  the  separation  of  powers  pro- 
vided a  system  of  checks  and  balances  which  prevented  any  one  or- 
gan becoming  despotic.^^  It  is  maintained  that  this  necessity  of  a 
separation  of  powers  still  continues.  "  By  compelling  a  distribu- 
tion of  authority  over  every  subject-matter  of  government,  the  sep- 
aration of  powers  insures  to  the  holders  of  authority  a  position  of 
relative  impartiality  which  lessens  the  likelihood  and  the  apprehen- 
sion of  unfairness.  ...  It  also  concentrates  on  each  department  re- 
sponsibility for  the  proper  performance  of  its  peculiar  function  and 
since  the  work  of  each  department  calls  for  special  aptitude  or 
experience,  it  brings  about  a  desirable  division  of  labor."  ^'^  At 
the  same  time  the  division  of  labour  must  be  directed  by  a  rational 
social  purpose  which  requires  co-operation  of  the  different  depart- 
ments.'*^ This  co-operation  has  developed  somewhat  in  spite  of  all 
obstacles.  The  executive  more  and  more  co-operates  with  his 
party  in  the  legislature  in  directing  ^^  the  legislative  program ;  the 
judiciary  in  many  cases  more  carefully  considers  what  was  the 
legislative  purpose,  in  applying  the  rule  of  reason  in  the  interpreta- 

*' Pound,  "Common  Law  and  Legislation,"  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXI:  402-403. 
48  Goodnow,  op.  cii.,  224. 

*7  Green,  "  Separation  of  Governmental  Powers,"  Yale  Laiv  Journal,  Feb.,  1920,  393 
(quoted  without  footnotes). 
*8  Pound,  "Legislation  as  a  Social  Function,"  Pub.  Amer.  Sociol  Sac,  VII:  155. 
*»  Laski,  "  Authority  in  the  Modern  State,"  72. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PRIVATE  RIGHTS      315 

tion  and  application  of  statutes;  the  legislature  more  willingly  con- 
sults the  executive  purpose  in  devising  legislation  and  assents  to 
the  necessity  of  judicial  legislation. 

In  the  last  analysis,  the  problem  of  a  progressive  development 
of  private  rights  resolves  itself  into  a  political  problem,  namely, 
the  problem  of  getting  elected  or  appointed  to  office  law-makers 
who  will  be  guided  by  a  rational  social  purpose,  and  of  getting 
effective  endorsement  of  their  action.  This  is,  in  the  last  analysis, 
a  social-psychological  problem.  While  law-making  will  probably 
continue  to  be  more  largely  the  business  of  lawyers  than  of  any 
other  class,  and  judges  will  almost  of  necessity  be  lawyers,  and 
while  training  in  the  law  does  tend  to  make  a  man  deductively 
minded  and  conservative,  nevertheless  there  are  lawyers  not  thus 
affected,  because  of  their  unusually  strong  sympathetic  and  intel- 
lectual disposition,  and  these  progressive  lawyers  should  become 
the  judges.  But  the  propertied  classes  ordinarily  exercise  a  pre- 
dominant influence  in  determining  nomination  or  appointment  to 
judicial  office.  The  lawyers  who  have  influential  backing  for  ju- 
dicial office  are  those  whose  dispositions  have  made  them  the  ef- 
fective servants  of  corporations  or  of  political  organizations,  and 
who,  in  the  course  of  a  career  in  which  it  was  their  business  to 
serve  those  interests,  and  in  which  they  attained  conspicuous  suc- 
cess in  that  service,  developed  those  attitudes  of  character  that 
would  cause  them,  as  judges,  to  take  the  attitude  of  those  interests 
to  the  juristic  problems  that  would  come  before  them  for  decision. 
When  a  court  finds  unconstitutional  a  law  that  was  passed  on  be- 
half of  the  public  welfare,  on  the  ground  that  it  restricts  freedom 
in  the  acquisition  of  property,  the  essential  question  is,  was  the 
court  in  sympathy  with  the  law.  Are  the  reasons  for  the  adverse 
decision  valid  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  rational  theory  of 
progress,  or  merely  secondary  explanations  advanced  to  justify  a 
bias  against  proposed  legislation  that  restricts  the  rights  of  proper- 
tied interests?  President  Goodnow  raised  this  essential  question 
in  connection  with  the  decision  that  declared  unconstitutional  the 
New  York  compensation  law.^^  He  pointed  out  that  "  a  careful 
reading  of  the  decision  can  hardly  fail  to  convince  one  who  is  in 
sympathy  with  the  desire  to  benefit  the  lot  of  the  laboring  popula- 
tion, that,  if  the  court  had  really  shared  this  sympathy,  it  might 

BO  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  Ives  vs.  South  Buffalo  Railway  Company,  1911. 


3i6      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

comparatively  easily  have  given  greater  weight  to  such  cases  as 
the  explosive  cases  which  it  does  not  even  mention.  .  .  .  The 
Court  of  Appeals  might  also  have  shown  greater  willingness  to 
follow  the  lead  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the 
recent  bank  depositors  guaranty  fund  cases.  ...  It  is  true  that 
the  Court  of  Appeals  is  not  bound  by  the  decisions  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court.  .  .  .  But  it  is  not  less  true  that  a  court 
desiring  to  uphold  the  constitutionality  of  the  act  in  question  might 
easily  be  more  astute  in  finding  reasons  for  supporting  it  than  the 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals  has  shown  itself  to  be."  ^^  The  basis 
of  a  judge's  opinion  is  his  attitude,  which  determines  whether  he 
will  try  to  find  legal  reasons  for  or  against  the  constitutionality  of 
a  statute.  The  question  is,  has  his  attitude  been  formed  in  the 
course  of  a  life-long  attempt  sympathetically  and  intellectually  to 
comprehend  the  lines  of  social  progress;  or  has  it  been  formed 
in  the  course  of  a  life-long  attempt  to  satisfy  a  rivalrous  impulse 
for  superiority  in  his  profession  and  in  his  state,  to  win  which  he 
must  so  commend  himself  to  political  and  propertied  interests  as 
to  secure  advancement?  As  soon  as  a  way  has  been  found  to  ad- 
vance the  former  instead  of  the  latter  type  of  lawyer  in  public  life, 
then  the  way  to  win  superiority  will  cease  to  be  the  service  of  prop- 
ertied interests,  and  will  become  service  for  the  progressive  wel- 
fare of  the  whole  people. 

51  Goodnow,    "The    Court    of    Appeals    Decision,"    Survey,    Apr.    29,    1911,    191- 
192. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    PROCESSES    IN    THE    DEVELOPMENT    OF 
PRIVATE    PROPERTY 

THE  essential  process  in  the  development  of  jurisprudence 
has  been  the  struggle  to  acquire  and  to  feel  security  in 
the  ownership,  the  enjoyment,  and  the  bequest  of  prop- 
erty. This  brings  to  view  a  far-reaching  social-psychological  basis 
of  jurisprudence.  An  adequate  treatment  of  the  subject  would  re- 
quire a  volume.  The  present  and  the  succeeding  chapters  aim 
merely  to  note  how  private  property  is  connected,  at  various  points 
in  its  development  with  underlying  social-psychological  processes. 

Private  property  originated  in  the  individual's  instinct  to  re- 
sist another's  taking  what  he  had  found  or  made  ^  or  received  or 
habitually  used."  The  instinct  to  resist  attack  or  exploitation  is 
stronger  than  the  instinct  to  aggress.  Among  animals  it  is,  there- 
fore, "  dangerous  for  an  individual  to  try  to  seize  anything  held 
by  another  of  about  equal  strength,  and  in  human  society  this  nat- 
urally led  to  the  habit  of  leaving  each  in  possession  of  whatever  he 
had  attained,  especially  in  early  times  when  the  objects  possessed 
were  of  little  value,  and  there  was  no  great  inequality  in  wealth."  ^ 
Defence  of  possessions  was  sympathized  with  by  the  group  and 
the  possessor  was  supported  by  the  communal  resentment  and 
restraint. 

The  property  thus  privately  owned  and  protected  in.  the  begin- 
ning included  merely  articles  of  personal  use,  not  the  hunting  and 
fishing  grounds  and  other  natural  resources  which  were  used  in  com- 
mon. These  group  possessions  were  defended  by  the  group 
against  the  encroachments  of  other  groups.^  Thus,  among  the 
native  tribes  of  Australia,  "  Each  of  the  various  tribes  speaks  a  dis- 
tinct dialect,  and  regards  itself  as  the  possessor  of  the  country  in 
which  it  lives."  *     And  it  will  defend  its  territory  on  occasion.^ 

1  Animals  will  defend  their  hoards  of  food  against  intruders.     See  Morgan,   "  The 
American  Beaver  and  his  Works,"  167. 

2  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  11:51-52   (quoted  without  footnotes). 
^Ibid.,  II:  36,  51. 

*  Spencer  and  Gillen,  "  The  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia,"  7. 
^Ibid.,  "The  Northern  Tribes  of  Central  Australia,"  26-27. 

317  .         . 


3i8      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

There  was,  therefore,  in  the  beginning,  private  property  and  public 
property. 

Private  property  originated,  in  the  last  analysis,  in  the  commun- 
ity's support  of  the  individual's  instinctive  assertion  of  ownership. 
For  while  this  assertion,  of  itself,  was  strong  enough  to  enable  the 
individual  to  support  his  claim  against  another  of  about  equal 
strength,  he  could  not  do  it  against  another  of  greater  strength,  or 
against  several  bent  on  exploiting  him.  The  situations  in  which  the 
community  supported  the  individual  were,  first,  when  his  possession 
was  due  to  previous  occupation.  "  The  principle  of  occupation  is 
illustrated  by  innumerable  facts  from  all  quarters  of  the  world  —  by 
the  hunter's  right  to  the  game  which  he  has  killed  or  captured;  by 
the  nomad's  or  settler's  right  to  the  previously  unoccupied  place 
where  he  has  pitched  his  tent  or  built  his  dwelling;  by  the  agricul- 
turist's right  to  the  land  of  which  he  has  taken  possession  by  culti- 
vating the  soil;  .  .  ."  ^  Creation  of  a  thing  also  conferred  a  right 
to  its  possession.  "  Even  among  the  rudest  peoples  there  is  prop- 
erty in  weapons,  implements,  dress,  decorations,  and  other  things  in 
which  the  value  given  by  labour  bears  a  specially  large  proportion  to 
the  value  of  the  raw  material.  .  .  .  Among  uncivilized  races  we 
frequently  find  that  the  land  itself  and  the  crops  or  trees  growing  on 
it  have  different  owners,  the  latter  belonging  to  the  person  who 
planted  them."  ^  Habitual  use,  also,  in  the  mind  of  primitive  man 
conferred  a  right  to  property.  "  Besides  occupation,  or  the  taking 
possession  of  a  thing,  the  keeping  possession  of  it  may  establish 
a  right  of  ownership.  That  these  principles,  though  closely  con- 
nected with  each  other,  are  not  identical  is  obvious  from  two  classes 
of  facts.  First,  a  proprietary  right  which  is  based  on  occupation 
may  disappear  if  the  object  has  ceased  to  remain  in  the  possession 
of  the  person  who  had  appropriated  it  .  .  .  among  agricultural 
savages  the  cultivator  frequently  loses  his  right  to  the  field  when 
he  makes  no  more  use  of  it.  .  .  .  Secondly,  the  retaining  possession 
of  an  object  for  a  certain  length  of  time  may  make  it  the  property 
of  the  possessor,  even  though  the  occupation  of  that  object  con- 
ferred on  him  no  such  right  .  .  .  ."  ^  Habitual  use  gives  owner- 
ship because  "  the  longer  a  person  is  in  possession  of  a  certain  ob- 
ject, the  more  apt  are  both  he  and  other  individuals  to  resent  its 

8  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  II:  35-36. 

7 /*i^.,  11:41-43. 

? /W<f.,  II :  39-^1   (quoted  without  footnotes). 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      319 

alienation ;  whereas  the  loss  or  abandonment  of  a  thing  has  a  tend- 
ency to  loosen  the  connection  between  the  thing  and  its  owner."  * 

While  the  community  tended  to  support  the  individual  in  a 
claim  to  property  based  on  occupation,  creation  or  habitual  use,  the 
communal  support  thus  instinctively  enlisted  was  not  invariably 
forthcoming.  It  was  possible  for  a  powerful  war  chief  and  his  fol- 
lowing to  defy  the  community  or,  by  his  influence  as  orator  or  pres- 
tige as  fighter,  to  have  his  will.^"  Furthermore,  particular  dis- 
putes often  presented  opposing  claims  each  with  some  degree  of 
validity,  in  which  cases  the  popular  instinct  to  favour  the  man  of 
prestige  entered  into  the  communal  determination  of  property  right. 

This  influence  of  the  man  of  power  over  public  opinion  was  im- 
mensely increased  by  the  rise  of  pastoral  and  agricultural  industry. 
There  then  developed  a  struggle  for  the  possession  of  land,  which 
the  rise  of  pastoral  industry  and  agriculture  had  made  valuable, 
but  which,  until  that  time,  had  not  been  private  property.  In  Eng- 
land the  law  eventually  provided  that  the  land  belonged  to  him 
who  was  strong  enough  to  appropriate,  hold  and  make  use  of  it. 
Thus  it  is  said  of  the  land  law  of  England:  "  In  the  history  of 
our  law  there  is  no  idea  more  cardinal  than  that  of  seisin.  Even 
in  the  law  of  the  present  day  it  plays  a  part  which  must  be  studied 
by  every  lawyer;  but  in  the  past  it  was  so  important  that  we  may 
almost  say  that  the  whole  system  of  our  land  law  was  law  about 
seisin  and  its  consequence."  ^^  And  "  seisin  simply  meant  posses- 
sion." ^^  "  A  man  is  in  seisin  of  land  when  he  is  enjoying  it  or 
in  a  position  to  enjoy  it.  .  .  .  The  man  who  takes  and  enjoys  the 
fruits  of  the  earth  thereby  '  exploits  '  his  seisin,  that  is  to  say,  he 
makes  his  seisin  '  explicit,'  visible  to  the  eyes  of  his  neighbors. 
In  order  that  seisin  may  have  all  its  legal  effects  it  must  be  thus 
exploited.  Still  a  man  must  have  seisin  before  he  can  exploit  it. 
.  .  .  Seisin  of  land,  therefore,  is  not  the  enjoyment  of  the  fruits 
of  the  earth ;  it  is  rather  that  state  of  things  which  in  due  time  wiU 
render  such  an  enjoyment  possible."  ^^  Various  plausible  explana- 
tions have  been  assigned  by  students  of  jurisprudence  for  making 
obvious  possession  the  criterion  of  ownership.     For  instance,  there 

^  Ibid.,  II:  52-53    (quoted  without  footnotes). 

10  Webster,  "Primitive  Individual  Ascendency,"  Pub.  Amer.  Social  Soc,  XII:  49-54. 

11  Pollock  and  Maitland,  "  History  of  English  Law,"  II :  29. 
12 /^-iV.,  11:31. 

18 /*,V.,  11:34. 


320      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

is  the  supposition  that  possession  came  to  be  legally  protected  be- 
cause this  conduced  to  peace  and  public  order.^*  This  assumption 
is  plausible  in  view  of  the  fact  that  today  people  are  impatient 
with  a  disturbance  of  public  order,  especially  if  the  one  whose  prop- 
erty right  is  questioned  is  a  man  of  power  and  influence.  Men  who 
made  fortunes  in  violation  of  the  Anti-Trust  Law  of  1890  main- 
tain their  ownership  of  those  fortunes  and,  by  their  monopoly,  are 
still  able  to  extort  high  prices  from  the  public.^^  So  the  men 
who  forcibly  possessed  themselves  of  land  were  able  to  extort 
from  the  cultivators  a  large  part  of  the  fruits  thereof.  It  is  not 
possible  to  analyse  the  motives  which  resulted  in  legally  established 
private  property  in  land,^''  but  it  is  probable  that  conquest  and 
power  to  maintain  ownership  played  a  leading  part.  And  those 
who  acquired  ownership  used  it  to  exploit  the  cultivators.^^ 

With  the  development  of  ownership  by  conquest  the  land 
eventually  passed  into  the  ownership  of  one  man,  the  king,  who 
then  disposed  of  it  in  a  way  to  give  him  the  greatest  dominating 
power.  Thus  feudal  England  was  organized  on  a  military  basis. 
The  sovereign  needed  men  for  his  wars,  and  "  to  obtain  men,  the 
sovereign  granted  his  domains  to  his  nearest  friends,  who,  in  their 
turn,  cut  their  manors  into  as  many  farms  as  possible,  and  each 
farmer  paid  his  rent  with  his  body. 

"  A  baron's  strength  lay  in  the  band  of  spears  which  followed 
his  banner,  and  therefore  he  subdivided  his  acres  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, having  no  great  need  of  money.  Himself  a  farmer,  he  cul- 
tivated enough  of  his  fief  to  supply  his  wants,  to  provide  his  table, 
and  to  furnish  his  castle,  but,  beyond  this,  all  he  kept  to  himself 
was  loss."  ^^  During  this  age,  "  little  inducement  existed  to  pilfer 
these  domains,  since  there  was  room  in  plenty,  and  the  population 
increased  slowly,  if  at  all.  The  moment  the  form  of  competition 
changed,  these  conditions  were  reversed.  Precisely  when  a  money 
rent  became  a  more  potent  force  than  armed  men  may  be  hard  to 
determine,  but  certainly  that  time  had  come  when  Henry  VIII 
mounted  the  throne,  for  then  capitalistic  farming  was  on  the  in- 
crease. .  .  .  Instead  of  tending  to  subdivide,  as  in  an  age  of  de- 

^*Ibid.,  11:41. 

IB  Manley,  "  Have  the  Packers  Escaped  Again?  "  The  Searchlight,  Washington,  D.  C, 
IV  (December,  1919) :  11. 

16  Jenks,  "A  History  of  Politics,"  iii. 

1^  Ibid.,  106-107. 

18  Adams,  "  The  Law  of  Civilization  and  Decay,"  199. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      321 

centralization,  land  was  consolidated  in  the  hands  of  the  economi- 
cally strong,  and  capitalists  systematically  enlarged  their  estates  by 
enclosing  the  commons,  and  depriving  the  yeomen  of  their  im- 
memorial rights."  ^^  "  Thus  by  degrees  the  pressure  of  intensify- 
ing centralization  split  the  old  homogeneous  population  of  England 
into  classes  graduated  according  to  their  economic  capacity."  ^^ 

The  appropriation  of  the  common  land  in  England  by  the  pow- 
erful property  owners  continued  down  to  recent  times.  For  a  his- 
tory of  the  subject,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  excellent  works  by 
Slater  (1907),  Johnson  (1909),  and  Hammond  (1911).  With 
the  rise  of  sheep  farming  and  the  growth  of  manufacturing  and 
commerce,  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  farming 
became  more  profitable  and  land  more  valuable;  and  the  larger 
landowners,  who  controlled  Parliament,  secured  the  passage  of 
acts  giving  themselves  the  common  land.^^  In  1844,  Parliament 
had  passed  upwards  of  four  thousands  acts  by  which  almost  six 
million  acres  of  common  land  were  made  private  property.^^  It 
is  estimated  that  approximately  twenty  per  cent  of  the  total  acre- 
age of  England  was  enclosed  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth 
centuries.^^  By  these  acts  of  enclosure  the  peasantry  lost  their 
source  of  fuel  on  common  land,  also  land  to  which  they  had  ac- 
quired a  legal  claim,  and  also  the  house  built  upon  and  other  im- 
provements made  on  the  land.^*  Hammond  describes  the  motive 
for  these  acts  as  follows:  "The  agricultural  community  which 
was  taken  to  pieces  in  the  eighteenth  century  and  reconstructed  in 
the  manner  in  which  a  dictator  reconstructs  a  free  government,  .  .  . 
was  not  killed  by  avarice  alone.  Cobbett  used  to  attribute  the 
enclosure  movement  entirely  to  the  greed  of  the  landowners.  But, 
if  greed  was  a  sufficient  motive,  greed  was  in  this  case  clothed  and 
almost  enveloped  in  public  spirit.  Let  us  remember  what  this 
community  looked  like  to  men  with  the  mind  of  the  landlord  class. 
English  landowners  have  always  believed  that  order  would  be  re- 
solved into  its  original  chaos,  if  they  ceased  to  control  the  lives 
and  destinies  of  their  neighbours.  '  A  great  responsibility  rests 
on  us  landlords;  if  we  go,  the  whole  thing  goes.'     So  says   the 

18  Ibid.,  199-2CX). 

20  Ibid.,  207. 

21  Johnson,  "  The  Disappearance  of  the  Small  Landowner,"  36-61. 

22  Ibid.,  90. 
'^^  Ibid.,  91. 

2* Slater,  "The  English  Peasantry  and  the  Enclosure  of  Common  Fields,"  1x8-122. 


322      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

landlord  in  Mr.  Galsworthy's  novel,  and  so  said  the  landlords  in 
the  eighteenth  century.  The  English  aristocracy  .  .  .  very  nat- 
urally concluded  that  this  old  peasant  community,  with  its  trouble- 
some rights,  was  a  public  encumbrance.  This  view  received  a 
special  impetus  from  all  the  circumstances  of  the  age.  The  land- 
lord class  was  constantly  being  recruited  from  the  ranks  of  the 
itianufacturers,  and  the  new  landlords,  bringing  into  this  charmed 
circle  an  image  of  their  own,  caught  at  once  its  taste  for  power, 
for  direction,  for  authority,  for  imposing  its  will.  Readers  of 
Shirley  will  remember  that  when  Robert  Moore  pictures  to  him- 
self a  future  of  usefulness  and  success,  he  says  that  he  will  obtain 
an  Act  for  enclosing  Nunnely  Common,  that  his  brother  will  be 
put  on  the  bench,  and  that  between  them  they  will  dominate  the 
parish.  The  book  ends  in  this  dream  of  triumph.  Signorial  po- 
sition owes  its  special  lustre  for  English  minds  to  the  association 
of  social  distinction  with  power  over  the  life  and  ways  of  groups 
of  men  and  women.  When  Bagehot  sneered  at  the  sudden  million- 
aires of  his  day,  who  hoped  to  disguise  their  social  defects  by 
buying  old  places  and  hiding  among  aristocratic  furniture,  he  was 
remarking  on  a  feature  of  English  life  that  was  very  far  from 
being  peculiar  to  his  time.  Did  not  Adam  Smith  observe  that 
merchants  were  very  commonly  ambitious  of  becoming  country 
gentlemen?  This  kind  of  ambition  was  the  form  that  public  spirit 
often  took  in  successful  Englishmen,  and  it  was  a  very  powerful 
menace  to  the  old  village  and  its  traditions  of  collective  life. 

"  Now  this  passion  received  at  this  time  a  special  momentum  from 
the  condition  of  agriculture.  .  .  .  Thus,  in  addition  to  the  desire 
for  social  power,  there  was  behind  the  enclosure  movement  a  zeal 
for  economic  progress.  .  .  .  Many  an  enclosing  landlord  thought 
only  of  the  satisfaction  of  doubling  or  trebling  his  rent :  ...  If 
we  are  to  trust  so  warm  a  champion  of  enclosure  as  William  Mar- 
shall, this  was  the  state  of  mind  of  the  great  majority.  But  there 
were  many  who  chafed  under  the  restraints  that  the  system  of 
common  agriculture  placed  on  improvement  and  experiment."  ^^ 
As  Hammond  states,  explanations  justifying  acts  of  enclosure  from 
motives  of  public  spirit  are  more  numerous  in  the  documentary 
sources  than  those  which  assign  it  to  desire  for  wealth  and  domi- 
nating power,  but  the  latter  are  not  lacking.  Thus  he  writes  that 
"  Mr.  Bishton,  who  wrote  the  Report  on  Shropshire  in  1794,  gives 

25  Hammond,  "  The  Village  Laborer,"  35-36. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      323 

a  still  more  interesting  glimpse  into  the  mind  of  the  enclosing  class; 
'  The  use  of  common  land  by  labourers  operates  upon  the  mind  as 
a  sort  of  independence.'  When  the  commons  are  enclosed  '  the 
laborers  will  work  every  day  in  the  year,  their  children  will  be 
put  out  to  labor  early,'  and  '  that  subordination  of  the  lower 
ranks  of  society  which  in  the  present  times  is  so  much  wanted, 
would  be  thereby  considerably  secured.'  "  ^^ 

The  motives  essential  in  the  acquisition  of  private  property  in 
land  by  acts  of  enclosure  were,  therefore,  to  be  able  to  appropriate 
more  and  more  wealth  from  the  possession  of  land;  to  control  la- 
bourers by  depriving  them  of  the  use  of  the  common  land;  to  win 
the  social  power  and  recognition  to  be  gained  through  ownership  of 
land  and  control  of  labourers;  and  the  desire  merely  professed  or 
sincere  to  promote  the  national  progress  and  superiority  by  promot- 
ing scientific  farming.  During  the  centuries  when  these  acts  of 
enclosure  were  being  passed,  and  were  reducing  small  farmers 
from  the  position  of  independent  owner  to  that  of  tenant  or 
farm  labourer,  laws  were  in  force  denying  labourers  the  right 
to  leave  the  landlord's  estate  in  search  of  better  paid  work;^''^ 
and  also  laws  empowering  justices  of  the  peace,  who  were  land- 
lords, to  fix  the  rate  of  wages  in  order  to  prevent  the  wages  of 
agricultural  labourers  from  rising.^^  These  laws  have  been  re- 
pealed, but  the  wages  of  English  agricultural  labourers  up  to  the 
time  of  the  World  War  continued  so  low  that,  in  a  vast  majority 
of  cases,  the  wages  were  insufficient  to  maintain  a  family  of  aver- 
age size  in  a  state  of  mere  physical  efficiency.^^  They  "  could 
not  make  ends  meet  at  all  if  it  were  not  for  charitable  gifts."  "^^ 
Private  property  in  land  thus  enabled  the  larger  landowners,  who 
controlled  the  government,  to  acquire  the  holdings  of  smaller  own- 
ers; and  this  landowning  class  also  secured  the  enactment  of  laws 
facilitating  the  exploitation  of  tenants  and  labourers.  Under  this 
domination  and  exploitation  tenants  and  labourers  were  reduced 
to  a  submissive  labouring  class  living  at  a  bare  subsistence  level. 

The  English  land  law  aimed  primarily  to  give  the  one  who 
claimed  ownership  a  sense  of  secure  possession.     Thus  "  To  our 

28/^jV.,  38. 

27Nicholls,  "History  of  the  English  Poor  Law,"  1:279-287,  323-3271  34°;  n:49i  239- 

257,  394-395.  406-407- 

^^Ibid.,  1:154-156,  203,  209,  270;  11:44.  131-133- 

29  Rowntree,  "  How  the  Laborer  Lives,"  52. 

30  Ibid.,  34. 


324      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

medieval  lawyers,  the  word  seistna  suggested  the  very  opposite  of 
violence;  it  suggested  peace  and  quiet.  It  did  so  to  Coke.  '  And 
so  it  was  said  that  possessio  is  derived  a  posse  et  sedeo,  because  he 
who  is  in  possession  may  sit  down  and  rest  in  quiet;  so  seisina  also 
is  derived  a  sedendo,  for  till  he  has  seisin  all  is  labour  et  dolor  et 
vexatio  spiritus;  but  when  he  has  obtained  seisin,  he  may  sedere 
et  acquiescere '  .  .  .  The  seated  man  is  in  quiet  enjoyment.  We 
reverence  the  throne,  the  bishop's  see,  '  the  Right  Reverend 
Bench,'  the  bench  of  judges,  we  obey  the  orders  of  the  chair;  the 
powers  that  be  are  seated."  ^^ 

This  effect  of  ownership  continues  to  the  present  day.  The 
property  owner  with  an  independent  income  feels  free  to  give  him- 
self to  the  enjoyments  of  life.  He  feels  a  satisfied  sense  of  being 
able  to  meet  whatever  situations  may  arise  and  to  order  his  life  as 
he  chooses.  >  With  money  he  can  care  for,  protect  and  gladden  the 
lives  of  those  he  loves.  He  feels  a  sense  of  security  for  the  fu- 
ture, as  well  as  a  gratifying  sense  of  the  social  recognition  accorded 
the  property  owner.  He  realizes  that  his  property  stands  between 
him  and  the  care  and  weariness  of  life,  apprehension  for  the  fu- 
ture, keen  sorrow  at  not  being  able  to  adequately  care  for  those  he 
loves,  and  the  misery  of  the  sense  of  inferiority  and  social  con- 
tempt suffered  by  the  poor.  To  escape  all  this  and  realize  the 
enjoyment  which  ownership  of  property  makes  possible  is  what 
most  men  work  for.  And  the  property  itself,  for  those  who  are 
fortunate  enough  to  accumulate,  stands  for  that  for  which  they 
have  spent  their  life's  energy;  as  such  it  is  precious.  It  is  be- 
cause property  thus  comes  to  stand  for  everything  worth  while,  to 
men  of  an  egoistic  attitude,  that  the  property  owner  of  this  atti- 
tude feels  subconsciously  an  apprehension  and  resentment  in  con- 
nection with  everything  which  he  imagines  will  make  his  owner- 
ship less  secure  and  less  advantageous, —  in  connection  with  every 
progressive  political  movement,  every  gain  in  votes  of  a  "  radical  " 
party,  every  appointment  to  an  important  office,  especially  to  the 
office  of  judge,  of  a  man  of  "  radical  "  views,  every  "  radical  " 
tendency  in  teaching,  preaching,  literary  and  scientific  work.  Be- 
fore the  menace  of  the  radical  political  leader,  these  reactionary 
property-owning  interests,  however  bitterly  in  conflict  before,  in- 
stinctively draw  together.     But  this  type  of  reaction  is  not  peculiar 

31  Pollock  and  Maitland,  op.  cii.,  11:30-31. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      325 

to  the  property  owner.  In  the  same  way  do  scholars  of  this  egois- 
tic attitude,  when  the  learning  to  which  they  have  given  their 
lives  is  threatened  by  new  ideas,  react  impulsively  against  the  new 
ideas.  Lawyers  likewise  are  habitually  conservative  toward 
changes  in  the  law,  knowledge  of  which  constitutes  their  stock  in 
trade;  teachers,  toward  changes  in  the  curriculum  which  may  di- 
minish the  demand  for  the  line  of  teaching  which  is  their  stock  in 
trade.  The  underlying  motive  for  conservatism  is  the  same  in  these 
cases  as  in  that  of  the  egoistic  property  owner.  But  the  conserva- 
tism of  the  latter  is  more  effective  in  staying  progress  than  is  that  of 
the  professional  man  because  the  property  owner's  power  is  vastly 
greater;  lawyers,  clergymen  and  teachers  are,  more  or  less  di- 
rectly, beneficiaries  of  property  owners.  The  conservatism  of  the 
lawyer,  scholar,  ecclesiastic  and  teacher  commends  them  to  the 
property  owner,  which  furnishes  an  added  incentive  to  their  con- 
servatism. All  this  is  true,  however,  only  for  conservative  and 
reactionary  property  owners  and  professional  men.  The  sympa- 
thetic and  intellectual  type  are  altruistic  and  progressive.  The 
more  public  education  centres  on  the  cultivation  of  sympathy  and 
intellect,  the  more  influential  will  this  type  become. 

James  Madison  long  ago  pointed  out  that  property  owners  differ 
in  their  attitude  to  questions  of  property  according  to  their  disposi- 
tions—  whether  of  "  reason  "  or  "  self-love."  ^^  He  implied  that 
self-love  predominated  and  emphasized  "  factions  "  or  rivalries  of 
propertied  interests  as  the  fundamental  process  of  political  be- 
haviour.^^ Long  before,  as  well  as  since  this  time,  status  was  deter- 
mined by  possession  of  property.  "  In  the  higher  civilization,  until 
modern  times,  the  possession  of  land  was  the  only  social  power 
which  would  raise  a  man  above  sordid  cares  and  enable  him  to  plan 
his  life  as  he  chose."  "  Men  of  talent  .  .  ,  had  to  win  recognition 
from  warriors  and  land  owners,  and  they  became  comrades  and  al- 
lies of  the  latter."  ^^  Men  who  gained  riches  in  the  city  bought  land 
and  got  themselves  ennobled.  "  In  France,  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries,  nineteen-twentieths  of  those  who  were  called 
nobles  were  middle-class  men  enriched,  decorated,  and  '  possessed  of 
land.'  "  ^^     The  rise  of  towns  and  of  a  commercial  and  manufac- 

32  The  Federalist,  No.  X. 

33  Ibid. 

34  Sumner,  "  Folkways,"  183-184. 

^^  Ibid.,  165-166.     In  Japan,  today,   land-owners  are  more  respected  than  business 


326     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

turing  class  resulted  in  resistance  to  the  political  domination  of  the 
landowning  class,  and  in  the  eventual  sweeping  away  of  the  priv- 
ileges which  that  class,  as  long  as  it  controlled  the  government, 
had  maintained  in  its  own  interest. ^*^  The  manufacturing  and 
commercial  classes  now  became  the  dominant  political  classes. 
"  While  land  owners  possessed  the  great  social  advantage,  they 
could  form  a  class  of  hereditary  nobles.  The  nobles  now  disap- 
pear because  their  social  advantage  is  gone.  The  modern  finan- 
ciers, masters  of  industry,  merchants,  and  transporters  now  hold 
control  of  moveable  capital.  They  hold  social  and  political 
power."  ^"^ 

The  propertied  classes  controlled  the  government  of  England 
during  the  development  of  the  English  Constitution,  at  least  up  to 
1870,^^  and  shaped  that  development  in  a  way  to  give  security  to 
their  holdings  and  perpetuity  to  their  control.^^  The  contest  of 
the  American  colonies  with  the  mother  country  was  essentially  a 
contest  over  property;  the  propertied  classes  in  England  aimed  to 
profit  at  the  expense  of  the  prosperous  propertied  classes  in  the 
colonies.^*^  The  resistance  of  the  colonies  was  a  resistance  pri- 
marily of  propertied  classes,  though  the  leader  in  the  rebellion, 
Samuel  Adams,  "  unlike  most  of  his  patriotic  friends,  .  .  .  had 
neither  private  business  nor  private  profession  ...  his  only  busi- 
ness being  .  .  .  the  definition  and  defence  of  popular  rights."  ^^ 
But  he  relied  on  the  influence  and  support  of  the  men  of  property.^^ 
In  the  formulation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  the 
propertied  classes  controlled  the  constitutional  convention  and  the 

men,  except  in  the  largest  cities,  so  that  men  who  make  money  in  the  cities  buy  land 
and  live  in  the  country. 

36  Smith,  "  The  Wealth  of  Nations,"  Bk.  IV. 

37  Sumner,  "  Folkways,,"  162. 

38  John  Stuart  Mill  wrote  in  1861:  Does  "Parliament,  or  almost  any  of  the  members 
composing  it,  ever  for  an  instant  look  at  any  question  with  the  eyes  of  a  working 
man  ?  .  .  .  On  the  question  of  strikes,  for  instance,  it  is  doubtful  if  there  is  so  much  as 
one  among  the  leading  members  of  either  House  who  is  not  firmly  convinced  that  the 
reason  of  the  matter  is  unqualifiedly  on  the  side  of  the  masters,  and  that  the  men's 
view  of  it  is  simply  absurd.  Those  who  have  studied  the  question  know  well  how  far 
this  is  from  being  the  case;  and  in  how  different,  and  how  infinitely  less  superficial  a 
manner  the  point  would  have  been  argued  if  the  parties  who  strike  were  able  to  make 
themselves  heard  in  Parliament."     (Mill,  "Representative  Government,"  56-57.) 

39  Maitland  writes  that  the  constitutional  law  of  England  "  seems  at  times  to  be  but 
an  appendix  to  the  law  of  real  property."     ("  Constitutional  History  of  England,"  538.) 

*«  Becker,  "  The  Eve  of  Revolution,"  30,  Chs.  III-IV. 
*^  Ibid..  J  S3. 
*'^  Ibid.,  179. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      327 

development  of  the  Constitution  after  it  was  adopted.^^  The  de- 
velopment of  the  Constitution  has  made  private  property  more 
secure  in  the  United  States  than  in  any  other  country.  "  The  fact 
is  that  private  property  in  the  United  States,  in  spite  of  all  the 
dangers  of  unintelligent  legislation,  is  constitutionally  in  a  stronger 
position,  as  against  the  government  and  the  governmental  authority, 
than  is  the  case  in  any  country  in  Europe.  This  is  partly  because 
the  governmental  means  provided  for  the  control  or  limitation  of 
private  property  are  weaker  in  America  than  elsewhere,  but  chiefly 
because  the  rights  of  private  property  are  more  formally  estab- 
lished in  the  Constitution  itself."  ^^  In  a  new  country,  where  the 
abundant  and  widely  distributed  opportunities  for  acquiring  prop- 
erty stimulate  a  strong  impulse  generally  for  private  property  and 
secure  ownership,  the  law,  with  popular  acquiescence,  takes  a 
marked  development  in  this  direction.  When  the  land  has  been 
appropriated,  and  when  other  opportunities  for  acquiring  property 
have  been  more  and  more  exploited  and  a  great  non-propertied 
class  has  developed,  the  popular  sentiment  for  an  extremely  indi- 
vidualistic development  of  the  law  of  private  property  is  less  pro- 
nounced, though  the  sentiment  of  the  owning  classes  is  stronger 
than  ever,  because  the  weakening  sentiment  of  the  non-propertied 
masses  constitutes  an  increasing  menace  not  only  against  privilege 
but  also  against  ownership  itself.^^ 

There  is  a  caste  tendency  in  the  institution  of  private  property 
as  we  have  it,  which  is  due  to  the  inheritance  of  wealth.  It  is  a 
matter  of  common  observation  that  the  relations  between  an  em- 
ployer who  has  himself  accumulated  his  property  and  loyal  work- 
men with  whom  he  has  been  intimately  thrown  are  likely  to  be 
more  or  less  comradely.  He  realizes  that  his  success  has  been  due 
to  their  efforts  as  well  as  to  his  own,  and  they  are  apt  to  have  a 
profound  respect  for  him  as  their  leader.  As  one  business  leader 
puts  it:  *'  Every  group  must  have  a  leadership.  My  idea  is  that 
the  boss  is  the  natural  labor  leader.  If  he  is  not  a  labor  leader, 
then  he  has  no  right  to  be  the  boss.  ...  If  the  employer  is  not  a 
natural  labor  leader,  then  the  working  people  will  secure  other 

*3  Beard,  "  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States " ; 
Beard,  "  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian  Democracy." 

**  Hadley,  "Undercurrents  in  American  Politics,"  38-56;  see  also  Hadley,  "The  Con- 
stitutional Position  of  Property  in  America,"  Independent,  LXIV:  834-837. 

<5Y«blen»  "Bolshevism  is  a  Menace  —  to  Whom?"  The  Dial,  Feb,  22,  1^19,  174-17^, 


328      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

leaders."  ^^  The  man  who  has  built  up  a  business  is  a  natural  labour 
leader,  though  often  he  is  selfish  and  is  secretly  making  large  profits 
while  paying  low  wages.  Nevertheless  he  is  admired  and  followed 
because  of  his  ability  as  leader.  But  how  is  it  when  the  business  is 
inherited  by  a  son?  As  Croly  says,  "  He  rarely  inherits  with  the 
money  the  individual  ability  possessed  by  its  maker,  but  he  does  in- 
herit a  money  power  wholly  independent  of  his  own  qualifications  or 
deserts."  ^'^  And  very  probably  he  has  grown  up  with  an  idea  of  his 
immeasurable  superiority  over  the  working  class.  Consequently  the 
relation  between  employer  and  workmen  may  cease  to  be  one  of  mu- 
tual regard  and  become  one  of  impulsive  domination  and  contempt 
on  the  part  of  the  owner  of  the  business,  and  of  resentment  and  in- 
creasing indifference  to  their  work  on  the  part  of  workmen.  The 
man  who  inherits  property  often  supposes  himself  to  be,  for  that 
reason,  a  little  better  than  others,  and  to  be  thereby  justified  in  con- 
temning others  and  exploiting  their  labour.  As  Professor  Fisher 
observes:  "  Unequal  distribution  of  wealth  produces  a  caste  feel- 
ing, breeding  contempt  for  poor  by  the  rich."  ^®  The  heirs  to  a  busi- 
ness may  take  little  interest  in  it,  and  may  administer  it  through 
bailiffs  who  are  apt  to  be  over-zealous  to  commend  themselves  to 
their  chiefs;  wherefore  they  assume  even  more  extremely  the  dom- 
inating and  contemptuous  attitude  to  subordinates.^^  Thus  inheri- 
tance tends  to  develop  a  reactionary  capitalistic  class  that  has  the  at- 
titudes of  a  caste.  The  corporation  device  under  which  most  busi- 
ness is  conducted  has  made  managers  the  bailiffs  of  vested  interests. 
The  influence  of  these  over  governments  in  turn  stimulates  the  same 
attitudes  in  governmental  ofiicials.  Hence  the  reactionary  attitude 
of  government  to  labour  unrest,^''  which  is  accentuated  when  the 
working  classes  are  of  a  different  race  or  national  group,  as  in 
bygone  days  when  one  group  conquered  another  and  used  the  con- 
quered as  serfs  to  till  the  soil,^^  and  today  when  a  considerable 
part  of  the  working  population  in  the  United  States  is  of  foreign 
descent  and  as  such  invites  capitalistic  exploitation  and  govern- 

*8  Johnson,  "30  Years  Without  a  Strike,"  System,  Jan.,  1920,  45. 

*''  Croly,  "  The  Promise  of  American  Life,"  203 ;  Wallas,  "  The  Great  Society,"  294. 

*^  Fisher,   "  Elementary  Principles  of  Economics,"  496. 

*8  Ross,  "  Class  and  Caste,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social. ,  March,  1917,  594. 

^"Compare  Ashley,  "Economic  History,"  1:276-277,  with  West,  "Report  on  the  Colo- 
rado Strike,"  U.  S.  Com.  on  Ind.  Rel.,  1915. 

61  Oppenheimer,  "The  State,"  89-116;  Ross,  "Class  and  Caste,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social, 
Jan.,  1917,  471. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      329 

mental  coercion.  This  exploitation  and  coercion  finds  sanction  in 
law,  for  instance,  in  the  increased  use  of  the  injunction  to  repress 
labour  unrest,  in  which  use  judges  are  encouraged  by  the  large 
foreign  and  hence  "  dangerous  "  element  in  the  labour  force  of 
many  corporations. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    PROCESSES    IN    THE    DEVELOPMENT    OF 
PRIVATE    PROPERTY     {cOTlcluded) 

THE  law  of  the  modern  state  is  largely  concerned  with  prop- 
erty. Dr.  Beard  writes  that  "  most  of  the  law  (except 
the  elemental  law  of  community  defence)  is  concerned 
with  the  property  relations  of  men,  which  reduced  to  their  simple 
terms  means  the  processes  by  which  the  ownership  of  concrete 
forms  of  property  is  determined  or  passes  from  one  person  to 
another."  ^  The  essential  aim  of  law-makers  has  been  that  of 
protecting  private  property,  though  they  may  disavow  this 
as  their  essential  purpose,  and  maintain  that  the  protection  of 
private  property  is  merely  a  means  to  the  end  of  promoting  "  gen- 
eral security."  But  general  security  would  require  that  workmen 
be  not  subject  to  dismissal  from  employment  at  the  will  of  the  em- 
ployer—  at  a  moment's  notice  if  the  employer  so  wills.  The  se- 
curity provided  by  law  is  the  security  of  the  property  owner. 

A  noteworthy  instance  of  the  solicitude  of  the  law  for  the  se- 
curity of  all  property  rights  is  furnished  by  the  attitude  of  the  law 
to  the  protection  of  reputation.  It  makes  a  sharp  distinction  be- 
tween reputation  that  means  merely  the  "  honour  "  of  an  indi- 
vidual and  reputation  that  is  a  financial  asset.  In  case  of  injury 
to  reputation  which  involves  only  an  injury  to  personal  honour, 
one  has  recourse  only  to  a  suit  for  damages,  while  reputation  which 
involves  loyalty  of  workmen,  patronage  of  customers,  or  the  con- 
fidence of  financial  concerns,  or  is  otherwise  a  financial  asset  is  not 
regarded  as  sufliciently  protected  by  the  legal  remedy  of  damages 
and  one  may  bring  suit  in  equity  and  have  the  protection  of  an  in- 
junction. The  equity  court  protects  rights  of  property  but  not 
rights  of  personality;  it  will  protect  a  reputation  only  when  this 
can  be  construed  as  a  property  right.^ 

1  Beard,  "  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,"  12. 

2  Pound,  "  Equitable  Relief  against  Defamation  and  Injuries  to  Personality,"  Harv.  L. 
Rev.,  XXIX:  640-648,  675-680;  Pound,  "Interests  of  Person  ality/'^f/arv.  L.  Rev.^ 
XXVIII:362,  445-452. 

3^0 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      331 

Another  example  of  the  solicitude  of  the  law  for  the  protection 
of  property  rights,  as  distinguished  from  personal  rights,  is  fur- 
nished by  the  attitude  of  the  courts  to  the  right  of  privacy.^  Even 
when  there  is  a  statute  granting  right  of  privacy,  the  court  is  very 
gingerly  in  its  interpretation  in  -a  case  where  the  statute  conflicts 
with  property  rights.  For  instance.  New  York  passed  a  statute 
prohibiting  the  use  of  a  person's  name  or  picture,  without  his  or 
her  written  consent,  "  for  advertising  purposes  or  for  purposes  of 
trade."  An  action  was  brought  under  this  statute  by  a  woman 
lawyer,  whose  activities  in  fixing  the  guilt  in  a  murder  case  had  at- 
tracted the  public  attention,  against  a  moving  picture  company 
which  figured  her  in  a  moving  picture.  The  picture  had  also  been 
advertised  on  the  bill-boards.  But  the  court  dismissed  the  case  on 
the  ground  that  the  statute  went  too  far  in  its  prohibitions  protect- 
ing private  rights.^ 

The  law  has  developed  largely  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  in- 
stincts involved  in  the  quest  for  property.  The  desire  for  private 
property  is  essentially  instinctive.  Man  has  an  instinct  to  seize 
that  which  holds  the  attention;  to  defend  his  possession  of  it;  and 
to  take  it  to  a  secret  place  to  contemplate  it,  or  to  a  familiar  person 
usually  a  member  of  the  family.^  The  developed  desire  for  prop- 
erty manifests  itself  in  the  instinctive  impulse  to  acquire  that  to 
which  the  attention  of  people  is  directed ;  to  go  to  any  lengths  to  de- 
fend possessions;  to  maintain  secrecy  as  to  possessions  and  business 
affairs  and  to  oppose  laws  requiring  publicity;  to  bequeath  property 
to  the  family  and  to  support  laws  of  bequest  and  inheritance.  The 
instinct  to  seize  and  appropriate  what  holds  the  attention  is  closely 
connected  with  the  instinct  to  take  a  thing  from  another  and  hence 
with  the  instinct  to  dominate  or  aggress  another.  It  is  connected, 
also,  with  the  instinct  to  use  what  is  appropriated  as  suits  the  in- 
stincts that  are  satisfied  through  the  use  of  material  things.  Acqui- 
sition of  property  is  sought,  also,  under  the  instinct  of  rivalry,  be- 
cause possession  of  wealth  is  the  essential  symbol  of  superiority 
in  modern  civilization.  The  use  of  imagination  and  shrewdness  in 
the  acquisition  of  property  does  not  inhibit  the  instinctive  motiva- 
tion.    Without  analysing  further  the  desire  for  property,  which 

sRoberson  v.  Rochester  Folding  Box  Co.   (1902),  171  N.  Y.,  538;  64  N.  E.,  442;  59 
L.  R.  A.,  478. 
*Humiston  v.  Universal  Film  Mfg.  Co.  (1919,  App.  Div.),  178  N.  Y.  Supp.,  752. 
^Thorndike,  "The  Original  Nature  of  Man,"  50-51. 


332      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

is  a  problem  for  a  future  volume,  we  see  that  it  involves  a  number 
of  strong  instinctive  connections  in  original  nature  in  virtue  of 
which  it  is  exceedingly  individualistic.  The  law  of  property  stands 
for  the  satisfaction  of  this  individualistic,  instinctive  motive.  There 
are  developments  in  the  law  on  behalf  of  a  social,  rational  regulation 
of  property  rights,*^  but  this  development  is  still  in  its  infancy. 

The  individualistic  attitude  to  property  is  essentially  instinctive ; 
the  social  attitude  is  essentially  intelligent.  The  individualistic 
attitude  has  shaped,  and  hence  has  the  endorsement  of,  the  law 
of  private  property.  The  making  of  the  alterations  in  the  law 
that  are  suggested  by  intelligence  on  behalf  of  the  public  wel- 
fare is  a  very  slow  process.  For  instance,  the  natural  resources 
on  which  the  group  depended  for  its  life  were  originally  the 
property  of  the  entire  group.  Eventually  these  natural  resources 
became  private  property;  and  the  legal  precedent  thus  established 
has  made  it  impossible  for  civilized  nations  to  this  day  to  nation- 
alize even  their  most  important  natural  resources,  which  continue  to 
be  wastefully  exploited  for  private  profit. 

While  the  law  endorses  an  individualistic  property  right,  and 
thereby  satisfies  powerful  instincts,  human  nature  has  instincts  that 
work  against  these  legal  formulations.  Among  some  primitive 
peoples,  men  were  obliged  by  custom  to  share  their  food  and  other 
wealth  with  their  associates;  '^  and,  to  satisfy  this  communal  demand 
there  developed,  among  pastoral  and  agricultural  peoples,  customs 
of  benevolence  enjoined  by  religion.^  Today,  while  men  respect 
legally  estabhshed  property  rights,  there  is  an  undercurrent  of  feel- 
ing that  those  who  "  have  more  than  they  know  what  to  do  with  " 
"  ought  to  share."  It  is  felt  that  a  just  distribution  of  wealth 
would  not  give  one  man  more  than  he  needs  while  many  others 
equally  deserving  have  less  than  they  need.  This  feeling  often 
causes  those  who  have  dealings  with  the  wealthy  to  "  get  what 
they  can  out  of  them."  Professional  men  and  storekeepers  charge 
this  class  a  higher  price  for  services  and  goods.  Artisans,  domes- 
tics and  others  employed  by  this  class  try  to  "  get  out  of  them  " 
as  much  as  possible.  This  attitude  to  the  wealthy  is  similar  to  the 
attitude  of  politicians  and  people  in  general  to  the  government. 

6  Ely,  op.  cit.,  I:Pt.  I,  Chs.  VI-VII;  II:Pt.  I,  Ch.  XX,  Pt.  II,  Ch.  V,  pp.  621-623; 
Goodnow,  "  Social  Reform  and  the  Constitution,"  Chs.  V-VIII, 
^  King,  "  The  Development  of  Religion,"  291-292. 
8  Westermarck,  "  The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  Ideals,"  1 :  540-569. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      333 

Until  comparatively  recent  years  government  was  in  the  hands  of 
aristocracies,  and  the  attitude  to  the  government  as  thus  controlled 
has  survived,  so  that  the  feeling  is  quite  prevalent  that  any  one 
is  entitled  to  get  what  he  can  out  of  the  government.  "  The  gov- 
ernment can  stand  it,"  it  is  said.  The  masses  have  not  yet  learned 
that  an  extravagant  government  injures  them.  While,  therefore, 
the  tendency  among  men  is  to  acquiesce  in  legal  property  rights, 
which  rest  on  strong  instincts,  other  instincts  act  in  the  opposite 
direction.  These  instincts  have  already  shown  some  influence  on 
the  law  of  private  property,  for  instance,  in  supporting  high  taxes 
on  luxuries  and  progressive  taxes  on  incomes.  The  inteUigent 
reasons  for  such  taxes  are  less  influential  with  the  public  than  is 
this  instinctive  feeling  that  the  wealthy  "  ought  to  share."  With 
the  spread  of  education  this  feeling  doubtless  will  be  strengthened 
by  intelligent  reasons  theref6r. 

The  individualistic  idea  of  property  is  that  the  owner  has  a 
right  to  use  his  property  for  his  own  benefit,  or  to  allow  its  use 
by  others  in  production  on  what  conditions  he  pleases.  "  Personal 
liberty  "  is  the  phrase  used  to  express  the  attitude  that  has  de- 
veloped for  the  free  and  unhampered  consumption  of  wealth;  and 
"  freedom  of  contract  "  is  the  phrase  used  for  the  attitude  of 
unhampered  use  of  property  in  production.  Various  secondary  ex- 
planations have  arisen  to  justify  freedom  of  contract,  which,  how- 
ever, existed  before  the  justifications.^ 

The  right  to  the  individualistic  use  of  property  is  assumed  to 
continue  even  after  the  death  of  the  owner.  Those  who  administer 
a  property  bequeathed  for  a  public  purpose,  for  instance,  for  a 
college  or  university,  often  assume  that  they  are  under  an  obliga- 
tion to  run  the  Institution  along  Hnes  that  would  be  approved  by 
the  benefactor,  even  to  further  teaching  of  his  rehglous  or  other 
beliefs  or,  at  least,  not  to  allow  the  inculcation  of  contradictory 
beliefs. ^*^  As  Professor  Fisher  says,  the  custom  of  bequest  and 
inheritance,  handed  down  to  us  from  Ancient  Rome,  though  justi- 
fied on  the  ground  of  Its  social  advantage,  is  due,  in  part,  to  respect 
for  the  property  right  of  the  dead.     "  I  believe  that  It  is  very  bad 

*Reed,  "The  Morals  of  Monopoly  and  Competition,"  Intern.  Jour.  Ethics,  Jan.,  1916, 
268. 

1"  But  while  this  obligation  is  urged  by  trustees  of  an  institution  of  learning  as  a 
reason  for  disapproving  of  the  teaching  of  ideas  contrary  to  their  own,  it  is  note- 
worthy that  the  obligation  is  not  urged  when  the  ideas  of  the  benefactor  were  contrary 
to  those  of  the  trustees. 


334      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

public  policy  for  the  living  to  allow  the  dead  so  large  and  unregu- 
lated an  influence  over  us.  .  .  . 

"  The  disposal  of  property  by  will  is  .  .  .  simply  a  custom, 
...  It  is  no  more  inviolate  than  the  custom  of  the  disposal  of 
the  body  of  the  dead  by  burying.  Just  as,  in  the  interests  of  the 
living,  we  are  substituting  cremation  for  burial,  so  —  likewise  in 
the  interests  of  the  living  —  we  may  substitute  a  new  for  a  tradi- 
tional method  of  disposal  of  the  dead  man's  goods."  " 

The  change  from  the  individualistic  to  the  social  conception,  in 
the  law  of  property,  is  retarded  because  propertied  classes  exert  a 
predominant  influence  over  governments.  This  is  not  surprising 
when  we  realize  that  legislators  and,  especially,  judges  come 
largely  from  the  propertied  classes,  wherefore  their  attitude 
prompts  them  to  perpetuate  the  legal  endorsement  of  the  indi- 
vidualistic attitude  to  property.  As  President  Goodnow  observes, 
"  Without  accusing  the  property  owning  and  employing  classes  of 
conscious  selfishness,  we  may  say  that  judges  belonging  by  birth 
and  association  to  those  classes  and  legislatures  chosen  by  them  are 
apt,  without  being  conscious  of  the  fact,  to  consider  that  the  preser- 
vation of  the  social  system  under  which  they  live  is  absolutely  nec- 
essary to  the  existence  of  all  social  order,  and  therefore  are  apt  to 
consider  that  the  law  must  be  framed  so  as  to  favor  the  preserva- 
tion of  that  system."  ^^  Professor .  Seager  testified  before  the 
United  States  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations:  "  I  don't  see 
how  any  fair-minded  person  can  question  but  what  our  judges  have 
shown  a  decided  bias  in  favour  of  the  employers.  I  would  not  be 
inclined  to  ascribe  this  so  much  to  a  class  bias,  although  I  think 
this  is  a  factor,  as  to  the  antecedent  training  of  judges.  Under 
our  legal  system  the  principal  task  of  the  lawyer  is  to  protect 
property  rights,  and  property  rights  have  come  to  be  concentrated 
more  and  more  into  the  hands  of  corporations,  so  that  the  success- 
ful lawyer  of  today,  in  a  great  majority  of  cases,  is  the  corporation 
lawyer.  His  business  is  to  protect  the  rights  of  employers  and 
corporations.  It  is  from  the  ranks  of  successful  lawyers,  for  the 
most  part,  that  our  judges  are  selected,  and  from  that  results  in- 
evitably a  certain  angle  on  the  part  of  a  majority  of  our  judges."  ^^ 

11  Fisher,  "  Economists  in  Public  Service,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX  (supplement) :  12. 

12  Goodnow,  "The  Relation  of  Economics  to  the  Law,"  Survey,  March  4,  1911,  935; 
see  also  Weyl,  "The  New  Democracy,"  ii2. 

13  Final  Report  of  the  United  States  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,  1915,  52-53. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      335 

The  judges  have  perpetuated  the  individualistic,  and  retarded 
the  social  development  of  property  rights  through  limiting  the 
scope  of  the  police  power  of  the  states.  All  states  have  police 
power,  subject  to  the  limitations  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
The  police  power  is  the  power  "  to  secure  and  promote  the  public 
welfare,  and  it  does  so  by  restraint  and  compulsion."  "  "  The 
maxim  of  this  power  is  that  every  individual  must  submit  to  such 
restraints  in  the  exercise  of  his  liberty  or  of  his  rights  of  property 
as  may  be  required  to  remove  or  reduce  the  danger  of  the  abuse 
of  these  rights  on  the  part  of  those  who  are  unskilful,  careless  or 
unscrupulous."  ^^  The  police  power  is  a  power  of  the  legislature 
but,  through  its  veto  power,  the  judiciary  may  decide  whether  any 
particular  exercise  of  police  power  by  the  legislature  is  constitu- 
tional or  not.  Most  of  the  laws  passed  and  decisions  handed  down 
under  the  police  power  have  to  do  with  the  regulation  of  property 
rights.  The  police  power,  as  exercised  by  legislatures  and  courts, 
"  is  essentially  the  power  to  interpret  property  and  especially 
private  property  and  to  give  the  concept  a  content  at  each  particu- 
lar period  in  our  development  which  fits  it  to  serve  the  general 
welfare."  ^^  As  distinguished  from  criminal  law,  the  legal  prohi- 
bitions made  under  the  police  power  do  not  necessarily  find  a  re- 
sponse and  endorsement  in  public  opinion. ^^  Their  reason  and 
necessity  may  not  be  understood  by  the  rank  and  file.  Hence,  a 
wise  development  of  law  under  the  police  power  requires  that  the 
political  activities  of  selfish  propertied  interests,  always  alert,  be 
met  by  that  of  citizens  organized  for  the  promotion  of  the  public 
welfare. 

Certain  constitutional  formulas  have  been  invoked  by  the  ju- 
diciary to  limit  or  repress  the  development  of  the  social  view  of 
property  under  the  police  power,  especially  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, which  provides  that  no  state  shall  "  deprive  any  person  of 
life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law;  nor  deny  to 
any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws."  ^^  The  Constitution  does  not  state  "  what  is  liberty  or 
what  is  due  process  of  law."  ^®     However,  the  courts  have  used 

1*  Freund,  "  The  Police  Power,"  3. 

"  Ibid.,  6. 

18  Ely,  op.  cit.,  1 :  207. 

1^  Freund,  op.  cit.,  21-22. 

18  Goodnow,  "  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government,"  328. 

^^  Ibid.,  266. 


336      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  Amendment  to  limit  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  until  its 
scope  has  been  so  enlarged  that  there  is  now  "  hardly  any  import- 
ant police  legislation  which  is  not  questioned  in  the  Supreme  Court 
as  violating  the  Fourteenth  Amendment."  ^^  Through  their  use 
of  it,  judges  have  given  capitalistic  domination  the  weight  of  ju- 
dical sanction.  "  A  condition  of  what  in  the  words  of  Mr.  Justice 
Clifford  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  may  be  called  '  judicial 
despotism  '  has  been  reached,"  ^^  which,  unless  alleviated  by  a  more 
enlightened  judicial  attitude,  may  result  in  profound  changes  in  our 
constitutional  system. ^^ 

The  conventional  and  the  rational  judge  differ  as  to  how  far  the 
court  should  go  in  excluding  legislative  opinions  as  to  what  is  a  rea- 
sonable exercise  of  the  police  power,  and  in  assuming  for  itself  an 
exclusive  dictation  on  that  point.  The  conventional  attitude  as- 
sumes an  exclusive  dictation.  The  rational  attitude  maintains,  in 
the  words  of  Justice  Brandeis,  that  the  court  "  is  not  to  decide 
whether  the  view  taken  by  the  legislature  in  a  particular  case,  is  a 
wise  view,  but  whether  a  body  of  men  could  reasonably  hold  such  a 
view."  ^^  This,  as  he  says,  is  to  be  determined  not  "  deductively 
from  preconceived  notions  and  precedents,"  but  inductively  by  "  rea- 
soning from  the  facts."  The  progressive  judge  is  guided  by  a 
rational  social  purpose  which  gives  meaning  to  the  facts.  Justice 
Brandeis  declares  that  property  is  not  an  end  in  itself  but  only  a 
means;  that  judges  often  have  made  the  preservation  of  the  existing 
legal  tradition  the  end;  that  this  tradition,  which  favours  the  ex- 
clusive rights  of  employing  classes,  is  not  in  accord  with  the  spread 
of  pohtical  democracy;  that  "  there  is  felt  today  very  widely  the 
inconsistency  in  this  condition  of  political  democracy  and  industrial 
absolutism  " ;  that  the  movement  toward  industrial  democracy  is 
bound  to  continue,  and  "  it  lies  with  our  lawyers  to  say  in  what  lines 
that  action  shall  be  expressed  ...  in  lines  of  evolution  or  in  lines 
of  revolution."  ^* 

In  this  class  conflict  over  the  distribution  of  income  the  essential 
fact  is  the  aim  of  reactionary  propertied  interests,  though  a  minor- 
ity, to  maintain  their  control  of  government,  as  against  the  non- 
20 /*»V.,  65.  ' 

21  Goodnow,  "  Social  Reform  and  the  Constitution,"  340. 

22  Ibid.,  358. 

23  Brandeis,  "  Business  —  A  Profession,"  li-lvi. 
i*-Ib'td.,  li-lvi. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      337 

propertied  majority.  The  propertied  minority  feel  they  need  the 
protection  of  a  strong  government,^^  and  become  uneasy  when 
their  control  is  threatened.  It  is  realized  that  the  aim  of  the 
organization  of  the  non-propertied  class  into  a  political  party  is  to 
enable  it  thereby  to  gain  control  of  the  government  in  order  to 
shape  the  law  in  its  own  interest,  and  the  propertied  suspect  and 
fear  the  intentions  of  a  long  suppressed  non-propertied  class. 

The  impulse  of  reactionary  propertied  interests  to  perpetuate 
the  mastery  long  secured  them  by  the  law  is  favoured  by  the  con- 
servatism of  law.  "  Law  may  be  even  more  conservative  than 
custom.  ...  In  all  progressive  societies,  as  Sir  Henry  Maine  ob- 
serves, social  necessities  and  social  opinion  are  always  more  or  less 
in  advance  of  law."  ^  In  the  United  States,  though  there  has 
been  a  growing  sentiment  for  legislation  that  will  make  the  position 
of  labour  less  vicissitudinous  and  more  secure,  the  changes  in  the 
law  to  bring  about  this  improvement  have  been  behind  the  changes 
required  by  public  opinion.^"^  The  employer  can  dismiss  his  work- 
men as  he  pleases,  so  far  as  the  law  is  concerned.  His  is  the  posi- 
tion of  security,  not  theirs.  He  can  withhold  work  except  on  his 
own  terms,  and  so  set  in  operation  against  workmen  the  compelling 
force  of  want.^^  In  the  use  of  this  compelling  force  in  conflict  with 
labour,  the  employer  is  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  he  is  "  within 
his  rights  under  the  written  law."  ^  "  There  is  no  incentive  for 
him  to  violate  the  written  law  because  the  law  agrees  with  him  in 
what  he  desires  to  do."  ^°  "  But  the  workers  .  .  .  feel  they  have 
a  property  right  in  the  jobs  they  formerly  held.  That  the  law 
holds  they  have  no  such  right  .  .  .  does  not  alter  the  situation  in 
the  minds  of  the  workers."  ^^  The  minds  of  the  workers,  with  re- 
spect to  property  rights,  are  influenced  by  the  same  motives  which 
determined  property  right  in  the  primitive  group,  namely,  that  the 
right  to  wealth  depends  on  creation  of  that  wealth  or  on  habitual 
use  of  it;  whereas  the  owners  of  property  rely  on  the  power  of  the 
state  to  protect  them  in  the  ownership  guaranteed  them  by  the  law. 

25  Adams,  Bigelow,  and  others,  "  Centralization  and  the  Law,"  29-30. 
28  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  1: 166. 

27  Beard,  "  American  Government  and  Politics,"  631-634,  732. 

28  Grant,  "  The  Nat'l.  Erectors'  Ass'n.  and  Intern.  Ass'n.  of  Bridge  and  Structural 
Iron  Workers,"  U.  S.  Com.  on  Ind.  Rel.,  191 5,  108-109. 

2»/JjV.,  109. 

80  Ibid.,  109.  1 

«i /*W.,  109;  Ely,  0^  o/.,  11:628-634. 


338      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  workers  believe  that  legislators,  judges  and  other  governmen- 
tal officials  are  in  sympathy  with  the  propertied  classes  as  against 
the  working  classes;  they  distrust  the  publicists  who  work  for 
labour  legislation;  and  they  realize  that  politicians  favour  labour 
legislation  only  as  a  concession  to  the  labour  vote.^^ 

Reformers  of  property  right  may  proceed  from  one  or  the  other 
of  two  points  of  view:  They  may  seek  such  a  distribution  of 
wealth  as  accords  with  the  primitive  instinct  to  own  what  one  has 
created,  occupied  or  habitually  used,  or  they  may  seek  such  a  dis- 
tribution as  accords  with  a  rational  social  purpose.  The  first  point 
of  view  seems  impossible  to  realize  in  the  complex  industrial  condi- 
tions of  modern  life  and  it  has  not  been  attempted  except  in  the  case 
of  land.  In  the  United  States,  legislation  concerning  the  public 
domain  has  implicitly  or  explicity  professed  the  aim  to  get  the  land 
into  the  possession  of  the  actual  tillers  of  the  soil.^*  The  land  law 
has  been  repeatedly  changed  with  this  end  in  view,  but  all  to  no 
purpose,  because  the  legal  principle  has  been  to  guarantee  legal 
ownership  of  all  property  acquired  in  ways  technically  legal, 
whether  or  not  it  was  acquired  by  evasion  of  the  intent  of  the  law.^* 
This  action  of  the  courts  has  encouraged  a  corrupt  influence  of  cor- 
porations over  legislatures.^^  By  various  subterfuges,  large  prop- 
ertied interests  were  able  to  acquire  vast  tracts  of  the  best  timber, 
mineral  and  arable  land.^  The  acquisition  of  property,  under 
modern  conditions,  depends  less  on  the  creation  of  wealth  than  on 
legal  control  of  property,  because  of  the  advantage  given  by  mere 
property  ownership  in  securing  more  property.  Through  lucky 
speculation  and  manipulations  a  man  can  acquire  a  large  prop- 
erty.*'^    A  large  property  can  be  acquired  also  by  inheritance,  by 

32  Beard,  "  American  Government  and  Politics,"  742. 

33  Hill,  "The  Public  Domain  and  Democracy,"  35-36. 

3*  Ibid.,  Ch.  II,  VII,  VIII ;  "  Report  of  Roosevelt  Public  Lands  Commission,"  Senate 
Doc.,  No.  154,  58th.  Congress,  3rd.  Session,  14. 

35  "  By  protecting  the  capitalist  in  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  privileges  un- 
wisely and  even  corruptly  granted,  they  (the  courts)  have  greatly  strengthened  the 
motive  for  employing  bribery  and  other  corrupt  means  in  securing  the  grant  of  special 
privileges.  If  the  courts  had  all  along  held  that  any  proof  of  fraud  or  corruption  in 
obtaining  a  franchise  or  other  legislative  grant  was  sufficient  to  justify  its  revocation, 
the  lobbyist,  the  bribe-giver  and  the  '  innocent  purchaser '  of  rights  and  privileges 
stolen  from  the  people,  would  have  found  the  traffic  in  legislative  favors  a  pre- 
carious and  much  less  profitable  mode  of  acquiring  wealth."  (Smith,  "The  Spirit  of 
American  Government,"  329-330.) 

3*  California  Commission  of  Immigration  and  Housing,  "A  Report  on  Large  Land- 
holdings  in  Southern  California,  with  Recommendations,"  1919,  7-41. 

37  King,  "The  Wealth  and  Income  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,"  218,  231; 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      339 

occupying  a  strategic  industrial  and  financial  position,^^  and  by 
special  privileges  given  by  governments.  On  the  other  hand  the 
primitive  instincts  still  persist.  The  non-propertied  masses  believe 
they  have  a  right  to  more  of  what  they  have  created  than  they  get, 
a  right  to  the  use  of  the  tools  and  machinery  they  have  habitually 
used,  and,  therefore,  a  right  to  keep  other  workmen  from  taking 
their  places  in  time  of  strike.^^  Thus  the  legal  control  of  property 
is  sharply  opposed  to  the  primitive  group  criteria  of  ownership  — 
creation  and  habitual  use.  The  legal  control  exercised  by  proper- 
tied classes  is  essentially  an  instinctive  phenomenon;  so  are  the 
primitive  property  motives  that  actuate  the  masses.  This  conflict 
of  instinctive  Interests  can  be  resolved  only  by  re-shaping  the  law 
of  property  according  to  a  rational  social  purpose.^^ 

In  addition  to  the  problem  of  the  social-psychological  processes 
of  the  development  of  private  property,  there  Is  the  problem  of 
the  processes  Involved  In  the  relation  of  private  property  to  other 
lines  of  development.  Note,  for  instance,  the  problem  of  the  re- 
lation of  private  property  to  religion,  which  is  Intimately  connected 
with  the  legal  development  of  private  property.^^  Among  primi- 
tive peoples  the  owner  sought  to  strengthen  his  claim  to  property  by 
associating  it  with  supernatural  sanction,  and  by  protecting  It  by 
magic  practices.*^  Among  more  advanced  peoples,  as  the  Egyp- 
tians, Hebrews,  Greeks,  and  Romans,  the  deity  was  represented  as 
the  principal  source  of  property  and  as  guarding  property  rights  *^ 

Davenport,  "  The  Extent  and  Significance  of  the  Unearned  Increment,"  Bulletin  of 
Amer.  Econ.  Ass'n,  4th.  Series,  No.  2,  524-526. 

38  Davenport,  "Economics  of  Enterprise,"  399-400;  Youngman,  "Economic  Causes  of 
Great  Fortunes." 

39  "  As  a  rule  in  labor  disputes  where  there  is  a  resort  to  the  destruction  of  property, 
it  comes  only  after  other  methods  to  obtain  the  desired  results  have  failed.  The  first 
form  of  violence  comes  in  the  shape  of  attacks  on  those  who  take  the  places  vacated  by 
strikers.  When  that  proves  ineffective,  when  the  strikers  find  they  cannot  prevent  the 
work  being  done,  the  next  step  is  to  seek  to  destroy  the  work. 

"  The  underlying  motive  is  the  firm  conviction  in  the  minds  of  the  strikers  that 
the  particular  work  belongs  to  them.  They  may  have  refused  to  perform  that  work 
except  under  conditions  acceptable  to  them.  These  conditions  may  not  be  acceptable  to 
the  employer.  Still  the  workers  cannot  in  their  minds  separate  themselves  from  their 
jobs  and  they  feel  justified  in  wreaking  vengeance  both  on  those  who  took  their 
places  and  on  the  employer  who  permitted  and  encouraged  it."     (Grant,  op.  cit.,  132- 

I33-) 

40  Holmes,  "The  Common  Law,"  48;  Ely,  op.  cit.,  I:  Ch.  VI. 

*i  Kocourek  and  Wigmore,  "  Formative  Influences  of  Legal  Development,"  382-392. 

*2Veblen,  "The  Beginnings  of  Ownership,"  Amer.  Jour.  Sociol.,  IV:  352-365;  Web- 
ster, "  The  Influence  of  Superstition  on  the  Evolution  of  Property  Rights,"  Amer.  Jour. 
Sociol.,  XV:  794-805. 

*3  Kocourek  and  Wigmore,  op.  cit.,  382-384. 


340      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and  punishing  their  violation.^^  Ecclesiastics  of  the  Christian 
church  declared  property  was  ordained  by  God,  and  were  the  last 
to  countenance  even  the  emancipation  of  slaves.^^  Christian  phil- 
osophers aimed  to  show  how  the  constitution  of  human  nature,  as 
it  had  come  from  the  hand  of  the  Creator,  called  for  private  prop- 
erty as  a  necessary  and  fundamental  institution.^^  This  support  of 
private  property  by  religion  gave  property  and  inheritance  an  au- 
thoritative endorsement.^'^  This  supernatural  sanction  of  private 
property  is  maintained  by  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  today,*^  and 
has  been  asserted  by  some  capitalists.^® 

Traditional  Christianity  —  both  the  Greek  Church  and  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  and  Protestant  sects  —  is  bound  up  with 
the  property  ranks  of  society.  Consequently,  when  Christian 
thinkers  challenge  the  attitude  of  reactionary  propertied  interests 
as  contrary  to  the  Christian  impulse  of  love,^^  and  when  they  de- 
velop a  philosophy  of  social  relations  based  on  love,  they  find  them- 
selves in  conflict  with  ecclesiastical  systems,  and  with  the  prevail- 
ing economic  order.  Tolstoi  projected  a  revolution  of  social  or- 
ganization in  which  relations  of  sympathy  would  replace  those  of 
rivalry,  domination-submission,  contempt-shame ;  and  he  found  him- 
self opposed  not  only  to  the  political  ^^  and  economic  ^^  order  but 
also  to  the  ecclesiastical  order,^^  and  even  to  the  prevailing  artistic 
standards.^^     His  main  attack  was  directed  against  the  ecclesiasti- 

**  Westermarck,  op.  cit.,  II :  60-68. 

*5  Ibid.,  I:  695-704. 

*8  Locke,  "Two  Treatises  of  Government,"  Bk.  II,  Chs.  2,  5,  9,  11. 

*7  Kocourek  and  Wigmore,  op.  cit.,  388-392. 

***  K.  of  C,  War  Activities  Committee,  "Bolshevism  —  The  Remedy,"  5-8,  14.  This 
pamphlet  was  written  by  Leo  XIII  against  socialism. 

*»  G.  H.  Baer,  one  of  the  anthracite  coal  operators  during  the  great  coal  strike  of 
1902,  referred  to  himself  as  one  of  "  the  Christian  men  to  whom  God  in  His  infinite 
wisdom  has  given  control  of  the  property  interests  of  this  country."  (Baer,  "  The  Mov- 
ing Spirit  of  the  Anthracite  Industry,"  Reviev}  of  Reviews,  XXX:  547.)  The  industrial 
engineer,  William  H.  Smyth,  compares  this  attitude  with  that  of  the  German  Kaiser 
as  expressed  in  a  speech  during  the  World  War:  "We  shall  defend  Alsace-Lorraine 
with  the  last  drop  of  our  blood  —  these  provinces  which  belong  to  us  and  which  the 
Almighty  has  entrusted  to  us  to  administer  as  His  stewards."  (Quoted  by  Smyth, 
"  Efficiency,"  Industrial  Management,  Dec,   1918,  464.) 

*°  Rauschenbusch,  "  Christianity  and  the  Social  Crisis,"  295 ;  Rauschenbusch,  "  A 
Theology  for  the  Social  Gospel,"  111-117;  Bishop  Williams,  "The  Christian  Ministry 
and   Social   Problems,"   14-85. 

"Maude,  "The  Life  of  Tolstoy,"  11:460-463. 

^^  Ibid.,    11:103-147,    238-283,   439. 

^^Ibid.,  II:Ch.  IL 

"The  Russian  edition  of  his  work,  "What  is  Art?"  had  to  pass  through  the  hands 
of  the  Censor  and  he  writes:  "The  Spiritual  Censor  —  a  priest  who  probably  under- 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY      341 

cal  order  as  that  which  most  firmly  bound  the  masses  in  subjection 
to  the  property  ranks  of  society.  He  was  excommunicated  by  the 
state  church, ^^  and  was  saved  from  exile  only  by  his  world  renown. 
The  Roman  Catholic  Church  maintains  that  private  property  and 
the  classes  based  thereon  are  supernaturally  ordained  and  that, 
therefore,  the  Church  alone  can  solve  the  social  problem,  and  the 
best  way  to  combat  socialism,  is  to  found  society  on  ecclesiastical- 
doctrine.^^ 

All  branches  of  the  Christian  Church  have  been  supported  by 
property  owners  as  one  effective  institutional  means  of  buttressing 
property  rights.  There  are  property  owners,  who,  while  con- 
spicuously devout  and  punctilious  in  their  religious  observances,  and, 
perhaps,  conspicuous  for  philanthropy,  are  steadfastly  opposed  to 
laws  limiting  property  rights  for  the  sake  of  improving  the  working 
and  living  conditions  of  the  masses. ^'^  In  some  cases  the  more  sym- 
pathetic among  the  well-to-do,  when  they  feel  pity  for  the  poor  in 
their  hard  working  conditions,  "  put  their  social  indignation  to 
sleep  "  ^^  by  reflecting  on  doctrines  of  Christianity  that  sanction 
the  existing  order,  and  that  teach  that  all,  including  the  poor, 
may  be  happy  in  the  hereafter  if  they  will  accept  the  conditions  of 
salvation  laid  down  by  the  ecclesiastical  system.^^  On  the  other 
hand,  the  history  of  social  reform  offers  conspicuous  instances  of 
laymen  and  ecclesiastics,  for  instance,  the  Earl  of  Shaftesbury, 
Charles  Kingsley,  Professor  W^alter  Rauschenbusch,  and  Bishop 
Charles  D.  Williams,  who  have  stood  for  a  limitation  of  property 
rights  on  behalf  of  the  working  masses.  These  are  the  men  who 
with  respect  to  property  are  true  to  the  essential  impulses  that  ac- 
tuated the  Founder  of  Christianity  and  determined  His  teachings. 

stands  art  and  is  interested  in  art  as  much  as  I  understand  or  am  interested  in  Church 
services,  but  who  gets  a  good  salary  for  destroying  whatever  is  likely  to  displease  his 
superiors  —  struck  out  all  that  seemed  to  him  to  endanger  his  position  and  substituted 
his  thoughts  for  mine  wherever  he  considered  it  necessary  to  do  so."  (Maude,  "The 
Life  of  Tolstoy,"  II:540.) 

^^Ibid.,  11:574-582. 

^•K.  of  C,  War  Activities  Committee,  "Bolshevism  —  the  Remedy." 

"Hammond,  "The  Town  Laborer,"  1760-1832,  231;  Bishop  Williams,  "The 
Christian  Ministry  and  Social  Problems,"  13,  26-28. 

^8  Hammond,  op  ctt.,  286 

^3  This  was  Luther's  attitude :  "  Luther's  rejection  of  social  reform  was  in  harmony 
with  the  fundamental  Christian  idea,  Protestant  as  well  as  Catholic,  that  man's  salva- 
tion is  independent  of  his  environment.  It  is  not  the  business  of  a  Christian  to  better 
the  condition  of  the  world  or  himself."  (Schapiro,  "  Social  Reform  and  the  Reforma- 
tion," 88.) 


342      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  devious  ways  of  thinking  by  which  the  relation  of  Christianity 
to  property  usually  is  evaded  and  Christianity  is  made  to  serve  the 
individualistic  conception  of  property  are  highly  interesting  to  the 
social  psychologist. 

We  have  now  reviewed  the  foundations  of  political  science  and 
jurisprudence  in  their  psychological  aspects.  We  have  seen  that 
political  scientists  and  jurists  have  emphasized  law  as  the  command 
of  a  sovereign,  as  the  form  of  social  order,  as  the  expression  of  an 
organization  for  mutual  service,  as  the  expression  of  an  ideal  of 
justice.  Each  of  these  several  emphases  or  partial  views  empha- 
sizes one  aspect  of  law,  and  each  of  these  aspects  has  a  social- 
psychological  basis.  But  these  bases  are  not  mutually  exclusive. 
For  instance,  law  as  command  of  a  sovereign  implies  domination- 
submission;  but  so  does  law  as  the  expression  of  an  organization 
for  mutual  service,  for  unwillingness  to  co-operate  has  to  be  com- 
pelled; and  so  does  law  as  the  expression  of  an  ideal  of  justice,  for 
human  wilfulness  has  to  be  restrained;  and  so  also  does  law  as  a 
form  of  social  order.^®  We  believe  that  social  psychology  can  aid 
the  jurist  in  his  task  of  unifying  these  partial  conceptions  in  a  com- 
prehensive theory  of  law.  In  fact  the  most  progressive  jurists  feel 
the  handicap  under  which  they  work  owing  to  the  backward  de- 
velopment of  social  psychology. 

^°  Under  the  latter  conception  Ehrlich  makes  four  classifications  of  legal  rules  and 
one  of  them  is  domination.  The  economic  productivity  of  labour  may  require  personal 
subjection,  he  says,  so  that  domination-submission  may  depend  not  on  the  caprice  of  a 
master  but  on  the  whole  economic  order  of  the  country.     (Ehrlich,  op.  cit.,  73.) 


BOOK  III 

SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AS  RELATED  TO  ECONOMICS, 
HISTORY,  AND  SOCIOLOGY 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE    RELATION    OF    SOCIAL    PSYCHOLOGY    TO    ECONOMICS 

ECONOMISTS  have  long  recognized  a  psychological  field 
which  does  not  lie  within  the  scope  of  their  science,  but  an 
understanding  of  which  is  necessary  for  the  development  of 
economic  principles.  Economists  have  assumed  certain  psychologi- 
cal principles  as  essential  in  economic  behaviour,  which  assumptions 
have  rested  on  more  or  less  superficial  impressions  of  economic  be- 
haviour. Among  German  economists,  Wagner  was  impressed 
with  the  motives  of  the  thrifty  middle  class;  Knies,  Schmoller  and 
Brentano  with  the  impulse  for  national  economic  development  and 
superiority  which  was  becoming  marked  in  their  day;  Sombart  with 
the  motives  of  the  leaders  in  this  national  development.  The 
assumptions  were  in  the  nature  of  vaguely  conceived  or  historically 
elaborated  theories,  rather  than  carefully  analysed  and  adequately 
formulated  psychological  concepts. 

In  offering  an  analysis  of  economic  motives,  Wagner  accepted  the 
traditional  classification  into  egoistic  and  non-egoistic  motives. 
The  former  included  fear  of  want,  the  acquisitive  impulse,  the  im- 
pulse to  win  public  approval  and  to  avoid  disapproval,  a  sense  of 
honour  and  pride  in  workmanship,  the  impulse  of  domination,  and 
the  impulse  for  physical  and  mental  activity.  The  non-egoistic 
motive  was  the  sense  of  duty  and  conscience  which  acts  as  a  check 
on  the  egoistic.  "  Because  of  it,  competition  is  not  pressed  to  the 
utmost,  .  .  .  and  ...  an  industrial  or  social  superior  purposely 
refrains  from  making  his  own  interest  the  exclusive  ground  of  his 
economic  conduct."  ^  Nevertheless  the  egoistic  motives  are,  said 
Wagner,  overwhelmingly  determinative  of  economic  behaviour  so 
that  we  may  speak  of  self-interest  as  the  essential  economic  motive. 
Self-interest  includes  an  impulse  to  provide  for  the  family  and  to 
acquire  property  for  transmission  to  descendants.  While  this  is  a 
widening  of  the  egoistic  motive,  it  remains  egoistic.^     The  indi- 

1  Wagner,  "  Grundlegung  der  politischen  Oekonomie,"  I:  Sees.  33-46. 

2  Wagner,  "  Systeraatische  Nationalokonomie,  Jahrbucher  fur  Nation alokonomie  und 
Statistik."     Neue  Folge.    Zwoelfter  Band.     1886.    pp.  230-232. 

345 


346     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

vidualistic  family  was  central  in  Wagner's  thought.  Still  he  did 
not,  like  Herbert  Spencer,  writing  from  the  security  of  the  British 
Isles,  claim  for  this  family  practically  unlimited  freedom  and  decry 
all  governmental  regulation  on  its  behalf.  As  early  as  1871,  he 
called  for  national  reform  with  a  view  to  an  immediate  improve- 
ment of  the  material  condition  of  the  lower  classes  as  an  intellec- 
tual and  moral  influence.^ 

From  Wagner  to  the  period  of  the  World  War,  the  impulse  for 
national  superiority  increasingly  influenced  German  economic  think- 
ing. The  German  economists  were  less  scientific  thinkers  than 
publicists  who  supported  the  national  impulse  for  superiority,  with 
its  related  assumptions,  by  means  of  the  learned  explanations  of 
historical  disquisition.  In  these  historical  studies,  the  Germans 
worked  out  the  group  rivalry  process  but  paid  no  attention  to  its 
psychological  analysis,  though  admitting  that  the  process  is  essen- 
tially psychological.^  Where  psychological  explanation  was  neces- 
sary, they  contented  themselves  with  unanalysed  psychological 
assumptions.  Thus  Schmoller,  writing  in  1883,  described  the 
economy  of  the  Middle  Ages  as  a  rivalry  of  municipalities  to  in- 
crease their  trade  advantages  and  to  diminish  the  trade  advantages 
of  rival  municipalities.  "  Market-rights,  toll-rights,  and  mile- 
rights  (Meilenrecht)  ^  are  the  weapons  with  which  the  town 
creates  for  itself  both  revenue  and  a  municipal  policy.  The  soul 
of  that  policy  is  the  putting  of  fellow-citizens  at  an  advantage,  and 
of  competitors  from  outside  at  a  disadvantage.  The  whole  com- 
plicated system  of  regulations  as  to  markets  and  forestalling  is 
nothing  but  a  skilful  contrivance  so  to  regulate  supply  and  demand 
between  the  townsman  who  buys  and  the  countryman  who  sells, 
that  the  former  may  find  himself  in  as  favorable  a  position  as  pos- 
sible, the  latter  in  as  unfavorable  as  possible,  in  the  business  of  bar- 
gaining." ^  "  All  the  resources  of  municipal  diplomacy  .  .  .  and, 
in  the  last  resort,  of  violence,  were  employed  to  gain  control  over 
trade-routes  ...  to  bring  it  about  that  as  many  routes  as  pos- 
sible should  lead  to  the  town,  as  few  as  possible  pass  by;  that 

8  Wagner,  "  Rede  iiber  die  Social  Frage,"  29. 

*  Schmoller,  "  The  Mercantile  System,"  trans,  by  Ashley,  12. 

"  This  was  the  rule  which  forbade  craftsmen  from  carrying  on  particular  industries 
within  a  certain  distance  of  the  town.  Cf.  the  cases  of  York  and  Nottingham  in  re- 
spect to  the  manufacture  of  cloth,  in  Ashley,  "  Economic  History,"  I  pt.  II  (Amer.  cd., 
vol.  II),  p.  29. 

8  Schmoller,  op.  cit.,  8-9.  "-* 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     347 

through  traffic,  by  caravan  or  ship,  should,  if  possible,  be  made 
to  halt  there  and  goods  en  route  exposed,  and  offered  for  sale  to 
the  burgesses."  "^  "  What,  then,  we  have  before  our  eyes  in  the 
Middle  Ages  are  municipal  and  local  economic  centres  whose  whole 
economic  life  rests  upon  this, —  that  the  various  local  interests 
have,  for  the  time,  worked  their  way  into  agreement,  that  uniform 
feelings  and  ideas  have  risen  out  of  common  local  interests,  and 
that  the  town  authorities  stand  forward  to  represent  these  feel- 
ings with  a  complete  array  of  protective  measures;  .  .  .  The 
whole  of  this  municipal  economic  policy,  .  .  .  was  justified  so  long 
as  the  progress  of  civilization  and  of  economic  well-being  depended 
primarily  on  the  prosperity  of  the  towns.  This  prosperity  could 
rest  upon  no  other  '  mass-psychological  cause-complex '  than  cor- 
porate selfishness:  ...  So  long  as  this  selfish  feeling  of  com- 
munity ....  brought  about  an  energetic  movement  forward,  it 
justified  itself,  .  .  .  not  until  the  system  began  to  support  an  easy 
luxuriousness  and  sloth  did  it  degenerate.  It  had  then  to  be  re- 
placed by  other  mass-psychological  elements  and  processes,  by  other 
social  forms  and  organization."  ® 

"  Corporate  selfishness  "  is,  thus,  as  far  as  Schmoller  gets,  in 
his  analysis  of  the  "  mass-psychological  cause-complex."  Corpor- 
ate selfishness  is  merely  a  phrase  to  cover  the  ignorance  as  to  the 
actual  processes  involved.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  impossible  to 
know  what  were  the  motives  of  that  group  rivalry  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  The-  social  psychologist  of  today  was  not  there  to  analyse 
it,  and  observers  who  might  have  been  there  have  left  no  record. 
We  may  infer  what  the  motives  might  have  been  from  an  analysis 
of  the  rivalry  of  civic  groups  today,  but  mere  inference  is  not 
scientific  analysis.  The  analysis  of  civic  rivalry  as  we  see  it  before 
our  eyes  is  difficult  enough.  We  find,  for  instance,  in  the  ambi- 
tious, growing  city  certain  energetic  business  men  who  advocate 
projects  of  city  growth  avowedly  from  "  public  spirit "  but  really 
because  such  projects  are  in  line  with  their  own  private  interests. 
Landowners  want  the  city  to  grow  because  growth  will  raise  the 
price  of  land,  storekeepers  because  it  will  increase  trade,  the  aver- 
age man  because  in  booming  his  city  he  booms  himself  as  a  citizen. 
A  man  is  proud  of  being  a  citizen  of  a  prosperous  city.  It  gives 
him  prestige,  gives  him  a  bit  of  the  thrill  of  superiority  which  he 

t  Ibid.,  lo-ii. 
^Ibid.,  ZI-12. 


348      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

would  perhaps  enjoy  in  no  other  way.  Men  who  are  animated  by 
none  of  these  motives  are  suggestible  to  the  men  who  are,  the 
men  of  superior  energy,  ambition  and  that  gladdening  sense  of 
corporate  superiority  which  we  call  public  spirit.  Is  it  objected 
that  the  leaders  are  not  looking  primarily  for  the  satisfaction  of 
their  own  interests  but  are  intelligently  seeking  the  public  welfare? 
Why  then  did  the  merchants,  in  their  attitude  to  the  liquor  traffic, 
oppose  local  option  and  no  license  "  because  it  will  drive  trade  out 
of  the  city"?  Did  any  merchant  believe  that  the  saloon  was  an 
asset  to  the  public  welfare?  He  might  believe  it  if  it  was  in  line 
with  his  instinctive  interests,  but  he  did  not  understand  it  to  be  so. 
Why  does  the  landowner  insist  that  a  trolley  company  be  given  a  per- 
petual franchise  for  nothing?  Does  any  landowner  believe  it  fur- 
thers the  public  welfare  to  give  away  valuable  rights  belonging  to 
the  public?  He  may  believe  it,  but  he  does  not  understand  it. 
Why  do  the  rank  and  file  want  a  growing  city  at  any  price  and 
approve  fostering  the  saloon  and  giving  away  public  rights?  Do 
they  believe  that  a  growing  city  at  any  price  furthers  the  public 
welfare?  They  may  believe  it,  but  they  do  not  understand  it. 
That  is,  they  may  have  an  impulsive  belief  —  an  idea  which  satisfies 
a  certain  instinctive  impulse  —  but  they  have  no  understanding  of 
the  situation.  Without  making  a  complete  analysis  of  corporate 
selfishness,  then,  we  find  that  it  means  action  satisfying  to  profit- 
seeking  or  rivalrous  instinctive  impulses,^  as  opposed  to  a  thorough 
understanding  of  the  situation.  If  there  are  any  who  dissent  from 
the  propaganda  of  those  leading  the  impulsive  movement,  they  are 
unheeded  in  the  general  movement  for  growth  at  any  price.  This 
analysis  of  civic  ambition  may  be  tested  and  amplified  by  a  study  of 
a  concrete  case.  But  the  social  psychologist  does  not  venture  to 
draw  inferences  from  the  results  of  these  studies  of  contemporary 
groups  as  to  the  motives  of  the  groups  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Such 
inferences,  if  made,  could  not  be  subjected  to  scientific  test. 

Schmoller  describes,  as  far  as  historical  data  permit,  how  the 
rivalry  of  municipalities  was  restrained  in  the  interest  of  rivalry 
between  territorial  states,  and  how  this  rivalry  of  territorial  states 
finally  developed  into  an  international  rivalry. ^°  The  analysis 
throughout  is  historical  and  not  psychological.  Nevertheless 
Schmoller  assumes  that  the  essential  impulses  involved  in  the  riv- 

»Lasker,  "Bolshevik  Cities,"  The  Survey,  June  14,  1919,  424. 
10  Schmoller,  qp.  cit.,  13-68. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     349 

airy  of  territorial  states  are  similar  to  those  of  the  old  municipal- 
ities because  the  external  behaviour  in  the  two  instances  has  similar 
aspects. ^^ 

The  interest  of  the  German  economists  in  the  welfare  of  the 
working  classes  sprang  from  their  interest  in  German  national 
superiority.  National  superiority  requires  a  highly  vitalized,  skil- 
ful, efficient  force  of  working  and  fighting  men.  This,  however, 
was  not  the  original  motive  of  the  interest  of  economists  in 
working  class  advancement.  Schmoller  sought,  in  early  life  at 
least,  primarily  the  intellectual  and  moral  development  of  the  work- 
ingman.  In  an  address  delivered  before  the  Verein  fiir  Social- 
politik  in  1877,  he  urged  that  the  Germans  profit  by  the  experience 
of  the  English  and  the  teachings  of  the  English  economists  and 
adopt  a  system  of  industrial  freedom  and  free  competition  but,  at 
the  same  time,  use  the  regulative  power  of  the  state  where  neces- 
sary for  the  social  welfare.  He  asserted  the  need  of  a  social  re- 
form which  should  aim  to  achieve  justice  through  the  penetration 
of  the  economic  life  with  moral  ideas. ^^  One  contemplates  with 
profound  regret  what  might  have  been  the  fruition  of  the  doctrines 
of  these  early  apostles  of  industrial  righteousness,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  increasing  influence  of  the  militaristic  ideal  proclaimed  by 
Treitschke  and  others  and  endorsed  by  the  military  aristocracy  and 
the  people  under  their  influence.  Even  Schmoller  came  more  and 
more  under  the  influence  of  the  militaristic  ideal.  Like  Knies  who 
rejected  Wagner's  conception  of  the  individualistic  family  on  the 
ground  that  a  group  with  complete  freedom  of  action,  whose  mem- 
bers were  entirely  actuated  by  self-interest,  never  existed,^^  Schmol- 
ler helped  to  direct  German  economic  thinking  away  from  the 
individualism  of  the  English  economists  and  to  imbue  it  with  the 
impulse  for  national  superiority.  He  ridiculed  the  English  opin- 
ion that  "  only  the  egoism  of  the  individual  is  justified,  and  never 
that  of  the  states  and  nations."  ^*  The  demand  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  welfare  of  the  working  classes  for  the  sake  of  national 
superiority,  instead  of  for  justice  and  social  self-realization,  be- 
came more  pronounced  in  the  utterances  of  German  economists 

"  Ibid.,  14,  43-50- 

12  Schmoller,  "  Reform  der  Gewerbe-Ordnung,  Verhandlungen  der  funften  General- 
versammlung  des  Vereins  fiir  Socialpolitik,"  am  8,  9,  and  10  October,  1877.  Shriften, 
XIV;  189. 

13  Knies,  "  Die  Politische  Oekonomie  vom  Geschichtlichen  Standpuncte,"  504. 
1*  Schmoller,  "  The  Mercantile  System,"  80. 


350     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

until  it  reached  the  explicit  form  given  it  in  the  address  of  Pro- 
fessor Brentano  to  the  Vereins  fiir  Socialpolitik,  in  1901,  when  he 
urged  the  improvement  of  the  material  well  being  of  the  lower 
classes  as  essential  to  the  power  of  the  German  Empire, ^^ 

The  work  of  Sombart,  who  studied  the  causes  of  modern  indus- 
trial development,  and  particularly  the  motives  of  the  business 
man,  is  the  logical  outcome  of  the  work  of  his  German  predecessors. 
Obviously,  the  role  of  the  financial  and  industrial  leader  is  funda- 
mental in  national  group  rivalry.  Somebody  must  direct  the  plac- 
ing of  loans  and  the  development  of  the  industry  of  the  nation; 
and  this  important  task  naturally  falls  to  financiers  and  industrial 
organizers.  Sombart  was  chiefly  interested  in  the  behaviour  of 
these  leaders,  but  his  analysis  was  confined  to  the  externals  of  be- 
haviour, to  the  more  obvious  characteristics  which  impress  the  ob- 
server and  can  be  studied  in  documentary  sources.  He  at  first  de- 
clared psychological  analysis  to  be  of  little  use  ^^  and  then  used  it 
slightly  in  a  later  work.^^  He  implicitly  recognized  the  essential 
nature  of  disposition  in  the  explanation  of  economic  behaviour 
and  had  much  to  say  of  the  burgher  spirit  and  the  spirit  of  business 
enterprise ;  but  he  attempted  no  incisive  psychological  analysis. ^^ 

The  methods  of  economics  have,  like  those  of  history,  developed 
partly  in  response  to  certain  impulsive  and  analogical  processes  of 
thinking.  As  an  example  of  impulsive  processes  the  German  econ- 
omists were  moved  by  the  impulse  for  national  superiority  and 
developed  economic  conceptions  in  harmony  with  that  impulse. 
The  English  economists  were  by  no  means  unmoved  by  that  im- 
pulse but  were  more  strongly  moved  by  the  individualistic  impulse 
for  profits  and  considered  laissez-faire  ^^  to  be  a  surer  means  of 
winning  national  superiority  than  governmental  regulation  of  in- 
dustry. Analogical  processes  of  thinking  also  have  entered  into  the 
determination  of  economic  method,  as  seen  in  the  adoption  of  the 
methods  of  physical  science  by  economists  because  their  adoption 
had  resulted  in  brilliant  achievements  in  history.^"     The  adoption 

1^  Brentano,    "  Aufruf    zur    Griindung    eines    Vereins    fur    Socialpolitik."     Schriften, 
XCVIII:2f. 
18  Sombart,  "  Der  Moderne  Kapitalismus,"  I:  pp.  XX,  XXII,  378. 

17  Sombart,  "  Der  Bourgeois,"  222. 

^^  Ibid.,  24,  69-73,  i94-i9S>  224-226,  236;  see  also  Sombart,  "The  Quintessence  of 
Capitalism,"  Chs.  II-IV,  XI-XV. 

18  Marshall,  "  Principles  of  Economics,"  757,  n. 

20 "  Everybody   adopted   it.     Disciples   inspired   by   the   enthusiasm  of  Jacob   Grimm 
traced    the    history    of    language.     Scherer    and    Sainte-Beuve,    renouncing    dogmatic 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    351 

of  the  methods  of  physical  science  was  due  also  to  affective  pro- 
cesses of  thinking,  for  a  scientific  method  becomes  attractive  if  it 
has  been  used  with  marked  success  by  a  rival  group  of  scholars. 
In  the  absence  of  definite  knowledge  of  what  results  a  method  will 
yield  until  it  is  tried,  the  affective  and  analogical  reasoning  pre- 
vails. Economists  have  been  too  prone  to  emulate  methods  which 
have  been  used  brilliantly  in  physical  science  or  history,  without 
considering  the  difference  between  the  subject  matter  and  problems 
of  physical  science  or  history  and  their  own.  In  this  connection, 
one  of  the  functions  of  social  psychology  is  to  insist  that  the  econ- 
omist does  not  deal  entirely  with  matter,  as  does  physical  science; 
that  his  data  do  not  lie  principally  in  the  past  and  he  does  not 
deal  entirely  with  documentary  sources  as  does  history.  He  deals 
with  human  beings  organized  to  realize  their  material  welfare. 
He  deals  in  part  with  material  things  but  merely  as  means  to  the 
development  of  personality.  He  deals  with  documentary  sources, 
but  not  wholly,  inasmuch  as  the  documents  cannot  be  understood 
without  a  knowledge  of  the  conditions  under  which  men  work  and 
live. 

Economics  received  its  first  development  in  England  under  the 
impetus  of  the  interest  in  business  enterprise  stirred  by  the  rise  of 
the  factory  system  with  the  opportunities  thus  opened  for  the  mak- 
ing of  private  profits.  The  early  English  economists  were  inter- 
ested primarily  in  the  activity  of  the  business  man  in  his  quest 
for  profits  rather  than  in  the  broader  material  welfare  of  the 
whole  people;  and  they  adopted,  as  their  point  of  view,  that  of 
the  business  man,  without  any  careful  analysis  of  the  motives  or 
significance  of  that  point  of  view.  They  did  not  seek  to  ground 
their  conceptions  on  scientific  principles  of  human  nature, ^^  but 
assumed  the  impulses  of  business  men  to  be  the  essential  impulses 
of  economic  behaviour,  from  which  they  developed  a  "  pecuniary 
logic."  The  economics  of  these  writers  "  deals  not  with  the  en- 
tire real  man  as  we  know  him  in  fact,  but  with  a  simpler,  imaginary 
man  —  a  man  answering  to  a  pure  definition  from  which  all  im- 

canons,  interpreted  literature  as  the  product  of  time  and  place.  Baur  and  the 
Tubingen  school  of  theology  applied  the  principle  of  relativity  to  dogma  .  .  .  philoso- 
phers .  .  .  turned  themselves  into  historians  and  wrote  histories  of  philosophy  instead 
of  philosophies  of  history."  (Becker,  "Some  Aspects  of  the  Influence  of  Social  Prob- 
lems and  Ideas  Upon  the  Study  and  Writing  of  History,"  A  titer.  Jour.  Social. ,  XVIII: 
647.) 

21  Mitchell,  "The  Role  of  Money  in  Economic  Theory,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  Supple- 
ment, VI,  No.  I,  140-X4Z. 


352      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

pairing  and  conflicting  elements  have  been  fined  away.  The  ab- 
stract man  of  this  science  is  engrossed  with  one  desire  only  —  the 
desire  of  possessing  wealth.  .  .  ."  ^^  This  economic  method  is 
justified  by  Mr.  Bagehot  on  the  ground  that  "  The  maxim  of  science 
is  simply  that  of  common  sense  —  simple  cases  first ;  begin  with 
seeing  how  the  main  force  acts  when  there  is  as  little  as  possible 
to  impede  it,  and  when  you  thoroughly  comprehend  that,  add  to 
it  in  succession  the  separate  effects  of  each  of  the  encumbering  and 
interfering  agencies."  ^^  The  earlier  English  economists  sepa- 
rated studies  of  human  nature  as  such  from  economics.  Thus  Mill 
declared:  "  PoHtical  Economy  .  .  .  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
consumption  of  wealth,  further  than  as  the  consideration  of  it  is 
inseparable  from  that  of  production,  or  from  that  of  distribution. 
We  know  not  of  any  laws  of  consumption  of  wealth  as  the  subject 
of  a  distinct  science :  they  can  be  no  other  than  the  laws  of  human 
enjoyment."  ^^  In  Mill's  view,  the  science  of  human  nature  con- 
stituted a  distinct  science  which  he  called  ethology.^^  Later  econ- 
omists used  psychological  assumptions  in  the  logical  development 
of  their  principles.  Thus  Jevons  declared  that  "  the  theory  of 
Economics  must  begin  with  a  correct  theory  of  consumption."  ^^ 
The  "  ultimate  qualities  which  we  treat  in  Economics  are  Pleasure 
and  Pains.  .  .  ."  ^"^  "  But  it  is  convenient  to  transfer  our  attention 
as  soon  as  possible  to  the  physical  objects  or  actions  which  are  the 
source  to  us  of  pleasures  and  pains."  ^^  Later  writers,  notably 
Edgeworth,  maintained  that  pleasure  and  pain  are  concomitant  with 
physical  processes  which  may  be  mathematically  determined,  thus 
making  possible  a  scientific  determination  of  psychical  processes 
also.^^  The  inadequacy  of  the  pleasure-pain  psychology  was  gradu- 
ally perceived,  and  its  use  passed  out  of  economic  assumptions.^® 

Nevertheless,  the  assumption  of  psychological  principles  has  per- 
sisted in  economic  thinking  and  the  psychological  aspect  of  the 
science  is  generally  recognized.     Professor  Fetter  presents  "  a  quite 

22  Bagehot,    "Economic    Studies,"    74;     Mill,     "Unsettled     Questions     of    Political 
Economy,"  137-141. 
28  Bagehot,  op.  cit.,  74. 
2* "Unsettled  Questions  of  Political  Economy,"  132,  note. 

25  Mill,  "  Logic,"  Bk.  VI,  Ch.  V. 

26  Jevons,  "  Theory  of  Political  Economy,"  40. 

27  Ibid.,  65. 
^^Ibid..  37. 

28  Edgeworth,  "  Mathematical  Psychics,"  9,  97. 

^^  For  a  discussion  of  this  point  see  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  144-145. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    353 

new  statement  of  material  value,  more  in  accord  with  the  modern 
volitional  psychology,  thus  eliminating  entirely  the  old  utilitarianism 
and  hedonism  which  have  tainted  the  terms  and  conceptions  of  value 
ever  since  the  days  of  Bentham.  The  basis  of  value  is  conceived 
to  be  the  simple  act  of  choice  and  not  a  calculation  of  utility.  Even 
the  phrase  *  marginal  utility '  is  definitely  abandoned."  ^^  The 
concept  of  value  is  thus  logical,  with  a  psychological  basis.  It  can 
become  thoroughly  explanatory  only  as  economic  assumptions  meet 
the  test  of  social-psychological  analysis.  The  psychological  aspect 
of  economics  is  made  explicit  also  in  the  work  of  Fisher,^^  Selig- 
man,^^  Johnson,^^  Seager,^^  Ely  ^^  and  others.  On  the  other 
hand,  Davenport  disclaims  all  connection  with  psychological  as- 
sumptions and  states  that  economics  "  treats  phenomena  from  the 
standpoint  of  price  ";  ^'^  that,  "  Purely  as  economists  we  are  fortu- 
nately free  from  the  necessity  of  investigating  the  origin  of  choices 
or  any  of  the  psychological  difficulties  surrounding  the  question. 
It  is  sufficient  for  us  that  these  choices  take  place  as  human  nature 
presents  itself."^^  Davenport  assumes  without  psychological 
analysis  the  "  private  and  acquisitive  point  of  view "  ^^  as  the 
human  nature  basis  of  economics.  Thus  he  differs  from  the  econo- 
mists just  mentioned  in  that  his  psychological  assumptions  are  nar- 
rower and  less  explicitly  stated  than  theirs. *°  All  economists,  ex- 
plicitly or  implicitly,  begin  with  some  assumptions  as  to  economic 
behaviour.  The  more  thoroughly  scientific  such  assumptions  are, 
the  more  scientific  and  trustworthy  will  be  the  economic  concepts ;  *^ 

3^  Fetter,  "Economic  Principles,"  1915,  I; Preface,  ix. 

82 "  The  result  has  been  inevitably  to  lead  us  to  a  consideration  of  the  psychic 
stream  of  events  as  final  income,  .  .  ."     (Fisher,  "The  Nature  of  Income,"  177.) 

S3  Seligman,  "  Principles  of  Economics,"  175. 

3*  Johnson,  "  Introduction  to  Economics,"  27-28. 

85  Seager,  "  Principles  of  Economics,"  50-52. 

8«  Ely,  "  Outlines  of  Economics,"  93-95. 

87  "  Economics  of  Enterprise,"  25. 

^^  Ibid.,  60,  98-101.  See  also  Johnson,  "Davenport's  Economics  and  the  Present 
Problems  of  Theory,"  Quart.  Jour.  Econ.,  XXVIII:  420-421. 

8^  Davenport,  op.  cit.,  517. 

*o  He  acknowledges  that  correct  psychological  assumptions  are  necessary  and  that 
this  implies  an  intimate  relation  between  economics  and  social  psychology  and  that 
advances  in  social  psychology  will  necessitate  changes  in  economic  assumptions.  He 
would  limit  the  psychological  assumptions  of  economics  as  narrowly  as  possible  in 
order  that  the  development  of  economics  may  not  be  retarded  by  the  backwardness  of 
social  psychology  and  the  disagreements  of  psychologists.  (Davenport,  "Scope,  Method 
and  Psychology  in  Economics,"  Jour.  Phil.  Psy.  Sc.  M.,  XIV:  617-622.) 

*^  Hamilton,  "  The  Institutional  Approach  to  Economic  Theory,"  Amer.  Econ,  Rev., 
IX  (supplement) :  316. 


354     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

hence    the   closeness    of   the    relation    of    social   psychology    and 
economics. 

The  wide  difference  of  opinion  among  economists  as  to  psycho- 
logical assumptions  is  well  illustrated  by  comparing  the  views  of 
Professor  Marshall  and  Professor  Wicksteed,  who  have  been  quite 
explicit  in  their  statements.  Professor  Marshall  assumes  that 
economics  is  a  quantitative  science,  that  money  "  is  the  centre 
around  which  economic  science  clusters."  '^^  The  economist  is  not 
interested  in  the  analysis  of  human  motives  except  in  so  far  as  their 
relative  strength  may  be  measured  by  the  money  which  will  call 
forth  an  effort  or  which  a  man  is  willing  to  spend  in  the  satisfaction 
of  a  desire.  He  writes  that  "  the  variety  of  motives,  the  difficul- 
ties of  measuring  them,  and  the  manner  of  overcoming  those  diffi- 
culties are  among  the  chief  subjects  "  ^^  of  his  book.  He  sketches 
the  method  of  measurement  as  follows:  Economists  "watch  care- 
fully the  conduct  of  a  whole  class  of  people,  sometimes  the  whole 
of  a  nation,  sometimes  only  those  living  in  a  certain  district,  more 
often  those  engaged  in  some  particular  trade  at  some  time  and 
place:  and  by  the  aid  of  statistics,  or  in  other  ways,  they  ascertain 
how  much  money  on  the  average  the  members  of  the  particular 
group  they  are  watching,  are  just  willing  to  pay  as  the  price  of  a 
certain  thing  which  they  desire,  or  how  much  must  be  offered  to 
induce  them  to  undergo  a  certain  effort  or  abstinence  that 
they  dislike.  The  measurement  of  motive  thus  obtained  is  not 
indeed  perfectly  accurate;  for  if  it  were,  economics  would  rank 
with  the  most  advanced  of  the  physical  sciences,  and  not  as  it  actu- 
ally does  with  the  least  advanced."  *^  Not  only  are  such  measures 
of  motives  as  can  be  obtained  inaccurate,  but  there  are  motives 
which  cannot  be  measured  at  all.  "  It  would  perhaps  be  possible 
even  now  to  predict  with  tolerable  closeness  the  subscriptions  that  a 
population  of  a  hundred  thousand  Englishmen  of  average  wealth 
will  give  to  support  hospitals  and  chapels  and  missions;  and,  in 
so  far  as  this  can  be  done,  there  is  a  basis  for  an  economic  dis- 
cussion of  supply  and  demand  with  reference  to  the  services  of 
hospital  nurses,  missionaries  and  other  religious  ministers.  It  will, 
however,  probably  be  always  true  that  the  greater  part  of  those 

*2  Marshall,  "  Principles  of  Economics,"  22. 
*^Ibid.,  25. 
**Ibid.,  26. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     355 

actions,  which  are  due  to  a  feeling  of  duty  and  love  of  one's  neigh- 
bour, cannot  be  classed,  reduced  to  law  and  measured;  ......."  ^^ 

Economics  is,  therefore,  not  psychological  analysis.  The  economist 
analyses  "  the  force  of  a  person's  motives  —  not  the  motives  them- 
selves  "  ^^     The  motives  the  force  of  which  is  measured  are 

only  generally  designated  and  not  carefully  analysed.  For  instance, 
a  study  of  the  money  spent  by  different  groups  for  hospitals  assumes 
certain  motives  to  be  essential  in  such  expenditure ;  but  the  assumed 
motives  are  complex  and  their  constituent  elements  cannot  be  meas- 
ured as  to  their  relative  "  force."  Before  we  can  regard  any  giving 
of  money  as  a  measurement  of  certain  motives,  we  must  know  what 
are  the  motives  which  prompt  the  giving.  Professor  Marshall's 
conception  of  economics  involves,  therefore,  the  closest  possible 
relation  with  social  psychology. 

Sharply  contrasted  with  Professor  Marshall's  conception  is  that 
of  Professor  Wicksteed,  He  conceives  of  man  as  given  to  more  or 
less  careful  choice  between  material  things  because  of  economic 
scarcity  and  the  consequent  necessity  of  weighing  possible  satis- 
factions.^'^ To  the  psychologist,  the  choices  involve  various  mo- 
tives, but  the  economist  cannot  make  this  analysis  of  motives. 
Wicksteed  refuses  to  use  the  term,  "  motive,"  because  of  its  psycho- 
logical connotation.^^  He  goes  to  some  length  to  point  out  the  com- 
plexity of  mental  states  which  may  be  involved  in  any  act  of  choice  ^^ 
and  concludes :  "  The  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter,  so  far  as  our 
diagrams  are  concerned,  is  that  it  is  generally  an  abuse  of  the 
diagrammatic  method  to  attempt  to  make  a  curve  represent,  with 
any  closeness,  an  isolated  and  concrete  experience.  A  curve  must 
represent  the  estimate  formed  by  the  consumer  of  the  value  to  him 
of  the  successive  increments  of  the  commodity,  and  that  estimate  will 
be  formed  in  view  of  all  the  immediate  effects  and  remoter  reactions 
and  implications  which  he  is  capable  of  appreciating."  ^®  Thus 
Professor  Wicksteed  assumes  that  psychological  valuation  is  com- 
pleted before  the  economic  forces  of  the  market  place  begin.  Each 
man  has  represented  his  desires  in  terms  of  money  or  "  ideal 

^^Ibid.,  24. 

^^Ibid.,  15. 

*^  Wicksteed,   "  The   Common   Sense  of  Political  Economy,"   34. 

*^Ibid.,  167-168. 

*^  Ibid.,  430-437. 

60  Ibid..  437-438- 


356      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

prices,"  and  economics  takes  account  of  the  logic  of  the  process 
by  which  market  prices  result  from  these  ideal  prices.  This  method 
makes  the  field  of  economics  more  nearly  distinct  from  that  of 
social  psychology  than  does  Professor  Marshall's  method;  but  the 
relation  of  the  two  sciences  is  none  the  less  close  and  their  co-opera- 
tion indispensable  to  the  development  of  either  field. 

The  inadequacy  of  economics  alone  to  explain  fundamental 
problems  becomes  evident  when  the  economist  attempts  to  conduct 
on  an  economic  basis  an  inquiry  into  the  adequacy  of  income. 
Professor  Pigou's  inquiry  furnishes  a  case  in  point.  He  was  obliged 
to  begin  with  certain  unanalysed  social-psychological  assumptions,^^ 
not  a  thoroughly  scientific  procedure  but  necessitated  by  the  partly 
psychological  nature  of  the  problem  and  the  lack  of  any  science 
to  furnish  scientifically  grounded  assumptions.  If  we  knew  the 
exact  income  of  the  members  of  a  group,  we  should  still  be  unable 
to  decide,  without  social  psychology,  as  to  its  adequacy,  for  the 
question  would  arise,  adequate  for  what?  We  might  reply,  ade- 
quate to  live  like  self-respecting  members  of  the  community;  but 
this  means  accepting  the  standard  of  a  group  without  analysis  as 
to  its  adequacy.  Or  we  might  reply,  adequate  for  maximum  eco- 
nomic eflliciency;  but  this  is  taking  the  point  of  view  of  one  class,  the 
employing  class.  The  rank  and  file  of  workmen  do  not  admit  that 
they  live  merely  to  work.  Life  is  not  for  working  but  working  is 
for  life,  for  self-realization.  For  our  criterion  of  adequacy  we  are 
forced,  then,  to  an  examination  of  human  nature  and  the  economic 
conditions  of  social  self-realization.^-  Such  an  examination  does  not 
lie  entirely  within  the  scope  of  economics;  and  an  economics  that  is 
a  pecuniary  logic  will  throw  very  little  light  on  that  part  of  the 
human  problem.  As  Professor  Pigou  admits,  any  change  in  the 
national  income  will  affect  not  merely  the  economic  but  the  total 
welfare  of  the  group,  and  "  anything  in  the  nature  of  rigid  inference 
from  effects  on  economic  welfare  to  effects  on  total  welfare  is  out 

51  Pigou,  "Wealth  and  Welfare,"  4-24. 

52  We  know  comparatively  little  of  the  actual  standards  of  living  of  the  various 
income  groups  in  the  United  States  (Meeker,  "What  is  the  American  Standard  of 
Living?",  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Monthly  Labor  Review,  July,  1919,  1-13). 
We  know  still  less  as  to  what  expenditures  for  food,  clothing,  housing  and  house 
furnishings,  amusements,  and  other  factors  of  a  standard  of  living  are  required  for 
the  development  of  personality  that  is  possible  for  the  average  man  and  woman  in 
modern  civilization. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    357 

of  the  question."  **'  He  maintains  that  "  there  is  a  presumption 
.  .  .  that  conclusions  about  the  effect  of  an  economic  cause  upon 
economic  welfare  will  hold  good  also  of  the  effect  on  total  wel- 
fare." «* 

It  is  particularly  important  to  bear  in  mind  the  social-psycho- 
logical nature  of  principles  of  human  welfare,  and  that  economics 
does  not  supply  such  principles,  when  we  turn  to  the  interpretation 
of  statistical  studies  of  wealth  and  income.  For,  unless  this  is 
borne  in  mind,  interpretations  will  be  made  according  to  personal 
or  class  or  professional  bias.  Lacking  scientific  principles  of  wel- 
fare, the  subconscious  dispositions  and  attitudes  direct  thinking,  and 
the  interpretations  are  justified  by  secondary  explanations.  The 
state  of  our  statistical  knowledge  of  the  distribution  of  wealth  and 
income  furnishes  an  additional  reason  for  caution  in  the  interpreta- 
tion of  statistics.  Statistical  studies  of  wealth  and  income  in  the 
United  States  give  little  more  than  a  blurred  impression  of  the 
distribution  of  income. ^'^  And  when  we  pass  from  money  income  to 
"  real  or  psychic  income  "  we  are  told  that  "  this  particular  species 
has  successfully  defied  all  attempts  at  accurate  statistical  measure- 
ments." ^^  It  would  be  idle,  therefore,  to  attempt  any  severely 
scientific  analysis  of  the  welfare  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
Such  attempts  as  are  made  to  interpret  statistical  studies  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  income  consist  largely  of  reasoning  from  assumptions 
determined  by  the  personal  disposition  and  attitudes  of  thinkers, 
which  incline  them  toward  certain  assumptions  and  against  others. 
For  instance,  a  man  who,  like  H.  G.  Wells,  because  of  sympa- 
thetic and  intellectual  dispositions  and  attitudes,  assumes  for  the 
masses  somewhat  stronger  sympathetic  and  intellectual  capacities 
than  they  possess,  would  make  an  interpretation  of  one  kind,  while 
the  orthodox  economist  would  make  a  very  different  interpreta- 
tion."'^    We  cannot  get  away  from  this  personal  element  in  interpre- 

'•3  Pigou,  op.  cit.,  n. 

^*Ibid.,  II. 

'•'  Young,  "  Do  the  Statistics  of  the  Concentration  of  Wealth  in  the  United  States 
Mean  What  They  Are  Commonly  Assumed  to  Mean?"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  VII  (Sup- 
plement):  144;  Dewey,  "The  Statistics  of  the  Concentration  of  Wealth,"  Amer.  Econ. 
Rev.,  VII   (Supplement) :  172-173. 

58  King,  "Desirable  Additions  to  Statistical  Data  on  Wealth  and  Income,"  Amer. 
Econ.  Rev.,  VII   (Supplement)  :  163. 

^"^  Young,  op.  cit.,  144-147. 


358      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

tation ;  and  a  thoroughly  intellectual  point  of  view  will  make  explicit 
the  fact  that,  in  problems  in  connection  with  which  the  scientific 
data  are  inadequate,  interpretations  do  depend  on  the  personal 
element;  and  that  an  interpretation  is  not  to  be  given  undue  weight 
just  because  it  happens  to  be  in  accord  with  tradition. 

Economists  in  the  past  have  been  more  or  less  blind  to  the  social- 
psychological  basis  of  economic  life,  owing  to  their  penchant  for 
deductive  thinking  and  to  the  persistance  in  "  economic  "  assump- 
tions of  individualistic  assumptions  as  to  economic  behaviour. 
These  assumptions  have  survived  from  past  ages,  when  they  were 
not  unqualifiedly  true,  and  are  certainly  not  true  at  the  present  time. 
They  have  owed  their  hold  on  the  minds  of  economists  to  the  fact 
that  they  assumed  business  conditions  to  be  as  they  were  represented 
by  business  men.  In  the  absence  of  scientific  investigations,  econo- 
mists, like  other  men,  have  been  susceptible,  subconsciously  perhaps 
more  than  consciously,  to  the  suggestions  of  the  classes  that  wielded 
suggestive  power  —  particularly  the  enterprisers  — ,  and  have  not 
been  inclined  to  question  the  representations  of  those  classes  as  to 
economic  conditions.  The  more  rivalrous  enterprisers  —  those 
who  assumed  to  speak  for  their  class,  and  who,  because  of  a 
masterful  personality,  became  subconsciously  or  consciously  recog- 
nized as  leaders  of  their  class  —  have  justified  low  wages  and  evil 
conditions  of  labour  on  the  ground  of  the  bitter  competition  to  which 
they  were  subjected.  They  understood  that  the  public  approved 
of  this  competition,  as  the  process  through  which  prices  were  kept 
down,  and  realized  that,  by  laying  the  palpable  evils  of  industry  to 
keen  competition,  they  effectively  stopped  whatever  public  odium 
might  be  coming  their  way,  because  of  those  evils.  They  also 
realized  that  to  plead  the  necessities  of  keen  competition  would 
allay  suspicions  of  their  large  profits.  Whatever  basis  in  fact  the 
economic  assumption  of  keen  competition  between  enterprisers  may 
have  had,  and  still  has,  it  has  been  given  added  weight  by  the  con- 
stant reiteration  of  enterprisers  themselves,  and  by  their  influence 
over  thinkers  who  had  comparatively  little  inside  knowledge. 

The  individuaUstic  assumption  has  persisted,  in  spite  of  its  inade- 
quacy; and  the  manifold  deviations  of  actual  conditions  from  this 
assumption  have  been  treated  as  variations  from  a  more  funda- 
mental and  permanent  condition.  The  situation  is,  therefore,  much 
the  same  as  that  already  noted  in  the  development  of  jurispru- 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     359 

dence,  in  which  the  individualistic  attitude  to  private  property  has 
furnished  an  assumption  for  deduction  as  to  the  constitutionality  of 
labour  legislation;  the  dogma  of  freedom  of  contract  takes  the 
place  that  ought  to  be  taken  by  a  scientific  knowledge  of  industrial 
conditions. 

Without  relaxing  the  claim  that  economics  must  be  a  quantitative 
science,  it  is  suggested  that  its  human  behaviour  basis  be  widened 
to  include  all  those  processes  through  which  a  community  seeks  its 
material  welfare, ^^  instead  of  focusing  attention  on  the  most  atten- 
tion-compelling figure  in  economic  activity  —  the  business  man. 
The  human  behaviour  basis  is  to  include  adequate  and  accurate 
conceptions  of  the  psychological  nature  of  economic  relationships, 
as  assumptions  for  the  logical  and  statistical  development  of 
economic  concepts. 

That  this  development  of  economics  is  inevitable,  and  that  it  in- 
volves the  recognition  of  a  distinct  closely  related  science  of  social 
psychology,  is  at  no  point  more  evident  than  in  connection  with 
theories  of  wages.  Though  there  are  some  who  think  that  eco- 
nomics might  dispense  with  a  theory  of  value,  probably  there  is  no 
economist  who  would  dispense  with  a  theory  of  wages.  In  text- 
books on  economics  wage  rates  are  made  to  depend  on  social- 
psychological  conditions,  particularly  on  the  standard  of  living,  in 
which  there  is  general  agreement,  and  on  other  "  psychic  factors," 
mentioned  in  some  text-books. ^^  Social-psychological  inquiries  are 
still  more  necessary  in  problems  of  wages  under  scientific  manage- 
ment, which  raises  the  problem  of  the  "  just  "  division  of  the  profits 
of  scientific  management  between  employers  and  employes.  This 
problem  is  said  to  have  a  basis  in  "  social  ethics."  ®"  Problems  of 
wages  where  labour  is  organized  also  involve  social-psychological 
inquiries,  for  "  the  wages  of  the  union  workmen  are  not  determined 
automatically  by  demand  and  supply  but  by  a  process  of  bargain- 
ing." *^  To  understand  this  process  of  bargaining  requires  a  knowl- 
edge of  all  the  psychological  factors  which  enter  into  the  determi- 
nation of  a  standard  of  living,  also  a  knowledge  of  the  factors  in 
the  relations  between  employers  and  workmen.     "  In  determining 

68  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  159. 

6^  See,  for  instance.  Fetter,  "  Economic  Principles,"  1 :  202-205. 

^0  Thompson,  "  The  Relation  of  Scientific  Management  to  Labor,"  Quart.  Jour.  Econ., 
XXX:  320. 
^iHoxie,  "Trade  Unionism  in  the  United  States,"  ii, 


36o      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  outcome  of  this  process  of  bargaining,  the  two  most  important 
factors  are  the  normal  or  standard  day's  work  and  the  standard 
of  living  of  the  workers.  ...  If  the  employer  can  make  it  appear 
that  under  existing  conditions  the  workers  are  not  working  or  pro- 
ducing up  to  the  standard  day's  work,  he  has  a  strong  case  to  show 
.  .  .  that  more  work  ought  to  be  done  for  the  same  pay,  which 
amounts  virtually  to  lowering  the  wage.  If  the  employer  further 
can  make  it  appear  that  at  the  given  wage  rate,  on  the  basis  of  the 
standard  day's  work,  the  workers  can  secure  a  standard  of  living 
higher  than  that  customary  in  their  class,  he  has  a  strong  case  to 
show  that  the  wage  rate  should  be  lowered,  or  at  least  that  it  should 
not  be  increased.  .  .  .  Now,  the  workers  have  learned  by  long  and 
bitter  experience  that  if  individuals  among  them  work  faster  and 
accomplish  more  than  the  others  while  receiving  the  same  wage 
rate,  the  employers  tend  to  take  the  accomplishment  of  these  work- 
ers as  the  standard  day's  work  and  to  compare  their  earnings  with 
the  standard  of  living  of  the  class  when  negotiations  are  on  to  deter- 
mine wages.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  day  work,  the  accomplishment 
of  the  strongest  and  the  swiftest  is  the  goal  which  is  set  for  all,  .  .  . 
Under  these  circumstances  the  increased  efficiency  and  output  of  the 
few  tend  to  mean  less  wages  for  all  or  more  work  for  less  pay. 
All  this  has  taught  the  unionists  that  if  they  wish  to  prevent  wage 
reductions  they  must  all  try  to  work  at  the  same  pace.  .  .  .  Their 
specific  rule  limiting  speed  and  output  is  therefore  seen  to  be  pri- 
marily to  establish  and  maintain  this  principle  of  uniform  accom- 
plishment for  a  given  rate  of  wages."  ^^  The  analysis  of  the  causes 
of  wage  rates  takes  us,  therefore,  into  an  analysis  of  the  instinctive 
dispositions  that  determine  the  behaviour  of  workmen  in  the  course 
of  their  work.  There  is  the  instinctive  disposition  among  workmen 
to  rival  one  another  in  work,  which  results  in  setting  a  standard  of 
work  that  means  increasing  strain  for  the  mass  of  workmen,  and 
results  merely  in  increasing  the  profits  of  the  employer.  Intelli- 
gence, therefore,  suggests  to  workmen  an  inhibition  of  this  rival- 
rous  disposition  in  work.  This  and  other  intelligent  regulations  of 
instinctive  dispositions  are  working  profound  changes  in  the  be- 
haviour of  workmen  and  in  industrial  relations  as  they  affect  wage 
rates. 

The  psychological  reaction,  among  the  workmen  of  a  city,  to  a 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    361 

rise  in  wages  in  a  certain  establishment  is  interesting  and  significant 
for  the  economic  student  of  wages.  Workmen  in  other  establish- 
ments are  made  discontented  by  the  good  fortune  of  workmen  in  a 
favoured  establishment.  This  discontent  involves  a  number  of 
strong  instincts.  There  is  a  dissatisfaction  of  the  rivalrous  instinct 
on  account  of  inferior  wages.  There  is  instinctive  resentment  against 
employers  for  "  beating  down  their  workmen,"  as  appears  to  the 
lower  paid  workmen  must  be  the  case ;  for,  if  another  employer  can 
afford  to  pay  his  men  high  wages,  assuredly  their  employer  can. 
This  resentment  of  the  domination  of  employers,  and  the  dissatis- 
faction arising  from  a  sense  of  inferiority  to  rival  workmen  causes 
a  discontent  that  results  in  inefficiency  in  work,  in  a  tendency  to 
"  shop  for  jobs,"  and  in  impulsive  demands  for  increases  in 
wages.®^ 

The  wages  that  will  be  paid  to  labour  depend  on  the  instinctive 
dispositions  of  employers.  Because  the  prevailing  dispositions  are 
egoistic  —  the  acquisitive,  conforming,  fearful,  rivalrous  and  domi- 
nating dispositions  — ,  the  prevailing  motive  of  employers,  in  their 
relations  with  workmen,  is  to  get  labour  at  least  cost.  For  this 
reason  workmen  are  paid  according  to  their  differential  efficiency  ^^ 
—  the  more  efficient  the  labour  the  smaller  the  supply  and  hence  the 
higher  the  wage  employers  have  to  pay.  But  there  are  variations 
from  this  prevailing  impulse  to  get  labour  at  least  cost,  and  these 
variations  affect  wages.  Take  this  situation:  A  prosperous  em- 
ployer, a  man  of  sympathetic  disposition  and  brilliant  ability,  raised 
the  wages  of  his  workmen  higher  than  other  workmen  of  the  same 
grade  were  receiving,  and  thereby  stirred  resentment  among  other 
manufacturers  for  "  spoiling  the  labour  market."  Workmen  in 
other  factories  became  discontented  and  ultimately  their  employers 
were  obliged  to  make  some  increase  in  their  wages.  This  advance 
in  wages  would  not  have  occurred  at  that  time  but  for  the  initiative 
of  the  manufacturer  above  mentioned.  There  were  no  conditions 
that  required  such  a  rise  In  wages  as  was  given  by  the  manufacturer 
of  sympathetic  disposition.^^ 

83  Employers  recognize  this  rivalrous  instinct  in  workmen  and  assign  much  of  the 
large  labour  turnover  in  many  plants  to  "  these  inborn  tendencies  which  lead  the 
workman  to  '  shop  for  jobs.'  "  (Stearns,  "  Standardization  of  Occupations  and  Rates  of 
Pay,"  U.  S.  Dept.  of  Labor,  Bulletin  247,  37.)  The  remedy  suggested  is  an  agreement 
among  employers  on  standard  rates  of  pay. 

8*  Moore,  "  Laws  of  Wages,"  90-96. 

86  Professor  Taussig  writes  that  "  large  enterprises  have  been  conducted  by  men  of 


362     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE   ' 

The  altruistically  inclined  manufacturer  goes  as  far  as  he  can  in 
improving  conditions  of  labour  and  still  maintain  his  industrial  posi- 
tion. If  competition  is  keen  in  his  industry  he  cannot  go  very  far. 
"  It  is  for  this  reason  that  labour  legislation  comes  in  to  supplement 
good  will.  Competition  tends  to  bring  the  advanced  employers 
down  to  the  level  of  the  backward.  It  reduces  the  general  level. 
Legislation  forces  the  worst  to  come  up  toward  the  level  of  the  more 
advanced  and  eliminates  the  backward.  It  raises  the  general 
level."  «« 

There  are  very  great  differences  in  the  profits  of  competing  manu- 
facturers, that  is,  in  their  ability  to  pay  high  wages  and  improve 
hours  and  conditions  of  labour;  there  is  also  a  very  great  difference 
in  their  industrial  position  as  regards  competition.  Many  of  them 
are  not  compelled  by  low  profits  and  the  stress  of  competition  to  get 
labour  at  least  cost.  This  has  been  true  since  the  rise  of  modern 
industry.  Robert  Owen,  one  hundred  years  ago,  reduced  the  hours 
of  labor  in  his  cotton  mills  to  ten  a  day  and  made  a  fortune  when 
other  employers  were  working  their  employes  fifteen  or  sixteen 
hours.®''^  The  disposition  of  manufacturers  is  essential  in  deter- 
mining what  those  who  make  large  profits,  and  are  in  an  advantage- 
ous position  with  respect  to  competition,  shall  do  with  their  profits. 
They  may  use  them  in  expenditures  for  display  —  luxurious  homes, 
automobiles,  etc.  —  ;  or  to  extend  their  business  operations  and 
increase  their  power  in  the  business  world;  or  to  improve  the  con- 
dition of  their  workmen.  Robert  Owen,  sympathetic  and  intel- 
lectual in  disposition,  used  his  profits  in  experiments  to  improve  the 
conditions  of  labour.  Most  employers  use  their  profits  for  comforts 
and  luxuries  for  self  and  family;  or  to  increase  their  accumulations 
and  extend  their  power  and  influence;  or  for  philanthropy  outside 
their  business.  For,  to  raise  the  wages  of  workmen  Incurs  the 
odium  of  other  manufacturers  whose  workmen  are  made  discon- 
tented thereby.  The  manufacturer  aims  to  stand  well  with  other 
manufacturers  and  with  the  financial  interests.  Though  the  essen- 
tial impulse  in  some  cases  may  not  be  to  extend  business  operations 

strong  altruism  as  well  as  of  high  ability,  who  have  gathered  about  them  a  staff  of 
managers  and  workmen  imbued  with  the  same  spirit.  Unfortunately  this  spirit  is 
rare.  Were  it  common,  the  whole  aspect  of  the  economic  world  would  be  changed." 
(Taussig,  "Principles  of  Economics,"  II:  306.) 

88  Commons,  "  Industrial  Goodwill,"  28-29. 

"Podmore,  "Robert  Owen,"  1: 162, 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    363 

and  increase  influence,  this  is  so  often  the  case  that  business  men  are 
generally  brought  directly  under  the  control  of  bankers,  on  whom 
they  are  dependent  for  credit  to  extend  their  business  operations. 
Thus  the  control  of  industry  tends  to  pass  to  men  who  seek  ever 
greater  power  and  influence.  The  social  psychologist  must  analyse 
this  tendency,  but  in  his  analysis  he  must  not  ignore  the  differences 
that  appear  in  the  dispositions  of  business  men. 

One  of  the  services  of  social  psychology  to  economics  will  be  to 
correct  the  partial  insights  into  human  nature  ^^  which  from  time  to 
time  temporarily  influence  economic  thinking.  The  classical  econo- 
mists were  in  error,  not  in  assuming  the  prevailing  motive  of  busi- 
ness enterprise  to  be  profit-seeking,  but  in  centring  attention  on  the 
profit-seeker,  in  making  of  his  role  a  dogma,  and  reasoning  deduc- 
tively therefrom  as  to  what  are  inevitably  the  motives  of  employers 
and  workmen,  and  the  conditions  of  highest  productivity  and  public 
welfare.  Such  a  procedure  today  would  ignore  the  results  of  ex- 
periments of  industrial  engineers  which  prove  that  profit-seeking 
may  interfere  with  the  highest  productivity.  Social  psychology  will 
help  to  open  the  way  toward  making  the  public  welfare,  instead 
of  the  inviolabiity  of  private  enterprise,  essential  in  economic 
thinking. 

Taking  the  industrial  situation  as  a  whole  the  essential  tendency 
seems  to  be  toward  a  decreasing  competition  within  the  capitalistic 
class,  and  a  decreasing  competition  within  the  working  class,  and 
an  increasing  rivalry  between  the  two  classes.''^  While  competition 
continues  in  business,  the  tendency  is  toward  agreements,  for  the 
sake  of  increasing  profits.  Among  workmen,  while  there  is  rivalry 
for  jobs,  and  rivalry  between  those  on  a  job,  rivalry  for  jobs  is  more 
and  more  subordinated  to  collective  bargaining,  and  rivalry  between 
those  on  a  job  is  eliminated  by  union  limitation  of  the  output,  or  by 
stalling  among  non-union  workmen.  Furthermore,  when  employ- 
ers, instead  of  intelligently  adjusting  their  workmen  to  their  jobs 
and  to  one  another,  maintain  conditions  which  cause  a  large  labour 
turnover,  and  let  themselves  be  drawn  into  rivalry  to  entice  away 
the  more,  skilled  workmen  of  other  employers,'^*'  there  results  an 

88  Carver,  "The  Behavioristic  Man,"  Quart.  Jour.  Econ.,  XXXIII:  195-197. 

•^  Hobson,  "Work  and  Wealth,"  251-254. 

^^  Blackman,  Clayton,  Meeker,  Fisher,  Noyes  and  others,  "  Destructive  Labor  Re- 
cruiting, Proceedings  Employment  Managers'  Conference,"  1918,  U.  S.  Dept.  Labor, 
Bulletin  247,  51-88. 


364      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

inefficiency  due  to  the  large  labour  turnover; '^^  and  this  condition 
has  given  rise  to  the  new  function  of  employment  management,'^ ^  the 
purpose  of  which  is  to  hold  workmen  in  the  employ  of  a  company 
and  so  diminish  the  cost  of  superintendence  and  the  expense  of 
inefficient  labour.  The  increasing  tendency  not  to  hire  high-class 
workmen  of  other  employers  without  the  latter's  consent,  is  increas- 
ing the  workman's  sense  of  powerlessness  before  his  employer,  his 
solicitude  not  to  lose  his  employer's  good  will,  so  that  employment 
management  is  operating,  as  did  scientific  management,  to  weaken 
the  position  of  labour.  It  would  seem  that  these  developments 
must  eventually  stimulate  the  tendency  already  marked  toward 
labour  organization  for  the  sake  of  gaining  a  voice  in  the  manage- 
ment of  industry.  What  we  have,  therefore,  as  increasingly  deter- 
mining factors  in  wages,  prices  and  other  economic  adjustments,  is 
organized  labour  and  organized  capital,  which,  for  the  national 
industrial  efficiency,  should  co-operate  effectively,  but  which,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  are  mutually  opposed  and  conscious  of  their  opposi- 
tion of  interests;  therefore  a  group  rivalry  conception  would  come 
nearer  the  truth,  as  an  economic  assumption,  than  any  other. 

Economists  of  vision  long  ago  widened  the  scope  of  their  in- 
quiries, and  certain  brilliant  inductive  studies  have  discredited  the 
traditional  formulas  and  revealed  the  social-psychological  assump- 
tions. But  there  seems  to  be  little  agreement  among  economists  as 
to  the  significance  of  the  new  movement.  They  "  give  no  promise 
of  arriving  at  even  a  factual  and  descriptive  statement  of  what  their 
central  problem  or  concept  objectively  is."  ^^  If  they  should  take 
as  their  point  of  departure  the  analysis  of  economic  relations  in 
their  entirety  with  the  aim  of  developing  a  theory  of  economic 
progress,  the  lines  of  inquiry  in  which  the  social  psychologist  could 
assist  them  would  include  ( i )  an  examination  of  the  nature  of  the 
prevailing  financial  and  industrial  relations  and  the  formulation  of 
correct  psychological  assumptions;  (2)  an  examination  of  the  effect 
of  changes  in  motives  on  economic  organization  and  of  changes  in 

71 "  Standard  Definition  of  Labor  Turnover  and  Method  of  Computing  the  Percent- 
age of  Labor  Turnover,"  U.  S.  Bur.  Labor  Statistics,  1-2. 

72  See  the  follovying  addresses  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Employment  Managers' 
Conference,  1917:  Williams,  "An  Actual  Account  of  What  we  Have  Done  to  Re- 
duce our  Labor  Turnover " ;  Hubbell,  "  The  Organization  and  Scope  of  the  Employ- 
ment Department  " ;  Wolf,  "  Individuality  in  Industry." 

''^  Davenport,  "  Scope,  Method,  and  Psychology  in  Economics,"  Jour.  Phil,  Psy.  Sc. 
Meth.,  XIV:  617. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    365 

organization  on  motives;  ^^  (3)  an  examination  of  the  effect  of  the 
elucidation  of  economic  relations  on  the  behaviour  of  the  parties 
to  those  relations.^^  Investigations  along  these  lines  are  difficult 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  social  scientist  cannot  make  experiments 
at  will,  as  can  students  of  the  natural  sciences.  He  must  await  his 
opportunity.  And  opportunities  are  more  apt  to  come  to  men  actu- 
ally in  business  life,  as  engineers  or  managers,  than  to  the  social 
scientist  on  the  outside.  Naturally,  therefore,  until  recently  the 
interest  of  economists  has  been  largely  in  mechanisms.  But  eco- 
nomics cannot  get  away  from  its  human  nature  basis.  Even  the 
most  severely  non-psychological  economists  make  some  psychological 
assumptions. 

It  is  easy  to  assert  the  need  of  correct  assumptions  but  difficult  to 
state  them.  Without  venturing  to  attempt  this  I  may  suggest  four 
types  of  behaviour,  similar  to  those  discerned  in  the  fields  of  politics 
and  jurisprudence,  which  have  been  influential,  also,  in  shaping 
economic  institutions.  These  are :  behaviour  which  is  primarily 
acquisitive  and  individualistic;  rivalrous  behaviour  or  "  free  com- 
petition " ;  behaviour  in  which  rivalry  is  developing  into  a  struggle 
for  domination;  and  co-operative  behaviour.  In  relations  between 
business  enterprises  we  discern  four  types  of  behaviour.  There  is 
the  great  number  of  small  merchants  and  manufacturers  who  are 
sufficiently  satisfied  with  their  profits  to  follow  the  traditional  lines 
of  business  behaviour  and  to  hold  the  maxim  "  Live  and  let  live."  '^^ 
There  are  others  who  are  keenly  competitive  and  not  bound  by 
tradition,  without,  however,  attempting  to  dominate  competitors; 
they  rely  on  close  attention  to  business  to  decrease  costs  and  to  Im- 
prove the  quality  and  attractiveness  of  goods.  Others  aim  to 
dominate  competitors  and  control  prices.  This  Impulse  to  domi- 
nate may  be  Intensified  by  holding  a  position  favourable  to  domina- 
tion. There  Is  a  difference  In  position  "  between  those  who  own 
wealth  enough  to  make  it  count,  and  those  who  do  not."  '"^  The 
fourth  type  of  behaviour  Is  the  co-operative.  Men  who  are 
strongly  moved  by  sympathetic  and  Intellectual  impulses  see  a 
greater  complexity  In  economic  problems  than  do  the  other  types, 

7*Fite,  "Moral  Valuations  and  Economic  Laws,"  Jour.  Phil.  Psy.  Sc.  Meth.,  XVI: 
18-19. 
75  Ibid.,  19-20. 

76Veblen,  "The  Vested  Interests  and  the  State  of  the  Industrial  Arts,"  159-160. 
''•'Ibid.,  161. 


366     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

because  they  look  at  problems  from  the  points  of  view  of  diverse 
interests,  and  they  incline  to  a  policy  of  wider  governmental  regu- 
lation than  other  types.  This  type  of  behaviour  is  to  be  contrasted 
with  the  preceding  types  in  the  matter  of  intelligence :  the  first  type 
is  more  conservative  than  intellectual;  the  second  has  a  narrow 
shrewdness  with  a  demand  for  a  "  square  deal  "  that  springs  from 
the  impulse  of  the  rivalrous  disposition  for  equality  of  opportunity; 
the  third  type  is  fostered  by  the  development  of  inequality  that 
tempts  the  financially  powerful  to  dominate  those  who  would  inter- 
fere with  their  plans.  The  position  of  the  financier  may  require 
little  intelligence  beyond  shrewdness  in  the  selection  of  a  competent 
staff  and  some  administrative  capacity,  with  the  knowledge  an  or- 
dinary man  would  acquire  in  the  course  of  experience  in  finance.^^ 

The  social  psychologist  studies  the  types  of  behaviour  while  the 
economist  studies  the  changes  in  economic  organization  that  de- 
velop, for  instance,  the  changes  due  to  the  spreading  influence  of 
investment  bankers,  and  the  changes  advocated  by  those  who  would 
check  the  growing  industrial  domination  ''^  for  the  sake  of  freer 
competition  or  of  co-operation  between  capital  and  labour  in  man- 
agement. Business  managers  and  engineers  are  in  close  touch  with 
the  human  nature  basis  of  industry  because  their  problem  is  to 
increase  production,  while  the  bankers  have  no  interest  in  the  human 
nature  basis  because  they  are  concerned  with  the  mechanism  of 
credit.  They  regard  labour  as  merely  a  commodity  used  in  produc- 
tion, and  demand  that  labourers  work  like  well  disciplined  hosts, 
for  strikes  interfere  with  the  mechanism  of  credit;  the  engineers 
regard  labour  not  as  a  commodity  but  as  a  human  force  with  im- 
pulses that  can  be  appealed  to  in  a  way  to  increase  production.     To 

''^  The  "  work  of  financial  management  has  progressively  taken  on  a  character  of 
standardized  routine  such  as  no  longer  calls  for  or  admits  any  large  measure  of  dis- 
cretion or  initiative.  They  (financiers)  have  been  losing  touch  with  the  management 
of  industrial  processes,  at  the  same  time  that  the  management  of  corporate  business 
has,  in  effect,  been  shifting  into  the  hands  of  a  bureaucratic  clerical  staff.  The  cor- 
poration financier  of  popular  tradition  is  taking  on  the  character  of  a  chief  of  bureau." 
(Veblen,  "The  Industrial  System  and  the  Captains  of  Industry,"   The  Dial,  May  31, 

1919,  SS5-) 

'^^  Veblen,  "Industry  and  the  Captains  of  Industry,"  The  Dial,  May  31,  1919,  554- 
557;  Veblen,  "The  Captains  of  Finance  and  the  Engineers,"  The  Dial,  June  14,  1919, 
599-606;  Wolf,  "Securing  the  Initiative  of  the  Workman,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX 
(supplement)  :  129;  Fisher,  "Economists  in  Public  Services,"  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX 
(supplement)  :  13-15 ;  Brandeis,  "Other  People's  Money  and  How  the  Bankers  Use 
It";  Mitchell,  "Business  Cycles,"  33-35;  Moulton,  "Principles  of  Banking,"  455; 
Report  of  the  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Concentration  of  Control  of  Money  and 
Credit  1913,  145-147. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    367 

the  dominating  attitude  of  financial  interests  toward  labour  they 
attribute  the  tendency  of  labour  to  work  inefficiently  and  to  practise 
sabotage,^*^  which  results  in  small  production. 

Among  consumers  also  we  distinguish  the  four  types  of  behaviour. 
There  is  the  numerous  class  of  consumers  which  is  thrifty  and 
largely  indifferent  to  style;  there  are  those  who  aim  to  "keep  in 
style  "  in  their  consumption  sufficiently  to  appear  "  up  to  date  " ; 
there  are  those  who  indulge  an  impulse  to  display  ^^  by  ultra-stylish 
consumption;  and  those  whose  consumption  is  directed  by  a  wise 
consideration  of  self  and  others.  Manufacturers  aim  to  stimulate 
the  impulses  to  be  up  to  date  or  ultra-fashionable  in  style  because 
purchases  for  style  increase  consumption.  Obviously  their  power 
thus  to  stimulate  consumption  for  style  depends  on  the  disposition 
of  the  population.  A  thrifty  rural  population  and  a  highly  cultured 
community  are  less  fruitful  fields  for  exploiting  the  instinctive  im- 
pulses for  style  than  are  the  prosperous  middle  and  upper  classes 
of  our  villages  and  cities. 

The  four  types  of  behaviour  are  seen  also  in  relations  between 
capital  and  labour.  In  the  rural  community  of  small  farms,  with 
its  many  producers,  independent,  indifferently  competing  and  chiefly 
intent  on  their  relation  with  physical  nature,  labourers  move  freely 
from  one  employer  to  another,  share  the  employer's  home  and 
his  table,  or  live  on  their  own  small  plot  of  ground  with  much  the 
same  standard  of  living  as  their  employer.  Here  the  employer  does 
not  belong  to  an  exclusive  class.  The  same  is  true  in  many  small 
factories  and  stores  throughout  the  United  States.  Good  feeling 
prevails  between  employers  and  employes,  and  bargaining  between 
theni  goes  on  in  the  conventional  way.  The  employes  are  generally 
satisfied  when  their  wages  are  "  better  than  they  have  been  "  or  as 
high  as  the  wages  of  other  workmen  of  the  same  grade  in  the  com- 
munity. Another  type  of  relation  is  found  in  a  regime  of  keenly 
competitive  business ;  the  old  personal  touch  between  employer  and 
employes  is  passing  and  the  employer  regards  wages  as  labour  cost 
of  production  —  to  be  kept  at  the  lowest  figure.  The  numerous 
independent  establishments,  however,  facilitate  competition  for  jobs. 
Another  type  of  relation  is  found  in  great  corporations  which,  for 

80  Brissenden,  "  The  I.  W.  W.,"  277. 

81  The  instinct  of  display  is  one  phase  of  the  instinct  of  domination.     (Thorndike, 
"The  Original  Nature  of  Man,"  94.) 


368      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

several  reasons,  are  in  a  very  favourable  position  to  exercise  domi- 
nation over  workmen  and  to  repress  organized  effort  to  improve 
their  condition. ^^  They  have  large  financial  resources;  they  employ 
a  large  mass  of  unskilled  labour,  which  it  is  difficult  to  organize;  ^^ 
often  they  can  transfer  work  to  be  done  from  a  factory  in  which 
there  is  a  strike  to  other  factories ;  ^^  their  very  size  and  power 
intimidates  workmen;  the  policy  of  diminishing  the  output  to  raise 
the  price  decreases  the  demand  for  labour;  the  decrease  in  the  num- 
ber of  establishments  under  a  regime  of  combination  lessens  the  op- 
portunity for  striking  workmen  to  find  work  elsewhere.  Because  of 
the  mighty  dominating  position  of  the  great  corporation,  resistance 
of  workmen  may  be  long  delayed.  When  it  does  come  it  is  apt 
to  have  the  force  of  a  long  smouldering  resentment,  and  to  be  as 
determined  as  is  the  determination  of  the  corporation  to  perpetuate 
its  domination.  In  these  industrial  disputes  "  the  essential  aim  of 
either  party  is,  not  so  much  to  secure  a  particular  immediate  advan- 
tage, as  to  impress  upon  opponents  a  sense  of  its  own  power,  and 
to  instill  into  them  a  disposition  to  yield  to  reasonable  demands  in 
the  future."  ^^  The  result  is  very  apt  to  be  a  deadlock.^*^  Indus- 
trial conflict  results  in  financial  loss  and  worry,  repeated  experiences 
of  which  incline  employers  to  relax  the  attitude  of  domination  suffi- 
ciently to  discuss  their  differences  with  representatives  of  their 
employes  in  order,  if  possible,  to  reach  a  peaceful  settlement.^^ 
Finally,  as  a  result  of  the  fuller  understanding  of  each  other  made 
possible  through  discussion,  the  "  spirit  of  sympathy  "  ^^  may  de- 
velop and  co-operation  become  possible.  Beginnings  of  co-opera- 
tion are  found  in  those  corporations  where  the  management  de- 
velops intimate  relations  with  the  employes;  aims  to  have  them 

82  Weyforth,  "  The  Organizability  of  Labor,"  J.  H.  U.  S.  H.  P.  S.,  Series  XXXV,  No. 

2,  200-212. 

s^Wolman,  "The  Extent  of  Trade  Unionism,"  Annals  Amer.  Acad.  Pol.  Soc.  Sc, 
Pub.  No.  1092,  6. 

8*  Wolman,  "  The  Extent  of  Labor  Organization  in  the  United  States,"  Quart.  Hour. 
Econ.,  May,  1916,  507. 

*6Pigou,  "Principles  and  Methods  of  Industrial  Peace,"  13-14. 

88  In  this  case  the  only  way  out  is  compulsion  by  the  government  or  the  mediation 
of  some  third  party  in  whose  sympathetic  understanding  and  disinterested  intelligent 
fairness  each  of  the  antagonists  has  confidence.  Such  a  mediator  is  born  and  not  made. 
Some  of  the  most  successful  have  come  from  the  ranks  of  workingmen.  See  Fitch, 
"John  Williams  —  Peace-maker,"  Survey,  Jan.  18,  1919,  522. 

^''  Ibid.,  15-16.  See  Wolman,  "Collective  Bargaining  in  the  Glass  Bottle  Industry," 
Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  Sept.,  1916,  561. 

sspigou,  op.  cit.,  16-17. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    369 

participate  in  the  management  of  the  business  as  far  as  their  intelli- 
gence permits;^"  furnishes  educational  facilities  and  inducements 
for  an  increase  of  intelligence;  takes  the  workmen's  point  of  view 
concerning  their  impulses  for  self-realization;  and  co-operates  with 
them  in  effectuating  opportunities  for  self-realization  both  in  the 
course  of  work  and  in  hours  of  recreation. 

The  behaviour  of  a  corporation  toward  competitors  often  follows 
the  same  principle  as  its  behaviour  toward  workmen.  A  policy  of 
live-and-let-live  toward  competitors  tends  to  be  found  with  a  "  fair 
wage"  policy  toward  workmen.  Corporations  which  are  attempt- 
ing to  control  competitors  and  to  fix  prices  are  apt  to  try,  at  the 
same  time,  to  dominate  and  exploit  workmen.  But  the  large  profits 
that  result  from  price  agreements  may  incline  corporations  to  con- 
ciliate workmen  and  pay  higher  wages.  Prosperity  is  apt  to  put 
the  business  man,  like  any  other  man,  in  an  agreeable  frame  of  mind, 
which  expresses  itself  in  a  rise  of  wages  and  beneficent  plans  for 
workmen.  Corporations  which  do  not  attempt  to  dominate  com- 
petitors, but  are  keenly  competitive,  are  apt  to  use  the  same  shrewd- 
ness in  their  relations  with  workmen.  They  are  not  apt  to  risk  a 
disastrous  strike  for  the  sake  of  satisfying  the  impulse  of  domina- 
tion. 

In  all  four  of  these  types  of  industrial  relations  the  motive  of 
money-making  is  active  but  it  is  not  equally  essential  in  all.  The 
essential  motive  may  be  to  conform  to  the  prevailing  business  be- 
haviour; and,  while  the  prevailing  behaviour  arises  from  the  impulse 
to  make  money,  the  motive  to  conform  may  be  more  essential  than 
the  motive  to  make  money.  The  impulse  to  make  money  becomes 
essential  when  men  do  the  uncustomary  thing  in  order  to  make 
money.^'^  When  the  rivalrous  instinct  is  aroused  in  connection  with 
money-making,  the  essential  impulse  is  to  excel  in  money-making,  to 
enlarge  the  business.  Many  men  who  are  doing  well  in  business 
are  caught  by  the  rivalrous  instinct  and  enlarge  beyond  the  limits 
suggested  by  business  shrewdness.  When  the  dominating  instinct 
is  aroused  in  connection  with  money-making,  the  essential  impulse 

89  For  instance,  The  Hart,  Schaffner  and  Marx  agreement  with  their  workmen, 
now  adopted  practically  by  the  whole  clothing  industry,  "  stipulates  that  each  step 
which  limits  the  authority  of  the  employer  places  definite  responsibility  upon  the  em- 
ployee and  should  not  be  developed  faster  than  the  capacity  of  the  employees,  through 
their  representatives,  to  assume  such  responsibility  successfully."  (Howard,  "In- 
dustrial Government,"  The  Survey,  Sept.  13,  1919,  845.) 

90  Williams,  "An  American  Town,"  28. 


370     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

is  to  control  competitors  and  workmen  in  order  to  malce  money. 
Sometimes  a  young  man  who  inherits  a  business  shows  this  impulse. 
Patents,  bought  in  order  to  keep  them  from  competitors,  are  put 
away  and  never  used.  The  impulse  seems  to  be  to  make  profits 
by  the  easy  way  of  dominating  and  exploiting  labour;  managers  and 
foremen  of  a  dominating  disposition  are  congenial  to  the  young 
man,  and  he  gathers  this  kind  around  him.  In  the  co-operative  rela- 
tion, the  essential  impulse  is  to  deal  "  justly  "  and  reasonably  with 
competitors  and  workmen,  though  the  business  man  may  be  con- 
scious of  satisfaction  when  it  turns  out  that  just  dealing  "  pays." 
Thus,  a  very  successful  manufacturer,  who  has  built  up  his  enter- 
prise from  small  beginnings  to  one  of  the  largest  in  the  industry, 
writes  me:  "I  think  many  employers  are  coming  to  believe  that 
it  pays  to  treat  their  employes  with  justice.  .  .  .  You  see,  they  get 
the  general  viewpoint  first,  then  it  is  an  application  and  the  thing 
before  them  all  the  time  is  what  is  honest  and  fair  and  not,  '  does  it 
pay?'  I  claim  thus  that  in  their  actual  performances  they  have 
good  motives,  although  back  of  it  and  out  of  sight  may  be  a  very 
selfish  one,  i.  e.,  that  honesty  and  fairness  pays."  This  manu- 
facturer notes  that,  in  some  instances,  the  honesty  and  fair  dealing 
pays  and  in  others  it  does  not.  In  some  cases  it  decreases  the  per- 
centage of  the  labour  turnover  and  thus  saves  the  expense  of  train- 
ing new  workmen,  in  other  cases  it  does  not.  He  adds  that  the 
desirable  results  are  not  gained  as  a  consequence  of  foreknowledge 
that  the  just  treatment  would  pay,  but  that  the  just  treatment  is 
primarily  impulsive.  It  springs  from  impulses  different  from  those 
out  of  which  have  developed  the  prevailing  business  attitude,  im- 
pulses to  deal  justly  and  reasonably  with  workmen  and  not  to  make 
money.  However,  the  employer  is  naturally  gratified  when  such 
treatment  of  workmen  is  appreciated  by  them,  perhaps  resulting  in 
an  increase  of  production. 

It  thus  appears  that  the  development  of  industrial  institutions 
is  determined  not  only  by  the  quest  for  profits,  but  also  by  other  and 
very  different  impulses  that  seek  satisfaction  through  the  industrial 
activity  itself.  Some  men  do  "  make  a  romance  "  of  business  in- 
stead of  making  it  a  hard  profit-seeking  game.  The  results  of  this 
idealism  in  business,  if  they  turn  out  to  be  effective  in  profit-getting, 
are  adopted  by  business  men  whose  essential  motive  is  profit-getting. 
For  instance,  the  success  of  an  idealist  in  managing  workmen  no 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     371 

sooner  attracts  the  attention  of  profit-seeking  corporations  than  his 
ideas  are  adopted  and  his  personal  traits  imitated.  In  this  way 
sympathetic  tend  to  replace  dominating  personalities  in  managing 
positions  in  which  the  incumbent  is  in  close  contact  with  workmen. 
Sometimes  the  general  manager,  who  represents  the  company  to 
the  whole  organization,  is  a  person  of  rough  and  ready  gener- 
osity; ^^  he  may  be  something  of  an  idealist,  with  a  hobby  of  profit- 
sharing  as  a  possible  future  policy  of  the  company,  or  something 
else  that  serves  as  a  lure  to  the  loyalty  of  subordinates.  Just  now 
the  alluring  hobby  is  "  industrial  democracy  "  in  a  variety  of  super- 
ficial forms.  One  of  the  most  fascinating  fields  of  social-psycho- 
logical study  is  the  way  in  which  corporations  whose  one  aim  is 
profits  incorporate  in  their  organization  features  that  first  arose  as 
variations  in  the  behaviour  of  more  or  less  idealistic  business  men. 

In  a  profit-seeking  economic  system  idealistic  impulses  may  have 
some  play,  but  the  essential  tendency  is  reactionary.  Among  the 
economic  developments  that  accentuate  this  tendency  are,  first,  the 
development  of  the  great  corporation  and  the  fact  that  the  men  who 
reach  the  higher  positions  therein  do  so  through  a  masterful  dis- 
position, and  through  a  good  degree  of  conservatism.  And  the  cor- 
poration, with  its  management  removed  from  the  working  force, 
fails  to  take  interest  in  the  human  nature  of  the  working  force ;  it  has 
no  sympathy  with  the  efi^ort  of  the  occasionally  progressive  manager 
to  work  out  industrial  relations  that  furnish  opportunities  for  the 
development  of  personality  in  the  course  of  work.  This  is  not  true 
in  all  large  corporations;  the  situation  is  quite  the  contrary  in 
some  of  them.  But  this  is  the  tendency  that  has  been  marked  in 
the  development  of  the  great  corporation,  until  serious  labour  trou- 
bles have  compelled  attention  to  the  human  nature  of  the  working 
force,  when  managers  of  intelligence  and  sympathy  may  replace 
dominating  managers.  Otherwise  the  tendency  is  to  perpetuate  the 
dominating  relation  of  I-will-run-my-own-business-and-if-you-are-not- 
satisfied-get-out. 

Second,  there  Is  the  development  of  a  repressive  financial  control 
of  Industry.  Financiers  make  their  Influence  felt  far  and  wide  on 
the  directorates  of  corporations  they  are  financing.  And  being  far 
removed  from  the  factories,  their  Influence  is  determined  by  financial 
Instead  of  Industrial  considerations.     They  do  not  understand  the 

81 "  Human-Being  Management,"  Industrial  Management,  Dec,   1916,   398-400. 


372      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

human  nature  of  a  working  force.  Consequently  they  assume  the 
traditional  industrial  relation  to  be  final  and  insist  that  it  be  fol- 
lowed in  industrial  troubles.  They  "  sit  on  "  managers  who  urge 
a  more  progressive  attitude  to  labour.  But  this  reactionary  tend- 
ency conflicts  with  another:  Financial  corporations  require  a  good 
labour  record  of  corporations  whose  bond  issues  they  float  on 
favourable  terms,  and  if  a  progressive  labour  policy  succeeds  in  a 
corporation  which  does  not  happen  to  have  been  under  the  influence 
of  reactionary  financial  interests,  it  is  apt  to  be  adopted  in  corpora- 
tions which  are.  But  reactionary  financial  interests  and  the  corpor- 
ations they  dominate  may  long  withstand  a  successful  progressive 
labour  policy.  Even  though  it  is  financially  successful,  the  fact  that 
it  is  progressive,  that  it  is  contrary  to  the  traditional  dominating 
attitude  stirs  their  distrust.  "  For,"  they  say,  "  once  take  the 
attitude  of  being  willing  to  discuss  and  compromise,  once  appear 
to  give  in  and  you  give  up  your  attitude  of  running  your  own  busi- 
ness, and  who  can  tell  where  it  will  lead?  " 

It  is  not  possible  for  the  industrial  relation,  under  any  conceivable 
economic  system,  to  become  one  of  co-operation  between  manage- 
ment and  workmen  on  a  plane  of  complete  personal  equality. 
Whether  the  employer  is  a  manager  hired  by  private  owners  or  a 
government  official  or  a  manager  elected  by  a  co-operating  group 
of  workmen,  there  must  be  authority  and  subordination  in  the  indus- 
trial relation.  Those  most  capable  of  industrial  leadership  must 
direct  the  work  of  others;  the  directed  must  act  according  to  the  in- 
structions of  the  directors.  It  is,  therefore,  an  evidence  of  intelli- 
gence in  industrial  relations  that  the  subordinate  accepts  the  subordi- 
nation necessary  to  the  efliciency  of  the  organization.  Thus  accept- 
ing his  position,  he  intelligently  inhibits  his  instinctive  self-assertion. 
Exactly  the  same  intelligence  is  required  of  one  who  occupies  a 
position  of  authority.  He  is  required  to  perform  the  duties  of 
that  position  without  thinking  of  his  position  as  giving  him  authority 
impulsively  to  dominate  subordinates.  The  elimination  of  this  im- 
pulsive relation  depends  on  bringing  into  the  financial  and  industrial 
leadership  the  men  most  capable  of  leadership  and  on  developing 
the  intelligence  of  workmen.  Intelligent  workmen  follow  the  lead- 
ership of  those  who  show  themselves  able  to  lead,  but  they  resent 
an  assumption  of  authority  without  abihty.  Those  in  positions  of 
authority  who  lack  ability  to  lead  tend  to  assume  authority,  that  is 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    373 

to  dominate,  assuming  that  the  right  to  dominate  Is  conferred  by 
their  position.  And  subordinates  as  Instinctively  resist  this  domina- 
tion of  the  incompetent  as  they  follow  the  leadership  of  the  com- 
petent. 

Incompetence  of  employers  Is,  then,  one  cause  of  a  dominating 
attitude  of  employers  toward  workmen.  Another  cause  is  more 
fundamental,  being  inherent  in  the  industrial  system  as  at  present 
constituted.  That  system  has  developed  out  of  the  profit-seeking 
motive,  and  that  motive  involves  the  use  of  labour,  as  of  raw  mate- 
rials, by  the  business  man,  for  private  profit.  High  productivity 
in  a  period  of  high  prices  and  the  lowest  wages  consistent  therewith 
is  the  aim  of  the  profit-seeking  employer.  His  ultimate  aim  is  not 
to  increase  the  efficiency  of  labour,  but  to  make  large  profits  for  the 
time  being,  even  at  the  sacrifice  ultimately  of  the  vitality  and  morale 
of  workmen  on  which  productivity  depends.^^  This  aim  to  use 
labour  for  his  own  profit,  to  put  labour  and  raw  material  in  the  same 
category  and  keep  both  costs  at  the  lowest  figure,  regardless  of  the 
ultimate  effect  on  productivity,  makes  inevitable  the  antagonism 
between  capital  and  labour.  It  involves  domination  of  labour  —  a 
subconscious  attitude  of  domination  in  the  ordinary  course  of  busi- 
ness, a  conscious  attempt  to  dominate  if  workmen  jointly  resist  and 
ask  higher  wages  or  improved  conditions  of  labour.  Individual 
employers  may  feel  little  or  none  of  this  domination  toward  work- 
men, may  simply  follow  of  necessity  the  prevailing  business  practice, 
and,  in  case  of  a  difference  of  opinion,  may  intelligently  discuss 
grievances  with  their  workmen.  But  the  system  itself  is  based  on 
domination-submission,  or  domination-resistance  —  mutual  antag- 
onism —  ,  and  the  men  who  reach  the  positions  of  power  and 
influence  in  the  system  are  apt  to  be  those  who  excel  in  dominating 
power.  Hence  the  reactionary  aspect  of  the  capitalistic  system. 
Its  motive  is  contrary  to  the  production  of  goods  and  services  for 
the  public  welfare. ^^  As  Justice  HIggins,  President  of  the  Aus- 
tralian Court  of  Conciliation  and  Arbitration,  says:  "There  is  a 
very  real  antinomy  in  the  wages  system  between  profits  and 
humanity.  The  law  of  profits  prescribes  greater  receipts  and  less 
expenditures  —  including  expenditure  on  wages  and  on  the  protec- 
tion of  human  life  from  deterioration.     Humanity  forbids  that 

*2  Webb,  "  The  Restoration  of  Trade  Union  Conditions,"  76. 
»3  Gantt,  "  Organizing  for  Work,"  Ch.  I. 


374      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

reduction  of  expenditure  should  be  obtained  on  such  lines.  Other 
things  being  equal,  the  more  wages,  the  less  profits:  the  less  wages, 
the  more  profits.  It  is  folly  not  to  admit  the  fact  and  face  it. 
Moreover  the  economies  which  are  the  easiest  to  adopt  in  expen- 
diture tend  to  the  waste  and  degradation  of  human  life  —  the  most 
valuable  thing  in  the  world;  therefore  so  long  as  the  wage  system 
continues  there  is  need  of  some  impartial  regulating  authority."  ^^ 
And  no  man  is  better  qualified  than  Justice  Higgins  to  point  out,  as 
he  does  from  his  own  experience,  just  how  the  regulating  authority 
proceeds.  As  he  says,  no  matter  how  far  co-operation  may  be  car- 
ried in  industry  there  will  be  needed  some  authority  to  settle  indus- 
trial disputes.  "  Even  elected  persons  are  sometimes  found  indif- 
ferent to  the  legitimate  claims  of  a  minority."  ^^  Whatever  the 
form  of  industrial  organization  it  is  apt  to  produce  a  would-be 
dominant  class  that  must  be  restrained  in  the  interest  of  the  whole. 
The  profit-seeking  motive  is  contrary  to  the  highest  efficiency  not 
only  of  manual  labour  but  also  of  professional  labour.  Modern 
business  has  increasingly  subordinated  the  professional  man  to 
business  standards.  Large  corporations  employ  various  kinds  of 
professional  men  —  chemists,  all  kinds  of  engineers,  and  also  some 
physicians,  statisticians,  lawyers,  social  workers,  and  occasionally 
clergymen.  Of  the  chemists,  engineers,  and  other  technicians,  it  is 
said:  "  But  in  no  country  in  the  world  are  these  technical  experts 
allowed  free  scope  in  their  work.  Higher  authority  is  assigned 
by  the  money  economy  to  another  class  of  experts,  business  men  who 
are  skilled  not  in  making  goods  but  in  making  money."  ^^  Yet, 
"  the  men  who  dominate  In  manufacturing  processes  could  not  con- 
duct their  business  for  twenty-four  hours  without  the  assistance  of 
the  experts.  .  .  .  Modern  Industry  depends  upon  technical  knowl- 
edge; and  all  these  gentlemen  did  was  to  manage  the  external 
features  of  great  combinations  and  their  financial  operation,  which 
had  very  little  to  do  with  the  Intimate  skill  with  which  the  enter- 
prises were  conducted."  ^'^  Nevertheless,  "  as  an  employe  of  the 
business  man,  the  engineer  must  subordinate  his  interest  In  mechan- 

9*  Higgins,   "A   New  Province  for  Law  and  Order,"  II,  Harv.  L.  Rev.,  XXXII: 
216-217. 

»6  Ibid.,  217. 

88  Mitchell,  "  Business  Cycles,"  32. 

8'^  Wilson,  "The  New  Freedom,"  Master  Workers  Book,  71-72. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     375 

ical  efficiency  to  his  superior's  interest  in  profitable  investment."  ®* 
In  like  manner,  the  lawyer  employed  by  a  corporation  must  subordi- 
nate his  interest  in  legal  justice  to  his  superior's  interest  in  profitable 
investment.  The  economist  and  statistician  employed  by  a  corpora- 
tion must  accept  the  corporation's  business  attitude  and  promote  the 
business  interests  of  the  corporation.  The  physician  employed  by 
a  corporation,  in  his  testimony  as  to  the  cause  of  an  accident  or  of 
industrial  disease,  must  favour  the  interests  of  the  corporation  as 
far  as  he  plausibly  can.  The  social  worker  employed  by  a  corpora- 
tion must  solve  the  social  problems  of  the  communities  of  the  cor- 
poration in  such  a  way  as  suits  the  interests  of  the  corporation. 
The  clergyman  must  cherish  religious  attitudes  among  the  workmen 
that  are  not  contrary  to  corporation  domination.^^  In  addition 
to  this  direct  control  over  professional  men  in  their  employ,  there 
is  the  indirect  social  control  exerted  by  the  economic  powers  that  be 
through  their  influence  on  professional  standards  and  over  educa- 
tional and  ecclesiastical  institutions.  Thus  does  the  reactionary 
business  attitude  conflict  with  progressive  tendencies  throughout  the 
social  organization.  The  problems  presented  by  this  conflict  con- 
stitute the  essential  social-psychological  problems. 

^8  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  32. 

99  West,  "Report  on  the  Colorado  Strike,"  U.  S.  Com.  on  Ind.  Rel.,  155-157. 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE    RELATION    OF    SOCIAL    PSYCHOLOGY    TO    ECONOMICS 

{concluded) 

THE  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  is  to  indicate  various 
points  of  contact  between  economics  and  social  psychology, 
in  addition  to  those  referred  to  in  the  preceding  chapter. 
The  problem  of  population  is  said  to  have  been  inadequately  under- 
stood because  of  the  failure  to  recognize  the  psychical  factors.^ 
Malthus  recognized  a  prudential  restraint  in  the  matter  of  children, 
but  no  thorough  analysis  of  this  motive  has  been  attempted.  Nor 
has  any  analysis  been  made  of  the  impulses  entering  into  lack  of 
restraint.  Men  who  apparently  have  as  large  families  as  is  bio- 
logically possible  often  give  a  reason  which  is  probably  more  than 
a  mere  excuse  for  unrestrained  passion.  A  middle-aged  truckman, 
father  of  eight  children,  recently  remarked,  as  a  good  reason  for 
having  so  many,  "  If  one  won't  take  care  of  you  when  you  are  old, 
another  will."  The  average  man  despairs  of  reaching  a  position  of 
economic  independence  in  old  age,  even  if  he  had  no  children  at  all; 
and,  being  hopeless  of  an  opportunity  to  rest  when  he  is  no  longer 
able  to  work,  the  thought  of  having  grown-up  sons  and  daughters  is 
comforting.  There  are  also  the  parental  and  gregarious  instincts 
prompting  the  workman  and  his  wife,  who  are  isolated  by  their 
poverty  and,  perhaps,  by  their  foreign  birth,  to  desire  a  large  family. 
As  one  such  father  said:  "  One  takes  a  lot  of  comfort  in  having 
children  around."  The  nature  of  prudential  restraint,  or  the  lack 
of  it,  is  not  explained  by  economists.  Restraint  has  produced  most 
conspicuous  results  in  the  population  of  France  which  is  the  only 
exception  to  the  rule  that  increase  of  population  follows  increase  in 
means  of  subsistence.  Dr.  Thompson  thinks  that  a  careful  psycho- 
logical study  of  the  French  people  will  be  necessary  to  ascertain  the 
way  in  which  economic  conditions  affect  the  attitude  of  the  different 
classes  toward  offspring.^ 

1  Fetter,  "  Economic  Principles,"  1 :  408. 

2  Thompson,  "  Population :    A  Study  in  Malthusianism,"  122. 

376 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     377 

Another  section  of  problems,  closely  connected  with  population, 
which  are  in  part  psychological,  are  those  resulting  from  immi- 
gration. Among  the  psychological  aspects  of  these  problems  are 
the  industrial  qualities  of  immigrants  and  the  qualities  which  fit  or 
unfit  them  for  assimilation.^  We  need  to  answer  such  queries  as 
these :  In  how  far  do  the  mental  characteristics  of  different  peoples 
fit  them  for  intermarriage ;  in  how  far  are  the  diverse  characteristics 
of  different  peoples  apt  to  cause  friction  between  native  and  alien 
labour*;  in  how  far  are  immigrants  apt  to  remain  loyal  to  native 
land,  to  the  extent  of  being  disloyal  to  their  adopted  country.  It 
is  quite  as  important  to  know  whether  a  people  are  truth-tellers  or 
deceitful,  industrious  or  lazy,  as  to  know  whether  they  are  small  or 
large  in  stature.^  Although  immigration  problems  are  in  part 
psychological,  some  writers  on  the  subject  dismiss  this  side  of  their 
problems  with  scant  attention.* 

Trade  unionism,  as  indicated  in  the  preceding  chapter,  has  a 
psychological  aspect.  Says  Professor  Hoxie :  "  The  social  psycho- 
logical view  of  unionism  and  its- relation  to  society  may  be  stated 
somewhat  as  follows:  Modern  realistic  social  science  has  pretty 
definitely  reached  the  conclusion  that  society  is  made  up  of  a  great 
complex  of  interacting  and  interlocking  social  groups.  Each  of 
these  groups  is  composed  of  individuals  holding  a  common  view 
point  in  regard  to  some  vital  social  matter  or  series  of  such  matters. 
For  example,  there  is  something  in  the  nature  of  a  general  group  of 
employers  and  a  general  group  of  laborers,  but  both  the  laboring 
and  the  employing  groups  are  again  split  into  an  indefinite  number 
of  smaller  groups,  each  with  its  peculiar  viewpoint  opposed  to  that 
of  any  other  group.  In  general,  each  occupation  and  profession  is 
likely  to  constitute,  for  certain  purposes,  a  distinct  group  with  a 
definite  point  of  view.  .  .  .  The  possession  of  this  common  view- 
point welds  the  individual  members  of  such  a  group  into  a  more  or 
less  permanent  social  force. 

"  Each  of  these  groups  has  its  own  peculiar  aims,  social  motives 

8  Commons,  "  Races  and  Immigrants  in  America,"  127-134,  208-224. 

*  Wolfe,  "  Admission  to  American  Trade  Unions,"  J.  H.  U.  S.  H.  P.  S.,  xxx.  No.  3, 
Ch.  s- 

5  Ross,  "The  Old  World  in  the  New,"  293. 

8  Fairchild,  "  Immigration,"  5.  Professor  Ross  gives  more  careful  attention  to  the 
psychological  side  of  immigration  problems.  See,  "  The  Old  World  in  the  New," 
39-45,  54-66,  83-92,  113-119.  See  also  the  great  monograph  by  Thomas  and  Znaniecki, 
"The  Polish  Peasant  in  Europe  and  America." 


378      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and  attitudes,  social  principles,  theories  and  program  of  action  more 
or  less  clearly  formulated,  which  it  is  struggling  consciously  and 
unconsciously  to  realize  and  put  into  effect  in  society.  .  .  .  The 
social  will  and  social  action  in  regard  to  any  matter  —  as,  for  ex- 
ample, wage  rates,  hours  of  labour  .  .  .  are  at  any  moment  the 
outcome  of  the  struggle  between  these  groups,  each  attempting  to 
realize  its  own  ideals  and  aims,  subject  always,  of  course,  to  the 
great  underlying  conditioning  factors  of  physical  nature  and  long 
established  social  institutions  and  conditions  which  ...  set  the 
limits  to  what  society  can  do."  ''' 

Turning  from  the  labour  to  the  capital  side  of  the  economic 
order,  we  find  the  same  close  relation  of  economic  and  social- 
psychological  processes.  The  relations  of  commerce  are  admitted 
by  the  economist  to  rqst  on  psychological  processes  that  lie  outside 
the  field  of  his  own  science.  He  urges  the  necessity  of  understand- 
ing and  directing  these  processes.^  But  his  lack  of  understanding 
of  social  psychology  is  apt  to  incline  him  to  the  acceptance  of  the 
traditional  individualistic  ideal  of  commercial  organization;  where- 
fore his  reasoning  lacks  the  cogency  that  valid  psychological  assump- 
tions would  give  it. 

The  mechanisms  of  commerce  have  a  psychological  basis.  Bank- 
ing operations  rest  on  confidence.  Bankers  who,  because  of  their 
reputation  for  integrity,  have  the  confidence  of  depositors  are  said 
to  possess  a  "  psychological  reserve."  ^  The  causes  of  the  seasonal 
variations  in  the  money  market  are  said  to  be  "  in  part  psycho- 
logical," but  the  economist  does  not  analyse  these  psychological 
causes.^''  Speculation  is  determined  by  psychological  causes  which 
the  economist  does  not  analyse. ^^  Uncertainty  as  to  the  supply  of 
and  demand  for  a  particular  commodity  enables  those  who  occupy 
the  strategic  points  in  the  economic  system  to  exploit  economic 
changes;  ^^  wherefore  facilities  that  introduce  greater  certainty  and 
facilitate  intelligent  forecasting  of  supply  and  demand  benefit  the 
rank  and  file  of  producers.^'     The  problem  as  to  whether  the 

''Hoxie,  "Trade  Unionism  in  the  United  States,"  6-7,  64-67. 
8  Brown,  "Principles  of  Commerce,"  189-191. 
8  Withers,  "  The  Meaning  of  Money,"  286. 

10  Kemmerer,  "  Seasonal  Variations  in  the  New  York  Money  Market,"  Amer.  Econ. 
Rev.,  I:  35. 

11  Fisher,  "  Elementary  Principles  of  Economics,"  425-427,  430-432. 

12  Moore,  "  Forcasting  the  Yield  and  the  Price  of  Cotton,"  163-164. 

13  Ibid.,  2-3,  165-169. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     379 

government  should  not  merely  furnish  such  facilities  but  also  regu- 
late organized  speculation  requires  attention  to  the  underlying 
psychological  processes  of  speculation.  We  must  know  whether 
regulation  will  diminish  uncertainty  in  the  transactions  in  question, 
and  therefore  diminish  impulsive  and  facilitate  intellectual  be- 
haviour.^^ The  problem  is  the  more  important  because  trading 
on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  is  not  confined  to  professional 
speculators ;  owing  to  the  opportunity  to  buy  less  than  one  hundred 
shares,  "the  opportunity  to  enter  the  stock  market  is  brought 
within  the  reach  of  nearly  everyone."  ^^ 

Problems  of  insurance  have  a  psychological  aspect.  Insurance 
centres  around  the  motive  to  avoid  or  reduce  uncertainties  as  to  the 
security  of  property  and  income. ^°  The  motive  is  most  pro- 
nounced in  people  of  an  intellectual  disposition,  because  uncertainty 
or  risk  is  annoying  to  the  intellectual  impulses;  on  the  contrary, 
where  uncertainty  involves  a  chance  of  quickly  winning  great  gain 
the  chance  is  seductive  to  the  rivalrous  impulse  for  superiority.  In- 
surance reduces  risk  to  a  minimum,  whether  risk  from  fire,  ship- 
wreck, burglars,  or  from  mishap  to  or  death  of  the  breadwinner. 
There  are  other  psychological  effects  of  insurance,  for  instance,  the 
effect  of  marine,  fire  and  life  insurance  in  causing  fraudulent  prac- 
tices and  crimes  on  the  part  of  insurance  companies  and  policy 
holders.^"  Health  insurance  results  in  a  tendency  to  malingering  ^^ 
and  to  "  morbid  susceptibility,"  "  a  habit  of  mind  ready  to  fall 
victim  to  disease,  quick  to  exaggerate  small  symptoms  to  gross  pro- 
portions, and  to  make  the  person  ill  by  mere  weight  of  thought.  .  .  . 
It  is  very  difficult,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  evil,  to  estimate 
how  far  it  exists.  But  a  careful  student  of  insurance  in  Germany 
cannot  but  be  impressed  with  its  existence."  ^^  On  the  other  hand, 
a  sturdy  population,  in  which  the  old  rural  trait  of  stolid  endur- 
ance of  pain  persists,^"  may  suffer  from  lack  of  prompt  atten- 
tion to  illness.     If  poor  they  are  often  too  proud  to  ask  for  medical 

^* Brace,  "The  Value  of  Organized  Speculation,"  51-54,  138,  139,  149. 

15  Gersternberg,  "  Materials  of  Corporation  Finance,"  430,  quoting  from  a  pamphlet, 
entitled  "Wall  Street  Ways,"  issued  by  J.  F.  Pierson  and  Co.,  members  of  the  New 
York  Stock  Exchange. 

1^  Fisher,  "  Elementary  Principles  of  Economics,"  427-429. 

"  Campbell,   "  Insurance  and  Crime,"   Chs.  III-XVIII, 

18  Gibbon,  "  Medical  Benefit  in  Germany  and  Denmark,"  17,  252,  265. 

^^  Ibid.,  93-94. 

20  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  40. 


38o      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

relief  and  too  honest  to  run  in  debt,  unless  it  is  a  case  of  life  or 
death,  to  a  doctor  whom  they  know  they  can  never  pay.  When 
he  falls  sick,  the  poor  man  worries  because  he  "  can't  afford  to  be 
sick,"  while  the  well-to-do  invalid  may  lie  back  and  hasten  his 
recovery  by  placidly  surrendering  to  the  ministrations  of  doctor  and 
nurse.  Thus  the  need  of  health  insurance  must  be  accepted;  ^^ 
and  a  system  must  be  developed  which,  in  view  of  the  processes  of 
human  nature,  will  benefit  without  injuring.^^ 

Problems  of  taxation  are  psychological  as  well  as  economic. 
Thus  "  the  fundamental  conception  of  faculty  or  ability,  ...  is 
after  all  the  best  standard  we  have  of  the  measure  of  general  obliga- 
tion to  pay  taxes  .  .  ."  ^^  "  The  elements  of  faculty,  then,  are 
two-fold  —  those  connected  with  acquisition  or  production,  and 
those  connected  with  outlay  or  consumption.  What  is  the  applica- 
tion to  the  topic  in  hand?  "  ^^  In  acquisition,  the  more  money  a 
man  has,  the  more  he  can  make.^^  In  consumption,  the,  more 
money  he  has  the  less  satisfaction  he  sacrifices  by  giving  up  a  given 
sum  of  money  to  the  government.^^  Here,  then,  is  a  psychological 
basis  of  taxation.  "  If  it  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  any  definite 
scale  of  progression,  much  less  can  it  necessarily  lead  to  a  fixed 
proportional  taxation.  But  if  we  never  can  reach  an  ideal,  there  is 
no  good  reason  why  we  should  not  strive  to  get  as  close  to  it  as 
possible."  ^'^  How  far  a  government  may  go,  at  any  particular 
time,  in  approximation  to  a  progressive  scale  depends  on  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  people.  Hence  not  only  the  principle,  but  its  applica- 
tion involves  psychological  considerations. 

Corporation  finance  also  has  a  social-psychological  basis.  Note 
the  consolidation  of  financial  interests  in  Germany,  under  govern- 
mental encouragement  and  direction,  as  compared  with  the  opposi- 
tion that  has  marked  the  development  of  consolidation  in  the  United 
States.     These  diverse  economic  developments  cannot  be  explained 

21  Fisher,  "The  Need  for  Health  Insurance,"  Amer.  Labor  Leg.  Rev.,  March,  1917, 
13.  See  also,  in  the  same  periodical,  Lambert,  "Medical  Organization  and  Health 
Insurance,"  37.  See  also  Goldmark  and  Frankfurter,  "  Oregon  Minimum  Wage  Cases," 
127-146. 

22  Gibbon,  op.  cit.,  94;  Lambert,  op.  cit.,  41. 

28  Seligman,  "Progressive  Taxation  in  Theory  and  Practice,"  290;  see  also  Seligman, 
"The  Income  Tax,"  4-18. 

2*  Seligman,  "  Progressive  Taxation  in  Theory  and  Practice,"  291. 

25  Ibid.,  291-292. 

28  Ibid.,  209-216. 

^"^  Ibid.,  292-293;  see  also  Seligman,  "The  Income  Tax,"  31-34.  ^ 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    381 

without  a  knowledge  of  the  differences  in  national  psychology. 
Public  finance  likewise  has  a  social-psychological  basis.  Thus,  in 
the  United  States  the  democratic  tradition  that  any  man,  regardless 
of  S9cial  class,  may  rise  to  any  office  in  the  government,  and  that 
these  men  are  capable  of  transacting  any  and  all  governmental 
business  has  resulted  in  an  irresponsible  and  inefficient  system  of 
public  finance;  ^^  while,  in  England,  the  undemocratic  tradition  that 
a  popular  assembly  is  unfitted  for  the  transaction  of  governmental 
business  and  should  select  the  proper  persons  for  that  function, 
has  resulted  in  a  responsible  and  efficient  system  of  public  finance. ^^ 
These  different  traditions  rest  upon  different  social-psychological 
processes;  those  of  the  democratic  tradition  must  be  understood  in 
order  to  appreciate  the  persistence  of  the  inefficient  system  of  public 
finance  in  the  United  States. 

Conditions  affecting  general  price  level  are  psychological. 
Among  these  conditions.  Professor  Fisher  mentions  the  "  extent 
and  variety  of  human  wants,"  "  business  confidence,"  "  habits  of 
the  individual "  as  to  hoarding  and  the  giving  of  credit,  and 
others.^*^  These  conditions  are  not  analysed  by  the  economist  but 
are  assumed  in  his  logical  and  statistical  studies. 

The  accumulation  of  capital,  also,  rests  on  psychological  condi- 
tions. It  is  said  to  be  due  to  the  preference  for  future  over  present 
goods  or  services,  with  little  attempt  at  analysis  of  the  psychological 
nature  of  such  preference.  "  Just  as  in  the  ordinary  theory  of  prices 
the  ratio  of  exchange  of  any  two  articles  is  based  on  a  psychological 
or  subjective  element,  —  their  comparative  marginal  utiHty,  —  so 
in  the  theory  of  interest  the  rate  of  interest,  or  the  premium  in 
exchange  between  present  and  future  goods,  is  based  on  a  sub- 
jective prototype,  namely,  the  preference  for  present  over  future 
goods."  ^^  The  author  goes  on  to  state  that  "  This  time-preference 
is  the  central  fact  in  the  theory  of  interest.  It  is  what  Rae  calls 
the  '  effective  desire  for  accumulation,'  and  very  nearly  what  Bohm- 
Bawerk  calls  the  '  perspective  under-valuation  of  the  future.'  "  ^^ 

28 Willoughby,  "Budgetary  Procedure  in  its  Relation  to  Representative  Government," 
Yale  Laiu  Journal,  XXVII :  747-752 ;  Plehn,  "  Government  Finance  in  the  United 
States,"  96-1CX3. 

29  Willoughby,  op.  cit.,  744-747. 

30  Fisher,  "Elementary  Principles  of  Economics,"  192-202.  See  also  Fisher,  "Why 
the  Dollar  is  Shrinking,"  90-92. 

31  Fisher,  "  The  Rate  of  Interest,"  88. 

32  Ibid.,  88.     (Quoted  without  footnotes.) 


382      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

In  their  analysis  of  the  processes  of  production,  economists  find 
these  to  be  inseparably  bound  up  with  social-psychological  processes. 
For  instance,  in  the  study  of  the  wool  industry,  the  economist  is 
obliged  to  make  an  analysis  of  the  processes  that  determine  the  rise 
and  dissemination  of  styles,  because  the  style  determines  the  quan- 
tity and  quality  of  the  fabrics  manufactured  in  a  given  season,'* 
Again,  the  economist  shows  that  changes  in  the  supply  of  goods 
produce  changes  in  demand,  according  to  the  elasticity  of  the  de- 
mand for  the  goods.  The  differences  in  the  elasticity  of  demand 
can  be  statistically  stated,*^  but  the  causes  of  these  different  elastici- 
ties are  problems  of  social  psychology. 

Economists  have,  therefore,  at  many  points  implicitly  or  ex- 
plicitly acknowledged  the  close  relation  of  economics  and  social 
psychology.  Yet,  in  reading  monographs  on  economic  problems, 
one  is  often  impressed  with  the  vagueness  of  the  part  devoted  to 
the  social-psychological  factors.  In  monographs  on  labour  prob- 
lems one  finds  a  vagueness  in  the  analysis  of  the  psychological  as- 
pects, or,  to  use  the  term  more  often  used  by  economists,  the 
"  ethics  "  of  the  problem,  as  compared  with  the  clear  analysis  of  the 
economic  factors.  The  deficiency  is  due  to  the  lack  of  social-psycho- 
logical training,  or,  more  accurately,  to  the  lack  of  social  psychol- 
ogy. Sometimes  economists  invoke  an  ethical  principle  when  there 
is  no  economic  principle  touching  the  problem.  For  instance  econ- 
omists have  long  sought  but  never  found  a  principle  according  to 
which  may  be  solved  the  problem  of  what  constitutes  a  just  wage  in 
any  particular  instance.^^  Professor  Pigou  acknowledges  the  lack 
of  such  a  principle  and  proposes  an  ethical  standard  which  is  de- 
rived from  a  conception  of  what  ought  to  be.^^  If  such  a  principle 
is  ultimately  attained,  it  will  not  be  an  ethical  assumption,  but  a 
principle  derived  from  the  science  of  human  nature.  For  the  dis- 
tribution of  wealth  must  be  such  as  to  promote  the  development  of 
personality. 

There  are  some  recent  studies  of  economic  processes  which  lead 
us  to  hope  that,  if  sufficiently  exhaustive  researches  can  be  made, 
economics  may  become  a  quantitative  study  of  human  behaviour 
in  the  achievement  of  material  welfare.     Such  a  monograph  is 

33  Cherington,  "  The  Wool  Industry,"  Chs.  XI-XII. 

3*  Moore,  "  Economic  Cycles,  Their  Law  and  Cause,"  69. 

35  Hollander,  "  Abolition  of  Poverty,"  49-50. 

36  Pigou,  "Principles  and  Methods  of  Industrial  Peace,"  35-38. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS     383 

Professor  Mitchell's  Business  Cycles.     He  finds  that  the  controlling 
factor  in  business  cycles  is  "  the  quest  of  profits."     "  Since  the  quest 
of  money  profits  by  business  enterprises  is  the  controlling  factor 
among  the  economic  activities  of  men  who  live  in  a  money  economy, 
the  whole  discussion  must  center  about  the  propects  of  profits."  '"^ 
In  the  description  of  a  cycle,  which  begins  with  the  revival  of  activity 
after  a  period  of  depression,  he  observes  that  "  the  only  safe  way 
of  dating  a  revival  is  to  accept  the  consensus  of  opinion  among  men 
intimately  familiar  with  business  conditions  at  the  time."  ^^     The 
revival  is  due,  among  other  causes,  to  the  rise  of  certain  psycho- 
logical conditions  which   stimulate   the   quest   of  money  profits.'* 
Among  these  are  the  "  optimism  "  of  the  prosperous  individual  and 
his  influence  on  others.^**     "  As  it  spreads,  the  epidemic  of  optimism 
helps  to  breed  conditions  which  both  justify  and  intensify  it."  "^^ 
As  the  business  activity  increases,  prices  begin  to  rise.     This  is  due 
to  increasing  prime  and  supplementary  costs  and,  also,  to  the  sellers' 
impulse  for  profits.     On  the  intelligent  regulation  of  this  impulse 
depends  the  further  course  of  the  cycle.     "  There  is  always  danger 
that  sellers  may  over-reach  themselves  by  advancing  prices  more 
rapidly  than  the  market  conditions  will  support.     For  the  expansion 
in  the  volume  of  business,  upon  which  rests  the  whole  movement 
toward  prosperity,  may  be  checked  by  an  ill-timed  or  excessive  ad- 
vance.    Frequently  one  or  more  branches  of  trade  receive  a  set- 
back while  others  are  reviving,  because  mistakes  of  this  kind  are 
made  by  leading  enterprises.     More  rarely,  the  whole  revival  is 
retarded  or  even  stopped  by  an  over-rapid  rise  of  the  price  level."  *^ 
Throughout  the  course  of  the  cycle,  the  essential  process  is  the  im- 
pulse for  profits.     The  aim  of  the  business  man  is  to  fix  prices  at 
the  highest  point  consistent  with  the  continued  rise,  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  lack  of  intelligence  of  labourers  to  pay  the  lowest 
possible  wage,^^  and  the  lowest  price  for  loans.**     Owing  to  the  es- 
sentially impulsive  nature  of  man,  however,  extravagant  expectation 
prevails  over  careful  thought.*^     The  result  is  an  accumulation  of 

37  Mitchell,  "  Business  Cycles,"  450. 

38  Ibid.,  456. 

39  Ibid.,  452-453. 

*o  Ibid.,  :^SS- 
<i  Ibid.,  455. 
42  Ibid.,  459. 
*3  Ibid.,  465-466. 
**  Ibid.,  466-467. 
« Ibid.,  483,  498. 


384      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

conditions  which  eventually  causes  depression. ^"^  This  in  turn  is 
intensified  by  the  cumulative  effect  of  apprehensive  ideas  upon  the 
depression.^^  The  few  men  who  are  not  obsessed  by  these  impul- 
sive ideas  because  of  extraordinary  shrewdness,  and  who  have  the 
advantage  of  a  knowledge  of  inside  conditions,  are  those  who  reap 
the  big  fortunes. ^^ 

What  one  finds  in  economic  monographs  are  logical  and  statis- 
tical analyses  of  the  economic  results  of  essential  tendencies  of  be- 
haviour, with  no  attempt  at  a  psychological  analysis  of  the  essen- 
tial tendencies.  For  instance,  Professor  Moore  assumes  the  psy- 
chological processes  of  speculation  —  the  uncertainty,  the  affective 
thinking  processes,  the  intellective  thinking  processes  ^^ —  without 
analysing  them,  and  recognizes  these  processes  only  at  points  where 
they  appear  as  alleged  causes  that  must  be  proved  or  disproved. ^° 
Again,  Professor  Moore  has  proved  that  workmen  are  paid  ac- 
cording to  their  differential  efficiency.^^  This  means  that  the  wages 
of  labour  are  subject  to  the  law  of  supply  and  demand:  the  more 
efficient  the  labourers,  the  smaller  the  supply  and  the  higher  the 
wage.  This,  in  turn,  means  that  the  prevailing  motive  of  em- 
ployers in  their  relations  with  labour  is  to  get  labour  at  least  cost. 
The  economist  thus  incidentally  demonstrates  what  is  the  prevail- 
ing motive  of  the  employer,  but  does  not  attempt  a  psychological 
analysis  of  the  relation  of  employer  and  employe.  He  is  not  con- 
cerned with  variations  from  the  prevailing  motive  nor  with  the 
check  on  variant  motives  by  the  prevailing  motive  to  get  labour  at 
least  cost.  All  these  problems  of  essential  motives,  their  connec- 
tions and  variations,  are  problems  for  the  social  psychologist. 

Another  illustration  of  social-psychological  assumptions  of 
economists  which  require  analysis  is  furnished  by  the  problem  of 
the  jurisdictional  disputes  of  trade  unions.  Dr.  Whitney,  after 
a  careful  analysis  of  the  jurisdictional  disputes  of  American  build- 
ing-trade unions,  assigns  several  impulses  of  the  members  as  causes 
of  these  disputes.^^     There  is  no  attempt  to  relate  these  motives, 

*^  Ibid.,  503-511. 

^-i  Ibid.,  512,  554-555- 

*^Ibid.,  598. 

*^  Moore,  "  Forecasting  the  Yield  and  the  Price  of  Cotton,"  2,  3,  10,  n,  163,  164,  166. 

'^^Ibid.,  76-78. 

51  Moore,  "  Laws  of  Wages,"  90-96. 

52  Whitney,   "  Jurisdiction   in  American  Building  Trades,"  J.  H.   U.  S.  H.  P.  S., 
Series  XXXII,  Ch.  IV. 


RELATION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  TO  ECONOMICS    385 

and  only  the  vaguest  hypothetical  statement  Is  made  as  to  their 
relative  importance.  It  is  implicitly  regarded  as  outside  the  sphere 
of  the  economist. ^^  Because  the  motives  are  for  the  most  part 
subconscious,  and  because  some  of  them,  when  conscious,  are  not 
admitted  by  workmen,  an  explanation  of  them  is  not  found  in  the 
documentary  sources.  Very  careful  field  work  among  trade  union 
men  in  their  meetings  and  at  their  work  is  necessary  to  accumulate 
data  for  a  study  of  their  motives.  This  field  work  is  one  of  the 
distinctive  methods  of  social-psychology.^* 

We  have  seen  that  the  economist  deals  with  quantitative  data, 
and  in  his  interpretation  of  these  data  uses  psychological  assump- 
tions. The  social  psychologist  analyses  the  assumed  processes,  and 
examines  their  relation  to  the  processes  that  are  assumed  by  the 
political  scientist  and  the  student  of  jurisprudence.^^  Social  psy- 
chology also  explains  the  processes  of  human  nature  that  economic 
conditions  must  facilitate  for  the  development  of  personality.  It 
likewise  prescribes  for  political  and  juristic  development.  Social 
psychology  is,  therefore,  a  co-ordinating  science,  less  objective,  less 
susceptible  of  quantitative  treatment  than  other  social  sciences,  but, 
nevertheless,  concrete,  inductive,  with  a  distinct  field  and  method, 
and  functioning  as  a  further  stage  in  the  intensive  analysis  of  social 
relations, 

®3  For  another  example  see  Spedden's  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  use  and  failure 
to  use  the  trade  union  label.  (Spedden,  "The  Trade  Union  Label,"  J.  H.  U.  S.  H. 
P.  S.,  Series  XXVIII,  No.  2,  69-74.) 

5*  Williams,   "  An  American  Town,"   Introduction. 

ss  Commons,  "A  Sociological  View  of  Sovereignty,"  Amer.  Jour.  Sociol.,  V:io. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

SOCIAL    PSYCHOLOGY    AND    HISTORY 

IN  suggesting  as  briefly  as  possible  what  seem  to  me  to  be  some 
of  the  relations  of  social  psychology  to  history,  I  do  not  want 
to  be  drawn  into  problems  of  historical  reconstruction.  These 
are  problems  for  the  historian  and  not  for  the  social  psychologist. 
The  aim  is,  therefore,  simply  to  state  what  the  different  attitudes 
of  historians  to  alleged  psychological  aspects  of  historical  method 
imply  as  to  the  relation  of  social  psychology  to  history.  I  am  not 
interested  in  estabhshing  or  denying  any  relation  but  seek  merely 
to  indicate  aspects  of  the  relation  that  seem  to  be  implied  in  the 
statements  of  historians  themselves.  This  is  not  saying  that  his- 
torians would  endorse  the  relation  suggested. 

In  his  book,  "  The  New  History,"  Dr.  Robinson  includes  the  so- 
cial psychologist  among  "  The  New  Allies  of  History  " ;  and  de- 
clares that  "  the  great  and  fundamental  question  of  how  mankind 
learns  and  disseminates  his  discoveries  and  misapprehensions  —  in 
short,  the  whole  rationale  of  human  civilization  as  distinguished 
from  the  life  of  the  anthropoids  —  will  never  be  understood  with- 
out social  psychology;  .  .  ."  ^  Since  this  statement  was  written, 
the  social-psychological  point  of  view  has  had  an  increasing  influ- 
ence in  the  work  of  some  historians  while  others  have  developed 
a  decided  attitude  against  it. 

The  relation  of  social  psychology  to  history  involves  a  considera- 
tion of  its  relation  to  the  criticism  of  historical  method  and  to  the 
different  conceptions  of  the  reconstruction  of  history.  The  former 
requires  consideration  first.  Let  us  note,  then,  some  of  the  ways 
in  which  social-psychological  assumptions  have  served,  or  might 
have  served,  the  criticism  of  historical  method. 

We  note,  first,  that  "  we  shall  not  go  far  astray,  if  we  view  his- 
tory, as  it  has  existed  through  the  ages,  and  even  down  to  our  own 
day,  as  a  branch  of  general  literature,  the  object  of  which  has  been 
to  present  past  events  in  an  artistic  manner,  .  .  ."  ^     The  motives 

1  Robinson,  "  The  New  History,"  93. 

2  Robinson,  op.  cit.,  27;  see  also  Becker,  op.  cit.,  642. 

386 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  387 

that  inspired  artistic  creation  animated  the  writing  of  history; 
though,  to  be  sure,  the  historian  did  not  give  his  imagination  such 
perfectly  free  rein  as  did  the  literary  man.  Essential  among  the 
motives  common  to  both  kinds  of  writing  were  impulses  having 
their  source  in  the  rivalrous  disposition  of  man.  In  the  writing 
of  history,  this  motive  took  the  direction  of  an  impulse  for  sec- 
tarian, national,  or  class  superiority.  Note  first  the  action  of  the 
impulse  to  glorify  the  religious  sect  to  which  the  historian  belonged. 
Christian  historians  used  history  against  paganism.^  Catholic 
historians  used  history  to  endorse  Catholic  behefs;  Protestant  his- 
torians to  magnify  the  truth  of  Protestant  beliefs;  while  anti-Chris- 
tian writers,  as  Voltaire,  used  history  to  give  authority  to  their 
contradictions  of  the  beliefs  of  Christian  theology;  and  Christian 
theologians  used  history  against  Voltaire.* 

These  writers  allowed  their  sectarian  impulses  subconsciously  or 
consciously  to  direct  their  reconstruction  of  history.  This  method 
of  historical  reconstruction  continued  down  to  recent  times.  Ban- 
croft saw  in  history  "  the  movement  of  the  divine  power  which 
gives  unity  to  the  universe,  and  order  and  connection  to  events."  ^ 
This  impulsive  purpose  caused  a  lack  of  thoroughness  in  the  treat- 
ment of  sources  and  of  frankness  in  telling  the  whole  truth.  The 
association  of  ideas  was  affective  and  not  intellectual. 

Another  form  of  group  rivalry  that  affected  the  writing  of  his- 
tory was  the  rivalry  of  nations.  As  sectarian  impulses  weakened, 
historians  wrote  more  and  more  under  the  impulse  to  glorify  their 
own  nation  or  some  nation  of  antiquity.^  Especially  susceptible  to 
such  treatment  is  the  history  of  ancient  nations  and  the  beginnings 
of  the  history  of  modern  nations;  for  historical  reconstruction  here 
deals  with  the  dim  past  where  the  scarcity  of  data  gives  ample  play 
to  the  imagination  under  the  direction  of  the  rivalrous  disposition. 
For  nearly  a  century,  the  thought  of  students  concerning  the  origins 
of  institutions  was  determined  by  rivalry  between  Teutonic  and 
Roman  scholars,  and  each  group  magnified  the  influence  on  civiliza- 
tion of  the  institutions  in  which  it  was  interested,  and  minimized  the 
influence  of  the  institutions  extolled  by  the  rival  group.     Teutonic 

'Robinson,  op.  cit.,  29-32;  Shotwell,  "The  Interpretation  of  History,"  Amer.  Hist. 
Rev..  XVIII:  649-701. 

*  Robinson,  op.  cit.,  33-39;  Shotwell,  op.  cit.,  702. 

0  Bancroft,  "The  History  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,"  n:284;  1:6. 

•Dunning,  "Truth  in  History,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XIX: 221. 


388      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

historians  aimed  to  show  that  civilization  had  developed  from  Teu- 
tonic institutions,  that  wherever  the  Teutonic  race ,  went,  it  dis- 
played certain  innate  qualities  that  made  its  institutions  superior  to 
Roman  institutions.  All  this  was  denied  by  the  French  school 
which  declared  that  the  original  Teutonic  free  group  was  a  figment 
of  the  Teutonic  imagination;  that  the  manorial  system  in  England 
could  be  traced  back  to  Roman  times.  The  tremendous  and  sus- 
tained interest  in  origins,  as  compared  with  the  interest  in  the  more 
immediate  past,  has  been  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  mystery  of  the 
remote  past  and  to  the  opportunity  afforded  by  this  mystery  to 
make  impulsive  ideas  impressive. 

Another  form  of  group  rivalry,  which  has  determined  the  asso- 
ciation of  ideas  in  the  writing  of  history,  has  been  the  rivalry  of 
political  parties.  This  influence  was  particularly  marked  follow- 
ing the  French  revolution.  "  Of  the  questions  which  the  revolu- 
tion left  unsettled,  perhaps  the  most  pressing  was  political  in  its 
nature.  In  France  and  Germany,  if  not  also  in  England,  the  revo- 
lution destroyed  all  consensus  of  opinion  as  to  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  government  and  public  law.  For  two  generations  party 
divisions  turned  on  this  issue;  and  we  might  expect  to  find,  as  we  do 
in  fact  find,  that  historians  and  statesmen,  when  they  turned  to  the 
past,  were  primarily  interested  in  its  poHtical  and  legal  aspects: 
they  wanted  the  past  to  tell  them  what  law  really  was  after  all,  and 
what  kind  of  government  would  prove  most  stable.  It  was  there- 
fore an  age  of  political  historians,  and  each  political  party  found 
support  in  history  for  its  practical  program."  '^ 

With  the  development  of  historical  research  under  these  various 
forms  of  group  rivalry,  historians  became  more  exacting  in  their 
intellectual  requirements.  Each  was  bent  on  proving  his  superior- 
ity to  the  other  in  ability  to  marshal  an  abundance  of  detailed  proofs 
of  the  theory  ^  that  would  establish  the  superiority  of  the  group 
he  represented.  There  was  more  care  in  documentation,  as  one 
may  see  by  comparing  the  work  of  earlier  writers  with  that  of 
Stubbs,*^  or  Fustel  de  Coulanges.^®  But  with  all  their  painstaking 
accuracy,  as  long  as  historians  were  animated  by  group  rivalry, 
their  interpretations  were  unscientific.     "  To  scan  the  past  with  the 

7  Becker,  op.  cit.,  642-643. 

8  Ashley,  "  Introduction  to  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  The  Origin  of  Property  in  Land,"  xi. 
^  Stubbs,  "  Constitutional  History  of  England." 

J^"  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  "  Histoire  des  Institutions  Politiques  de  L'Ancienne  France." 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  389 

hope  of  discovering  recipes  for  the  making  of  statesmen  and  war- 
riors, of  discrediting  the  pagan  gods,  of  showing  that  Catholic  or 
Protestant  is  right  "  is  not  scientific.  None  "  of  these  motives  are 
scientific,  although  they  may  go  hand  in  hand  with  much  sound 
scholarship."  "  So  long  as  historians  continued  to  present  to  the 
reader  such  conspicuous  events  as  they  thought  might  enlist  his 
interest,  and  commented  on  these  with  a  view  of  fortifying  his 
virtue  or  patriotism  or  staying  his  faith  in  God,  it  made  little  dif- 
ference whether  they  took  pains  to  verify  the  facts  or  not.  .  .  . 
But  today  a  large  part  of  the  historian's  attention  is  directed  to  the 
character,  the  reliability,  or  defects  of  his  sources.  The  data  upon 
which  history  rests  have  been  subjected  to  the  most  searching  scien- 
tific scrutiny."  ^^ 

In  view  of  the  results,  which  are  mentioned  in  the  preceding  para- 
graphs, of  the  functioning  of  group  rivalry  impulses  in  the  writing 
of  history,  would  not  a  knowledge  of  the  social-psychological  proc- 
esses of  group  rivalry  serve  the  critic  of  historical  method?  And 
would  not  social  psychology  have  enabled  historians  who  wrote  un- 
der the  influence  of  group  rivalry  impulses  to  discriminate  between 
associations  of  ideas  due  to  such  impulses  and  intellectual  associa- 
tions? Will  not  social  psychology  enable  the  historian  of  today,  in 
his  reconstruction  of  the  past,  to  discern  in  historical  events  the 
movement  of  group  rivalry  impulses?  A  proper  appreciation  of 
social-psychological  processes  widens  the  vision  of  the  historian  and 
guides  the  imagination  in  historical  reconstruction,  even  though  the 
reconstruction,  for  lack  of  data,  cannot  take  place  very  definitely 
along  social-psychological  lines. 

The  associative  processes  of  history  writing  were,  then,  once  es- 
sentially affective.  The  associations  of  ideas  were  believed  to  be 
true  because  they  were  satisfying  to  group  rivalry  impulses.  The 
determining  impulses  of  the  associations  undoubtedly  were  for  the 
most  part  subconscious  and,  where  conscious,  were  allowed  to  de- 
termine thinking  without  criticism.  They  were  not,  however,  en- 
tirely irrational.  Association  was  determined  also  by  the  super- 
ficial reasoning  processes  we  term  analogy.  All  science,  in  its  first 
stages,  has  reasoned  by  analogy  —  that  is,  in  formulating  its  data 
has  employed,  more  or  less  uncritically,  the  concepts  of  a  more  de- 
veloped science.     This  procedure,  also,  is  more  or  less  subconscious; 

1^  Robinson,  op,  cit.,  43-44. 


390      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and,  where  conscious,  it  is  implicitly  assumed  to  be  justified,  rather 
than  explicitly  and  critically  developed.  The  analogical  method 
has  served  two  functions;  it  has  given  the  student  of  a  new  and  un- 
formed science  hypotheses  for  provisional  groupings  of  his  facts; 
and  it  has  given  the  groupings  and  conceptions  of  the  incipient 
science  the  prestige  of  analogy  with  conceptions  the  truth  of  which 
had  become  generally  recognized.  Astronomy,  physics,  and  bi- 
ology were  at  first  condemned  because  destructive  of  the  beliefs  of 
rivalrous  sects  and  nations ;  then,  as  the  conceptions  of  these  sciences 
came  to  be  more  and  more  widely  accepted  by  intellectual  men  and 
to  discredit  theological  and  other  beliefs,  the  conceptions  of  natural 
and  biological  science  gained  prestige  from  their  defeat  of  theology, 
and  became  the  dominant  thought  of  the  age.  Then  it  was  that 
scientists  in  other  fields  aimed  to  give  their  sciences  prestige  by 
adopting  the  methods  of,  and  by  formulating  their  concepts  in  terms 
of  the  dominant  formulas  of,  natural  and  biological  science.  Stu- 
dents of  human  society  —  historians,  and  sociologists,  and  others 
—  have  sought  prestige  for  their  conceptions  by  analogical  use  of 
formulations  that  had  become  famous.  Thus,  thought  about  hu- 
man society  has  been  physical  and  biological.  When  astronomy 
and  physics  were  dominant,  thought  about  society  was  formulated  in 
terms  of  the  Newtonian  theory.^^  When  the  achievements  in 
biology  became  conspicuous,  philosophizing  about  history  and  man 
followed  conceptions  of  organic  development.  For  instance, 
Herder  maintained  that  the  same  God  who  established  laws  for 
nature  made  man  and  ordained  for  him  certain  laws;  that  history  is 
the  result  of  the  action  of  men  in  accordance  with  these  laws;  hence 
history  as  well  as  nature  discloses  certain  great  laws.^^  Herder's 
formulation  was  satisfying,  therefore,  to  the  impulse  for  sectarian 
superiority;  he  formulated  the  omnipotence  of  God  in  terms  of  an 
impressive  scientific  analogy. 

The  idea  of  organic  development  was  applied  not  only  to  history 
but  still  more  widely  in  other  branches  of  knowledge  of  human  so- 
ciety. Herder's  idea  of  history  as  "  a  progressive  education  of 
humanity,"  "  had  from  Lessing,  is  combined  with  the  idea  of  Leib- 
niz that  change  is  evolution,  by  means  of  an  internal  force,  of 
powers  originally  implicit  in  existence,  and  with  the  idea  of  Spinoza 

12  Wilson,  "  The  New  Freedom,"  "  Master  Workers'  Book,"  45-47. 

13  Robinson,  op.  cit.,  38. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  391 

of  an  all-comprehensive  substance.  This  idea  of  organic  growth 
was  then  applied  to  language,  literature  and  institutions.  It  soon 
obtained  reinforcement  from  the  rising  science  of  biology.  Long 
before  the  days  of  Darwin  or  Spencer,  the  idea  of  evolution  had 
been  a  commonplace  of  German  thought  with  respect  to  everything 
concerning  the  history  of  humanity."  ^* 

Hegel  accepted  Herder's  idea  of  the  historical  process  as  a  work- 
ing out  of  divine  intention  which  he  termed  the  world-spirit.^' 
Hegel  used  this  analogy  in  satisfaction  of  the  impulse  for  national 
superiority.  He  maintained  that  the  world-spirit  had  assumed  its 
final  form  in  the  German  nation  which  was  to  be  the  bearer  of  the 
Christian  principle  for  other  nations.^®  Thus  connected  not  only 
with  the  sectarian  but  also  with  the  political  group  rivalry  impulse 
of  the  German  people,  this  world-spirit  philosophy  of  history  had 
a  great  vogue. ^''^  Its  influence  continued  up  to  the  period  of  the 
World  War.  "  When  a  recent  German  writer  argues  that  for 
Germany  to  surrender  any  territory  which  it  has  conquered  during 
the  present  war  would  be  sacrilegious,  since  it  would  be  to  refuse  to 
acknowledge  the  workings  of  God  in  human  history,  he  speaks  quite 
in  the  Hegelian  vein."  ^®  "  The  supreme  role  assigned  by  Hegel 
to  his  own  countrymen  filled  them  with  justifiable  pride,  And_^was 
not  this  assumption  amply  borne  out  by  the  glories  of  '  Deutsch- 
tum  '  in  the  Middle  Ages, —  which  the  romanticists  were  singing: 
and,  much  more  recently,  by  the  successful  expulsion  of  the  French 
tyrant?  That  all  this  should  combine  to  give  a  distinct  national 
and  patriotic  trend  to  historic  research  and  writing  was  inevitable. 
The  great  collection  of  the  sources  for  the  German  Middle  Ages, — 
the  '  Monumenta  Germaniae  Historica  '  .  .  .  began  to  be  issued  in 
1826.  .  .  .  Ranke,  Dahn,  .  .  .  and  dozens  of  others  who  began 
to  devote  themselves  to  German  history,  were  all  filled  with  a  warm 
patriotism  and  enthusiasm  very  different  from  the  cosmopolitan 
spirit  of  the  preceding  century.  Throughout  Europe  history  tended 
to  become  distinctly  national,  and  an  extraordinary  impetus  was 
given  to  the  publication  of  vast  collections  of  material."  ^"     In  the 

^*  Dewey,  "German  Philosophy  and  Politics,"  112-113. 

15  Hegel,  "  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  History,"  trans,  by  Sibree,  19-23. 

1®  Ibid.,  62-63,  475-476. 

1'^  Dewey,  "  German  Philosophy  and  Politics,"  119. 

18  Ibid.,  113-114. 

"Robinson,  "The  New  History,"  41. 


392      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

organization  of  this  material,  the  German  historian  Ranke  accepted 
the  Hegelian  conception  of  a  Zeitgeist  that  determined  the  spirit  of 
the  nation,  and  which  the  historian  should  portray.  "  Ranke  did 
not  develop  this  philosophic  background  of  history,  he  accepted  it 
and  worked  from  rather  than  towards  it.  .  .  .  Why,  therefore, 
should  one  turn  aside  to  other  devices  to  explain  history,  since  it  ex- 
plained itself  if  once  presented  in  its  own  light?  "  ^"  One  would 
have  thought  that,  with  this  point  of  view,  Ranke  would  have  empha- 
sized psychological  processes  in  his  reconstruction.  But  he  trusted 
implicitly  to  the  philosophers  to  make  explicit  this  philosophy  of 
history.^^  In  spite  of  his  comprehensive  mind,  Ranke  shared  the 
nationalistic  impulses  of  his  time,^^  and  limited  himself  to  political 
history. 

The  development  of  psychology  ultimately  gave  rise  in  Ger- 
piany  to  a  conception  of  a  close  relation  between  social  psy- 
chology and  history.  For  instance,  Wundt  declared  that  "  the  es- 
sential content  of  history  consists  in  those  events  which  spring  from 
the  psychical  motives  of  human  conduct.  Moreover,  it  is  the  nexus 
and  change  of  motives  underlying  such  conduct  that  lends  to  events 
the  inner  continuity  which  is  universally  demanded  of  history."  ^' 
A  philosophy  of  history  "  is  a  psychological  account  of  the  develop- 
ment of  mankind."  ^^  But  Wundt's  studies  of  the  mind  of  primi- 
tive peoples  are  more  metaphysical  than  scientific.  The  same  is 
true  of  Lamprecht's  interpretation  of  German  history.  Lam- 
precht  sketched  the  trend  of  the  national  spirit  of  Germany  in  suc- 
cessive periods  of  German  history  —  symbolism,  typism,  conven- 
tionalism, individualism,  subjectivism.^^  His  method  calls  for  an 
intensive  treatment  of  historical  processes,  which  is  possible  only 
for  recent  history.  It  is  evident  that  much  of  his  work  is  inspired 
by  the  organismic  analogy  applied  to  the  nation  —  the  same  anal- 
ogy that  German  political  scientists  applied  to  the  interpretation 
of  the  state. 

There  is  a  justifiable  use  of  analogy  but  it  is  extremely  diflicult 
to  confine  its  use  to  justifiable  limits.     The  reason  is  that  the  use 

20  Shotwell,  op.  cit.,  703. 

21  Ibid.,  70+. 

22  Ibid.,  703. 

28  Wundt,  "  Elements  of  Folk  Psychology,"  trans,  by  Schaub,  509. 
"^^Ibid.,  522. 

25  Lamprecht,    "Deutsche    Geschichte";    Lamprecht,   "Zur   jungsten    deutschen   Ver- 
gangenheit " ;  Lamprecht,  "  What  is  History  ?  "    Translated  by  E.  A.  Andrews. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  393 

of  the  concepts  of  one  science,  as  analogies  for  the  framework  of 
the  thought  of  another,  Is  apt  to  persist  long  after  these  analogies 
have  outlived  their  strictly  scientific  usefulness.  The  analogy 
makes  possible  a  provisional  formulation  of  Impressions,  which 
formulation,  because  of  the  prestige  of  the  concepts  used  as  anal- 
ogles,  Interests  thinking  people  In  the  possibilities  of  the  new  science. 
The  use  of  the  analogy  persists  because  thinkers  In  a  new  field  are 
apt  to  be  more  or  less  carried  away  by  a  conception  which  has 
proved  to  be  of  great  scientific  value  in  another;  and  because  they 
cling  to  a  conception  that  gives  their  work  prestige;  and  because 
assumptions,  once  they  have  become  fixed,  are  hard  to  change. 
Thus  the  dominant  conceptions  of  an  age  get  a  grip  on  thought  in 
widely  separated  fields,  and  their  control  chokes  free  inquiry  and  se- 
vere analysis  through  which,  alone,  Intellectual  progress  is  possible. 
A  thoroughly  Intellectual  attitude  is  rare,  even  among  scholars, 
because  scholars,  like  other  men,  are  subject  to  the  influence  of  the 
powers  that  be.  The  rivalrous  Impulses  impel  to  thought  and 
behaviour  that  will  demonstrate  superiority  In  thinking  that  com- 
mends the  scholar  to  the  powers  that  be.  One  way  of  winning  this 
commendation  has  been  to  increase  the  prestige  of  the  sect  or  na- 
tion by  marshalling  a  mass  of  learning  In  support  of  its  beliefs  and 
prejudices,  and  by  plausibly  interpreting  these  In  thought  forms 
that  have  acquired  great  prestige.  Thus  the  conception  of  a  reign 
of  cosmic  law  magnified  the  power  of  God  as  the  great  law-giver, 
and  therefore  magnified  the  power  of  the  sect  that  claimed  this 
God  as  Its  God;  and  magnified  the  power  of  the  nation  in  which 
this  God  or  World  Spirit  had  been  most  fully  manifested.  Schol- 
ars who  seek  to  commend  themselves  to  the  powers  that  be  and 
who,  in  so  doing,  lend  themselves  to  the  use  of  those  powers, 
may  be  unconscious  of  so  doing.  Yet  those  impulses  will  affect 
their  thought  and  behaviour  even  more  because  of  the  unconscious 
nature  of  the  Influence.  The  control  of  the  powers  over  the 
scholars  in  the  main  may  not  be  deliberately  or  consciously  exerted; 
but  it  is  none  the  less  effective.  This  relation  to  the  powers  that 
be  is  seen  among  scholars  of  all  countries;  and  it  was  conspicuous 
among  German  scholars  who  lent  their  abilities  to  the  national  am- 
bition for  superiority.  Their  associations  of  ideas  determined  by 
these  subconscious  Impulses  were  attributed  by  the  Germans  to 
an  absolute  and  universal  Reason,  as  distinguished  from  analytic 


394     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

thought  condemned  by  them  as  mere  "  understanding."  "  The 
appeal  was  not  from  reasonable  experience,  but  from  the  analytic 
thought  (henceforth  condemned  to  be  merely  '  Understanding ' — 
'  Verstand  ')  to  an  absolute  and  universal  Reason  (Vernunft)  par- 
tially revealed  in  nature  and  more  adequately  manifested  in  human 
history  as  an  organic  process.  Recourse  to  history  was  required 
not  because  of  any  empirical  lessons  it  has  to  teach,  nor  yet  be- 
cause history  bequeathes  to  us  stubborn  institutions  which  must  be 
reckoned  with,  but  because  history  is  the  dynamic  and  evolving 
realization  of  immanent  reason. .  .  ^^ 

Thus  clothed  with  divinity  and  glorified  by  association  with  the 
absolute,  the  impulsive  movements  of  the  imagination  could  serve 
the  nationalistic  ambition  with  an  exalted  fervor  and  without  any 
disagreeable  misgivings  as  to  the  real  nature  of  the  thought  proc- 
esses involved.  This  impulsive  trend  of  German  philosophy  af- 
fected every  branch  of  social  science  in  Germany,  even  anthro- 
pology. Thus,  alleged  likeness  of  race  was  long  given  as  an  excuse 
for  the  national  ambition  for  extension  of  sovereignty.  "  All  coun- 
tries where  the  names  of  places  or  of  persons,  the  colour  of  the 
eyes,  or  the  shape  of  the  head  denote  an  infiltration  of  Teutonic  ele- 
ments, are  declared  to  be  the  domain  of  the  German  race.  The 
Netherlands,  the  Flemish  districts  of  Belgium  and  France,  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  Burgundy,  Franche  Comte,  the  Scandinavian  nations, 
Finland,  the  Baltic  provinces  of  Russia,  Austria,  in  short,  all  central 
Europe  from  the  North  Cape  to  the  Adriatic  has  been  proclaimed 
the  chosen  land  which  is  destined  to  become  subject  to  the  German 
Empire.  And  since  race  is  not  so  easy  to  determine,  and  since  the 
people  themselves  forget  their  true  descent,  the  scientists  must  un- 
dertake the  task  of  apprising  them  of  their  correct  allegiance  ac- 
cording to  their  origin.  .  .  .  These  trenchant  affirmations  of  *  com- 
petent authorities  '  might  be  harmless  enough,  were  they  not  backed 
up  by  imperialist  politicians,  armed  with  the  verdicts  of  scholarship 
as  if  with  title  deeds,  who  command  the  peoples  to  throw  them- 
selves, willing  or  unwilling,  into  the  embrace  of  the  reconstituted 
race.  In  just  this  fashion  did  the  German  universities  prepare 
the  way  for  the  achievements  of  Bismarck  and  represent  to  their 
*  long  lost  brothers  '  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  their  annexation  by  the 
Empire  as  a  return  to  the  '  German  family.'  .  .  . 

26  Dewey,  "  German  Philosophy  and  Politics,"  93. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  395 

"  Who  does  not  feel  the  scandal  and  shamelessness  of  such  soph- 
istries? In  the  name  of  what  Renan  has  termed  the  '  poor  little 
conjectural  sciences,'  in  the  name  of  history,  that  complaisant  serv- 
ant of  any  theory,  in  the  name  of  linguistics  and  of  anthropology, 
yet  more  uncertain  and  still  more  complaisant,  attempts  are  made 
to  decide  the  fate  of  peoples  against  their  will.  A  few  degrees 
more  or  less  of  the  cephalic  index  are  expected  to  determine  a 
frontier.  Was  it  not  Frederick  the  Great  who,  understanding  his 
people,  remarked  on  the  eve  of  the  partition  of  Poland:  '  What- 
ever I  may  do,  I  shall  always  find  some  pedant  to  justify  me.'  "  ^"^ 

Two  forms  of  thought  that  have  conspicuously  served  to  sup- 
port the  control  of  the  powers  that  be,  are  the  biological  and 
psychological  analogies  of  the  state  and  of  its  historical  develop- 
ment. The  state  has  been  viewed  as  an  organism  and  as  a  per- 
sonality. The  idea  of  the  state  as  organism  or  personality  or 
both  serves  the  interests  of  the  powers  that  be  because  it  ignores, 
glosses  over  and  detracts  attention  from  the  class  conflict.  The 
theory  of  the  state  as  a  personality  with  one  legally  absolute  will 
obviously  does  not  regard  the  conception  of  a  dominant  class  and 
of  class  resistance  and  conflict  as  essential  in  the  conception  of  the 
state.  The  historian  who  assumes  that  the  people  whose  history 
he  writes  have  a  state  personality  cannot  consistently  make  class 
conflict  an  essential  assumption  of  his  work.  This  theory  of  a 
state  personality  serves  the  purposes  of  an  autocracy,  whose  am- 
bition for  national  supremacy  requires  that  there  be  no  class  con- 
flict within  the  nation.  Thinkers  of  a  nation  like  Germany,  which 
had  long  dwelt  upon  projects  of  national  supremacy  and  conquest, 
conspicuously  fostered  the  theory  of  the  state  as  a  personality,^^ 
and  regarded  history  as  the  record  of  the  development  of  the  state 
personality.  A  theory  of  state  personality  also  serves  the  interests 
of  a  dominating  aristocracy  that  frowns  on  the  suggestion  of  lower 
class  resistance  implied  in  the  conception  of  a  class  struggle.  A 
theory  that  ignores  class  conflict  and  implies  the  undisturbed  domi- 
nation of  an  aristocracy  or  an  autocracy  commends  itself  to  scholars 
who  are,  consciously  or  subconsciously,  desirous  to  commend  them- 
selves to  the  powers  that  be. 

Organismic  theories  of  the  state  and  of  history  are  examples  of 

27  Ruyssen,  "What  is  a  Nationality?"     Intern.  Council.,  No.  112,  13-14. 
28Coker,  "Organismic  Theories  of  the  State,"  11,  Chs.  II- IV. 


396      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  direction  of  thinking  processes  of  historians  by  the  concepts  of 
other  sciences,  and  are  the  outcome  of  a  sentiment  for  state  abso- 
lutism that  is  fostered  by  an  autocracy  or  a  dominant  class.  Ger- 
many illustrates  the  first,  England  the  second  influence  for  sohdarity. 
Organismic  theories  of  the  state  have  appealed  to  the  English  mind 
because  there  the  state  and  other  institutions  are  regarded  by  the 
aristocracy  as  the  cumulative  wisdom  of  past  generations,  so  that 
changes  must  not  affect  fundamental  laws  and  customs. ^^  Mr. 
Bosanquet  gave  the  English  conception  of  state  personality  a  formu- 
lation that  appealed  to  the  English  reverence  for  law  and  custom. 
Just  as  most  of  the  reactions  of  the  individual  are  habitual,  he  said, 
so  social  reactions  and  adjustments  are  chiefly  habits  of  joint  ac- 
tion. "  If  the  analogy  is  sound,  which  suggests  itself  between  an 
individual  and  a  community  in  this  respect,  the  ideal  of  political 
nihilism  is  exploded.  For  our  conception  would  indicate  that  so- 
cial life  is  necessarily  and  increasingly  constituted  by  adjustments 
which  have  become  automatic,  and  are  in  a  large  measure  with- 
drawn from  pubHc  attention.  The  formation  of  such  adjustments 
would  then  appear  to  be  the  condition  of  social  progress.  A 
definite  habit  of  orderly  action,  which  receives  the  imprimatur  of 
the  state,  and  is  thus  put  beyond  the  range  of  discussion,  effects  an 
economy  of  attention  .  .  .  setting  free  the  social  mind  for  new 
ideas.  .  .  . 

"  When  we  speak  of  the  State  using  force  or  coercion  upon  in- 
dividuals, by  far  the  greater  part  of  what  we  mean  consists  in  the 
fact  that  each  private  mind  is  rooted  in  the  common  life  by  inter- 
locking adjustments  which  become  automatic  to  all.  By  being  thus 
rooted  its  capacities  and  faculties  are  immeasurably  extended,"  ^" 
just  as,  by  the  formation  of  habits,  the  capacity  of  the  individual 
mind  is  immeasurably  extended.  The  Germans,  on  the  other  hand, 
explained  social  solidarity  as  due,  not  merely  to  habitual  joint  ac- 
tion, but  to  the  fact  that  traditions  are  vehicles  of  the  eternal 
spiritual  truths  of  the  absolute  and  universal  Reason.  "  The  con- 
trast of  the  German  attitude  with  that  of  Edmund  Burke  is  instruc- 
tive. The  latter  had  the  same  profound  hostility  to  cutting  loose. 
from  the  past.     But  his  objection  was  not  that  the  past  is  an  em- 

29  Coker,  op.  cit.,  ii. 

5°  Bosanquet,   "  Social   Automatism   and   the   Imitation   Theory,"  Mind,  N.   S.,  VIII, 
167-168. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  397 

bodiment  of  transcendent  reason,  but  that  its  institutions  are  an 
'  inheritance  '  bequeathed  to  us  from  the  '  collected  wisdom  '  of  our 
forefathers.  The  continuity  of  political  life  centres  not  about  an 
inner  revolving  Idea,  but  about  '  our  hearths,  our  sepulchres  and 
our  altars.'  "  ^^ 

Organismic  theories  of  the  state  have  thrown  little  or  no  light 
on  political  or  historical  processes.  "  Rarely  is  the  argument  sup- 
ported by  precise  definition  or  carried  out  with  careful  reasoning. 
Even  among  those  theorists  who  develop  their  conclusion  through 
logical  deduction  there  is  no  close  approach  to  unanimity  in  their 
major  premises.  Nor  do  those  who  attempt  to  arrive  at  or  sub- 
stantiate their  thesis  inductively  indicate  the  same  kinds  of  facts 
or  the  same  points  of  analogy  as  data  for  their  conclusions  or  as 
verifying  instances  of  their  assumptions."  ^^ 

The  Newtonian  theory,  with  its  conception  of  a  resistless  reign  of 
law  throughout  the  universe,  was  congenial  to  the  attitudes  of  an 
age  characterized  by  a  devout  sense  of  an  omnipotent  Creator, 
ruling  according  to  law.  The  organismic  theory  of  the  state  is  con- 
genial to  the  attitude  of  an  age  or  nation  characterized  by  an  ac- 
quiescence in  the  control  of  an  autocracy  or  an  aristocracy  and  a 
solicitude  for  the  preservation  of  the  existing  social  order.  The 
Darwinian  theory  with  its  emphasis  on  rivalry  may  be  made  to  serve 
the  purpose  of  political  scientists  and  historians  who  aim  to  justify 
a  struggle  for  domination  whether  between  nations  or  between 
classes  within  a  nation.  It  may  also  be  made  to  serve  the  purpose 
of  scholars  who  aim  to  justify  resistance  of  the  domination  of  an 
upper  class,  either  an  aristocracy  or  controlling  corporate  inter- 
ests.^^ A  Darwinian  interpretation  is  less  inapt  than  is  a  Newton- 
ian interpretation,  but  Huxley  long  ago  pointed  out  that  Darwin- 
ism, as  a  formula  for  the  interpretation  of  human  society,  does  not 
apply  in  that  we  sympathetically  preserve  the  unfit. ^^  What  truth 
there  is  in  Darwinian  interpretations  lies  in  the  fact  that  essential 
instincts  of  human  nature, —  acquisition,  sex  instincts,  rivalry  and 
domination  —  are  also  essential  in  the  animal  struggle  for  ex- 
istence; and,  because  of  the  action  of  these  instincts,  the  essential 
process  of  human  history  was,  for  an  immense  period,  a  struggle 

31  Dewey,  op.  cit.,  93. 

32  Coker,  op.  cit.,  191. 

33  Wilson,  "  The  New  Freedom,"  48. 

34  Huxley,  "  Evolution  and  Ethics  and  Other  Essays,"  79-83. 


398     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

for  domination  between  groups.^^  The  defect  of  Darwinian  in- 
terpretations lies  in  the  fact  that  instincts  of  comparatively  little 
importance  in  animal  behaviour  are  rapidly  becoming  more  essential 
in  human  behaviour;  also  in  the  fact  that  through  the  use  of  lan- 
guage, which  distinguishes  man  from  the  animals,  groups  developed 
"  idea-systems  "  which  became  their  distinguishing  characteristics.^* 
As  a  result  of  an  idea-system  "  what  we  find  in  '  civilization  '  is  not 
the  product  of  the  primary  emotions,  which  man  shares  with  ani- 
mals, but  of  some  activity  which  he  has  developed  in  a  characteristic 
manner."  ^^  As  a  result  of  this  functioning  of  ideas,  instincts  which 
are  insignificant  in  animal  behaviour  develop  a  role  in  human  be- 
haviour. "  Thus  human  '  evolution  '  is,  fundamentally,  intellec- 
tual '  evolution,'  and  the  diversity  of  status  in  human  groups  at  the 
present  time  is  to  be  traced  to  differences  in  mental  activity."  *® 

Certain  institutions  common  to  all  mankind,  which  have  no  de- 
velopment among  animals,  are  determining  factors  in  human  adap- 
tation. We  may  find  the  beginnings  of  property  among  animals, 
but  nowhere  do  we  find  any  appreciable  development  of  property, 
nor  any  control  exercised  over  millions  of  their  fellow  creatures 
by  small  groups  who  happen  to  have  been  born  into  the  control  of 
property.  Again,  among  animals  there  are  instances  of  compas- 
sion, but  there  is  no  development  of  institutional  care  of  the  weak 
and  unfit.  These  institutions  derive  a  fixity  from  the  idea-systems 
that  are  developed  to  justify  them,  and  this  fixity  prevents  progres- 
sive changes.  It  "  is  not  the  physical  contact  of  men  that  is  of  su- 
preme importance  in  human  advancement,  but  the  overthrow  of  the 
dominance  of  the  traditional  system  in  which  the  individuals  com- 
posing the  group  have  been  trained,  and  which  they  have  uncon- 
ditionally accepted;  though  advancement  seems  rarely  to  have  been 
possible,  in  the  past,  save  when  diverse  groups  have  been  set  face 
to  face  in  desperate  struggle."  '^  This  struggle  is  the  occasion  of 
"  the  mental  release,  of  the  members  of  a  group  or  of  a  single  in- 
dividual, from  the  authority  of  an  established  system  of  ideas. 
This  release  has,  in  the  past,  been  occasioned  through  the  breaking 
down  of  previous   idea-systems  by  prolonged  struggles  between 

35  Xeggart,  "The  Processes  of  History,"  151. 
38  Ibid.,  100-102. 

37  Ibid.,  103-104. 

38  Ibid.,  104. 

^^  Ibid.,  1 50-151. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY         399 

opposing  groups  which  have  been  brought  into  conflict  as  a  result 
of  the  involuntary  movement  of  peoples.  What  follows  is  the 
building  up  of  a  new  idea-system,  which  is  not  a  simple  cumulation 
of  knowledge  previously  accepted,  but  the  product  of  critical  activ- 
ity stirred  by  the  perception  of  conflicting  elements  in  the  opposed 
idea-systems."  ^®  Thus  we  see  that  historical  study  requires  a 
knowledge  of  social-psychological  processes.  It  does  not  involve 
a  deductive  application  of  the  concepts  of  any  physical,  biological 
or  social  science,  not  even  of  social  psychology.  Social  psychology 
merely  assists,  but  does  not  direct  the  thinking  of  the  historical 
student. 

The  impulsive  and  analogical  period  of  historical  reconstruction, 
so  marked  in  Germany,  was  followed,  especially  in  the  United 
States,  by  a  criticism  of  the  historical  allusions  thus  spread  abroad. 
The  ascertainment  of  historical  fact  came  to  be  emphasized  above 
everything  else;  in  this  emphasis  historians  pressed  the  analogy  of 
the  inductive  method  of  physical  science. ^^  This  serious  intent  on 
the  fact  has  finally  acquired  the  proportions  of  a  sentiment  until 
"  the  restless  quest  for  new  facts  has  overshadowed  every  other 
activity  of  the  historical  student."  ^^  "  The  absorbing  and  relent- 
less pursuit  of  the  objective  fact,"  which  is  "the  typical  function  of 
the  modern  devotee  of  history,"  ^^  impairs  the  effectiveness  of  his- 
torical research.  "  In  the  first  place  it  tends  greatly  to  limit  the 
scope  of  history.  Again,  it  tends  to  stress  the  material  as  compared 
with  the  spiritual  or  psychic  forces  or  influences  in  human  life. 
Further,  it  reduces  to  the  minimum  the  consideration  of  the  casual 
nexus,  and  tends  to  limit  history  to  the  post  hoc,  regardless  of  the 
propter  hoc.  Finally,  it  tends  unduly  to  limit  regard  for  the  influ- 
ence of  what  men  believe  to  be  true,  as  compared  with  what  was 
true."  *^ 

As  the  German  historians  worked  according  to  the  essential  at- 
titude of  their  national  character  —  ambition  for  national  superior- 
ity,^^—  so  American  historians  have  worked  according  to  the  es- 
sential attitude   of  their  national  character, —  ambition   for  per- 

*^  Ibid.,  151-152. 

*i  Hart,  "Imagination  in  History,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XV:  233-234. 

*2  Dunning,  op.  cit.,  226. 

*3  Ibid.,  419. 

*^  Ibid.,  219-220. 

*'  See  the  chapter  entitled,  The  Conflict  of  Political  Attitudes  and  Ideals. 


400      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

sonal  superiority,  which  expressed  itself  in  the  impulse  to  excel  in 
accuracy  in  the  determination  of  historical  facts  and  in  the  discovery 
of  new  facts.  Again  quoting  Professor  Dunning:  "  Every  seri- 
ous student  of  history  knows  the  thrill  that  comes  with  the  discov- 
ery of  an  unknown  or  a  forgotten  fact  of  the  past.  .  .  .  Especially 
keen  and  spicy  is  the  satisfaction  of  historical  discovery  when  it  im- 
plies the  erroneousness  of  long-standing  beliefs  and  enables  the  dis- 
coverer to  proclaim  the  most  eminent  and  authoritative  chroniclers 
of  the  past  the  victims  of  ignorance  and  delusion.  '  Reconstruction 
of  history  '  is  always  in  the  mind  of  the  investigator,  whether  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  and  in  the  intoxication  of  an  actual  discov- 
ery of  new  truth  he  is  very  prone  to  foresee  a  reconstruction  vastly 
greater  than  what  actually  takes  place.  The  current  of  humanity's 
past  obstinately  continues  to  move  before  his  eyes  in  the  same  old 
channel  with  but  a  trifling  little  jog,  though  the  new  revelation 
seems  to  require  a  great  displacement  all  along  the  course. 

"Why  is  this  so?  Why  do  the  achievements  of  historical  re- 
search, in  bringing  to  light  the  truth  about  the  individual  events 
of  the  past,  change  so  slightly  the  broad  picture?  This  is  the 
question  to  which  I  wish  to  devote  some  particular  attention  in  this 
place.  The  answer  to  it  cannot  be  a  simple  one,  and  I  do  not 
aspire  to  make  mine  complete.  I  would  merely  suggest,  as  in  some 
measure,  at  least,  influential,  this  fact,  that  the  course  of  human 
history  is  determined  no  more  by  what  is  true  than  by  what  men 
believe  to  be  true ;  and  therefore  that  he  who  brings  to  hght  a  past 
occurrence  of  which  he  is  the  first  to  have  knowledge  is  likely  to  be 
dealing  with  what  is  no  real  part  of  history.  The  phenomena  of 
social  life,  so  far  as  they  are  determined  at  all  by  the  will  of  man, 
are  due  in  origin  and  sequence  to  conditions  as  they  appear  to  con- 
temporaries, not  to  conditions  as  revealed  in  their  reality  to  the 
historian  centuries  later."  ^^  Professor  Dunning  devotes  several 
pages  to  this  point,  and  then  returns  to  his  criticism  of  the  his- 
torian's emphasis  on  mere  facts,  and  the  spirit  of  rivalry  and  ex- 
ultation over  superiority  therein.  "  That  the  critical  spirit  in 
the  study  of  history  during  the  nineteenth  century  has  pro- 
duced some  astonishing  results,  is  beyond  all  controversy.  Its  re- 
constructions of  human  life  in  the  past  have  been  no  less  signifi- 
cant than  the  amazing  changes  wrought  by  the  physical  sciences  in 

*•  Dunning,  op.  cit.,  219-220. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY         401 

our  ideas  of  the  material  universe.  .  .  .  No  wonder  that  the  rest- 
less quest  for  new  facts  has  overshadowed  every  other  activity  of 
the  historical  student.  .  .  .  We  are  overwhelmed  with  the  glory  of 
our  achievements  in  discovery  and  intoxicated  with  our  superiority 
over  the  luckless  generations  that  preceded  us."  ^'^ 

That  the  attitude  for  the  fact  may  develop  beyond  strictly  in- 
tellectual bounds  is  evident  to  any  one  who  has  observed  the  effect 
of  rivalry  on  the  pursuit  of  any  calling  or  aim.  In  the  first  place, 
a  rivalrous  impulse  causes  an  individual  to  attribute  more  impor- 
tance to  a  discovery  than  is  justified.  So,  as  Professor  Dunning 
says,  historians  expect  greater  effects  on  historical  reconstruction 
from  the  discovery  of  new  facts  than  actually  happen.  Second, 
rivalry  tends  to  set  limits  to  the  aims  of  scholarship  which  inter- 
fere with  the  free  intellectual  activity  that  is  necessary  for  the  most 
productive  scholarship.  When  a  group  —  be  it  of  scholars  or 
professional  men  —  comes  to  recognize  certain  methods  and  mental 
qualifications  as  essential  for  efficient  work,  then  these  may  become 
objects  of  cultivation,  not  for  the  sake  of  efliciency  in  scholarly  or 
professional  work,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  superiority  of  the  in- 
dividual over  his  fellow  scholars  or  professional  associates.  This 
impulse  for  superiority  may  be  subconscious,  but  it  gives  a  glamour 
and  a  fixity  to  the  standards  of  mental  excellence  of  the  group  that 
prevents  their  change  as  the  mental  requirements  for  efficient  work 
change.  What  was  before  a  means  to  an  end  now  becomes  an  end 
because  of  rivalry  and  personal  pride.  Especially  does  the  dis- 
covery of  new  facts  stimulate  personal  rivalry.  In  other  sciences, 
we  find  that,  in  the  first  stages,  when  discoveries  of  facts  were  the 
essential  achievements,  this  rivalrous  spirit  was  conspicuous.  This 
and  that  investigator  is  proud  of  some  discovery;  and  those  who 
have  won  greatest  distinction  become,  by  common  consent,  the  ex- 
emplars of  the  group ;  whereupon  the  group  standards  become  less 
qualifications  for  efliciency  than  marks  of  superiority.  Such  a  con- 
dition seriously  hampers  intellectual  work.  By  enabling  scholars 
to  analyse  their  own  subconscious  processes  and  to  realize  when 
they  are  subject  to  non-intellectual  motives  and  under  non-intel- 
lectual influences,  social  psychology  can  perform  a  service  for 
scholars  in  all  fields. 

Professor  Dunning  describes  at  length  the  effect  of  pride  in  the 

«Ibid.,  aa6. 


402      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

discovery  of  new  facts  on  the  progress  of  history.  "  No  long  re- 
flection is  needed  to  detect  the  dangers  that  flow  from  exaggerating 
the  importance  of  new  truth  in  history.  If  we  impute  it  for  un- 
righteousness to  an  age  or  a  people  that  they  lack  the  knowledge 
of  the  past  that  has  become  our  profession,  the  age  or  people  in 
question  is  affected  with  a  taint  that  operates  to  obscure  its  own 
history.  .  .  .  We  subconsciously  feel  that  so  ignorant  a  people 
could  have  had  little  in  its  own  affairs  to  warrant  the  attention  of 
respectable  scholarship.  .  .  . 

"  The  corrective  for  whatever  evils  may  be  involved  in  the  ten- 
dencies referred  to  lies  ready  to  our  hand.  We  must  recognize 
and  frankly  admit  that  whatever  a  given  age  or  people  beheves 
to  be  true  is  true  for  that  age  and  that  people.  .  .  .  The  business 
of  the  historian  who  studies  "  a  period  "  is  to  acertain  the  scope  and 
content  of  the  ideas  that  constitute  the  culture  of  that  period. 
Whether  these  ideas  were  true  or  false,  according  to  the  standards 
of  any  other  period,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter.  That  they 
were  the  ideas  which  underlay  the  activities  of  the  men  of  this  time, 
is  all  that  concerns  the  work  of  the  historian."  ^^  "  Our  pride  in 
the  attainments  of  our  own  day  distorts  all  our  judgments  of  the 
past.  In  vain  the  master-mind  of  a  distant  generation  rears  with 
matchless  ingenuity  a  system  of  Institutions  based  on  the  teachings 
of  Moses  or  of  Numa,  We  follow  out  languidly  the  story  of  his 
system,  no  matter  how  precisely  it  fitted  the  demands  of  the  time. 
At  only  one  point  will  our  interest  revive,  where  the  master-mind, 
by  some  chance,  hit  upon  a  notion  that  has  acceptance  and  vogue 
in  our  own  day.  Here  we  center  our  attention  and  appreciation, 
and  In  our  history  of  the  affair  make  the  central  feature,  not  the 
ingenious  adaptation  of  the  system  to  contemporaneous  needs  and 
environment,  but  the  accidental  fact  that  there  was  in  the  situation 
something  that  anticipated  the  thought  or  achievement  of  the  won- 
derful twentieth  century."  ^^ 

This  conception  of  the  function  of  the  historian  brings  history 
into  the  closest  possible  relation  to  social  psychology.  For  the 
ideas  of  the  culture  of  a  people,  In  a  certain  age,  are  a  functioning 
of  the  attitudes  of  the  age;  and  these  attitudes  are  psychological  as- 
sumptions for  the  historical  student.     The  reconstruction  of  the 

*8  Ibid.,  227-228. 
*^Ibid.,  227-228. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  403 

culture  of  an  age  Is  facilitated,  therefore,  by  such  a  knowledge  of 
social  psychology  as  makes  possible  scientific  psychological  assump- 
tions. 

During  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  growing  tendency  to  sup- 
plement the  reconstruction  of  periods  of  the  past  with  the  search 
for  lines  of  causation  running  through  all  periods;  °®  this  gives  the 
present  an  added  importance,  in  the  interpretation  of  the  past,  and 
the  past  an  added  interest,  because  of  its  illumination  of  the  pres- 
ent. This  tendency  may,  in  some  cases,  unduly  limit  interest  in  the 
past,  if  attention  is  thereby  centred  only  on  historical  conditions 
which  illuminate  the  present.^^  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  true  that 
"  Each  age  finds  it  necessary  to  reconsider  at  least  some  portions  of 
the  past,  from  points  of  view  furnished  by  new  conditions  which 
reveal  the  influence  and  significance  of  forces  not  adequately  known 
by  the  historians  of  the  previous  generation.  Unquestionably  each 
investigator  and  writer  is  influenced  by  the  times  in  which  he  lives 
and  while  this  fact  exposes  the  historian  to  a  bias,  at  the  same  time 
it  affords  him  new  instruments  and  new  insight  for  dealing  with 
his  subject."  ^^  If  the  past  is  to  be  viewed  not  as  a  storehouse  of 
historical  allusions  to  stress  this  or  that  process  of  the  present  — 
a  procedure  manifestly  unscientific^^ — but  as  something  in  itself 
worth  knowing,  if  there  is  really  a  serious  attempt  to  understand 
the  processes  of  the  past,  as  well  as  the  processes  of  the  present, 
and  to  discover  lines  of  causation  running  through  past  and  present, 
this  view  of  method  in  history  requires  a  marked  development  of 
social  psychology,  and  the  closest  relation  between  that  science  and 
history. 

Passing  from  the  relation  of  social  psychology  to  the  criticism  of 
historical  method  and  turning  to  its  relation  to  historical  recon- 
struction, we  repeat  the  suggestion  that  correct  psychological  as- 
sumptions as  to  the  attitudes  and  processes  of  past  ages  is  necessary 
for  reconstruction  and  interpretation  of  the  past.  We  have,  for 
instance,  the  types  of  behaviour  which,  as  we  have  seen,  have  de- 
termined political,  juristic  and  economic  ideas,  one  of  which  types 
may  attain  an  extreme  development  in  a  nation  In  a  certain  period, 
and  another  In  another  period,  or  all  four  of  which  may  be  active 

50  Becker,  op.  cit.,  663  ff. 

51  Dunning,  op.  cit.,  227. 

52  Turner,  "Social  Forces  in  American  History,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XVI:  225-326. 
58  Ibid.,  232. 


404      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

at  the  same  time,  with  one  after  another  temporarily  predominant. 
As  an  example  of  the  extreme  development  of  one  type  of  be- 
haviour we  have  described  in  a  preceding  chapter  ^^  the  role  of  the 
domination-submission  attitude  in  Germany  during  the  autocratic 
period,  where  it  determined  the  form  of  government  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  the  attitude  of  that  government  toward  dependent 
peoples,  the  regulation  of  the  life  and  conduct  of  the  German  peo- 
ple by  their  bureaucratic  government,  the  attitude  of  the  head  of  the 
German  family  toward  wife  and  children,  the  censorship  of  the 
German  press,  the  German  system  of  education,  the  thinking  of 
the  German  philosophers,  as  well  as  the  peculiar  influence  of  those 
philosophers  over  the  thinking  people.  Germany  furnishes  a  good 
example  of  a  people  among  whom  a  particular  type  of  behaviour 
permeated  every  phase  of  the  social  organization. 

An  example  of  how  all  four  types  of  behaviour  may  be  more  or 
less  active  at  the  same  time,  with  one  after  another  temporarily 
predominant  is  furnished  by  the  history  of  the  United  States, 
"  Read  in  the  light  of  the  causative  facts,  it  may  be  affirmed  that 
there  is  no  people  whose  history  is  more  consistently  characterized 
by  the  display  of  certain  dominant  traits  than  is  that  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States."  ^^  These  traits  affected  both  the  internal 
and  the  international  relations.  Note,  for  instance,  their  effect  on 
the  international  relations.  The  settlers  in  the  United  States  were 
at  first  composed  in  the  main  of  adventurous  and  enterprising  emi- 
grants from  the  countries  of  Europe  who  lived  in  the  new  country 
as  isolated  and  economically  independent  families  or  neighbour- 
hoods.^^ This  population  enthusiastically  acquiesced  in  the  policy 
to  establish  a  secure  national  isolation.  Absorbed  in  the  exploita- 
tion of  the  abundant  natural  resources,  and  in  the  development  of 
a  national  industry,  enterprisers  had  little  incentive  to  seek  markets 
abroad.  This  sentiment  for  isolation  has  continued  to  the  present 
day,  but  is  passing.  There  has  developed  an  international  view,  an 
impatience  with  the  old  sentiment  for  isolation,  an  impulse  for  ex- 
pansion,—  to  become  a  greater  and  greater  nation  in  territorial 
extent,  financial  power,  and  prestige,  to  rival  other  nations  in  the 
world  markets. ^'^     In  some  cases  this  attitude  has  prompted  an  im- 

s*  See  the  chapter  entitled,  The  Conflict  of  Political  Attitudes  and  Ideals. 

55  Moore,  "Four  Phases  of  American  Development,  12-13. 

56  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  Pt.  I. 

*^  Moore,  op.  cit.,  "Lecture  IV";  Turner,  op.  cit.,  219-220. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY         405 

pulse  to  dominate  in  international  questions  that  affect  South  Ameri- 
can states  —  the  "  imperialistic  "  idea.^^  Instances  of  imperialistic 
behaviour  have  stirred  a  distrust  of  the  United  States  in  Central 
and  South  America.  And  recently,  as  we  have  seen,  a  co-operative 
international  relation  has  been  suggested  by  American  statesmen. 

The  problem  of  the  causes  of  changes  in  national  attitudes  is 
evidently  one  in  which  social  psychology  and  history  are  closely  as- 
sociated. If  economic  interests  were  the  factors  that  determined 
the  isolation  policy,  and  later  the  expansionist  and  imperialistic 
policies,  still  there  remains  the  problem  as  to  the  social-psychological 
processes  of  this  control  that  is  exercised  by  the  economic  interests. 
We  want  to  analyse  the  Individualism  of  the  early  settlers  and  the 
agrarian  interests;  of  the  newly  developed,  keenly  competing  cor- 
porate interests;  of  the  dominating,  monopolistic,  transportation, 
financial  and  industrial  corporations.  We  want  to  analyse  the  op- 
position between  the  individualistic  and  the  social  ideals  that  have 
obtained  from  the  beginning,  and  to  seek  to  understand  the  long 
ascendancy  of  the  individualistic  ideal.  There  have  been  "  two 
ideals  .  .  .  fundamental  in  traditional  American  thought,  ideals 
that  developed  in  the  pioneer  era.  One  was  the  ideal  of  individual 
freedom  to  compete  unrestrictedly  for  the  resources  of  a  continent 
—  the  squatter  ideal.  The  other  was  the  ideal  of  democracy  — 
'  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people  and  for  the  people  '  .  .  . 
American  democracy  was  based  on  free  land;  these  were  the  very 
conditions  that  shaped  its  growth  and  its  fundamental  traits."  ^^ 
But  the  other  ideal  prevailed;  the  natural  resources  passed  into  the 
private  ownership  of  a  small  percentage  of  the  population.  And 
this  economic  condition  is  now  shaping  the  development  of  the  na- 
tional attitudes  and  institutions.  Both  the  squatter  ideal  and  the 
social  equality  ideal  of  former  times  are  contrary  to  the  attitude  of 
class  domination-submission  that  has  developed.  We  are  inter- 
ested to  know  not  only  the  historical  events  in  this  national  devel- 
opment, but  also  why  the  mass  of  the  people  apparently  acquiesced 
in  conditions  that  have  caused  the  rise  of  a  vast  non-propertied 
mass,  and  whether  we  may  infer  that  this  acquiescence  implies  a 
permanent  submission  to  the  social  and  political  control  of  proper- 
tied classes. 

"8  Moore,  op.  cit.,  139-140;  Turner,  op.  cit.,  202. 
•"Turner,  op.  cit.,  223-224. 


4o6     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Of  the  hypotheses  used  by  historians  who  are  seeking  to  trace  a 
line  of  causation  through  history,  the  most  fruitful  has  been  the 
"  economic  Interpretation  "  of  history.  An  economic  interpreta- 
tion, if  carried  far  enough,  is  social-psychological,  though  the  social- 
psychological  studies  are  difficult  to  make  because  of  the  meagre- 
ness  of  the  historical  data.  The  economic  interpretation  makes 
progress  slowly  because  the  motives  which  have  been  operative  in 
historical  development  are  not  usually  made  explicit  In  the  documen- 
tary sources.  One  reason  for  this  Is  that  It  has  been  assumed  by 
governments,  both  In  time  of  peace  and  war,  that  profits  and  patriot- 
ism and  national  progress  go  together;  that  whatever  governmental 
action  satisfies  and  strengthens  the  profit-seeking  class  —  and  there- 
fore makes  them  patriotic,  and  also  those  under  their  suggestive 
control  — strengthens  the  nation.  High  officials  who  may  have 
thought  differently  have  lacked  the  courage  to  say  so  and  to  act 
upon  It.  Hence  the  economic  interpretation  is  difficult  of  demon- 
stration because  of  the  lack  of  frank  and  full  statements.  In  the 
sources,  of  the  motives  that  have  determined  the  behaviour  of  gov- 
ermental  officials  In  the  past.  These  motives  are  given  but  frag- 
mentary official  expression  In  the  documents  on  which  the  historian 
must  rely.  As  officials  who  have  the  courage  to  speak  on  behalf 
of  the  public  welfare  become  more  numerous  and  are  kept  In  of- 
fice because  the  people,  with  the  Increase  of  popular  Intelligence, 
understand  that  they  are  speaking  for  the  pubhc  welfare  and  give 
them  their  support,  the  documentary  basis  of  the  economic  Inter- 
pretation of  history  will  undoubtedly  become  more  ample.  And 
it  will  be  possible  to  analyse  more  of  the  psychological  implications 
of  the  economic  interpretation.  However,  economic  motives,  be- 
ing largely  egoistic,  are  apt  to  be  repressed  and  disguised  though 
they  are  the  essential  motives  of  behaviour;^"  and  often,  though 
essential,  they  fall  in  the  realm  of  the  subconscious,  wherefore  it 
is  going  to  be  very  difficult  to  correctly  estimate  their  Importance  in 
the  historical  process.  The  economic  interpretation,  in  the  past, 
has  stressed  the  third  of  the  four  social-psychological  types  of  be- 
haviour already  suggested, —  class  domination-submission;®^  but 
it  recognizes  the  role  of  the  others.  There  is,  therefore,  no  con- 
flict between  the  economic  interpretation   and  the  soclal-psycho- 

8°  Ogburn,   "  The  Psychological   Basis  for   the   Economic  Interpretation   of   History," 
Amer.  Econ.  Rev.,  IX  (supplement) :  299-305. 
*i  Shotwell,  op.  cit.,  707. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY  407 

logical  point  of  view.  The  latter  simply  insists  on  adequate  psy- 
chological assumptions  and  on  intensively  working  out  all  the  im- 
plications of  the  economic  interpretation,  on  investigating,  as  far  as 
possible,  all  the  ramifications  of  the  motives  of  the  classes  partici- 
pating in  the  class  conflict. 

Less  complicated  is  the  problem  of  the  motives  and  traits  of 
leadership.  One  of  the  points  of  close  contact  between  social 
psychology  and  history  Is  the  social  psychologist's  analysis  of  types 
of  leadership  and  the  historian's  analysis  of  the  traits  of  character 
of  the  statesman  or  other  leader  whose  biography  he  Is  writing. 
One  of  our  historians  and  biographers  writes :  "  The  basis  of  his- 
tory Is  human  nature,  the  expression  of  human  nature  is  through 
history,  .  .  .  and  therefore  history  must  include  the  study  of  per- 
sons." ^^  Professor  Hart  urges  the  necessity  of  a  discriminating 
imagination  In  the  study  of  great  men;  not  the  impulsive  imagina- 
tion of  a  Gibbon  "  who,  whatever  he  is  writing,  is  always  describing 
a  triumph ;  for  his  sentences  rank  right-forward  and  fours-right  " ;  ^^ 
but  the  imagination  of  trained  students  of  human  nature  who,  with 
imaginative  insight,  can  establish  "  sympathy  and  understanding 
between  themselves  and  the  personality  of  men  whom  they  never 
saw."  ^^  Obviously,  social-psychological  studies  of  leadership 
have  the  closest  possible  relation  to  the  work  of  the  biographer. 

At  the  present  time  one  finds  among  historians,  as  may  be 
judged  from  the  preceding  citations,  widely  different  attitudes  to- 
ward social  psychology.  There  are  some  who  avow  their  belief  in 
the  close  relation  of  social  psychology  and  history;  others  who  in- 
cline to  such  a  belief  but  avoid  expressing  it,  lest  their  reputation 
as  historians  be  Injured  thereby;  and  others  who  deny  any  relation 
at  all.  The  latter  are  Interested  mainly  in  "  what  the  fact  was,  in- 
cluding the  Immediate  conditions  which  gave  It  shape."  *^^  They 
maintain  that  "  The  field  of  the  historian  is,  and  must  long  remain, 
the  discovery  and  recording  of  what  actually  happened."  ^^  Their 
indifference  to  the  service  social  psychology  might  render  history 
is.  In  some  cases,  at  least,  due  not  to  an  easy  sense  of  the  superiority 
and  achievements  of  their  severely  factual  methods,  nor  to  the  im- 

*2  Hart,  op.  cit.,  238-239. 

83  Ibid.,  250. 

^*  Ibid.,  249. 

«5  Adams,  "History  and  the  Philosophy  of  History,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XIX:  229. 

^^  Ibid,,  236. 


4o8     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

patience  of  the  conventional  man  with  a  new  and  disturbing  point 
of  view;  but  it  is  due  to  a  dispositional  predilection  for  clear  think- 
ing and  an  aversion  to  problems  involving  obscurity.  Their  aver- 
sion to  the  problem  of  the  psychological  forces  in  history  does  not 
imply  a  denial  of  the  existence  of  a  psychological  field  contiguous  to 
that  of  history,  but  that  this  is  the  field  of  a  distinct  and  uncultivated 
science  which,  therefore,  cannot  be  of  service  in  historical  recon- 
struction. This  point  of  view  only  emphasizes  that  social  psychol- 
ogy is  a  distinct  science  which  requires  cultivation.  And  the  social 
psychologist  may  reasonably  expect  that,  when  he  has  developed  his 
field  to  the  point  of  a  recognized  science,  historians  will  come  to 
recognize  whatever  light  can  be  thrown  by  social  psychology  on 
problems  of  causation  in  history. 

It  will  conduce  to  a  right  understanding  of  the  relation  of  social 
psychology  to  history  to  distinguish  between  historical  reconstruc- 
tion by  the  historian,  and  the  use  of  history  by  the  social  psycholo- 
gist in  the  development  of  his  science.  As  the  historian  may  use 
psychological  assumptions  in  his  interpretation  of  historical  facts 
without  becoming  a  social  psychologist,  so  the  social  psychologist, 
without  becoming  an  historian,*'^  may  use  history  in  the  analysis  of 
social-psychological  processes.  He  so  uses  history  in  his  study 
of  social  attitudes,  which  involves  a  comparison  of  the  attitudes  of 
different  sections  of  a  nation, ^^  and  of  different  nations,  in  a  given 
period,  and  of  the  same  nation  in  successive  periods.  In  his  study 
of  processes  of  social  suggestion,  also,  he  uses  history  and  biog- 
raphy. These  are  social-psychological,  not  historical  studies. 
Failure  to  discriminate  between  the  two  has  led  some  historians 
to  think  that  social  psychologists  were  attempting  to  show  them 
how  to  write  history.  Almost  any  historian  would  admit  that, 
where  the  data  happen  to  be  abundant  and  of  the  right  kind,  it  is 
possible  to  trace  psychological  processes  in  history.  But  to  admit 
that  historical  data  permit  of  generalizations  as  to  the  essential 
psychological  processes  of  history  is  another  matter.  Before 
scholars  can  venture  that  far,  it  must  be  known  more  definitely  just 
what  are  the  essential  social-psychological  processes.  It  is  possible 
that,  with  the  development  of  social  psychology,  and  with  the  more 

'■^  Teggart,  "  The  Processes  of  History,"  108-109. 

«8  These  studies  are  closely  connected  with  the  historian's  analysis  of  sectionalism. 
(Turner,  op.  cit.,  224.) 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  HISTORY         409 

abundant  sources  for  history,  its  cultivation  will  eventually  become 
sufficiently  intensive  to  demonstrate  the  essential  processes  of  causa- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE    RELATION    OF    SOCIAL    PSYCHOLOGY    TO    SOCIOLOGY, 
EUGENICS    AND    SOCIAL    PHILOSOPHY 

SOCIOLOGY  began  as  social  philosophy,^  using  psychological 
assumptions.  Thus  Comte  regarded  society  as  a  psychical 
unity,  which  included  unity  of  thought  and  of  feeling  and 
purpose,  and  considered  the  individual  apart  from  society  a  mere 
abstraction.^  He  thus  distinguished  sociology  from  biology,  in 
which  the  individual  organism  is  the  central  fact  for  investigation. 
He  conceived  of  the  general  or  social  mind  as  the  result  of  an 
evolutionary  process  of  adaptation  in  which  the  feelings  impel  to 
adaptation,^  while  the  intellect  determines  the  method.  There 
had  been,  he  said,  three  successive  methods:  the  theological,  the 
metaphysical,  and  the  scientific*  Comte,  therefore,  used  psycho- 
logical assumptions,  but  his  method  was  one  of  logical  elaboration, 
not  scientific  analysis.  He  did  not  profess  to  be  severely  scientific 
but  aimed  to  elaborate  a  provisional  system  as  a  stimulus  and  guide 
to  more  thorough  scientific  work. 

Herbert  Spencer  considered  social  evolution  as  due  largely  to 
adaptation  to  the  environment  under  the  unconscious  functioning 
of  the  instincts.  While  he  attempted  analysis  of  instinctive  be- 
haviour, he  relied  less  on  such  analyses  than  on  deduction  from  con- 
spicuous results  of  instinctive  behaviour  in  adaptation ;  for  instance, 
the  effect  of  an  increase  of  population,  of  a  struggle  for  existence, 
and  other  instinctive  phenomena.^  His  chief  distinction  in  social 
behaviour  was  between  the  compulsory  co-operation  characteristic 
of  militarism  and  the  voluntary  co-operation  characteristic  of  in- 

^  "  Sociology  began  by  being  a  social  philosophy,  a  philosophy  of  history,  and  such 
it  has  been  until  very  recently."  Vincent,  "  The  Development  of  Sociology,"  Congress 
of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904,  V:  811. 

2  Comte,  "Positive  Philosophy,"  trans,  by  Martineau,  II:  Chs.  Ill,  V. 

8 "  Feeling  is  not  only  the  essential  spring  of  true  progress,  but  also  its  main 
end.  .  .  ."     (Comte,  "System  of  Positive  Polity,"  Ch.  I,  56.)  ^ 

*  Comte,  "Positive  Philosophy,"  Ch.  VI. 

5  Spencer,  "The  Principles  of  Sociology,"  I:  Chs.  II,  IV,  V,  VI,  VII. 

410 


SOCIOLOGY,  EUGENICS  AND  PHILOSOPHY    411 

dustrialism.*'  He  regarded  these  as  successive  stages  of  social 
progress;  the  compulsory  co-operation  extended  throughout  the  so- 
cial organization, —  the  family  and  the  industrial,  as  well  as  the 
political  organization, —  and  was  followed  by  the  development  of 
voluntary  co-operationJ  When  the  military  struggle  for  existence 
between  groups  has  ceased,  and  rivalry  has  become  essentially  eco- 
nomic, those  groups  will  survive  and  become  superior  "  which  pro- 
duce the  largest  number  of  the  best  individuals  —  individuals  best 
adapted  for  life  in  the  industrial  state."  ^  In  voluntary  co-opera- 
tion, the  chief  aim  of  the  individual  is  assertion  of  individuality,  and 
the  chief  purpose  of  society  should  be  to  provide  individual  liberty.^ 
The  different  positions  assigned  by  Comte  and  Spencer  to  the 
individual  in  his  relation  to  society  have  led  to  a  long  series  of  at- 
tempts at  reconciliation,  most  of  which  are  deductive  rather  than 
inductive,  and  hence  are  of  little  importance  to  the  social  psycholo- 
gist, except  for  the  logical  ingenuity  displayed  in  seeking  to  escape 
the  necessity  of  careful  observation  and  analysis  of  the  motives  of 
social  behaviour.  It  is  obvious  that  the  relation  of  the  individual 
to  society  can  be  explained  only  by  an  analysis  of  the  general  mind, 
the  collective  consciousness, ^°  the  soul  of  a  group, ^^  the  social  mind, 
or  the  social  interest  ^^  in  terms  of  the  psychological  elements  which 
enter  into  the  processes  implied  by  these  comprehensive  phrases. 
Because  these  elementary  processes  occur  in  individual  minds,  it  does 
not  follow  that  such  analysis  belongs  to  the  study  of  the  individual 
mind;  for  the  analysis  is  not  of  individual  reactions  under  the  con- 
ditions of  set  experiment,  but  of  social  relations  which  permit  of  no 
set  experiments.^^  The  rise  of  the  science  of  social  psychology  as 
a  result  of  the  more  intensive  development  of  social  philosophy  was, 
therefore,  inevitable. ^^ 

e  Ibid.,  II :  Chs.  XVII,  XVIII. 
1 1bid.,  II:  613. 
'^Ibid.,  II:  610. 
^Ibid.,  II:  607. 

10  Durkheim,  "  De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social,"  84;  Durkheim,  "  Les  Regies  de  la 
methode  Sociologique,"  127. 

1^  Le  Bon,  "  Psychology  of  Peoples,"  14. 

12  Ratzenhofer,   "  Die  Sociologische  Erkenntnis,"  56-65. 

13  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  a  hard  and  fast  division  between  individual  and  social 
psychology.  The  division  between  the  two  which  has  obtained  in  the  past  is  due  to 
the  narrowness  of  conception  and  the  inadequacy  of  method  of  both  sciences,  "  thus 
letting  up,"  as  Dewey  says,  "two  independent  and  even  contradictory  sciences  —  in- 
dividual and  social  psychology."  (Dewey,  "The  Need  for  Social  Psychology,"  Psy. 
Rev.,  XXIV,  No.  4,  268.) 

i*The  differentiation  of  the  two  sciences  can  be  traced,  for  instance,  in  Professor 


412      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  development  of  social  philosophy  Is  marked  also  by  a  more 
careful  analysis  of  all  the  factors  that  determine  social  behaviour 
In  Its  external  aspects.  Students  of  the  Influence  of  physical  con- 
ditions are  chiefly  Interested  In  the  effect  of  differences  of  physical 
conditions  on  group  traits,^^  not  in  the  analysis  of  those  traits,  but 
psychological  assumptions  are  used  in  explaining  the  effect  of 
physical  conditions.  Again,  students  of  customs  either  imphcitly 
assume  certain  motives  to  be  essential  in  the  determination  of  cus- 
toms, while  making  an  explicit  use  of  biological  principles  of  inter- 
pretation,^® or  make  an  explicit  use  of  psychological  principles  of 
Interpretation.^'^  Both  methods  Imply  a  close  relation  between  the 
science  which  concerns  Itself  with  behaviour  In  Its  external  aspects, 
sociology  —  and  social  psychology.  A  second  result  of  the  more 
intensive  development  of  social  philosophy  has  been,  therefore,  the 
rise  of  a  more  careful  scientific  analysis  of  the  externals  of  behaviour, 
and  the  recognition  of  this  as  the  field  of  a  distinct  science.  This 
differentiation  between  sociology  and  social  psychology  is  due  to  the 
difference  between  the  methods  used  In  the  study  of  the  externals  of 
behaviour  and  those  used  in  the  study  of  motives,  and  to  the 
difference  in  the  mental  faculties  required  In  the  two  fields. 

We  are  not  here  concerned  with  the  distinction  between  biological 
sociology  and  psychological  sociology  —  for  that  is  the  concern  of 
the  sociologist,  not  of  the  social  psychologist  — ,  except  as  it  is  neces- 
sary to  recognize  the  distinction  in  defining  the  relation  of  social 
psychology  to  sociology.  In  my  use  of  the  term  sociology,  I  shall 
imply  psychological  sociology,  unless  otherwise  stated.  Psycho- 
logical sociology  was  long  ago  distinguished  from  social  psy- 
chology.^^ By  psychological  sociology  I  understand  merely  that 
sociology  which  uses  psychological  assumptions,  as  distinguished 
from  that  sociology  which  uses  biological,  and  disavows  psycho- 
logical assumptions,  though  the  latter  may  implicitly  and  subcon- 
sciously use  such  assumptions.     I  suppose  all  sociology  is,  in  a  sense, 

Giddings  work:  "The  Principles  of  Sociology,"  "Elements  of  Sociology,"  "Induc- 
tive Sociology." 

IS  Semple,  "  Influence  of  Geographic  Environment " ;  Huntington,  "  The  Pulse  of 
Asia  "  ;  Huntington,  "  Civilization  and  Climate." 

1^  Sumner,  "  Folkways  " ;  Keller,  "  Societal  Evolution." 

1^  Boas,  "  The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man  " ;  Westermarck,  "  The  Origin  and  Develop- 
ment of  Moral  Ideas  " ;  Goldenweiser,  "  Totemism,  An  Analytical  Study,"  Jour.  Amer. 
Folklore,  1910,  86-97;  Teggart,  "Processes  in  History,"  108-109. 

18  Giddings,  "The  Psychology  of  Society,"  Science,  Jan.  6,  1899,  16. 


SOCIOLOGY,  EUGENICS  AND  PHILOSOPHY    413 

psychological  sociology   in   that   all   sociologists  explicitly   or   im- 
plicitly use  some  psychological  assumptions. 

The  validity  of  the  distinction  between  psychological  soci- 
ology and  social  psychology  is  evident  from  the  necessity  for 
it  if  the  further  analysis  and  testing  of  the  essential  concepts  of 
social  philosophy  is  to  continue  fruitful.  Take,  for  instance,  the 
concept  of  group  rivalry  which  we  have  from  Darwin, ^^  Spencer,^® 
Gumplowicz,^^  and  others,  and  which  long  since  came  to  the  fore 
in  social  philosophy. ^^  The  patent  facts  of  group  rivalry  are  plain 
without  psychological  analysis.  We  note  the  early  intense  rivalry 
between  kinship  groups,  with  rigorous  male  control  of  the  women 
and  youth  of  the  group  by  domination  and  ridicule.  This,  as  larger 
political  groups  took  over  from  their  constituent  groups  the  more 
aggressive  forms  of  group  rivalry,  was  succeeded  by  family  and 
communal  relations  of  increasing  sympathy  and  understanding,  but 
with  the  survival  of  the  old  intolerant  reactions  in  these  and  other 
internal  relations.  The  rivalry  of  the  larger  political  groups,  with 
aristocratic  domination  of  subjects,  was,  in  turn,  succeeded  by  the 
integration  of  such  groups  and  the  surrender  to  the  government  of 
this  larger  combination  of  the  more  aggressive  functions,  since 
political  freedom  in  internal  relations  depends  upon  confining  ag- 
gression to  foreign  relations  and  not  allowing  it  to  react  upon  inter- 
nal relations.  But  within  each  nation,  as  it  developed,  continued 
the  rivalry  of  economic  interests,  which  is  taking  the  form  of  an 
increasingly  hostile  class  conflict.  Such  a  highly  abstract  outline 
of  the  group  rivalry  process  as  this  cannot  be  called  scientific.  It 
could  be  made  much  more  concrete  and  lucid  by  elaboration  with 
ethnological  and  historical  data,  but  psychological  assumptions 
would  inevitably  appear,^^  and  to  be  valid  these  would  require  an 
analysis  and  an  elaboration  that  is  possible  only  with  a  knowledge 
of  social  psychology.  There  are  those  who  would  rest  satisfied  with 
the  ethnological  and  historical  elaboration  and  the  implicit  unan- 
alysed  assumptions.  This,  to  be  sure,  takes  us  a  long  way  in  ex- 
plaining group  rivalry;  how  far  would  require  a  volume  to  explain. 

IS  Darwin,  "The  Descent  of  Man,"  102,  105,  108,  126,  132-135. 

20  Spencer,  "Principles  of  Sociology,"  IlrChs.  XVII,  XVIII,  XIX. 

21  Gumplowicz,  "  Der  Rassenkampf  " ;  Gumplowicz,  "  Grundriss  der  Soziologie." 

22  Vincent,  "  The  Development  of  Sociology,"  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis, 
1904,  812. 

23  See  Vincent,  "The  Rivalry  of  Social  Groups,"  Amer.  Jour.  SocioL,  Jan.,  1909,  for 
■  luggestive  statement  of  essential  psychological  processes. 


414      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  treatment  of  the  externals  of  behaviour  is  the  method  with 
which  the  study  of  society  begins;  on  the  accuracy  and  thoroughness 
with  which  it  is  done  depends,  in  part,  our  knowledge  of  society.^^ 
But  no  social  process  is  thoroughly  understood  without  psycholog- 
ical analysis.  Such  a  conception  as  that  of  group  rivalry,  which 
involves  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  his  groups, 
requires  that  we  get  below  externals  of  social  process  to  the  instinc- 
tive impulses  and  attitudes  of  social  behaviour. ^^ 

Though  distinct  in  subject  matter  and  in  method,  psychological 
sociology  and  social  psychology  are  intimately  related.  As  in  the 
case  of  other  social  sciences,  so  in  that  of  sociology,  owing  to  its 
intimate  relation  to  social  psychology,  the  backward  development  of 
social  psychology  has  retarded  the  development  of  sociology.  This 
is  one  of  the  reasons  why  sociology  "  is  so  often  indefinite  and  even 
inhuman  .  .  .  because  it  lacks  an  adequate  basis  in  concrete  and 
comprehensive  observation  of  actual  persons  and  houses,  of  definite 
villages  and  cities."  ^®  The  principles  of  the  sociologist  are  "  often 
mere  abstractions,  and  therefore  not  verifiable  generalizations  at 
all,"  because  of  his  lack  of  "  an  insistent  sense  of  the  always  human 
reference  and  subject-matter  of  his  discourse,  however  sheerly  intel- 
lectual that  discourse  may  have  been  made  by  elaboration  and  re- 
moteness." 2'^  Again,  sociologists  who  Incline  to  the  biological 
interpretation,  and  who,  therefore,  recognize  no  relation  of  their 
science  to  social  psychology,  inevitably  fall  into  the  habit  of  inter- 
preting social  behaviour  too  much  as  mere  unconscious  conformity 
to  custom. ^^ 

It  is  in  inductive  studies  of  social  groups  that  the  distinction 
between  psychological  sociology  and  social  psychology  stands  out 
clearly.  In  prefacing  such  a  study  Professor  Thomas  writes :  When 
"  we  study  the  life  of  a  concrete  social  group  we  find  a  certain  very 
important  side  of  this  life  which  social  psychology  cannot  adequately 
take  into  account  .  .  .  and  which  during  the  last  fifty  years  has 
constituted  the  central  sphere  of  interest  of  the  various  researches 
called  sociology.     Among  the  attitudes  prevailing  within  a  group 

2*  Rivers,  op.  cit.,  2. 
25 /^i^.,  7-1 1. 

26  Bradford,   "  Interpretations  and   Forecasts,"   389. 

27  Ibid.,  389-390. 

28  See  the  criticism  of  Keller's  theory  of  legal  development  (Keller,  "Law  in  Evolu- 
tion," Yale  Law  Journal,  XXVIII 1769-783),  by  Brown,  "Law  and  Evolution,"  Yale 
Laiv  Journal,  XXIX:  i^j. 


SOCIOLOGY,  EUGENICS  AND  PHILOSOPHY    415 

some  express  themselves  only  in  individual  action  —  uniform  or 
multiform,  isolated  or  combined  —  but  only  in  action.  But  there 
are  other  attitudes  —  usually,  though  not  always,  the  most  general 
ones  —  which,  besides  expressing  themselves  directly,  like  the  first, 
in  actions,  find  also  an  indirect  manifestation  in  more  or  less  explicit 
and  formal  rules  of  behaviour  by  which  the  group  tends  to  maintain, 
to  regulate,  and  to  make  more  general  and  more  frequent  the  corre- 
sponding type  of  actions  among  its  members.  .  .  .  The  rules  of 
behaviour,  and  the  actions  viewed  as  conforming  or  not  conforming 
with  these  rules,  constitute  with  regard  to  their  objective  signifi- 
cance a  certain  number  of  more  or  less  connected  and  harmonious 
systems  which  can  be  generally  called  social  institutions,  and  the 
totality  of  institutions  found  in  a  concrete  social  group  constitutes 
the  social  organization  of  this  group.   .   .  . 

"  Sociology,  as  theory  of  social  organization,  is  thus  a  special 
science  of  culture  like  economics  or  philosophy,  and  is  in  so  far 
opposed  to  social  psychology  as  the  general  science  of  the  subjective 
side  of  culture."  ^® 

A  word  now  as  to  the  relation  of  social  psychology  to  biological 
sociology.  If  the  essential  processes  are  instinctive,  then  the  bio- 
logical conception  of  the  social  process  is  not  necessarily  contrary  to 
the  psychological,  inasmuch  as  the  social  psychologist  regards  the 
assumptions  of  the  biological  sociologist  as  subject  matter  for 
analysis.^"  But  the  conceptions  are  contrary  if  the  biological  soci- 
ologist regards  his  explanations  as  complete  explanations  of  social 
process.  The  assumption  of  an  instinctive  causation  and  a  Dar- 
winian process  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  an  analysis  of  the  in- 
stinctive processes  assumed.  Problems  of  social  evolution  were  at 
first  regarded  as  psychological  Inasmuch  as  variations  In  customs 
as  between  peoples  spring  from  certain  seemingly  explanable  mo- 
tives. As  the  difficulties  of  a  psychological  interpretation  become 
apparent,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  sources  are  documentary  and 
the  motives  for  variations  in  customs  are  not  usually  recorded,  so 
that  it  Is  impossible  to  understand  the  motives  except  by  inference, 
attempts  were  renewed  to  give  human  evolution  a  biological  inter- 
ns Thomas  and  Znaniecki,  "The  Polish  Peasant  in  Europe  and  America,"  1:31-33. 
^^  "  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  psychology  of  behavior  all  psychology  is  either 
biological  or  social  psychology,  and  if  it  still  be  true  that  man  is  not  only  an  animal 
but  a  social  animal,  the  two  cannot  be  dissevered  when  we  deal  with  man."  (Dewey, 
"  The  Need  for  Social  Psychology,"  Psy.  Rev.,  Vol.  XXIV,  No.  4,  July,  1917,  276.) 


4i6      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

pretation.  These  sociologists  explain  processes  as  due  to  variations 
in  customs  and  to  the  selection  of  "  tentatives,"  without  inquiring 
as  to  the  motives  of  variations.  Professor  Keller  accepts  as 
axiomatic  that,  in  human  society,  the  brain  rather  than  the  bodily 
structures,  becomes  the  organ  of  adaptation, ^^  and  that  variations 
are  psychical  ^^;  he  assumes  that  instinctive  processes  are  essential 
in  societal  evolution,  that  these  "  unconsciously,  and  later  to  some 
extent  consciously,  throw  out  a  series  of  tentatives  under  the  stimu- 
lus of  need.  Certain  of  these  tentatives  cancel  out  at  once  or 
otherwise  disappear,  while  others  are  concurred  in  and  become  char- 
acteristic of  a  group.  They  are  then  the  folkways  of  that  group, 
and  when  they  become  the  object  of  group  approval  and  so  become 
the  embodiment  of  its  prosperity-policy,  they  become  its  mores. 
Here  is  where  they  enter  into  the  field  of  societal  evolution  and 
invite  the  interest  of  the  sociologist;  .  .  ."  ^^  He  recognizes  the 
fundamental  importance  of  various  motives  that  determine  the 
selection  of  variations  in  the  mores, ^^  without  attempting  any 
analysis  of  these  motives,  for  he  regards  this  problem  as  lying 
outside  his  field.  He  notes  that  the  persistence  of  the  mores  is 
due  not  only  to  the  force  of  habit,  but  also  to  the  satisfaction  de- 
rived from  the  customary  behaviour, ^^  without  attempting  any 
analysis  of  this  satisfaction  or  of  the  psychological  nature  of  cus- 
tomary behaviour.  He  distinguishes  "  rational  "  from  "  auto- 
matic "  selection  ^^  without  analysing  any  of  the  psychological  pro- 
cesses implied  by  the  use  of  these  terms.  Under  Professor  Keller's 
method,  therefore,  the  field  of  the  social  psychologist  is  sharply 
distinct  from  that  of  the  sociologist. 

Students  of  primitive  customs  find  an  intensive  psychological 
analysis  very  difficult;  wherefore  we  find  among  these  students  two 
opposing  attitudes:  one  school,  excluding  psychological  interpreta- 
tion, emphasizes  explanation  through  association  with  correlative 
and  antecedent  fact;  the  other  school  seeks  a  more  fundamental 
explanation  through  psychological  assumptions.^'^  The  rejection  of 
psychological  interpretation  does  not  imply  a  denial  of  the  existence 

31  Keller,  "  Societal  Evolution,"  39.  ( 

'^^  Ibid.,  SI- 

^^Ibid.,  51. 

^*Ibid.,TS. 

86  Ibid.,  103-107. 

88  Ibid.,  Chs.  3-6. 

"Lowie,  "Psychology  and  Sociology,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social.,  Sept.,  1915,  217-229. 


SOCIOLOGY,  EUGENICS  AND  PHILOSOPHY    417 

of  a  psychological  field  contiguous  to  that  of  sociology  but  that 
ethnological  facts  are  too  remote  to  permit  of  psychological  analysis. 
It  implies  also  that  social  psychology  is  a  distinct  science  which  has 
not  yet  been  cultivated  to  the  point  where  it  can  furnish  trustworthy 
assumptions  to  serve  the  purpose  of  inference  in  the  interpretation 
of  the  beliefs  and  customs  of  primitive  groups.  This  only  empha- 
sizes that  social  psychology  is  a  distinct  science  that  needs  cultiva- 
tion. Those  ethnologists  who  use  psychological  interpretations 
emphasize  the  need  of  a  "  scientific  "  as  opposed  to  a  "  popular  " 
psychology.** 

Summarizing  our  view  of  the  relation  of  social  psychology  to 
sociology,  we  may  say  that  sociology  studies  the  origin  and  de- 
velopment of  institutions,  their  inter-relations  in  the  culture  of  a 
particular  people  and  their  variations  between  peoples,^^  while 
social  psychology  studies  the  motives  of  the  individuals  that  partici- 
pate in  the  institutional  development.  The  two  sciences  are  dis- 
tinct in  that  they  use  different  methods.  Sociology  uses  data  of 
ethnology  and  history  —  exploits  documentary  sources  —  while 
social  psychology  requires  such  an  intimate  contact  with  people  as 
makes  possible  an  understanding  of  their  motives. 

We  see  the  two  sciences  co-operating  in  various  departments  of 
knowledge  which  heretofore  have  been  studied  under  the  general 
title  of  sociology.  In  ethnology,  for  instance,  the  ethnologist  is 
not  entitled  to  project  psychological  processes  as  interpretations  of 
the  behaviour  of  a  remote  society  of  which  he  has  little  knowledge, 
yet  he  is  entitled  to  use  processes  of  social  psychology  to  assist  his 
creative  imagination  in  the  interpretation  of  the  behaviour  of  a 
remote  society  of  which  he  has  abundant  and  carefully  analysed 
data.  He  may  use  current  social-psychological  concepts  in  his  inter- 
pretations until  such  a  time  as  there  is  forthcoming  a  more  adequate 
knowledge  of  social-psychological  processes.^''  His  final  aim  must 
be  to  interpret  customs  and  institutions,  "to  formulate  hypothetical 
mechanisms  by  which  social  institutions  and  customs  have  come 
into  existence  ";  and  such  formulations  will  be  assisted  to  scientific 
validity  by  a  correct  understanding  of  social-psychological  pro- 
cesses.*^    Again,  the  study  of  the  family  includes  not  merely  an 

88  Ibid.,  228-229. 

»»  Thomas,  "  Social  Origins,"  857. 

*o  Rivers,  of.  ciU,  7-8. 


4i8     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

analysis  of  the  customary  relations  of  the  members  of  the  family 
one  to  another,  and  of  the  family  as  a  whole,  in  its  historical  de- 
velopment, to  church  and  state,  but  also  an  analysis  of  the 
psychology  of  sex,  of  the  psychological  processes  of  congenial, 
happy  marital  relations,  and  of  the  psychological  processes  of  child 
training.  Again,  the  phenomena  of  religion  are  both  sociological 
and  social-psychological,^^  Including  as  they  do  beliefs,  observances 
and  a  ritual  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  attitudes  thereto 
and  instinctive  impulses  satisfied  thereby.  Esthetic  phenomena  also 
are  sociological  and  social-psychological.  Sociology  makes  a  com- 
parative study  of  esthetic  standards  and  of  variations  therein, 
but  "  the  explanation  of  the  esthetic  categories  is  to  be  sought 
largely  In  social  psychology."  ^^  The  analyses  of  Volkelt's  great 
work  ^"^  owe  their  defects  to  lack  of  social-psychological  prin- 
ciples of  Interpretation.  Both  the  religion  and  the  art  of  a  nation 
are  now  studied  In  connection  with  the  political  and  industrial  de- 
velopment; ^^  the  aim  is  to  detect  in  all  these  particular  institutional 
developments  correlations  which  indicate  certain  underlying  psycho- 
logical processes. 

Social  psychology  is  closely  related  to  the  science  of  eugenics. 
First,  in  the  matter  of  heredity,  social  psychology  distinguishes  cer- 
tain inherited  dispositions  that  are  determining  factors  in  the 
thought  and  behaviour  of  individuals  throughout  their  lives.  In 
the  same  family  one  sometimes  sees  one  girl  of  a  pronounced  rlval- 
rous  disposition  and  another  girl  of  a  pronounced  sympathetic  dis- 
position, both  reared  in  the  same  home  and  sometimes  In  an  isolated 
home  In  a  remote  region,  so  that  environmental  Influences  are  Iden- 
tical. The  hereditary  aspect  of  the  different  instinctive  disposi- 
tions constitutes  a  problem  for  the  eugenlst.*^  Second,  social 
psychology  studies  the  instincts  that  enter  into  family  relations, 
and  eugenics  covers  part  of  the  same  ground  in  its  analysis  of  sexual 
selection.^'^  Third,  eugenics  emphasizes  the  fundamental  distinc- 
tion made  by  social  psychology  between  possession  of  social  evi- 

*2  Shotwell,  "  The  Religious  Revolution  of  Today,"  93 ;  King,  "  The  Development  of 
Religion  "  ;   Ames,   "  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience  " ;   Brent,  "  Leadership," 

239- 

*3  Tufts,  "  The  Esthetic  Categories,"  Phil  Rev.,  XII:  i. 

**  Volkelt,  "  System  der  Asthetik." 

*^  Breasted,  "  A  History  of  Egypt " ;  Smith,  "  Greek  Art  and  National  Life." 

*"  Popenoe  and  Johnson,  "  Applied  Eugenics,"  90. 

*7  Ibid.,  Ch.  XI. 


SOCIOLOGY,  EUGENICS  AND  PHILOSOPHY    419 

dences  of  superiority  and  personal  superiority.  "  True  quality, 
then,  should  be  emphasized  at  the  expense  of  false  standards. 
Money,  social  status,  family  alignment,  though  indicators  to  some 
degree,  must  not  be  taken  too  much  at  their  face  value.  Emphasis 
is  to  be  placed  on  real  merit  as  shown  by  achievement,  or  on  descent 
from  the  meritoriously  eminent,  whether  or  not  such  eminence  has 
led  to  the  accumulation  of  a  family  fortune  and  inclusion  in  an 
exclusive  social  set.  In  this  respect,  it  is  important  that  the  value 
of  a  high  average  of  ancestry  should  be  realized.  .  .  .  When  it  is 
remembered  that  statistically  one  grandparent  counts  for  less  than 
one-sixteenth  in  the  heredity  of  an  individual,  it  will  be  obvious  that 
the  individual  whose  sole  claim  to  consideration  is  a  distinguished 
grandfather,  is  not  necessarily  a  matrimonial  prize."  ^^  Fourth, 
social  psychology  makes  evident  the  need  of  progressive  leadership 
in  all  branches  of  social  organization,  while  eugenics  indicates  in 
how  far  this  leadership  depends  on  conditions  of  heredity  over 
which  we  have  little  control  and  in  how  far  the  supply  of  such 
leaders  can  be  increased  by  the  proper  public  and  higher  education.^" 
These  are  some  of  the  problems  in  which  eugenics  is  closely  con- 
nected with  social  psychology,  but  they  do  not  by  any  means  exhaust 
the  points  of  contact. 

In  our  analysis  of  the  psychological  aspects  of  social  science,  we 
have  seen  that  the  political  scientist,  the  student  of  jurisprudence, 
the  economist,  the  historian,  the  sociologist,  and  the  eugenist  all 
recognize  an  underlying  psychological  science  to  which  their  sciences 
are  more  or  less  intimately  related.  Through  this  relation,  all  the 
social  sciences  are  somewhat  closely  allied.  A  thorough-going  solu- 
tion of  any  fundamental  problem  of  human  society  requires  a 
knowledge  of  all  the  social  sciences.  Take,  for  instance,  the 
problem  of  private  property.  The  sociologist  explains  the  origin 
and  development  of  property,^*^  and  the  custom  as  it  exists  through- 
out the  world;  the  student  of  jurisprudence  explains  the  law  of  pri- 
vate property;  the  political  scientist  explains  the  class  struggle  for 
the  control  of  the  government  and  of  property;  the  economist 
accepts  private  property  as  essential  in  the  existing  economic  organ- 
ization, and  studies  the  distribution  of  wealth  and  income  under  this 

*8  Ibid.,  229. 

*^Ibid.,  Ch.  IV;  Thorndike,  "Educational  Psychology,"  III:  304-305. 

50  Westermarck,  "The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  Ideas,"  II:  1-71. 


420      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

organization.  There  still  remain  the  social-psychological  prob- 
lems of  the  motives  of  the  origin  and  development  of  property, 
of  the  makers  of  the  law  of  private  property,  of  the  classes  that 
struggle  for  property,  of  the  behaviour  of  men  in  performing  the 
different  functions  of  the  economic  system  in  which  they  seek  to 
acquire  property.^^ 

Students  of  the  institution  of  private  property  need  a  knowledge 
of  social  psychology  in  order  to  correct  the  dispositional  bias  which 
otherwise  affects  the  course  of  thought  on  those  problems.  For 
instance,  differences  of  disposition  cause  different  opinions  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  facts  of  the  distribution  of  income.  Econo- 
mists, like  other  men,  differ  in  disposition,  and,  lacking  a  knowledge 
of  disposition  and  of  the  fundamental  part  it  plays  in  determining 
the  course  of  thought,  they  theorize  in  a  direction  satisfying  to  their 
dispositional  impulses,  so  that  the  theorizing  of  men  of  opposite 
dispositions  takes  opposite  directions.  As  the  impulses  are 
opposed,  the  thought  is  opposed,  and  no  amount  of  learning  or  sub- 
tilty  of  argument  will  suffice  to  reconcile  the  opposite  trends  of 
thought.  What  is  required  is,  therefore,  a  frank  recognition  of 
the  affective  processes  in  thought  and  such  a  perfection  of  scientific 
method  that  students  shall  "  see  straight,"  as  Professor  James  puts 
it,  in  spite  of  differences  in  disposition;  ^^  for,  as  he  says,  a  man  can 
make  no  claim  for  the  truth  of  beliefs  "  on  the  bare  ground  of  his 
temperament."  ^^  The  problems  of  human  society  require  for 
their  solution,  in  addition  to  a  knowledge  of  the  social  sciences, 
such  a  training  in  social  psychology  as  will  enable  the  individual  to 
become  conscious  of  Impulses  that  deflect  his  thought. 

The  interpretation  of  the  principles  of  the  social  sciences  for 
human  welfare  is  not  science,  strictly  speaking,  but  philosophy  and 
may  be  called  social  philosophy,  or  it  may  be  called  sociology  pro- 
vided this  meaning  of  the  term  is  distinguished  from  the  one  already 
defined.  If  we  use  the  term  social  philosophy,  we  must  distinguish 
the  meaning  of  the  word,  philosophy,  from  its  meaning  in  the  first 
pages  of  the  present  chapter  where  it  was  used  in  the  sense  of  vague 
and  indefinite  knowledge  —  a  sense  which  has  abundant  historical 

^1  Some  economists  include  a  statement  of  these  motives  in  their  treatises  but  without 
indicating  the  relation  of  this  statement  to  the  rest  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  treatise. 
See  Seager,  "  Principles  of  Economics,"  50-52 ;  Ely,  "  Outline  of  Economics,"  J03-105. 

52  James,  "  Pragmatism,"  8. 

58  Ibid.,  7. 


SOCIOLOGY,  EUGENICS  AND  PHILOSOPHY    421 

justification.  Such  knowledge  is  a  necessary  stage  in  the  develop- 
ment of  thought.  We  have  now  to  use  the  word  in  another  sense, 
that  of  synthetic  thinking  ^^  as  distinguished  from  the  analytical 
thinking  which  is  emphasized  in  scientific  method,  though  this  dis- 
tinction can  be  made  for  purposes  of  emphasis  only,  for  thinking 
in  one  process. 

We  have  to  distinguish,  also,  between  the  social  philosopher  and 
the  practical  thinker,  that  is,  the  thoughtful  legislator,  judge,  or 
executive.  The  profound  thinking  of  one  trained  in  the  social 
sciences  is  apt  to  appear  radical  to  the  practical  thinker.  But  this 
is  the  radicalism  of  the  thinker  as  distinguished  from  the  man 
of  action.  The  profound  thinker  is  often  conservative  in  his 
practical  attitude.  Social  scientists  have  tended  to  be  much  more 
conservative  with  regard  to  the  possibilities  of  social  reform  than 
is  justified  by  experience.  A  profound  thinker  is  apt  to  be  vividly 
conscious  that  most  men  are  conventional  thinkers,  and,  as  far 
as  he  can  see,  always  will  be;  wherefore  he  realizes  that,  when 
it  comes  to  plans  of  action,  a  wise  discounting  of  the  capacity  for 
progress  of  conventional  human  nature  is  essential.  Very  often 
his  experience  of  the  opposition  to  scientific  truth  of  the  conven- 
tional mass  makes  him  over-cautious  as  a  man  of  action.  Hence, 
while  profound  thinking  in  the  social  sciences  is  bound  to  seem 
more  or  less  destructive  of  the  social  order,  it  is  not  so.  It  is  rather 
constructive;  for  the  profound  thinker  indicates  what  changes  and 
reforms  are  inevitable,  and  thus  enables  leaders  to  avoid  being  re- 
actionary, and,  in  this  way,  to  avoid  the  unrest,  the  industrial  in- 
efficiency, and  perhaps  revolution  which  results  from  a  reactionary 
exercise  of  control  by  the  governing  classes. 

While  government  officials  are  not  usually  social  philosophers 
capable  of  profound  thinking,  their  efficiency  depends  on  their  being 
astute  and  unerring  practical  thinkers,  and  this  requires  a  knowledge 
of  social  science.  Executives,  legislators,  and  judges  have  a  wide 
discretionary  power  in  their  official  action,^^  and  they  need  to  be 
rooted  and  grounded  in  the  social  sciences  if  their  executive  policies, 
their  legislation,  and  their  decisions  are  to  benefit  the  state  they 
serve.     In  the  United  States,  legislators  enjoy  a  wide  police  power 

^*  The  word  is  used  in  this  sense  by  John  Fiske  in  the  phrase,  "  cosmic  philosophy," 
See  Fiske,  "  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,"  I :  Ch.  II. 

^i^  Green,  "  Separation  of  Governmental  Powers,"  Yale  Law  Journal,  Feb.,  1920,  369- 
393- 


422      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

in  law-making  and  need  to  be  equipped  to  exercise  that  power. ^^ 
The  same  is  true  of  judges,  in  deciding  the  constitutionality  of  law, 
where  they  have  a  wide  discretion  between  the  police  power  granted 
to  legislatures  by  the  federal  constitution,  and  liberty,  under  prec- 
edents interpreting  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.^'^  As  to  execu- 
tives, "  the  legislature  determines  policies  as  far  as  is  practicable, 
leaving  to  executive  discretion  the  mode  of  carrying  them  out  and 
the  occasions  on  which  action  is  required.  What  the  executive  may 
accomplish  by  action  it  may  accomplish  without  exceeding  the  limits 
of  executive  power  by  order.  .  .  .  This  vests  the  executive  with 
power  to  make  laws."  ^^  Furthermore,  executive  chiefs,  as  gover- 
nors of  states  and  the  President  of  the  United  States,  are  more  and 
more  becoming  the  leaders  of  their  party  and  the  exponents  of  its 
legislative  policy.  Changes  in  political  institutions  are  in  line  with 
this  development,^^  and  the  development  itself  is  an  expression  of 
the  tendency  of  human  nature  to  follow  leadership,  and  of  a  major- 
ity to  group  itself  around  a  man.^*^  Furthermore,  modern  life  is 
marked  by  an  increase  in  the  variety  of  interests  that  require  adjust- 
ment through  state  action,  and  these  interests  bring  pressure  to 
bear  on  the  executive,  so  that  his  power  is  increased  in  proportion  to 
the  failure  of  legislatures  and  courts  to  work  out  satisfactory  adjust- 
ments.^^ From  the  municipal  to  the  national  executive,  we  find  a 
tendency  to  vest  greater  discretionary  power  in  the  executive. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  problem  of  prostitution  as  it  confronts  city 
administrations.  Though  all  departments  of  the  government  have 
their  part  in  meeting  this  evil,  their  effective  action  depends  on  the 
attitude  of  the  executive.  If  he  is  aggressive  against  it,  the  city 
council  is  apt  to  provide  the  necessary  ordinances  and  the  judge 
to  impose  the  necessary  heavy  penalties  on  those  found  guilty. 
Public  opinion  offers  the  executive  wide  discretionary  power  in  his 
treatment  of  prostitution.  Public  opinion  is  seldom  so  well  organ- 
ized and  so  ably  led  as  to  dictate  the  measures  to  be  taken.  It  is 
apt  to  be  indifferent  but  will  support  any  intelligent  administration 

■5^  Commons  and  Andrews,  "Principles  of  Labor  Legislation,"  419-421. 

*7  Itid.,  422-430. 

^8  Green,  op.  cit.,  383   (quoted  without  footnotes). 

'8  Croly,  "  Progressive  Democracy,"  Ch.  XIV. 

«o  Ibid.,  313. 

'1  Bentley,  "The  Process  of  Government,"  357. 


SOCIOLOGY,  EUGENICS  AND  PHILOSOPHY    423 

that  attempts  to  suppress  commercialized  prostitution.^^  How- 
ever, executives  who  are  not  trained  in  the  social  sciences,  who  do 
not  understand  the  conditions  of  civic  and  national  well-being,  are 
apt  to  let  the  evil  alone  and  find  excuses  for  so  doing.  The  scientific 
training  opens  up  possibilities  of  civic  and  national  improvement 
along  this  line. 

The  national  executive  also  has  wide  opportunities  for  the  exer- 
cise of  discretion.  An  executive  whose  disposition  is  sympathetic 
and  intellectual  rather  than  aggressively  rivalrous  can  go  a  long  way 
in  safeguarding  peaceful  relations  between  nations,  forming,  as  he 
goes,  the  indifferent  or  hesitant  public  opinion  in  support  of  his 
policies;  on  the  other  hand,  an  aggressively  rivalrous  executive  can 
go  a  long  way  in  the  promotion  of  militaristic  international  rela- 
tions, forming  public  opinion  in  that  direction.  While  his  inherent 
disposition  will  play  an  important  part  in  the  executive's  thinking 
and  the  formation  of  his  judgment,  he  will  keep  from  dispositional 
extremes  in  thinking  and  action  by  scientific  and  philosophical  train- 
ing. Such  a  training  of  public  men  is  precisely  what  is  needed  if 
democracies  are  to  avoid  the  extremes  in  national  administration 
which  result  from  the  rivalry  for  political  control  of  conflicting 
class  interests.  Parties  stand  more  or  less  decidedly  for  conflicting 
classes;  and  no  executive  can  serve  class  interests  and,  at  the  same 
time,  serve  the  people  as  a  whole.  He  must  be  rooted  and 
grounded  in  the  principles  of  the  welfare  of  the  whole  if  he  is  to 
be  other  than  a  mere  representative  of  party  and  class  interests.^^ 
Given  statesmen  who  belong  to  one  party  or  another  according  to 
their  dispositional  inclination  and  training,  and  who  at  the  same 
time  are  conversant  with  the  principles  of  the  social  sciences  and 
trained  in  philosophic  judgment,  and  we  may  have  oscillations  in 
party  control  and,  at  the  same  time,  a  steadily  progressive  adminis- 
tration of  government. 

82  Flexner,  "  Next  Steps  in  Dealing  with  Prostitution,"  Amer.  Soc.  Hygiene  Ass'n., 
Pub.  No.  46,  8-9. 

83  Croly,  "  Progressive  Dennocracy,"  358. 


BOOK  IV 

THE  FIELD  AND  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE    FIELD    OF    SOCIAL    PSYCHOLOGY 

THE  purpose  of  the  discussion  of  the  relation  of  social 
psychology  to  other  sciences  was  stated,  at  the  beginning, 
to  be  to  justify  the  claim  of  social  pschology  to  recognition 
as  a  distinct  science  by  showing  that  it  has  a  distinct  field  which 
can  be  treated  scientifically.  The  preceding  chapters  have  shown 
that  the  assumptions  of  the  social  sciences  relate  to  a  field  distinct 
from  that  of  each  social  science.  Each  social  science  starts  with 
certain  habitual  social  relations  and  analyses  the  functioning  of  the 
institutions  developed  therefrom,  while  social  psychology  aims  to 
explain  social  relations  that  are  assumed  by  each  science  without 
analysis,  and,  perhaps,  without  any  consciousness  of  the  psycholog- 
ical significance  of  its  assumptions.  It  is  not  the  task  of  social 
psychology  to  formulate  for  any  social  science  its  particular  as- 
sumptions. It  is  the  task  of  social  psychology,  however,  to  analyse 
the  psychological  aspects  of  the  assumptions  of  a  particular  social 
science.  It  does  this  with  reference  to  its  own  problems,  and  not 
with  reference  to  those  of  the  particular  social  science ;  but  all  social 
scientists  need  a  knowledge  of  social  psychology  in  formulating  their 
assumptions.  This  knowledge  is  needed  also  by  social  scientists  in 
making  their  predictions  or  recommendations  for  progress.  Pre- 
dictions in  social  science,  as  explained  in  the  Introduction,  cannot 
pretend  to  the  exactness  of  predictions  in  natural  science.  But  we 
should  not,  for  that  reason,  accept  the  view  of  sociologists  who 
would  limit  the  task  of  the  social  scientist  to  merely  showing  an 
orderly  development  in  past  and  present,  through  use  of  the  form- 
ulas of  biological  evolution.^  This  view  is  inevitable  if  the  sociolo- 
gist denies  the  assistance  that  social  psychology  may  render  sociol- 
ogy. But  if  he  grants  it,  the  possibilities  of  interpretation  are 
immensely  enlarged.  It  becomes  possible  by  noting  changes  in  so- 
cial-psychological processes,  to  infer  changes  in  social  organization, 
and  thereby  to  make   recommendations   as  to  necessary  changes 

1  Keller,  "Law  in  Evolution,"  Yale  Law  Journal,  XXVIII: 773. 

427 


428      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

which  are  also  predictions  of  inevitable  changes.  These  predictions 
require  a  knowledge  of  human  nature  that  is  wider  than  the  as- 
sumptions of  any  particular  social  science.  Because  of  the  intricate 
relation  of  all  the  social  sciences  to  human  nature  and  to  one  an- 
other, predictions  require  a  knowledge  of  the  co-ordinating  science 
of  human  nature,  social  psychology. 

Social  psychology  was  defined  as  the  science  of  the  motives  of  the 
behaviour  of  men  living  in  social  relations.  That  it  is  possible  to 
analyse  social  relations  in  this  intensive  sense  and  to  generalize  as 
to  the  motives  of  behaviour  may  seem  incredible,  but  it  is  the 
purpose  of  the  present  chapter  to  show  that  that  is  what  people  are 
doing  all  the  time,  that  it  is  inevitable  that  it  should  be  done  and 
that  it  needs  to  be  done  intelligently.  People  are  doing  it  every 
day  in  their  relations  with  one  another,  and  even  in  their  judgments 
of  individuals  and  groups  they  never  saw,  —  of  public  men,  cor- 
porations and  labour  groups  they  read  about.  These  necessary 
judgments  are  made  haphazard,  with  little  intelligence,  with  little 
thought  of  their  significance  or  seriousness,  and  will  continue  so  to 
be  made  until  people  are  trained  to  make  them  more  intelligently. 
For  the  impulse  to  judge  the  motives  of  others  persists  in  spite  of 
the  injunction,  "  Judge  not  I  "  It  persists  with  a  naive  unconscious- 
ness of  its  limitations.  In  spite  of  the  personal  element  involved, 
and  the  Socratic  warning,  "  Know  thyself,"  the  judgments  tend  to 
be  made  with  all  the  cocksureness  of  a  judgment  of  objective  facts. 

Judgments  as  to  the  motives  of  others  are  inevitable  because 
behaviour  involves  self-consciousness.  What  we  find  in  human 
society  are  men  animated  by  more  or  less  conscious  motives,  and 
their  reactions  to  others  are  affected  by  what  they  believe  others' 
motives  to  be.  However  difficult  it  may  be  to  understand  the 
motives  of  their  associates,  men  do  reflect  as  to  what  these  are 
and  discuss  them;  and  they  consider  that  their  associates  have  the 
same  interest  in  their  own  motives.  A  man's  estimate  of  himself 
is  determined  by  what  others  think  of  him,  as  well  as,  in  many 
cases  more  than,  by  what,  in  his  heart  of  hearts,  he  knows  himself 
to  be.^  Only  the  great  moral  character  cares  supremely  for  the 
approval  of  the  man  within  the  breast.^ 

Because  of  the  importance  attached  to  another's  estimate  of 

2  Pillsbury,  "  The  Psychology  of  Nationality  and  Internationalism,"  220. 
8  Tarbell,  "  The  Life  of  Abraham  Lincoln,"  II:  121. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY         429 

one's  motives,  one  resents  a  misrepresentation  of  one's  motives. 
Men  differ  in  their  reactions  to  misrepresentation.  The  reaction 
will  depend  on  the  disposition  of  the  individual.  In  case  of  a  mis- 
representation in  the  press,  the  first  annoyance  for  the  man  of 
intellectual  disposition  is  that  the  statement  is  untrue.  Most  peo- 
ple will  think :  "  How  will  it  strike  people?  "  Or  "  What  was  the 
motive  of  the  misrepresentation?  "  But  the  first  and  strongest 
reaction  in  a  man  of  intellectual  disposition  is  that  the  report  is 
false  or  incomplete  or  garbled  or  otherwise  untrue.  If  he  takes 
up  a  misrepresentation  with  another,  the  latter  may  argue :  "  I  can't 
see  anything  in  this  to  object  to.  What  if  it  is  untrue?  There 
was  evidently  no  malice  in  it  because  there  is  nothing  in  it  which 
could  hurt  you  in  the  community.  Furthermore  I  can  imagine 
how  it  might  appreciably  further  your  interests  here."  The  reply 
of  the  man  of  intellectual  disposition  is  apt  to  be,  "  That  may  all 
be  true  but  is  neither  here  nor  there.  The  fact  is,  the  statement 
is  untrue  and  that  is  why  I  object  to  it."  The  argument  may  con- 
tinue, but  no  agreement  will  be  reached  because  the  men  are  essen- 
tially different  in  disposition.  In  one,  the  predominating  Impulses 
are  the  intellectual  so  that  he  is  most  annoyed  by  the  untruth;  in 
the  other,  the  strongest  impulses  are  not  the  intellectual  so  that  he 
will  pass  over  an  untruth  with  comparatively  little  feeling  of  annoy- 
ance unless  it  annoys  other  impulses  which  are  strong  within  him, 
as  the  impulse  to  avoid  social  contempt  or  to  gain  social  superiority 
or  to  satisfy  some  other  impulse  that  involves  a  consideration  of  the 
motives  of  others  toward  him.  Most  men  are  supremely  interested 
in  the  attitude  of  the  community  and  particularly  of  associates,  but 
the  intellectual  person  has  less  of  this  interest.  Even  for  him,  how- 
ever, these  vague  phenomena  raise  problems  of  adjustment;  and  the 
rank  and  file  are  not  primarily  intellectual.  They  take  an  impulsive 
interest  in  the  motives  of  others,  in  what  others  are  saying  about 
them,  and  in  its  social  effect.  Wherefore  conscious  motives  are  an 
important  part  of  the  subject  matter  of  social  psychology.  The 
social  psychologist  must  take  men  as  they  are.  Though  the  prob- 
lem, because  of  its  vagueness,  is  annoying  to  the  intellectual  im- 
pulses, yet  the  problem  is  there,  fundamental,  exceedingly  difficult, 
and  its  analysis  must  be  attempted. 

Right  at  the  start  it  is  necessary  to  emphasize  the  difference 
between  the  intellectual  and  the  non-intellectual  attitude  in  the  esti- 


430      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

mate  of  the  motives  of  others.  Where  there  is  an  absence  of  that 
intellectual  vigour  and  integrity  that  insists  on  scrupulous  accuracy, 
there  is  a  carelessness  in  interpreting  the  motives  of  others.  It  is 
common  to  misrepresent  the  words  or  worth  of  others,  usually 
without  any  deliberate  intent.  It  is  done  in  satisfaction  of  sub- 
conscious impulses.  Thus,  among  business  and  professional  men 
the  work  or  motives  of  those  who  are  liked  often  are  misrepresented 
in  a  "  favourable  light,"  and  the  work  or  motives  of  those  not 
liked  in  an  unfavourable  light.  This  is  often,  perhaps  usually,  done 
more  subconsciously  than  consciously.  Men  subconsciously  satisfy 
the  sympathetic  impulse  to  make  happy  those  they  like,  and  they 
do  so  by  giving  them  undue  credit.  Less  often,  they  subconsciously 
satisfy  the  impulse  to  injure  men  they  do  not  like,  and  they  do  so 
by  failing  to  give  them  due  credit.  The  one  and  the  other  are  done 
subconsciously  as  well  as  consciously,  in  little  reflective  ways,  by 
expression  of  face  or  by  a  casual  word  when  the  work  of  a  man  is 
mentioned;  and  the  effect  of  the  expression  or  word  on  others,  per- 
haps the  higher  officials  of  the  business  establishment  or  educational 
institution,  may  be  as  subconscious  as  the  stimulus.  It  is  none  the 
less  effective.  The  man  thus  favoured  by  being  given  undue  credit 
is  not  annoyed  by  the  lack  of  truth,  that  is,  the  lack  of  justice 
in  such  behaviour  unless  he  is  primarily  of  an  intellectual  disposition. 
He  is  usually  not  far-sighted  enough  to  realize  that  the  same  un- 
truthful behaviour  which  satisfies  him  when  he  is  liked,  may  make 
for  his  annoyance,  if  he  becomes  disliked.  As  opposed  to  this 
impulsive  valuation  of  others'  behaviour,  we  have  the  strictly  im- 
partial intellectual  valuation;  many  men  make  it  a  principle  of  their 
behaviour  to  be  just  to  another,  whether  he  is  liked  or  disliked. 
Only  the  man  of  intellectual  disposition  insists  on  judging  others 
according  to  their  merits  and  demerits,  regardless  of  his  likes  and 
dislikes,  and  on  being  judged  himself  in  the  same  way.  The  ability 
so  to  use  the  intellect  depends  on  native  intellectual  vigour,  and 
on  the  training  of  the  intellect  in  a  way  to  develop  the  habit  of 
intellectual  integrity  as  the  essential  attitude  of  character.  It  de- 
pends also  on  training  in  social  psychology.  When  once  our  knowl- 
edge of  motives  has  ceased  to  be  vague  intuition,  men  will  not  so 
naively  ascribe  to  others  this  or  that  motive,  and  estimate  their 
worth  as  suits  their  likes  and  dislikes. 

While  the  interest  of  most  men  in  each  other's  motives  is  pri- 


THE  FIELD  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY         431 

marily  impulsive,  the  reactions  of  close  association  necessitate  a 
more  or  less  intimate  and  certain  knowledge  of  the  character  of 
those  with  whom  we  are  associated.  This  necessity  begets  an  in- 
sistence on  sincerity.  Men  are  annoyed  by  a  profession  of  motives 
that  seems  insincere  and  strongly  attracted  by  an  associate  of  whose 
sincerity  they  feel  absolutely  certain.  Sincerity  is  valued  apart 
from  the  motives  in  which  a  man  is  sincere.  Sometimes  one  hears 
it  said  of  another:  "  He  is  narrow  and  domineering  but  you  know 
where  he  stands.  He  is  absolutely  sincere  and  I  like  him  for  that." 
Owing  to  the  vagueness  of  motives,  the  intellectual  uncertainty  in 
these  problems  is  very  trying,  and  it  is  with  a  grateful  sense  of 
relief  that  one  feels  an  associate  is  what  he  appears  to  be.  Then, 
too,  absence  of  pretence  is  apt  to  show  a  character  whose  motives 
are  so  estimable  that  pretence  is  uncalled  for. 

Sincerity  is,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  imperfect.  '*  Almost  all 
men  deceive  themselves  as  well  as  their  associates  with  conventional 
phrases,  with  expressions  which,  though  quite  devoid  of  insincerity, 
yet  are  far  from  genuine."  ^  In  addition  to  this  unconscious  insin- 
cerity men  get  into  the  habit  of  saying  not  what  they  think  but  what 
they  are  willing  to  have  repeated.  In  the  exercise  of  this  "  discre- 
tion "  the  intellect  is  used  to  serve  the  instinct  to  avoid  disapproval 
and  win  approval.  Obviously  any  teaching  into  which  this  motive 
enters  is  worthless.  It  is  the  motive  of  the  administrator  who 
works  with  an  eye  to  pleasing  superiors  and  to  maintaining  the  en- 
thusiastic loyalty  of  subordinates.  The  different  positions  in  society 
enlist  different  instincts,  which,  repeatedly  stimulated,  develop  dif- 
ferent types  of  mind  and  character.  The  problem  for  each  indi- 
vidual is  to  ascertain  what  combination  of  instinctive  reactions  con- 
duces to  the  highest  efficiency  in  this  and  that  position,  and  then  to 
choose  the  position  for  which  his  instinctive  capacities  fit  him. 
The  highest  efficiency  means  of  course  the  state  of  being  able  to 
render  the  maximum  service  for  the  public  welfare.  This  requires 
a  maximum  of  sincerity  as  to  motives,  whatever  the  position. 
Doubtless  sincerity  will  increase  as  social  psychology  takes  a  more 
important  place  in  public  and  higher  education.  It  has  notably 
increased  with  the  development  of  science  and  of  political  freedom.^ 
But  governmental  censorship  still  continues,  and  there  continues 

*  Taussig,  "  Inventors  and  Money-Makers,"  20. 

"  Robinson,  "  The  Threatened  Eclipse  of  Free  Speech,"  Atlan.  Mon.,  Dec,  1917,  815. 


432      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

also  the  more  subtle  control  of  the  expression  of  opinion  exercised 
by  the  dominant  social  class  and  operating  through  fear  of  that 
class,  or  through  the  allurement  of  the  satisfactions  in  the  gift  of 
that  class  —  industrial,  political,  academic  and  ecclesiastical  posi- 
tion, income  and  flattering  associations.  Hence  the  temptation  to 
please  that  class  or  avoid  displeasing  it,  as  may  be  done  by  a 
plausible  use  of  language  and  by  discreet  mental  reservations. 
Nothing  will  so  promote  sincerity  In  social  relations  and  in  teaching 
as  the  training  given  by  a  thoroughly  scientific  study  of  human 
motives. 

What  are  the  methods  of  this  scientific  treatment?  They  in- 
clude observation  of  behaviour,  studies  of  behaviour  through  use 
of  documentary  sources,  and  inference  as  to  the  motives  of  be- 
haviour. Testimony  as  to  the  motives  of  behaviour  by  itself  is  of 
little  importance.^  For  instance,  business  men  are  apt  to  mention 
as  causes  of  their  success  traits  that  commend  their  success,  or  un- 
expected traits  that  give  them  still  greater  prestige,  for  instance, 
a  love  of  music  that  gave  them  needed  recreation,  or  traits  that  will 
make  them  exemplars  of  the  young  or  will  endorse  the  old-time 
virtues.  Their  testimony  may  be  true  as  far  as  it  goes,  without 
indicating  the  relative  importance  of  the  traits  cited,  and  without 
including  all  the  traits  that  are  essential  to  business  success.  While, 
therefore,  the  statements  of  business  men  as  to  their  motives  are 
interesting,  the  prevailing  motives  of  business  behaviour  must  be 
inferred  from  an  extensive  and  intensive  analysis  of  business  prac- 
tices. Professed  motives  must  be  considered  In  the  light  of  the 
actual  behaviour  of  the  business  man  under  the  conditions  in  which 
he  is  doing  business.  For  instance,  if  a  corporation  professes  to 
run  its  business  in  such  a  way  as  to  enable  the  workman  to  realize 
his  highest  and  best  self,  and  yet  continues  to  pay  wages  and  pro- 
vide working  conditions  that  make  such  realization  impossible,  while 
large  dividends  are  declared,  the  conclusion  must  be  that  the  pro- 
fessed motive  is  not  the  essential  one,  that  the  essential  motive  Is  the 
prevailing  profit-seeking  motive  of  business  enterprise. 

An  adequate  interpretation  of  human  behaviour  requires  intimate 
observation  of  typical  men  and  groups.  It  must  include  a  study 
of  conscious  motives  and  must  be  given  in  terms  of  conscious  as 

8  Link,  "  Employment  Psychology,"  189-194. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY        433 

well  as  subconscious  processes.  It  is  said  that  we  know  the  mo- 
tives of  others  only  through  observation  of  their  behaviour, — 
of  what  they  do  "  in  giving  us  things,  in  writing  what  we  may  read, 
in  speaking  what  we  may  understand,"  "^  that  the  thoughts  we  attri- 
bute to  them  are  essentially  our  thoughts  with  reference  to  their 
behaviour,  that  we  cannot  have  their  ithoughts  any  more  than  they 
can  have  our  thoughts,  that  the  best  we  can  do,  therefore,  is  to 
develop  a  science  of  behaviour  without  reference  to  conscious 
motives.^  It  is  said  that  "  only  conduct  counts.  Motives  derive 
their  sole  value  from  the  conduct  which  they  produce."  ^  In  answer 
to  this  we  can  only  repeat  that  the  members  of  a  social  group  discuss, 
and  believe  that  they  understand  each  other's  motives,  think  of 
each  other  "  almost  exclusively  "  ^^  in  terms  of  motives,  estimate 
their  own  worth  according  to  others'  attitudes  to  them,  and  act 
according  to  what  they  believe  the  motives  of  others  to  be.  Men 
and  nations  fear  nothing  more  than  lest  damaging  motives  that  are 
attributed  to  them  become  generally  accredited.  Whatever  may 
be  the  ultimate  formulas  of  human  behaviour,  therefore,  the 
analyses  and  interpretations  of  the  social  psychologist  cannot  ignore 
the  conscious  motives. 

The  essential  distinction  in  consciousness  is  that  between  focalized 
states  and  those  states  of  which  one  is  not  clearly  conscious  —  the 
marginal  and  subliminal  states,  which  may  be  termed  subconscious 
states.  "  The  general  contrast  between  the  apperception  by  quick, 
total,  merged,  affective  impressions,  and  the  successive  and  separate 
attention  to  logically  selected  detail,  falls  in  large  measure  within 
the  contrast  of  the  subconscious  to  the  conscious."  ^^  Social  experi- 
•  once  is  more  largely  subconscious  than  conscious.  The  instinctive 
consciousness  is  subconscious  except  when  annoyance  or  satisfaction 
of  instinctive  impulses  becomes  intense.  Instinctive  annoyances 
may  be  so  serious  as  to  injure  health  while  still  subconscious,  undis- 
criminated, and  requiring  psycho-analysis  on  the  part  of  the 
physician.^^  States  originally  focal,  in  the  course  of  experience 
become  subconscious.     For,  just  as  we  get  used  to  seeing  familiar 

■^  Meyer,  "  The  Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Behavior,"  2. 

8  Ibid.,  2. 

®  Carver,  "  Essays  in  Social  Justice,"  61. 

10  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  2. 

11  Jastrow,  "The  Subconscious,"  112. 

1'  Freud,  "  Psychopathology  of  Everyday  Life,"  trans,  by  Brill. 


434      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

things/^  to  hearing  familiar  sounds,^*  and  to  experiencing  familiar 
organic  sensations/^  and  as  we  come  to  react  subconsciously,  even 
though  they  are  the  most  vital  reactions  of  our  lives,  so  we  get  used 
to  our  social  environment,  and  our  social  reactions  become  sub- 
conscious.^^ Only  on  the  withdrawal  of  a  familiar  stimulus  does 
the  idea  of  the  stimulus  and  reaction  rise  to  the  focus  of  attention. 
Thus,  happily  married  couples  know  that,  as  they  grow  older,  they 
are  less  conscious  of  their  love  for  each  other  than  at  first,  though 
they  love  each  other  none  the  less,  rather  much  more.  They  realize 
that  the  essential  thing  in  their  happiness  is  not  impulse,  but  the 
more  vaguely  conscious  attitude  of  affection  with  its  feeling  of  con- 
tentment in  each  other's  company.  If  they  are  separated  for  a 
time,  this  dimly  conscious  attitude  becomes  a  vividly  conscious  idea. 
"  I  never  know  how  much  I  love  you  until  I  go  away,"  is  a  common 
confession  of  married  people.  Social  attitudes  are  dimly  conscious 
until  the  relation  is  threatened,  or  for  the  time  being  broken,  when 
the  removal  of  the  habitual  stimulus  causes  the  attitude  to  become 
clearly  conscious. 

Because  of  the  importance  of  subconscious  states  in  social  rela- 
tions, the  social  psychologist  must  attend  carefully  to  these  states. 
The  task  is  difficult  because  of  the  inferential  aspect  of  social-psycho- 
logical method,  which  is  inherent  in  the  fact  that  we  can  experience 
only  our  own  motives  directly;  in  learning  the  motives  of  others  we 
have  to  infer  from  the  reactions  we  see,  the  motives  we  do  not  see. 
The  inferred,  subconscious,  instinctive  movements  are  the  elemental 

1^  We  sometimes  exclaim  as  we  see  an  object  in  a  familiar  environment,  "  Why,  I 
never  saw  that  before."    We  had  seen  it  many  times  but  not  focally. 

1*  We  become  accustomed  to  the  ticking  of  a  clock  and  are  not  aware  of  the  ticking 
unless  the  clock  stops. 

15  "  In  cases  of  lingering  illness  and  where  a  pain  of  low  intensity  is  an  almost 
constant  accompaniment,  the  sufferer  will  say  that  he  is  able  to  forget  it  at  times,  .  .  . 
'It  is  always  there,'  he  will  say,  'but  at  times  I  forget  it.'"  (Shand,  "Feeling  and 
Thought,"  Mind,  N.  S.,  VII:  487.) 

16  "  The  evidence  is  thus  varied  and  convincing,  that  the  processes  of  perception  of 
the  external  world  .  .  .  are  in  the  ordinary  use  of  our  faculties  as  typically  subconscious 
as  conscious  in  their  mode  of  functioning;  and  in  virtue  of  this  relation  does  it  ensue 
that  we  hear  and  see  and  feel  things,  that  guide  our  inferences,  that  enter  into  our 
associations,  .  .  .  and  yet  all  these  factors  enter  but  feebly  into  the  realm  of  conscious 
knowledge. 

"  The  extension  of  this  principle  to  more  general  acquisitions  and  to  the  practical 
life  lies  close  at  hand.  It  is  apparent  in  all  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  influence  of  the 
milieu,  in  the  home  and  in  the  school.  ...  It  is  the  trend  of  such  subconscious  impres- 
sions that  eventually  leads  to  the  toleration  of,  or  insensitiveness  to,  all  that  is  ugly 
or  vulgar  in  the  one  case,  and  in  the  other  to  a  refining  discrimination  .  .  .  and  to  the 
establishment  of  good  taste  and  good  morals."     (Jastrow,  "The  Subconscious,"  no.) 


THE  FIELD  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY         435 

psychological  processes  of  the  individual  consciousness;  but  they 
could  hardly  be  grasped  introspectively  by  the  individual  in  his  own 
consciousness,  were  it  not  for  the  many  reactions  in  his  fellows  that 
point  to  and  assist  introspection  to  a  clearer  understanding  of  these 
instinctive  processes.  As  conscious  processes,  therefore,  they  are 
in  a  sense  social  before  they  become  individual,  though  they  occur 
in  individual  minds.  They  are  social  processes  in  that  people  gener- 
ally are  moved  by  these  instinctive  processes.  But  people  are  apt 
to  be  unconscious  of  these  essential  motives  of  behaviour,  so  that 
the  social  psychologist  may  understand  the  behaviour  of  his  fellows 
better  than  they  understand  their  own  behaviour;  and  his  inferences 
will  very  often  meet  with  indignant  denial,  when  his  analyses  are 
uncomplimentary,^''^  Probably  no  individual  would  feel  compli- 
mented with  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  motives  of  his  behaviour. 
This  is  due  not  only  to  the  subconscious  or  unconscious  nature  of 
instinctive  processes  but  also  to  the  fact  that  motives  that  win  social 
approval  are  prominent  in  our  consciousness,  while  we  ignore  or 
disavow  motives  that  are  less  complimentary.  Wherefore,  the 
task  of  the  social  psychologist  is  a  disillusioning  and  by  no  means 
pleasant  one.  No  thorough  psychological  study  of  a  group  will 
please  that  group,  and  the  principles  of  social  psychology  will  not 
please  society.  This,  together  with  the  vague  nature  of  the  sub- 
conscious processes  of  society,  and  the  apparent  assumption  involved 
in  an  attempt  to  show  society  itself,  has,  until  recently,  inclined  social 
scientists  to  interest  themselves  only  in  the  more  clearly  conscious 
motives,  the  motives  of  leaders,^®  the  creditable  motives  of  the  dis- 
tinguished, and  to  ignore  those  vague  instinctive  processes  that  are 
essential  in  the  determination  of  social  behaviour.  The  vagueness 
of  motives  does  not  warrant  the  social  psychologist  in  eliminating 
them  from  his  consideration.  To  be  sure,  "  The  shades  of  the  rain- 
bow are  not  so  nice  ...  as  are  all  the  subtle,  shifting,  blending 
forms  of  thought  and  of  circumstances  that  go  to  determine  the 
character  of  us  and  of  our  acts."  ^®  But  we  are  not  studying  the 
subtle,  shifting,  blending  forms  of  thought  of  the  Individual  mind; 
we  are  studying  the  essential  motives  of  social  relations. 

Crises  bring  conscious  motives  to  the  fore;  this  is  true  whether 

17  Pillsbury,  "  The  Psychology  of  Nationality  and  Internatiwialism,"  220. 

18  Jenks,  "  Principles  of  Politics,"  24. 

19  Morley,  "The  Life  of  William  Ewart  Gladstone,"  1: 196. 


436      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

the  crisis  arises  in  the  relations  of  individuals  or  of  groups.  In  a 
crisis,  the  question  is  raised  as  to  the  motives  of  those  who  pre- 
cipitated it;  and  those  who  are  involved  seek  to  understand  the  mo- 
tives of  those  who  are  responsible  in  order  to  formulate  their  atti- 
tude. For  instance,  on  the  occasion  of  the  dismissal  of  Professor 
Scott  Nearing  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  the  motives 
of  the  trustees  who  favoured  the  action  were  challenged  by 
Professor  Nearing's  friends, 2*^  who  were  deliberating  what  atti- 
tude to  take  to  this  violation  of  freedom  of  teaching.  Again, 
Rev.  Henry  E.  Jackson  says  of  the  incident  which  eventually 
resulted  in  his  leaving  the  Presbyterian  Church  of  which  he  was 
pastor:  "Two  years  before  I  left  the  church,  a  preconcerted  and 
systematic  outburst  of  criticism  broke  over  me  totally  unexpectedly 
and  without  warning.  .  .  .  Some  of  the  criticism  was  true,  much  of 
it  false,  and  most  of  it  foolish.  This  made  me  suspicious,  for  I 
knew  that  when  men  hide  their  real  purpose  and  need  to  invent 
reasons  for  their  actions,  they  naturally  twist  and  falsify  facts  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  be  ridiculous."  ^^  The  author  describes  the 
process  through  which  he  analysed  the  motives  of  his  critics  and 
concludes :  "  Thus,  by  a  long  process  of  examination  and  elimina- 
tion, I  was  compelled  to  conclude  that  the  reason  for  the  disturbance 
was  just  what  T  beheved  at  the  beginning  it  must  be.  It  was  this : 
I  differed  fundamentally  with  two  small  but  influential  groups  of 
men  in  the  church  on  two  big  questions,  dogma  and  money."  ^^ 
Again,  the  motives  of  the  German  government  for  precipitating  a 
world  war  were  constantly  challenged  and  discussed  in  the  news- 
papers and  magazines  of  the  United  States  during  the  first  years 
of  the  war,  when  the  United  States  was  deliberating  what  attitude 
to  take  to  the  European  conflict.  Whenever  habitual  social  rela- 
tions are  broken  people  enquire  as  to  the  motives  of  those  who  are 
responsible  for  the  break.  There  develops  a  keen  interest  in  mo- 
tives. On  unerring  insight  into  motives  depends  social  survival  in  a 
crisis,  as  well  as  the  social  adjustments  that  are  required  in  every- 
day hfe. 

Social  adjustment  raises  questions  of  the  just  treatment  of  men, 
and  just   treatment   requires   that  we   discriminate   the   essential 

20Witmer,  "The  Nearing  Case,"  35. 

21  Jackson,  "  A  Community  Church,"  8. 

22  Ibid..  17.     See  also  Chs.  II-IV. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY         437 

motives  of  behaviour.  It  is  precisely  because  of  the  difficulty  of 
doing  this  that  men  often  lack  the  capacity  for  patient  thoughtful- 
ness  that  is  necessary  in  order  to  do  justice  to  others.  For  instance, 
the  failure  of  the  courts,  in  interpreting  the  constitutional  right  of 
free  speech,  to  give  sufficient  attention  to  the  intent  of  those  indicted 
has  resulted  in  doing,  as  Justice  Holmes  put  it  in  one  case,  "  a  great 
wrong  "  to  the  accused.^^  It  is  not  true  either  in  law  or  in  every- 
day life  ^^  that  only  conduct  counts.  It  is  important  to  know  the 
motives.  These  may  not  be  clearly  evident  in  the  behaviour,  and 
the  rough-and-ready,  easy  way  is  to  consider  merely  external  con- 
duct. 

Just  treatment  of  nations  also  requires  that  we  consider  their 
motives.  For  instance,  much  more  important  than  the  question  as 
to  which  nation  started  the  World  War  is  the  question  as  to  the 
essential  motives  of  the  different  nations  that  were  engaged  therein. 
A  national  aim  is  never  as  simple  as  it  appears  from  the  words  of 
those  who  speak  for  the  nation,  because  of  the  diverse  interests  of 
different  classes  within  the  nation^  To  ascertain  the  instinctive  pro- 
cesses which  constitute  the  undercurrents  of  a  national  purpose  is  a 
social-psychological  problem  of  the  utmost  importance  for  just  deal- 
ing between  nations.  The  instinctive  processes  of  a  nation,  which 
have  been  subconscious,  may  be  brought  by  a  crisis  into  clear  con- 
sciousness. The  war  against  Germany  made  us  clearly  conscious 
of  the  political  attitude  of  domination-obedience  as  the  thing  fought 
against,  and  also  of  the  democratic  political  attitude  of  resistance 
to  domination  and  the  preservation  of  liberty  as  the  thing  fought 
for.  We  awakened  to  the  existence  of  domination-submission 
wherever  it  existed  among  us,  in  our  industrial  organization,  our 
academic  organization,  even  in  our  family  organization,  and  in 
our  boss-ruled  poHtical  parties.  A  crisis  brings  into  clear  conscious- 
ness instinctive  processes  that  are  at  other  times  subconscious. 

The  leaders  of  a  nation  are  anxious  to  have  other  nations  inter- 
pret their  motives  in  a  favourable  light,  and  diplomacy  has  as  one  of 
its  purposes  the  creation  of  situations  that  will  convey  an  impression 
of  commendable  motives.  For  instance,  statesmen  realize  that 
there  is  an  instinctive  antipathy  toward  a  nation  which  is  an  aggres-' 

23  Abrams  v.  United  States,  text  of  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Ne<iu  Republic,  Nov.  26, 

1919.  383- 

2*  Robinson,  op.  cit.,  813-824. 


43B      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

sor  and  instinctive  sympathy  for  a  nation  which  is  aggressed  and 
fights  in  self-defense ;  and  a  wise  statesman,  like  Lincoln  ^^  or 
Bismarck,  -^  avoids  a  conflict  until  circumstances  so  transpire  that 
the  enemy  becomes  or  may  be  made  to  appear  the  aggressor.  We 
are  familiar  with  the  efforts  made  by  the  nations  to  show  that  the 
enemy  was  the  aggressor  in  the  World  War.  At  the  outbreak  of 
the  war,  the  German  emperor  issued  a  manifesto  to  the  effect  that 
Germany  declared  war  against  Russia  because  Russia  was  mobiliz- 
ing, which  meant  an  attack.^^  The  Russian  emperor  then  issued  a 
manifesto  declaring  the  war  was  started  by  the  Austrians,  who  first 
attacked  Servia  and  by  the  Germans,  who  first  invaded  Russia,  and 
that  the  Russians  were  "  forced  by  the  situation  "  to  arms.^^  The 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  of  England  declared  that  the  aggressor 
was  the  Prussian  military  aristocracy,^*^  to  which  the  German  am- 
bassador to  the  United  States  replied  that  England  "  is  known  to 
have  proposed  an  attack  on  the  German  fleet  before  the  war  had 
begun."  ^^  Each  nation  thus  tried  to  make  it  appear  that  its  fight 
was  on  the  defensive.  The  United  States  was  little  influenced  by 
any  of  these  manifestos  inasmuch  as  it  was  generally  known  that 
the  immediate  cause  of  the  war  was  Austria's  aggression  against 
Servia,  and  that  Austria  was  backed  by  Germany.  The  sentiment 
against  Germany,  in  the  United  States,  from  the  first  was  due,  in 
part,  to  the  belief  that  the  Teutonic  allies  were  the  aggressors, 
which  a  critical  survey  of  all  the  evidence  shows  to  have  been  the 
fact.^^  Nevertheless,  Germany  persisted  in  professing  the  defen- 
ds schurz  writes  of  Lincoln's  war  policy:  "The  ways  of  thinking  and  feeling  of 
the  masses,  of  the  plain  people,  were  constantly  present  to  his  mind.  The  masses,  the 
plain  people,  had  to  furnish  the  men  for  the  fighting,  if  fighting  was  to  be  done.  He 
believed  that  the  plain  people  would  be  ready  to  fight  when  it  clearly  appeared  neces- 
sary and  that  they  would  feel  the  necessity  when  they  felt  themselves  attacked.  He 
therefore  waited  until  the  enemies  of  the  Union  struck  the  first  blow.  As  soon  as, 
on  the  i2th  of  April,  1861,  the  first  gun  was  fired  in  Charleston  Harbor  on  the  Union 
flag  upon  Fort  Sumter,  the  call  was  sounded,  and  the  Northern  people  rushed  to  arms." 
(Schurz,  "Abraham  Lincoln,"  54.) 

2<5  One  of  the  axioms  of  statesmanship,  as  expressed  by  Bismarck,  in  conversation 
with  Moltke,  was  that  success  "  essentially  depends  upon  the  impression  which  the 
origination  of  the  war  makes  upon  us  and  others;  it  is  important  that  we  should  be  the 
ones  attacked."     (Butler,  "Bismarck,"  H:  loi.) 

^''Associated  Press,  August  2,  1914;  Stowell,  "The  Diplomacy  of  the  W^ar  of  1914," 
109-116,  133-146. 

28  Associated  Press,  August  4th,  1914. 
^^  Rochester  Herald,  Aug.  30,  1914. 

30  Ibid. 

31  Smith,  "  Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy  in  Bismarck's  Time  and  Afterward," 
Pol.  Sc.  Quart.,  XXX:  37-82;  Smith,  "Militarism  and  Statecraft,"  Ch.  V. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY         439 

sive  attitude.  Thus  the  German  Chancellor  said  in  December, 
1915:  "We  are  battling  in  this  struggle,  forced  upon  us,  not  to 
subjugate  foreign  nations,  but  to  protect  our  life  and  freedom. 
This  war  remains  for  the  German  government  what  it  was  in  the 
beginning  and  what  has  been  maintained  in  every  pronunciamento 
—  a  defensive  war  of  the  German  nation  for  its  future.  This 
war  can  only  be  ended  in  a  peace  which,  so  far  as  human  foresight 
reaches,  will  give  us  security  against  a  recurrence.  We  are  all 
united  in  this  aim.  That  is  our  strength  and  shall  remain  so  to  the 
end."  ^^  When  the  United  States  entered  the  war.  President  Wil- 
son, in  his  address  to  Congress  asking  for  a  declaration  of  war,  said: 
*'  While  we  do  these  things,  these  deeply  momentous  things,  let  us 
be  very  clear,  and  make  very  clear  to  all  the  world  what  our  motives 
and  our  objects  are."  ^^  He  then  stated  that  the  purpose  of  the 
war  did  not  spring  from  antipathy  for  the  German  people :  "  We 
have  no  feeling  towards  them  but  one  of  sympathy  and  friendship. 
It  was  not  upon  their  impulse  that  their  government  acted  in  enter- 
ing this  war.  It  was  not  with  their  previous  knowledge  or  ap- 
proval." The  United  States  entered  the  war,  he  said,  from  the 
necessity  of  self-defence  against  the  ruthless  aggression  and  secret 
plotting  of  the  German  autocracy,  and  also  for  the  sake  of  the  prog- 
ress of  democratic  government  everywhere,  which  was  menaced  by 
that  autocracy.  Thus  nations  are  solicitous  as  to  what  other 
nations  think  of  their  motives  because  nations  react  to  other  nations 
according  to  what  they  think  the  motives  of  others  to  be. 

It  is  evident  that  problems  of  motives  are  by  no  means  the  merely 
personal  problems  which  they  have  been  thought  to  be.  The 
behaviour  of  nations,  as  well  as  individuals,  is  determined  by  infer- 
ences as  to  the  sincerity  and  the  essential  motives  of  the  groups  with 
reference  to  which  the  nation  is  called  upon  to  act.  As  President 
Wilson  said  in  his  address  to  Congress,  the  American  nation  had 
been  a  long  time  in  making  up  its  mind  as  to  just  what  were  the 
motives  and  the  intentions  of  the  German  government;  having  made 
up  its  mind,  it  was  ready  to  act.  This  same  interest  in  motives, 
with  the  gradual  making-up  of  the  public  mind,  is  seen  in  connection 
with  conflicts  that  arise  within  the  nation.  Successive  revelations 
by  governmental  commissions  of  combinations  to  raise  prices,  result 

*2  The  Independent,  December  20,  1915,  460. 

38  "  President  Wilson's  State  Papers  and  Addresses,"  378. 


440      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

in  a  gradual  making  up  of  the  popular  mind  about  the  motives  that 
actuate  the  corporations  in  question.  The  people  become  con- 
vinced of  the  greed  of  the  corporations  and  this  reprehensible 
motive  causes  popular  support  of  governmental  regulation.  In  like 
manner  repeated  newspaper  stories  about  radical  labour  groups 
cause  readers  to  think  the  behaviour  of  those  groups  is  due  to 
hatred,  and,  their  minds  thus  made  up,  they  acquiesce  in  repressive 
governmental  measures. 

The  increasing  intimacy  of  intra-national  relations  and  of  re- 
lations between  nations  is  making  the  subject  of  motives  not  less, 
but  more  important.  When  a  misunderstanding  as  to  motives  may 
lead  to  a  disastrous  strike  or  to  a  war  between  nations,  it  is  evidently 
important  to  understand  motives.  The  more  intimate  our  relations 
with  others  the  more  certain  we  have  to  be  as  to  their  motives  in 
order  to  behave  understandingly  towards  them.  Furthermore,  the 
more  intimate  association  becomes,  the  less  easy  it  is  to  evade  the 
question  of  motives  or  to  deceive  as  to  essential  motives.  This  is 
true  both  between  individuals  and  between  groups,  even  between 
nations.  One  lesson  taught  by  the  World  War  was  the  greater 
difficulties  than  formerly  that  confront  a  nation  that  is  intent  on 
deceiving  other  nations  as  to  its  motives.  Less  secret  diplomacy, 
more  publicity  of  business  transactions,  are  some  of  the  lessons 
learned  from  the  World  War  and  the  profiteering  that  accompanied 
and  followed  it.  The  trend  of  social  evolution  is  in  the  direction  of 
a  more  conscious  and  rational  direction  of  the  processes  of  evolu- 
tion, and  this  involves  a  more  accurate  and  thorough  knowledge  of 
its  motivation. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

THE    METHODS    OF    SOCIAL    PSYCHOLOGY 

SOCIAL  psychology,  like  other  sciences,  originated  in  attention 
to  unusual  phenomena.  Crowds,  criminals,  and  the  like  first 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  social  psychologist.  The 
human  mind  Is  so  constituted  as  to  be  instinctively  Interested  In  novel 
stimuli.  Among  primitive  peoples,  such  stimuli  were  "  probable 
sources  of  danger,  and  the  creature  that  failed  to  attend  to  them 
would  soon  have  ceased  to  exist."  ^  This  interest  In  novel  stimuli 
predominates  In  the  beginning  of  scientific  work,  and  scientists  in 
the  various  fields  have  only  gradually  developed  "  the  most  striking 
traits  of  modern  scientific  method  "  which  include  "  an  appreciation 
of  the  overwhelming  significance  of  the  small,  the  common,  and 
the  obscure."  ^  In  Its  development  social  psychology  has  passed 
from  interest  in  the  striking  phenomena  of  crowds,  and  from  super- 
ficial delineations  of  social  processes  ^  to  the  analysis  of  the  pro- 
cesses of  typical  social  groups,*  and  of  the  motives  of  behaviour.^ 

Because  our  method  is  Inductive,  it  is  unnecessary  to  undertake 
an  analysis  of  the  conflicting  theories  of  social  mind.  The  differ- 
ences are  largely  due  to  imperfect  analysis,®  and  we  shall  do  well  to 
make  our  study  primarily  analytical  with  no  preconceived  theory  of 
social  mlnd.*^  If  It  Is  objected  that  our  analysis  has  primary  refer- 
ence to  individual  behaviour,  the  reply  is  that,  whenever  men  set  out 
to  describe  the  social  mind,  individual  behaviour,  with  a  conscious- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  individuals  of  their  like  beliefs  and  attitudes, 

iTitchener,  "A  Text-Book  of  Psychology,"  271. 

2  Robinson,  "  The  New  History,"  48. 

8  Dewey,  "The  Need  for  Social  Psychology,"  Psy.  Rev.,  XXIV: 267. 

*W^illiam8,  "An  American  Town,"  1906. 

5  Cooley,  "Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order,"  1902;  McDougall,  "An  Introduc- 
tion to  Social  Psychology,"  1909;  Thorndike,  "The  Original  Nature  of  Man,"  1913. 

«  Bristol,  "  Social  Adaptation,"  Chs.  VII,  X. 

^  "  The  fact  is  that  the  expression  '  social  mind,'  and  the  various  alternative  expres- 
sions which  are  used  as  equivalents  or  variants  of  it,  are  scarcely  fit  to  print  in  the 
context  of  exact  discourse.  This  does  not  mean  that  there  are  not  facts  referred  to  by 
these  expressions,  but  only  that  their  use  is  so  ill-defined  that  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  discover  just  which  facts  are  referred  to  at  any  given  time."  (Perry,  "  Economic 
Value  and  Moral  Value,"  Quart.  Jour.  Econ.,  May,  1916,  467-468.) 

441 


442      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

and  of  a  common  purpose,  with  little  or  no  consideration  of  its 
rationality,®  is  evidently  the  subject  matter  of  the  description. 
Take,  for  instance,  Mr.  Hughes'  description  of  the  mind  of  the  re- 
united Republican  party:  "This  representative  gathering  .  .  . 
means  the  strength  of  reunion.  It  means  that  the  party  of  Lincoln 
is  restored,  alert,  effective.  It  means  the  unity  of  a  common  per- 
ception of  paramount  national  needs.  .  .  .  We  know  that  we  are 
in  a  critical  period,  perhaps  more  critical  than  any  period  since  the 
Civil  War.  We  need  a  dominant  sense  of  national  unity;  the 
exercise  of  our  best  constructive  powers;  the  vigour  and  resourceful- 
ness of  a  quickened  America.  We  desire  that  the  Republican  party 
as  a  great  liberal  party  shall  be  the  agency  of  national  achievement, 
the  organ  of  effective  expression  of  dominant  Americanism.  What 
do  I  mean  by  that?  I  mean  America  conscious  of  power,  awake  to 
obligation,  erect  in  self-respect,  prepared  for  every  emergency  .  .  . 
safeguarding  both  individual  opportunity  and  the  public  interest, 
maintaining  a  well-ordered  constitutional  system  adapted  to  local 
self-government  without  the  sacrifice  of  essential  national  authority, 
appreciating  the  necessity  of  stability,  expert  knowledge  and 
thorough  organization  as  the  indispensable  conditions  of  security 
and  progress ;  a  country  loved  by  its  citizens  with  a  patriotic  fervour 
permitting  no  division  in  their  allegiance  and  no  rivals  in  their  affec- 
tion —  I  mean  America  first  and  America  efficient."  ®  "  Domi- 
nant Americanism  "  means,  then,  dominant  individuals,  "  conscious 
of  power,  awake  to  obligation,  erect  in  self-respect,  prepared  for 
every  emergency,"  acting  together  under  a  common  purpose,  united 
by  the  attitudes  that  characterize  the  party  in  question,  and  with 
the  patriotic  sense  of  power  which  comes  from  a  sense  of  member- 
ship in  a  great  party  of  a  great  nation. 

The  social  mind  evidently  has  no  existence  outside  of  individual 
minds.  But  it  exercises  a  dominant  influence  over  individual 
minds. ^'^  Rarely  does  the  individual  exist  who  has  such  a  persist- 
ently critical  attitude  as  to  be  beyond  the  influence  of  the  prevailing 
ideas  and  attitudes.  The  influence  of  these,  though  untrue,  is  as 
absolute  as  if  they  were  true.  So  much  has  this  been  so  in  the  past 
that,  as  Professor  Dunning  has  said,  in  the  interpretation  of  history 
"  We  must  recognize  and  frankly  admit  that  whatever  a  given  age 

8  Thomas  and  Znaniecki,  "The  Polish  Peasant  in  Europe  and  America,"  1:32-33. 
8  Hughes'  Speech  of  Acceptance,  Associated  Press  (R.  D.  C.))  August  i,  1916. 
10  Pillsbury,  "  The  Psychology  of  Nationality  and  Internationalism,"  219-220. 


THE  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY     443 

or  people  believes  to  be  true  is  true  for  that  age  and  that  peo- 
ple." ^^  Only  the  exceptional  man  takes  the  trouble  to  look  into 
the  truth  of  the  beliefs  of  his  time  and  his  criticisms  generally  have 
little  influence  on  contemporaries.  People  act  on  the  prevailing 
beliefs  with  even  more  assurance  than  the  scientist  on  rational  con- 
viction. 

The  individual  attributes  beliefs  to  his  family  or  nation,  which, 
though  they  exist  only  in  his  mind,  influence  him  as  if  they 
had  an  objective  existence.  In  just  the  same  way  he  attributes 
capacities  to  his  own  personality  which  have  no  existence  but 
which  influence  him  as  if  they  were  real.  "  The  self  of  which 
we  are  proud  is  as  much  a  mental  construction  as  is  the  nation,  yet 
most  of  our  endeavors  are  devoted  to  furthering  this  notion  of 
ourselves,  to  increasing  reputation  for  wealth,  for  charity,  for  ac- 
complishment in  some  line.  When  some  slight  is  cast  on  a  capa- 
bility which  we  believe  that  we  have,  but  really  do  not  have,  we 
are  as  much  disturbed  emotionally  as  if  we  were  robbed  of  a  real 
possession.  ...  In  many  respects,  the  nation  is  as  real  as  the  self. 
Both  are  in  large  measure  ideal  constructions."  ^^  The  social 
psychologist  assumes,  therefore,  that  processes  of  group  conscious- 
ness constitute  a  distinct  field  for  investigation.  But  he  does  not 
begin  with  a  theory  of  social  mind.  His  method  is  inductive,  and 
this  requires  actual  contact  with  the  members  of  social  groups. 

The  method  of  social  psychology  begins,  therefore,  with  the 
study  of  human  behaviour  as  observed  in  field-work  and  in  docu- 
mentary sources  that  have  employed  the  methods  of  careful  field- 
work.  These  include  the  work  of  those  ethnologists  who  empha- 
size the  necessity  of  intimate  personal  contact  with  the  peoples  they 
study,  and  who  insist  that  the  investigator  must  know  the  language 
of  the  group  instead  of  learning  through  an  interpreter,  must  live 
in  the  group  as  one  of  its  members,  and  take  part  in  its  daily  life 
and  conversation.^^  Boas  writes:  "  Unfortunately  the  descriptions 
of  the  state  of  mind  of  primitive  people,  such  as  are  given  by  most 
travellers,  are  too  superficial  to  be  used  for  psychological  investiga- 
tion. Very  few  travellers  understand  the  language  of  the  people 
they  visit;  and  how  is  it  possible  to  judge  a  tribe  solely  by  the 

"Dunning,  "Truth  in  History,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XIX:  227-228. 
^2  Pillsbury,  op.  c'tt.,  220-221. 

^3  Boas,  "  Handbook  of  Indian  Languages,"  Bur.  Amer.  Ethn.,  Bulletin  40,  Pt.  I,  59-61 ; 
Fletcher,  "The  Hako:  A  Pawnee  Ceremony,"  Bur.  Amer.  Ethn.,  XXII :Pt.  II,  p.  13. 


444      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

descriptions  of  interpreters  or  by  observations  of  disconnected 
actions  the  incentive  of  which  remains  unknown?  "  ^^  Further- 
more, even  when  the  language  of  a  group  is  known,  the  relation  of 
outsider  often  prevents  the  student  from  having  that  intimacy  of 
communication  and  enjoying  that  perfect  confidence  of  the  group 
members  that  is  necessary  in  order  to  understand  their  motives. 
"  We  must  remember  also  that  language  is  not  a  perfect  medium  of 
expression,  that  misunderstandings  constantly  arise  among  friends 
in  common  intercourse  on  this  account,  and  through  failure  to  ex- 
press the  idea  in  its  context,  and  that  this  becomes  a  very  grave 
source  of  error  in  our  judgment  of  races  whose  mental  background 
is  totally  different  from  our  own  and  whose  language  we  know  at 
best  imperfectly.  Moreover  the  mental  reservations  of  all  groups 
and  races  are  very  serious.  It  may  be  a  life  policy  to  deceive  the 
intruder."  ^^ 

Students  of  the  groups  of  civilized  society  similarly  emphasize 
careful  induction.  Thomas  and  Znaniecki's  great  monograph,  The 
Polish  Peasant  in  Europe  and  America,  proves  that  an  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  attitudes,  customs,  institutions  and  problems  of  a 
group  is  possible  with  a  painstaking  use  of  the  inductive  method. 
Social  workers  are  directed  in  making  a  careful  analysis  of  the 
motives  of  the  people  among  whom  they  work,^®  —  of  the  relations 
of  the  members  of  the  families  to  one  another,^^  their  relations  to 
relatives,^^  to  public  school  teachers,^^  to  employers  ^"  and  to  neigh- 
bours.^^ The  care  with  which  these  directions  are  worked  out 
shows  the  importance  attached  to  the  analysis  of  motives.  Students 
of  the  motives  of  criminals  live  in  the  environments  in  which  the 
delinquent  children,  from  whom  criminals  develop,  grow  up,  and 
cultivate  friendly  relations  with  these  children  and  their  families.^^ 
Those  who  deal  understandingly  with  delinquents  must  "  develop 
friendly  co-operation  with  the  offender  and  his  relatives,"  which 
requires  recognition  of  privileged  communication  on  the  part  of 

1*  Boas,  "  The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man,"  99. 

IS  Thomas,  "Race  Psychology:  Standpoint  and  Questionnaire,"  Amer.  Jour.  Social., 
XVII:  731. 

18  Richmond,  "Social  Diagnosis";  Cabot,  "Social  Work." 

17  Richmond,  "  Social  Diagnosis,"  Ch.  VII. 

18  Ibid.,  Ch.  IX. 
18  Ibid.,  Ch.  XI. 

20  Ibid.,  Ch.  XII. 

21  Ibid.,  Ch.  XIV. 

22  True,  "  Tht  Neglected  Girl,"  1-3.  ' 


THE  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY     445 

the  courts.^*  Students  of  the  labour  problem  are  obliged  to  go 
behind  the  documentary  sources  and  consult  members  of  employers' 
associations  and  trade  unions.^^  Students  of  the  activity  of  stock 
and  produce  exchanges  study  the  behaviour  of  speculators  in  ac- 
tion.^^  Students  of  particular  industries  find  that  the  essential 
problems  of  the  industry  are  less  problems  of  raw  material  than 
of  "  the  wants  and  habits  of  the  buying  public,"  ^®  or  of  the  effect 
of  the  management  of  the  industry  on  the  condition  and  attitude 
of  the  workers;  and  they  find  it  necessary  to  do  field  work.^'^  Stu- 
dents of  scientific  management  must  observe  the  industrial  relations 
in  the  shops. ^^  Students  of  any  phase  of  industrial  relations  must 
come  into  intimate  contact  with  the  people  in  those  relations. ^^ 
The  relative  intelligence  and  the  specific  abilities  of  workmen  can 
be  ascertained  by  laboratory  tests,  but  not  their  moral  qualities 
which  can  be  ascertained  only  after  a  prolonged  acquaintance,  and 
then  only  by  the  trained  psychologist.'®  The  motives  of  the  un- 
usual men  engaged  in  industry  cannot  be  ascertained  by  tests  or 
from  their  testimony,'^  but  only  on  intimate  acquaintance  with 
them.  The  motives  of  business  men  can  be  understood  by  this  inti- 
mate contact  with  typical  business  men.  The  same  methods  must 
be  used  in  a  study  of  the  behaviour  of  professional  groups.  The 
social  psychologist  must  know  typical  men  and  women  —  manual 
workmen,  business  men,  professional  men,  typical  men  and  women 
of  all  kinds.  He  must  understand  not  only  their  ideas  but  the 
more  fundamental  facts, —  their  dispositions  and  attitudes, —  and 
must  discriminate  occupational  from  personal  attitudes.  Further- 
more, he  must  learn  from  other  men  what  they  have  learned  of 
human  nature.  It  is  a  matter  of  regret  that  the  valuable  knowledge 
of  human  nature  which  business  and  professional  men  acquire  in 
the  course  of  a  long  experience  dies  with  them,  except  as  it  is  passed 

23Healy,  "The  Individual  Delinquent,"  30-31,  34-37'.  See  also  Healy,  "Mental  Con- 
flicts and  Misconduct,"  ^S;  Healy,  "Pathological  Lying,  Accusation  and  Swindling"; 
Healy  and  Bronner,  "Youthful  Offenders,"  Amer.  Jour,  SocioL,  July,  1916,  38-52. 

24Hoxie,  "Trade  Unionism  in  the  United  States,"  383;  Wolman,  "The  Boycott  in 
American  Trades  Unions,"  J.  H.  U.  S.  H.  P.  S.,  Series  XXIV,  No.  i,  Preface. 

25  Brace,  "The  Value  of  Organized  Speculation,"  51-53,  64,  150. 

28  Cherington,   "  The  V7ool  Industry,"  Preface,  viii-ix. 

27  Cherington,  op.  cit.,  Preface,  ix;  Van  Kleeck,  "A  Seasonal  Industry;  a  Study  of 
the  Millinery  Trade  in  New  York,"  Introduction. 

28  Hoxie,  "  Scientific  Management  and  Labor,"  Preface. 
2»"The  Pittsburg  Survey";  "The  Cleveland  Survey." 
80 Link,  "Employment  Psychology,"  Ch.  XVII. 
^^Ibid.,  189-194. 


446      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

down  as  oral  tradition.  For  instance,  think  what  a  lawyer  learns 
of  human  nature  in  the  course  of  his  adjustment  of  disputes  or  in 
such  business  as  helping  people  make  their  wills.  The  whole  range 
of  human  motives  is  run  through  on  such  occasions,  and  the  situ- 
ation does  not  permit  of  successful  deception  as  to  motives.  Busi- 
ness and  professional  men  value  their  knowledge  of  human  nature 
as  one  of  their  chief  assets.  But  it  is  vague,  unanalysed,  ineffective, 
and  of  little  value  to  rising  generations. 

In  intensive  studies  of  social  groups,  mechanical  tests  are  impos- 
sible, and  direct  questions  are  fruitless  unless  put  with  tact  and 
with  an  understanding  of  psychology.^^  People  have  little  clear 
understanding  of  their  motives,  and  often  conceal  what  they  do  un- 
derstand. One  learns  the  motives  of  people  by  knowing  them 
when  "  off  their  guard,"  in  the  casual  relations  of  daily  work  and 
recreation.  Furthermore,  human  nature  is  so  complex  that  no  one 
motive  can  be  understood  without  knowing  its  relations.  And  this 
understanding  cannot  be  reached  through  questionnaires.  One 
must  live  in  the  group,  experience  the  life  of  the  members,  and 
analyse  this  experience  with  the  aid  of  a  thorough  psychological 
equipment. ^^  Merely  recording  observations  does  not  get  an  in- 
vestigator very  far  in  scientific  work.  In  their  efforts  to  get  away 
from  personal  bias,  social  workers  have  sometimes  made  the  mis- 
take of  entering  "  upon  case  records  '  nothing  but  the  facts,'  .  .  . 
in  the  attempt  to  eliminate  all  prejudice,  they  eliminated  the  judg- 
ment and  discernment  which  would  have  given  to  the  whole  investi- 
gation unity  and  significance."  ^*  A  social-psychological  training 
is  essential  for  the  exercise  of  such  discernment. 

The  documentary  sources  of  social  psychology  can  be  ascertained 
from  the  lists  of  books,  documents  and  articles  which  are  appended 
to  this  and  the  five  succeeding  volumes,  though  these  are  only 
partial  lists  of  the  works  cited  in  the  texts  and,  therefore,  do  not 
purport  to  be  a  complete  bibhography.  Because  we  have  not 
had  a  distinct  science  of  social  psychology,  monographs  and  treatises 
on  the  other  social  sciences  contain  more  or  less  social  psychology; 

32  Richmond,  "  Social  Diagnosis,"  Ch.  IV. 

33  As  Dewey  says,  we  cannot  "  adapt  the  rubrics  of  introspective  psychology  to  the 
facts  of  objective  associated  life."  (Dewey,  "The  Need  for  Social  Psychology,"  Psy. 
Rev.,  Vol.  XXIV,  No.  4,  July,  1917,  271.) 

3*RichnQond,  op.  cit.,  94. 


THE  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY     447 

this  is  especially  true  of  the  newer  works  written  since  the  develop- 
ment of  the  social-psychological  point  of  view.  For  this  reason, 
as  well  as  because  of  the  intimate  relation  of  the  other  social  sci- 
ences to  social  psychology,  a  knowledge  of  the  other  social  sciences 
is  necessary  for  the  social  psychologist.  Furthermore,  assumptions 
and  concepts  of  the  social  sciences  which  are  not  psychological  are 
suggestive,  in  that  they  imply  general  tendencies  of  behaviour  which 
invite  psychological  analysis.  For  the  same  reason,  studies  in  the 
development  of  language  and  in  literary  and  other  art  criticism  are 
suggestive. 

In  addition  to  the  books,  documents,  and  articles  cited,  there  is 
an  extensive  field  of  documentary  sources  which  the  author  has  not 
exploited  and  which  offer  opportunities  for  monographic  studies. 
For  instance,  the  third  volume  of  the  social  psychology  which  deals 
with  the  conflict  of  instinctive. interests  in  social  relations  breaks 
ground  in  a  vast  and  largely  untilled  field,  which  invites  investiga- 
tion into  these  conflicts.  Much  of  this  investigation  must  be  made 
on  the  inside ;  and  ought  to  be  undertaken  by  several  men  collaborat- 
ing in  each  field.  A  teacher  of  social  psychology  should  keep  in 
close  touch  with  promising  students  who  have  gone  into  industry 
and  business,  into  politics,  teaching,  the  ministry  and  the  profes- 
sions, and  should  endeavour  to  enlist  students  in  those  different 
fields  in  an  analysis  of  relations  therein.  We  no  longer  have  to  go 
to  the  Malay  Archipelago  or  into  the  Arctic  regions  to  satisfy  a 
scientific  interest;  we  have  only  to  open  our  eyes  and  look  into  the 
social  relations  of  which  we  are  a  part. 

Among  the  documentary  sources  for  this  study  of  economic,  po- 
litical, professional,  educational  and  cultural  relations  are  files  of 
trade  union  journals  and  minutes  of  trade  union  meetings ;  files  of  in- 
dustrial journals  and  magazines;  state  and  congressional  investiga- 
tions of  the  activity  of  employers'  associations  and  labour  organiza- 
tions; judicial  decisions;  congressional  and  state  legislative  records, 
and  other  publications  of  state  and  federal  departments;  reports  of 
college  presidents  and  other  documents  of  academic  institutions 
which  throw  light  on  academic  relations;  files  of  ecclesiastical  jour- 
nals and  church  records;  files  of  journals  of  the  national  associa- 
tions of  the  different  professions,  and  the  constitutions  and  by-laws 
and  codes  of  ethics  of  those   associations.     These   documentary 


448      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

sources  for  the  conflict  of  interests  cannot  be  correctly  interpreted 
by  an  outsider.  It  is  necessary  to  read  between  the  lines,  which 
can  be  done  only  out  of  an  experience  on  the  inside. 

These  sources  of  information  are  to  be  used  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  particular  problem  under  investigation.  For  instance, 
suppose  we  are  working  on  the  problem  of  sovereignty  and  want 
to  ascertain  the  political  attitudes  of  a  religious  sect.  We  find  that 
magazines  of  ecclesiastical  organizations  are  coming  more  and  more 
to  print  articles  on  economic  and  political  topics,  indicative  of  po- 
litical attitudes.  In  the  study  of  papers  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  problem  of  sovereignty,  a  whole  article  or  editorial  may  be 
just  one  fact  concerning  a  political  attitude.  It  is  then  necessary 
to  work  out  a  methodology  through  which  to  determine  ( i )  what 
facts  and  what  degree  of  frequency  of  facts  is  necessary  to  Indicate 
a  certain  attitude;  (2)  what  facts  are  indicative  of  attitudes  of 
readers  and  what  facts  of  attitudes  of  the  Interests  behind  the  maga- 
zine which  are  trying  to  Influence  the  readers. 

In  addition  to  publications  that  represent  the  attitudes  of  par- 
ticular groups  and  classes,  there  are  the  critical  periodicals,  like 
The  Nation,  The  New  Republic,  The  Searchlight,  and  The  Survey, 
which  represent  no  group  or  class  but  aim  to  enlighten  and  guide  the 
reader  in  an  analysis  of  current  events  and  problems.  These  are  in- 
valuable both  for  the  Information  they  give  from  week  to  week  and 
for  the  changes  In  social  attitudes  that  are  to  be  Inferred  from  their 
editorials  and  articles,  which  reflect,  fairly  accurately,  different 
phases  of  the  more  thoughtful  public  opinion. 

The  files  of  newspapers  are  valuable  documentary  sources  if 
rightly  used.  The  files  of  the  daily  and  weekly  newspapers  of  the 
small  cities  and  villages  used  in  connection  with  field-work  in  those 
localities  yield  a  more  or  less  detailed  knowledge  of  the  social-psy- 
chological processes  of  their  respective  constituencies.^^  The  value 
of  newspapers,  as  sources  of  information,  is  impaired  by  lack  of 
scrupulous  accuracy,  and  by  the  class,  sectarian  and  partisan  bias 
which  determines  the  selection  and  the  editing  of  news.  Mono- 
graphic studies  of  the  files  of  newspapers  could,  by  the  use  of  the 
comparative  method,  work  out  the  class  and  other  bias  of  different 
papers  and  show  how  this  determines  the  selection  and  editing  of  the 
news.     These  social-psychological  studies  of  particular  newspapers 

85  Williams,  "An  American  Town,"  Pt.  II. 


THE  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY     449 

would  show  the  extent  to  which  newspapers  vary  from  the  stand- 
ards of  accuracy  and  candour  required  of  trustworthy  sources  of 
information.  The  newspapers  could  then  be  used  more  intelli- 
gently as  sources  for  social-psychological  investigations. 

Social  psychology  may  eventually  become  quantitative.  Statis- 
tical exactness  is  the  scientific  ideal.  But  problems  of  behaviour 
in  which  conscious  states  are  determining  motives  possibly  never 
can  be  subjected  to  statistical  treatment,  because  such  states  "  are 
not  a  direct  mathematical  function  of  any  objective  quantities.  We 
cannot  evade  this  difficulty  completely  by  dealing  with  a  hypotheti- 
cal average  man.  ...  It  may  well  prove  that  some  measurements 
of  satisfaction  are  perhaps  in  this  category."  ^®  For  instance,  sta- 
tistics of  consumption  have  to  do  with  the  goods  consumed,  not  with 
the  impulses  satisfied  by  such  consumption.  Take,  for  instance, 
statistics  of  money  spent  for  food.  The  satisfaction  derived  from 
such  expenditures  depends  on  the  various  impulses  satisfied.  The 
intelligent  house-wife  satisfies  her  intellectual  impulses  in  the  buying 
and  preparation  of  food,  while  the  rivalrous  house-wife  will  fol- 
low the  fashion  in  buying  and  preparing.  The  result  is  a  great 
difference  in  satisfaction  both  in  preparation  and  consumption  of 
the  same  value  of  food.  "  It  is  more  difficult  to  deal  with  clothes 
even  than  food,  and  of  course  out  of  the  question  to  measure  amuse- 
ments." ^^  Clothes  satisfy  a  variety  of  motives  according  to  the 
dispositions  of  people.  "  If  budgets  were  complete  we  could  find 
the  customary  expenditure,  and  distinguish  the  important  and  fre- 
quently recurrent  item,  boots,  from  the  rest.  But,  since  people 
in  buying  dress  pay  attention  perhaps  as  much  to  appearance  as 
to  durability  (when  we  include  both  sexes),  it  is  evidently  im- 
possible to  measure  the  intrinsic  value  of  clothes;  .  .  ."  ^^  Peo- 
ple in  certain  occupations  must  be  well  dressed  but  also  prefer 
to  be.'^  Often  the  same  good  satisfies  one  impulse  in  one  individual 
and  another  in  another.  A  man  who  would  find  an  auto  of  use  in 
his  business  may  get  along  without  it  until  his  wife  wants  it  for 
recreation  and  display.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  analyse  and 
measure  the  particular  satisfactions  derived  from  this  or  that  good. 

The  statistician,  when,  mathematically  stating  the  standard  of 

3*  Bowley,  "  The  Measurement  of  Social  Phenomena,"  9-10. 
3^  Ibid.,  140-141. 
s8/*iW.,  161. 
89  Ibid.,  loa. 


450      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

living  of  a  class,  does  not,  therefore,  have  reference  to  the  impulses 
satisfied  by  that  standard;  nor  when  comparing  the  standards  of 
two  classes,  does  he  measure  the  satisfaction  derived  by  one  class 
as  compared  with  that  of  another.  The  social  psychologist  is  con- 
stantly impressed  with  the  impossibility  of  measuring  satisfaction 
statistically.  For  instance,  a  Negro  remarked,  "  The  colored  peo- 
ple may  not  be  as  well  off  as  the  white  people  but  they  enjoy  them- 
selves." To  compare  the  satisfaction  of  that  coloured  family  with 
that  of  an  adjacent  white  family  on  a  money  income  basis  would  be 
the  veriest  folly.  Studies  of  comparative  satisfaction  require  field- 
work.  Satisfaction  is  always  relative.  The  man  with  abundant 
means  of  satisfaction  finds  life  unbearable  if  suddenly  reduced  to 
the  living  conditions  of  the  poor  man.  But  the  poor  man  is  not 
necessarily  more  unhappy  than  the  wealthy  man.  Members  of  a 
class  differ  in  capacity  for  happiness,  though  their  standards  of 
living  may  be  approximately  the  same.  "  While  it  is  natural, 
when  .  .  .  making  measurements  which  describe  the  standard  for 
a  class,  to  emphasize  the  similarity  of  the  members  and  the  hom- 
ogeneity of  the  class,  it  is  necessary,  after  numerical  description  is 
given  to  remember  that  there  is  in  reality  infinite  variety  and  that 
the  resemblances  are  rather  superficial.  One  family  will  live  in 
comfort  and  decency  on  a  sum  which  leaves  another  family  underfed 
and  badly  clothed,  even  though  the  money  is  allotted  in  much  the 
same  way.  This  kind  of  variation  is  outside  the  sphere  of  statis- 
tical measurement.  .  .  .  None  the  less  non-measurable  mental 
habits  are  of  the  first  importance  to  the  social  reformer."  ^" 

While  social  psychology  cannot  approach  the  quantitative  ac- 
curacy which  has  been  achieved  in  the  natural  sciences,  still  it  is 
possible  to  employ  statistical  methods  in  social-psychological  investi- 
gations, and  doubtless  these  methods  will  be  further  developed. 
For  instance,  we  can  state  statistically  the  relative  importance  of 
different  types  of  impulsive  behaviour  of  a  population  and  compare 
this  with  a  similar  statistical  statement  of  the  behaviour  of  another 
population,  or  compare  the  behaviuor  of  the  same  population  in 
successive  periods  of  its  history.^ ^  It  is  particularly  important  for 
the  social  scientist  to  aim  at  the  highest  attainable  accuracy,  because 
his  subject  matter  is  of  a  kind  that  tends  to  stir  affective  judgments 

*o/*i^.,  163-164. 

*^  Williams,  "  An  American  Town,"  Part  II. 


THE  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY     451 

—  a  tendency  which  can  be  overcome  only  by  the  most  severely 
scientific  methods  possible.  The  natural  scientist  may  be  a  man 
of  social  prejudices,  and  yet  his  prejudices  may  not  interfere  with 
his  judgments  about  matter.  But  the  data  of  the  social  scientist 
include  those  very  attitudes  and  beliefs  in  connection  with  which 
men  have  the  strongest  prejudices.  He  cannot  have  any  prejudice, 
political,  industrial,  class,  religious,  without  it  weakening  him  as  a 
social  scientist.  Furthermore,  all  personal  impulses  other  than  the 
intellectual  must  be  brought  to  heel,  because,  otherwise,  his  im- 
pulses are  so  readily  stirrred  by  his  data  as  to  make  trustworthy 
analysis  impossible.  Hence  the  need  of  an  ideal  in  social  science 
of  increasing  exactness  in  method. 

We  must  remember  that  intellect  itself  is  impulsive  so  far  as 
the  exercise  of  thought  and  its  instinctive  end  is  concerned.*^  The 
intellectual  courage  with  which  thinkers  strike  into  new  fields  is 
impulsive  and  the  desire  for  clearness  is  impulsive.  Men  seek 
clearness  because  clearness  is  satisfying  to  the  intellectual  impulses 
and  they  may  sacrifice  comprehensive  analysis  to  clearness.  The 
truths  of  exact  science,  because  of  their  clearness,  convince  not  only 
scientists  but  other  thinking  people ;  for  lack  of  equal  clearness  the 
work  of  the  social  scientist  is  often  condemned  as  not  having  the 
exactness  of  natural  science.  There  are  scientists  who  aim  to  give 
the  prestige  of  precision  and  statistical  accuracy  to  conceptions 
which,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  are  incapable  of  such  proof. 
Again,  note  the  scrupulous  attention  in  monographs  on  problems  of 
industrial  relations  to  statistical  data,  and  the  equally  scrupulous 
avoidance  of  problems  of  motives,  which,  when  they  cannot  be 
ignored,  are  dismissed  with  the  conventional  phraseology.  That  is, 
many  scientists  think  and  act  primarily  for  the  satisfaction  of  the 
intellectual  impulse  for  clearness  and  avoid  problems  that  involve 
annoyance  of  the  intellectual  impulse  for  clearness  —  where,  on 
account  of  the  vagueness  of  the  data  satisfying  clearness  is  difficult 
or  impossible.  Or  they  simplify  the  problem  by  assumptions  that 
make  contradictory  facts  merely  exceptions  to  a  general  rule,  and 
reason    deductively    from    the    rule.^^     A   method   which    makes 

*2  Hocking,  "  Human  Nature  and  its  Remaking,"  61-62. 

*3  "  Probably  the  very  fact  that  economics  is  not  an  exact  science  strengthens  the 
disposition  to  state  its  conclusions  in  exact  terras.  We  are  constantly  told  that  its  con- 
clusions hold  good  only  as  approximations.  .  .  .  All  this  is  not  to  be  questioned.  Nor 
>vould  I  for  a  moment  question  either  the  usefulness  or  the  inevitableness  of  this  mode 


452      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

possible  a  logically  clear  solution  gives  a  writer  prestige  as  a 
man  of  intellectual  achievement,  and  so  satisfies  his  rivalrous 
disposition.  Writers  of  this  disposition  are  apt  to  avoid  problems 
where,  as  in  problems  of  motives,  the  possibility  of  exact  treatment 
and  conspicuous  scientific  achievement  is  doubtful.  The  intellectual 
adventurer  in  the  new  field  of  motives  must,  therefore,  for  the 
present  deny  himself  the  satisfaction  of  the  intellectual  impulse  for 
clearness,  as  well  as  the  satisfaction  of  the  rivalrous  disposition. 

Social  psychology  will  not  only  reveal  the  motives  of  prevailing 
social  behaviour  but  also  disclose  variations  from  the  prevailing  be- 
haviour. These  variations  characterize  men  of  unusual,  or  of 
unusually  strong,  impulses,  and  men  of  imagination.  Social  psy- 
chology, if  it  is  scientific,  will  detect,  analyse  and  evaluate  all 
motives,  not  merely  the  prevailing  but  also  the  variant  motives. 
In  the  study  of  variations  the  aim  is  to  detect  the  rise  of  what  are 
to  be  new  tendencies  of  social  behaviour  and  to  predict  their  effect  on 
social  organization  in  the  hope  that  the  predictions  may  make  it  pos- 
sible to  anticipate  and  facilitate  inevitable  changes.  Social  psychol- 
ogy should  in  this  way  further  institutional  progress  in  industry,  pol- 
itics, the  professions,  education  and  religion.  It  awaits  the  rise  of 
variations  in  personality  and  public  opinion,  but  suffers  no  variation 
to  remain  unappreciated  and  uninterpreted,  once  it  has  arisen.  It 
should,  therefore,  be  of  special  interest  to  the  idealistic  leader;  and 
training  in  social  psychology  should  give  poise  to  the  idealist.  In 
the  logic  of  events,  the  sphere  of  influence  of  the  idealist  lies  in  the 
future  rather  than  in  the  present.  The  mistake  he  makes  is  in  seek- 
ing, in  the  present,  a  sphere  of  influence  comparable  with  his 
extraordinary  capacity.  Social  psychology  should  train  men  and 
women  to  look  to  the  future,  rather  than  to  the  present,  for  the 
realization  of  their  hopes.  It  will  not  make  all  men  idealists,  but 
it  will  confirm  the  trend  in  this  direction  of  the  elect;  and,  when  it 

of  procedure.  On  other  occasions,  and  in  connection  with  the  methodology  of  some 
typical  concrete  investigations,  I  have  pointed  out  the  unquestionable  necessity  which 
confronts  the  economist,  of  relying  on  deductive  reasoning  from  the  hedonistic  premise. 
(In  the  volume  on  Some  Aspects  of  the  Tariff  Question,  pp.  155,  512.)  But  the  ex- 
planation of  such  reliance  is  not  solely  that  the  economist  must  perforce  do  so.  As  a 
rule  he  also  likes  to  do  so.  The  sort  of  person  who  makes  a  good  economist  is  tem- 
peramentally impatient  of  loose  ends  and  rough  edges.  He  likes  results  that  are  clean- 
cut.  He  is  apt  to  disregard  the  admitted  qualifying  factors,  and  to  treat  the  qualifica- 
tions as  aberrations  from  the  truth,  not  modifications  of  his  conclusions.  And  among 
the  things  which  he  is  thus  tempted  to  push  aside  as  aberrations,  negligible  in  the 
formulation  of  accurate  results,  is  the  influence  of  sympathy,  or  altruism,  or  devotion." 
(Taussig,  "Inventors  and  Money-Makers,"  no-n2.) 


THE  METHODS  OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY     453 

has  been  taught  for  years  In  schools  and  colleges,  the  conformity  of 
the  masses  will  become  less  unthinking  and  deadening;  the  idealist 
himself  will  become  less  hesitant,  more  quick  to  discover  similar 
growing  tendencies  in  his  fellows,  more  clear  throughout  the  whole 
course  of  his  intellectual  vision,  more  ready  to  express  the  whole 
truth,  and  more  detached  from  personal  desires  incompatible  with 
intellectual  integrity  and  independence. 


A  PARTIAL  LIST  OF  THE  BOOKS,  DOCUMENTS,  AND 
ARTICLES  REFERRED  TO  IN  THE  TEXT 

Adams,  Brooks.     Bigelow,  Melville  M.,  Harriman,  E.  A.,  and  Haines,  H.  S., 

Centralization  and  the  Law;  Scientific  Legal  Education.     Boston,  1906. 
/  Adams,  Brooks.     The  Law  of  Civilization  and  Decay ;  an  Essay  on  History. 

London  and  New  York,  1895. 
-Adams,  Brooks.     The  Theory  of  Social  Revolutions.     New  York,  191 3. 
Addams,  Jane.     Democracy  and  Social  Ethics.     New  York,  1907. 
Alexander,  F.  Matthias.     Man's  Supreme  Inheritance;  Conscious  Guidance 

and  Control  in   Relation  to   Human  Evolution   in   Civilization.     New 

York,  1918. 
Ames,  Edward  Scribner.     The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience.     Boston, 

1910. 
Angell,  Norman.     The  Problems  of  the  War  —  and  the  Peace.     London. 
Angell,    Norman.     Arms   and    Industry;   the   Foundations   of   International 

Polity.     New  York,  19 14. 
Angell,   Norman.     The  British  Revolution  and  the  American  Democracy. 

New  York,  19 19. 
Aristotle,  Nichomachean  Ethics.     Translated  by  J.  E.  C.  Welldon.     London, 

1897. 
Aristotle,   Politics.     Translated  by  J.  E.  C.  Welldon.     London  and  New 

York,  1897. 
Ashley,   William   James.     Introduction   to   English    Economic   History   and 

Theory.     2  vols.     New  York,  1 892-1 893. 
Austin,   John.     Lectures   on  Jurisprudence;   or  the   Philosophy   of   Positive 

Law.     Edited  by  Robert  Campbell.     2  vols.     London,  1873. 
Bagehot,  Walter.     Economic  Studies.     London,  1880. 
Bancroft,   George.     History  of   the  Formation  of   the   Constitution   of   the 

United  States.     2  vols.     New  York,  1882. 
Beard,  Charles  A.     American  Government  and  Politics.     New  York,  19 10. 
Beard,  Charles  A.     Readings  in  American  Government  and  Politics.     New 

York,  1910. 
Beard,  Charles  A.     The  Supreme  Court  and  the  Constitution.     New  York, 

1912. 
Beard.  Charles  A.     American  City  Government.     New  York,  19 12. 
Beard,  Charles  A.     An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the 

United  States.     New  York,  19 13. 

454 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  455 

Beard,  Charles  A.  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian  Democracy.  New 
York,  191 5. 

Becker,  Carl.  The  Eve  of  the  Revolution;  A  Chronicle  of  the  Breach  with 
England.     New  Haven,  191 8. 

Bentham,  Jeremy.  A  Fragment  on  Government.  Edited  by  F.  C.  Mon- 
tague.    Oxford,  1 89 1. 

Bentham,  Jeremy.  Deontology;  or  the  Science  of  Morality;  arranged  and 
edited  by  J.  Bowring.     2  vols.     London,  1834. 

Bcntley,  Arthur  T.     The  Process  of  Government.     Chicago,  1908. 

Bernard,  Ludwig.  Das  polinische  Gerneinwesen  im  preussischen  Staat.  Die 
Polenfrage.     Leipzig,  19 10. 

Bernhardi,  F.  von.  Germany  and  the  Next  War.  Translated  by  Allan  H. 
Powles.     New  York,  19 14. 

Bernhardi,  Friedrich  von.     How  Germany  Makes  War.     New  York,  19 14. 

Blackstone,  Sir  William.  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  England,  4  vols. 
London,  1794. 

Boas,  Franz.     The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man.     New  York,  1913. 

Bodin,  Jean.  The  Six  Books  of  a  Commonwealth;  out  of  the  French  and 
Latin  copies  done  into  English  by  R.  Knolles.     London,  1606. 

Bowley,  A.  L.     The  Measurement  of  Social  Phenomena.     London,  191 5. 

Brace,  Harrison  H.     The  Value  of  Organized  Speculation.     Boston,  1913. 

Brailsford,  H.  N.  The  Covenant  of  Peace;  an  Essay  on  the  League  of 
Nations.     New  York,  19 19. 

Brandeis,  Louis  D.     Business  —  A  Profession.     Boston,  1914. 

Brandeis,  Louis  D.  Other  People's  Money  and  How  the  Bankers  Use  It. 
New  York,  19 14. 

Branford,  Victor.  Interpretations  and  Forecasts:  a  Study  of  Survivals 
and  Tendencies  in  Contemporary  Society.     New  York,   19 14. 

Breasted,  James  Henry.  A  History  of  Egypt;  From  the  Earliest  Times  to 
the  Persian  Conquest.     New  York,  19 12. 

Brent,  Rt.  Rev.  Charles  H.     Leadership.     New  York,  1919. 

Brissenden,  Paul  Frederick.  The  I.  W.  W.  A  Study  of  American  Syndi- 
calism.    New  York,  19 19. 

Bristol,  Lucius  Moody.  Social  Adaptation:  A  Study  in  the  Development 
of  the  Doctrine  of  Adaptation  as  a  Theory  of  Social  Progress.  Cam- 
bridge and  London,  19 15. 

Brooke,  Rev.  Stopford.     English  Literature.     New  York,  1894. 

Brown,  Harry  Gunnison.  Principles  of  Commerce;  a  Study  of  the  Mechan- 
ism, the  Advantages,  and  the  Transportation  Costs  of  Foreign  and 
Domestic  Trade.     New  York,  191 7. 

Bryant,  Louise.     Six  Red  Months  in  Russia.     New  York,  19 18. 

Bryce,  James.     The  American  Commonwealth.     2  vols.     London,  1889. 


456      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Buckle,  Thomas  Henry.  History  of  Civilization  in  England.  3  vols.  Lon- 
don, 1867. 

Bullitt,  William  C.     The  Bullitt  Mission  to  Russia.     New  York,  1919. 

Billow,  Bernard  von.     Imperial  Germany.     New  York,  1914. 

Burgess,  W.  W.  The  Function  of  Socialization  in  Social  Evolution.  Chi- 
cago, 1 91 6. 

Butler,  A.  J.  (translator).     Bismarck,  the  Man  and  the  Statesman.     2  vols. 
New  York  and  London,  1899. 
J  Carter,  James   Coolidge.     Law,   Its  Origin,   Growth   and   Function.     New 
York,  1907. 

Carver,  Thomas  Nixon.     Essays  in  Social  Justice.     Cambridge,  1915. 

Carver,  Thomas  Nixon.     Principles  of  Rural  Economics.     Boston,  191 1. 

Chatterton-Hill.  The  Philosophy  of  Nietzsche:  an  Exposition  and  an  Appre- 
ciation.    London. 

Cherington,  Paul  T.  The  Wool  Industry;  Commercial  Problems  of  the 
American  Woollen  and  Worsted  Manufacture.  Chicago  and  New  York, 
1916. 

Clark,  Floyd  Barzilia.  The  Constitutional  Doctrines  of  Justice  Harlan. 
Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science 
(J.  H.  U.  S.  H.  P.  S.J/  Series  XXXIII,  No.  4.     Baltimore,  191 5. 

Cleveland  Education  Survey.  25  vols.  Survey  Committee,  Russell  Sage 
Foundation.       1915-1916. 

Cleveland,  Frederick  A.,  and  Schafer,  Joseph.  Democracy  in  Reconstruction. 
Boston,  1919. 

Coker,  Francis  W.  Organismic  Theories  of  the  State.  Columbia  University 
Studies  in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law.     New  York,  19 10. 

Collier,  Price.  Germany  and  the  Germans  from  an  American  Point  of  View. 
New  York,  19 13. 

Collier,  Price.  England  and  the  English  from  an  American  Point  of  View. 
New  York,  1909. 

Commons,  John  Rogers.     Labor  and  Administration.     New  York,  1913. 

Commons,  John  R.     Races  and  Immigrants  in  America.     New  York,  1903. 

Commons,  John  Rogers,  and  Andrews,  John  Bertram.  Principles  of  Labor 
Legislation.     New  York,  1915. 

Commons,  John  R.,  Saposs,  David  J.,  Sumner,  Helen  F.,  Mittelman,  E.  B., 
Hoagland,  H.  E.,  Andrews,  John  B.,  Perlman,  Selig.  History  of  Labor 
in  the  United  States.     2  vols.     New  York,  19 18. 

Commons,  John  R.     Industrial  Goodwill.     New  York,  1919. 

Comte,  Isidore  Auguste  Marie  Frangois  Xavier.  Positive  Philosophy. 
Translated  by  Harriette  Martineau.     2  vols.     London,  1875. 

Comte,  Isidore  Auguste  Marie  Franqois  Xavier.     System  of  Positive  Polity. 
London,  1876. 
^Abbrevation  used  in  the  text. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  457 

Cooley,  Charles  Horton.     Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order.     New  York, 

1902. 
Cooley,  Thomas  Mclntyre.     Treatise  on  Constitutional  Limitations  which 

rest   upon   Legislative   Power   of   the   States  of   the   American   Union. 

Boston,  1903. 
Cramb,  J.  A.     Germany  and  England.     New  York,  19 14. 
Croly,  Herbert.     The  Promise  of  American  Life.     New  York,  19 14. 
Croly,  Herbert.     Progressive  Democracy.     New  York,  19 15. 
Darwin,  Charles.     The  Descent  of  Man;  and  Selection  in  Relation  to  Sex. 

New  York,  1906. 
Davenport,  Herbert  Joseph.     The  Economics  of  Enterprise.     New  York,  19 13. 
De  Tocqueville,  Alexis.     The   Republic  of  the  United   States  of  America. 

2  vols,  in  one.     New  York,  1856. 
Demolins,  Edward.     Anglo-Saxon  Superiority:  to  what  it  is  due.     London 

and  New  York,  1898. 
Dewey,  John.     Democracy  and  Education:  An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy 

of  Education.     New  York,  1916. 
Dewey,  John,  and  Tufts,  James  H.     Ethics.     New  York,  1908. 
Dewey,  John,  and  Dewey,  Evelyn.     Schools  of  Tomorrow.     New  York,  1915. 
Dewey,  John.     German  Philosophy  and  Politics.     New  York,  1915. 
Dibble,  G.  Binney.     The  Newspaper.     New  York,  19 16. 
Dicey,  Albert  Venn.     Lectures  on  the  Relation  between  Law  and  Opinion 

in  England  during  the  Nineteenth  Century.     New  York,  1905. 
Dicey,  Albert  Venn.     Introduction  to  the  Study  of  the  Law  of  the  Consti- 
tution.    New  York,  1908. 
Duguit,  Leon,     fitudes  de  droit  public.     Tome  I:  L'fitat,  le  droit  objectif 

et  la  loi  positive.     Paris,  1901. 
Duguit,  Leon.     Etudes  de  droit  public.     Tome  H:  L'Etat,  les  Gouvernants 

et  les  Agents.     Paris,  1903. 
Duguit,    Leon.     Manual    de    droit    constitutionnel.     Theorie    Generale    de 

I'Etat.     Organization  politique.     Paris,  1907. 
Duguit,  Leon.     Le  Droit  Social,  le  Droit  individuel,  et  la  Transformation 

de  I'Etat.     Conferences  faites  a  I'Ecole  des  hautes  etudes  sociales.     Paris, 

1908. 
Duguit,  Leon.     Les  Transformations  generales  du  droit  prive  depuis  le  code 

Napoleon.     Paris,  19 12. 
Duguit,  Leon.     Les  Transformations  du  droit  public.     Paris,  1913. 
Duguit,  Leon.     Law  in  the  Modern  State.     Translated  by  Frida  and  Harold 

Laski.     New  York,  19 19. 
Durkheim,  Emile.     De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social:  etude  sur  I'organization 

des  societes  superieures.     Paris,  1893. 
Durkheim,   Emile.     Les  Regies  de  la  methode   Sociologique.     Paris,    1904. 


458     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Dunning,  William  Archibald.  A  History  of  Political  Theories,  Ancient 
and  Mediaeval.     New  York  and  London,  1908. 

Dunning,  William  Archibald.  A  History  of  Political  Theories,  from  Luther 
to  Montesquieu.     New  York  and  London,  19 13. 

Dyde,  S.  W.     Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Right.     London,  1896. 

Edgeworth,  Francis  Ysidore.  Mathematical  Physics:  an  Essay  on  the  Appli- 
cation of  Mathematics  to  the  Moral  Sciences.     London,  1881. 

Ehrlich,  Eugene.  Grundlegung  einer  Soziologie  des  Rechts.  Miinchen  and 
Leipzig,  19 1 3. 

Ely,  Richard  T.  Property  and  Contract  in  their  Relation  to  the  Distribution 
of  Wealth.     New  York,  1914. 

Ely,  Richard  T.,  Adams,  Thomas  S.,  Lorenz,  Max  O.,  and  Young,  Allyn  A. 
Outlines  of  Economics.     New  York,  19 16. 

Farichild,  Henry  Pratt.  Immigration:  A  World  Movement  and  Its  Ameri- 
can Significance.     New  York,  19 13. 

Fetter,  Frank  A.     Economic  Principles.     2  vols.     New  York,  19 15-19 16. 

Fish,  Carl  Russell.     The  Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage.     New  York,  1905. 

Fisher,  Irving.  The  Rate  of  Interest:  Its  Nature,  Determination  and  Rela- 
tion to  Economic  Phenomena.     New  York,  1907. 

Fisher,  Irving.  The  Nature  of  Capital  and  Income.  New  York  and  Lon- 
don, 1906. 

Fisher,  Irving.     Elementary  Principles  of  Economics.     New  York,  19 13. 

Fisher,  Irving.  Why  the  Dollar  is  Shrinking;  a  Study  in  the  High  Cost  of 
Living.     New  York,  19 14. 

Fiske,  John.     Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy.     2  vols.     Boston,   1874. 

Fitch,  John  A.     The  Steel  Workers.     New  York,  19 10. 

Flint,  Timothy.     Recollections  of  the  Last  Ten  Years.     Boston,  1826. 

Follett,  M.  P.  The  New  State ;  Group  Organization  the  Solution  of  Popular 
Government.     New  York,  19 19. 

Ford,  Henry  Jones.  The  Rise  and  Growth  of  American  Politics:  a  Sketch 
of  Constitutional  Development.     New  York,  1898. 

Ford,  Henry  Jones.  The  Natural  History  of  the  State;  an  Introduction  to 
Political  Science.     Princeton,  19 15. 

Foster-Nietzsche,  Frau.  The  Life  of  Nietzsche.  Translated  by  Anthony  M. 
Ludovici.     2  vols.     New  York,  1912. 

Foulke,  William  Dudley.  Fighting  the  Spoilsmen.  Reminiscences  of  the 
Civil  Service  Reform  Movement.     New  York,  1919. 

Freud,  Ernest.  Police  Power;  Public  Policy  and  Constitutional  Rights. 
Chicago,   1904. 

Freud,  Sigmund.     Psychopathology  of  Everyday  Life.     New  York,  19 14. 

Fustel  de  Coulanges.  Histoire  des  Institutions  Politiques  de  L'Ancienne 
France.     Paris,  1877. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  459 

Fustel  de  Coulanges.  The  Origin  of  Property  in  Land.  Translated  by  Mar- 
garet Ashley,  with  an  Introductory  Chapter  on  the  English  Manor  by 
W.  J.  Ashley.     London,  1891. 

Gantt,  H.  F.     Organizing  for  Work.     New  York,  1919. 

Gerber,  Carl  F.     Grundziige  des  deutschen  Staatsrechts.     Leipzig,  1880. 

Gerstenberg,  Charles  W.  Materials  of  Corporation  Finance.  New  York, 
1915. 

Gibbons,  Henry  Adams.     The  New  Map  of  Asia.     New  York,  1919. 

Gibbon,  loan  Givilym.  Medical  Benefit;  a  Study  of  the  Experience  of  Ger- 
many and  Denmark.     London,  19 12. 

Giddings,  Franklin  Henry.     The  Principles  of  Sociology.     New  York,  1898. 

Gide,  Charles.  Principles  of  Political  Economy.  Translated  by  C.  W.  A. 
Veditz.     New  York,  1903. 

Gierke,  Dr.  Otto.  Das  deutsche  Genossenschaf tsrecht.  3  vols.  Berlin, 
1868,  1873,  1881. 

Gierke,  Dr.  Otto.     Die  Genossenschaf tstheorie.     Berlin,  1887. 

Goldmark,  Pauline  (editor).     West  Side  Studies.     New  York,  1914. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.  City  Government  in  the  United  States.  New  York, 
1904. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.     Social  Reform  and  the  Constitution.     New  York,  191 1. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.  Principles  of  Constitutional  Government.  New  York 
and  London,  191 6. 

Gore,  Charles.     Property,  Its  Rights  and  Duties.     New  York,  191 5. 

Gray,  John  Chipman.     The  Nature  and  Sources  of  Law.     New  York,  1909. 

Green,  Mrs.  J.  R.  Town  Life  in  the  Fifteenth  Century.  2  vols,  in  one. 
New  York,  1907. 

Gregory,  Herbert  Ernest,  Keller,  Alfred  Galloway,  and  Bishop,  Avard  Long- 
ley.  Physical  and  Commercial  Geography;  a  Study  of  Certain  Con- 
trolling Conditions  of  Commerce.     Boston,  19 10. 

Groat,  George  Gorham.  An  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Organized  Labor 
in  America.     New  York,  19 16. 

Gumplowicz,  Ludwig.  Der  Rassenkampf.  Sociologische  Untersuchungen. 
Innsbruck,  1883. 

Gumplowicz,  Ludwig.     Grundriss  der  Soziologie.     Vienna,  1885. 

Gumplowicz,  Ludwig.     Soziologie  und  Politik.     Leipzig,  1892. 

Hadley,  Arthur  T.     Undercurrents  in  American  Politics.     New  Haven,  1915. 

Hall,  William  Edward.  A  Treatise  on  International  Law.  London  and 
New  York,  1909. 

Hall,  Arthur  Cleveland.  Crime  in  Its  Relation  to  Social  Progress.  Columbia 
University  Studies  in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law.  New  York, 
1902. 

Hammond,  John  Lawrence  Le  Briton,  and  Hammond,  Mrs.  Barbara  Bradby. 


460      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

The  Village  Laborer,  1 760-1 832;  a  Study  in  the  Government  of 
England  Before  the  Reform  Bill.     London  and  New  York,  1912. 

Hammond,  J.  L.,  and  Hammond,  Barbara,  The  Town  Laborer,  1760- 
1832;  the  New  Civilization.     London  and  New  York,  1917. 

Hapgood,  Norman.  Abraham  Lincoln;  the  Man  of  the  People.  New 
York,  1903. 

Harrington,  James.  The  Commonwealth  of  Oceana,  with  an  introduction 
by  Henry  Morley.     London,  1887. 

Hastie,  W.     Kant's  Philosophy  of  Law.     Edinburgh,  1887. 

Hauser,  Henri.  Germany's  Commercial  Grip  on  the  World;  her  Business 
Methods  Explained.  Translated  by  Manfred  Emanuel,  with  a  pre- 
face by  J.  Lawrence  Laughlin.     London,  19 17. 

Healy,  William.  Pathological  Lying,  Accusation  and  Swindling  —  A  Study 
in  Forensic  Psychology.     Boston,  191 5. 

Healy,  William.  The  Individual  Delinquent:  a  Text-Book  of  Diagnosis 
and  Prognosis  for  all  concerned  in  understanding  Offenders.     Boston, 

1915. 

Healy,  William.     Mental  Conflicts  and  Misconduct.     Boston,  191 7. 

Hegel,  G.  W.  F.  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  History.  Translated  from 
the  third  German  edition  by  J.  Sibree.     London,  1857. 

Henderson,  Charles  Richmond.  The  Cause  and  Cure  of  Crime.  Chicago, 
1914. 

Hill,  Robert  Tudor.  The  Public  Domain  and  Democracy.  Columbia  Uni- 
versity Studies  in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law.  New  York, 
1910. 

Hobbes,  Thomas.  Leviathan;  or  the  Matter,  Power  and  Form  of  a  Com- 
monwealth, Ecclesiastical  and  Civil.     London,  1887. 

Hobson,  J.  A.     Work  and  Wealth:  A  Human  Valuation.     New  York,  1914. 

Hobson,  J.  A.     Taxation  in  the  New  State.     New  York,  1920. 

Hocking,  William  Ernest.  Human  Nature  and  Its  Remaking.  New 
Haven,  191 8. 

Hollander,  Jacob  H.     The  Abolition  of  Poverty.     Boston,  19 14. 

Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell.     The  Common  Law,  Boston,  1881. 

Hosmer,  William.  The  Higher  Law  in  Its  Relation  to  Civil  Government; 
with  Particular  Reference  to  Slavery  and  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law. 
Auburn,  1852. 

Hoxie,  Robert  Franklin.     Scientific  Management  and  Labor.     New  York, 

1915. 
Hoxie,  Robert  Franklin.     Trade  Unionism  in  the  United  States.     New  York, 

1917. 
Huntington,  Ellsworth.     The  Pulse  of  Asia;  A  Journey  in  Central  Asia 
illustrating  Geographic  Basis  of  History.     Boston,  1907. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  461 

Huntington,  Ellsworth.     Civilization  and  Climate.     New  Haven,  1915. 

Huxley,  Thomas  E.  Evolution  and  Ethics  and  other  Essays.  New  York,  1915. 

Ihering,  Rudolph  von.  The  Struggle  for  Law.  Translated  by  John  J. 
Lalor.     Chicago,  19 15. 

Ihering,  Rudolph  von.  Law  as  a  Means  to  an  End.  Translated  by  Isaac 
Husik.     Boston,  191 3. 

Jackson,  Henry  E.  A  Community  Center,  What  it  is  and  How  to  Organize 
It.     New  York,  19 18. 

Jackson,    Henry   E.     A   Community   Church.     Boston,    1919. 

James,  William.  Pragmatism;  a  New  Name  for  Some  Old  Ways  of  Think- 
ing.    New  York,  19 14. 

Jastrow,  Joseph.     The  Subconscious.     Boston,  1906. 

Jastrow,  Morris,  Jr.  The  Civilization  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria ;  its  Remains, 
Language,  History,  Religion,  Commerce,  Land,  Art  and  Literature. 
Philadelphia,  19 15. 

Jellinek,  Georg.     Die  Lehre  von  den  Staatenverbindungen,  1882. 

Jellinek,  Georg.     Allgemeine  Staatslehre.     Berlin,  1914. 

Jenks,  Jeremiah  Whipple.     Principles  of  Politics.     New  York,  1909. 

Jenks,  Edward.     A  History  of  Politics.     London  and  New  York,  1900. 

Jephson,  Henry.     The  Platform;  its  Rise  and  Progress.     New  York,  1892. 

Jevons,  W.  Stanley.     The  Theory  of  Political  Economy.     London,  1888. 

Johnson,  Alvin  Saunders.     Introduction  to  Economics.     New  York,  1909. 

Johnson,  Arthur  Henry.  The  Disappearance  of  the  Small  Landowner.  Ox- 
ford, 1909. 

Jones,  Eliot.  The  Anthracite  Coal  Combination  in  the  United  States;  with 
some  Account  of  the  early  Development  of  the  Anthracite  Industry. 
Cambridge,  19 14. 

Kallen,  Horace  Meyer.  The  Structure  of  Lasting  Peace;  an  Inquiry  into 
the  Motives  of  War  and  Peace.     Boston,  19 18. 

Kallen,  Horace  Meyer.  The  League  of  Nations,  Today  and  Tomorrow. 
Boston,  1919. 

Kant,  Immanuel.  Principles  of  Politics.  Translated  by  W.  Hastie.  Edin- 
burgh, 1 89 1. 

Keller,  Albert  Galloway.     Societal  Evolution.     New  York,  1915. 

Keller,  Albert  G.     Through  War  to  Peace.     New  York,  1918. 

Kellogg,  Paul  A.,  and  Gleason,  Arthur.  British  Labor  and  the  War.  Re- 
construction for  a  New  World.     New  York,  19 19. 

Kerchensteiner,  Georg.  Education  for  Citizenship.  Translated  by  A.  J. 
Pressland.     Chicago,  London,  New  York,  191 1. 

Kennedy,  J.  M.  The  Gospel  of  Superman:  The  Philosophy  of  Friedrich 
Nietzsche.  Translated  from  the  German  by  Henry  Litchenberger. 
Edinburgh  and  London,  19 10. 


462      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Keynes,  John  Maynard.     The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace.     New 

York,  1920. 
*/  King,  Irving.     The  Development  of  Religion :  A  Study  in  Anthropology  and 

Social  Psychology.     New  York,  19 10. 
King,  Willford   Isbel.     Wealth  and  Income  of  the  People  of  the  United 

States.     New  York  and  London,  19 15. 
Knies,  Earl  Gustav  Adolf.     Die  Politische  Oekonomie  vom  Geschichtlichen 

Standpunkte.     Braunschweig,   1883. 
Kocourek,  Albert,  and  Wigmore,  John  H.     Formative  Influences  of  Legal 

Development.     Boston,  1918. 
Kruger,  Fritz  Conrad.     Government  and  Politics  of  the  German  Empire. 

New  York,  1914. 
Lamprecht,  Karl.     What  is  History:  Five  Lectures  on  the  Modern  Science 

of  History.     Translated  by  E.  A.  Andrews.     New  York  and  London, 

1905. 
Lamprecht,  Karl.     Zur  jungsten  deutschen  Vergangenheit.     3  vols.     Berlin, 

1 902- 1 904. 
Lamprecht,  Karl.     Deutsche  Geschichte.     12  vols.     Berlin,  1 891-1909. 
Laski,  Harold  J.     Studies  in  the  Problem  of  Sovereignty.     New  Haven,  191 7. 
Laski,  Harold  J.     Authority  in  the  Modern  State.     New  Haven,  1919. 
Le  Bon,  Gustave.     The  Psychology  of  Peoples.     New  York,  1898. 
Levine,  Louis.     The  Taxation  of  Mines  in  Montana.     New  York,  19 19. 
Liebknecht,  Karl.     Militarism.     New  York,  1917. 

Lindsey,  Ben  B.     The  Problem  of  the  Children  and  How  the  State  of  Colo- 
rado Cares  for  Them.     Denver,  1904. 
Lindsey,  Ben  B.,  and  O'Higgins,  Harvey  J.     The  Beast.     New  York,  191 1. 
Link,  Henry  C.     Employment  Psychology.     New  York,  19 19. 
Lippmann,  Walter.     The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy.     New  York,  19 15. 
Lippmann,  Walter.     Liberty  and  the  News.     New  York,  1920. 
Locke,  John.     Two  Treatises  of  Government.     Dublin,  1766. 
f    Lowell,  A.  Lawrence.     The  Government  of  England.     2  vols.     New  York, 

1908. 
Lowell,  A.   Lawrence.     Public   Opinion   and   Popular  Government.     New 

York,  1914. 
Lowell,  A.  Lawrence.     The  Governments  of  France,  Italy,  and  Germany. 

Cambridge,  19 14. 
Maitland,    Frederic    William.     The    Constitutional    History    of    England. 

Cambridge,  1908. 
Marshall,  Alfred.     Principles  of  Economics.     London  and  New  York,  1910. 
Maude,  Aylmer.     The  Life  of  Tolstoy.     2  vols.     New  York,  191 1. 
McCarthy,  Charles.     The  Wisconsin  Idea.     New  York,  1912. 
McDougall,  William.     An  Introduction  to  Social  Psychology.     Boston,  1909. 
Meyer,  Max.     The  Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Behavior.     Boston,  191 1. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  463 

Merriam,  Charles  E.     History  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  Since  Rousseau. 

Columbia  University  Studies  in  History,   Economics  and  Public  Law. 

New  York,  1900. 
Merriam,   Charles  E.     A   History  of  American   Political  Theories.     New 

York  and  London,  1906. 
Mitchell,  Wesley  Clair.     Business  Cycles.     Berkeley,  1913. 
Michel,  Henry.     L'Idee  de  L'fitat,  1896. 

Mill,  John  Stuart.     A  System  of  Logic.     2  vols.     London,  1872. 
Mill,    John    Stuart.     Essays    on    Some    Unsettled    Questions    of    Political 

Economy.     London,  1887. 
Montesquieu,  Baron  de.     The  Spirit  of  Laws.     Trans,  by  Thomas  Nugent. 

Revised  by  J.  V.  Prichard.     2  vols.     London,  1906. 
Moore,  Henry  Ludwell.     Laws  of  Wages:  an  Essay  in  Statistical  Economics. 

New  York,  191 1. 
Moore,  Henry  Ludwell.     Economic  Cycles:  Their  Law  and  Cause.     New 

York,  1914. 
Moore,  Henry  Ludwell.     Forecasting  the  Yield  and  the  Price  of  Cotton. 

New  York,  19 17. 
Moore,  John  Bassett.     Four  Phases  of  American  Development :  Federalism  — 

Democracy  —  Imperialism  —  Expansion.     Baltimore,  1912. 
Morgan,  Louis  H.     The  American  Beaver  and  His  Works.     Philadelphia, 

1868. 
Morley,  John.     The   Life  of   William   Ewart   Gladstone.     3   vols.     New 

York,  1903. 
Morse,  John  Torrey,  Jr.     Benjamin  Franklin.     Boston,  1889. 
Moulton,  Harold  G.     Principles  of  Money  and  Banking ;  a  Series  of  Selected 

Materials,  with  Explanatory  Introductions.     Chicago,  19 16. 
Miinsterberg,  Hugo.     The  War  and  America.     New  York,  1914. 
Myers,  Gustavus.     History  of  Great  American  Fortunes.     3  vols.     Chicago, 

1911. 
Myers,  Gustavus.     History  of  Canadian  Wealth.     2  vols.     Chicago,  1914. 
Myers,  Gustavus.     History  of  Tammany  Hall.     New  York,  19 17. 
Nicholls,  Sir  George.     History  of  the  English  Poor  Law  in  connection  with 

the  State  of  the  Country  and  the  Condition  of  the   People.     2  vols. 

New  York,  1898. 
Nicolay,  J.   G.,   and   Hay,   John.     Complete  Works  of  Abraham  Lincoln. 

Gettysburg  Edition,  12  vols.     New  York,  1905- 1906. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     The  Will  to  Power:  an  Attempted  Transvaluation  of 

all  Values.     Translated  by  Anthony  M.  Ludovici.     2  vols.     Edinburgh 

and  London,  1909  and  19 10. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     Ecce  Homo  (Nietzsche's  Autobiography^.     Trans,  by 

Anthony  M.  Ludovici.     New  York,  191 1. 


464      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     The  Genealogy  of  Morals:  A  Polemic.     Translated 

by  Horace  B.  Samuel.     Edinburgh  and  London,  19 13. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     Human,  All-Too-Human;  a  Book  for  Free  Spirits. 

Translated  by  Paul  V.  Cohn.     3  vols.     New  York,  191 1. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     Beyond  Good  and  Evil.     Translated  by  Helen  Zim- 

mern.     New  York,  1907. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     The  Twilight  of  the  Idols;  or  How  to  Philosophize 

with  the  Hammer.     Translated  by  Anthony  M.  Ludovici.     Edinburgh 

and  London,  19 15. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     The  Case  of  Wagner.     Translated  by  J.  M.  Kennedy. 

Edinburgh  and  London,  191 1. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.     The  Birth  of  Tragedy;  or  Hellenism  and  Pessimism. 

Translated  by  William  A.  Haussmann.     Edinburgh  and  London,  1909. 
Nietzsche,    Friedrich.     On    the    Future    of    our    Educational    Institutions. 

Translated  by  J.  M.  Kennedy.     Edinburgh  and  London,  1909. 
Nietzsche,    Friedrich.     Thoughts    out    of    Season.     Translated    by    Adrian 

Collins.       Edinburgh  and  London,  19 10. 
Ogg,  Frederic  Austin.     The  Governments  of  Europe.     New  York,  19 18. 
Oppenheimer,  Franz.     The  State:  its  History  and  Development  viewed  So- 
ciologically.    Translated  by  John  M.  Gitterman.     Indianapolis,  1914. 
Orth,  Samuel  P.     Socialism  and  Democracy  in  Europe.     New  York,  19 13. 
Orth,  Samuel  P.     Readings  on  the  Relation  of  Government  to  Property  and 

Industry.     New  York,  19 15. 
Orth,  Samuel  P.     The  Imperial  Impulse;  Background  Studies  of  Belgium, 

England,  France,  Germany,  Russia.     New  York,  1916. 
Osborne,  Algernon  Ashburner.     Speculation  on  the  New  York  Stock   Ex- 
change, September,  1914  —  March,  1917.     Columbia  University  Studies 

in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law.     New  York,  1913. 
Ostrogorski,    M.     Democracy   and    the    Organization    of    Political    Parties. 

Translated  from  the  French  by  Frederick  Clarke,  2  vols.     New  York, 

1902. 
Page,  E.  D.     Trade  Morals;  their  Origin,  Growth  and  Province.     New 

Haven,  19 14. 
Perry,   Ralph   Barton.     The   Present   Conflict  of   Ideals:   a   Study   of   the 

Philosophical  Background  of  the  World  War.     New  York,  19 18. 
Pigou,  Arthur  Cecil.     Principles  and  Methods  of  Industrial  Peace.     London, 

1905. 
Pigou,  Arthur  Cecil.     Wealth  and  Welfare.     New  York,  1912. 
Pillsbury,   W.   B.     The   Psychology   of   Nationality   and    Internationalism. 

New  York,  19 19. 
Pittsburg  Survey.     6  vols.     Edited  by  Paul  Underwood  Kellogg.     New  York, 

1 907-1 908. 
Plato.     Republic     Translated  by  Benjamin  Jowett.     Oxford,  1894, 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  465 

Piatt,  Thomas  Collier.  The  Autobiography  of  Thomas  Collier  Piatt. 
Edited  by  Louis  J.  Lang.     New  York,  19 10. 

Plehn,  Carl  C.     Government  Finance  in  the  United  States.     Chicago,  1915. 

Podmore,  Frank.     Robert  Owen,  a  Biography.     2  vols.     New  York,  1906. 

Pollock,  Frederick,  and  Maitland,  Frederic  W.  History  of  English  Law. 
2  vols.     Cambridge,  1899. 

Pollock,  Sir  Frederick.  A  First  Book  of  Jurisprudence  for  Students  of  the 
Common  Law.     London,  1896. 

Pollock,  Sir  Frederick.     Expansion  of  the  Common  Law.     Boston,  1904. 

Popenoe,  Paul,  and  Johnson,  Roswell  Hill.  Applied  Eugenics.  New  York, 
1918. 

Porter,  Kirk  H.     A  History  of  Suffrage  in  the  United  States.     Chicago,  19 18. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Readings  on  the  History  and  System  of  the  Common  Law. 
Boston,  19 1 3. 

Ratzenhofer,  Gustav.  Die  Sociologische  Erkenntnis:  Positive  Philosophie  des 
Socialen  Lebens,  1898. 

Rauschenbusch,  Walter.  Christianity  and  the  Social  Crisis.  New  York, 
1907. 

Rauschenbusch,  Walter.  A  Theology  for  the  Social  Gospel.  New  York, 
1917. 

Reckitt,  Maurice  B.,  and  Bechofer,  C.  E.  The  Meaning  of  National 
Guilds.     New  York,  1918. 

Reed,  Thomas  Harrison.  The  Form  and  Functions  of  American  Govern- 
ment.    New  York,  19 18. 

Reischauer,  August  Karl.     Studies  in  Japanese  Buddhism.     New  York,  191 7. 

Richmond,  Mary  Ellen.     Social  Diagnosis.     New  York,  19 17. 

Robinson,  James  Harvey.     The  New  History.     New  York,  19 12. 

Theodore  Roosevelt  —  An  Autobiography.     New  York,  1919. 

Rose,  John  Holland.     The  Origins  of  War.     New  York,  19 15. 

Ross,  Edward  Alsworth.  The  Old  World  in  the  New:  the  Significance  of 
Past  and  Present  Immigration  to  the  American  People.  New  York, 
1914. 

Ross,  Edward  Alsworth.  Changing  America:  Studies  in  Contemporary  So- 
ciety.    New  York,  191 2. 

Rousseau,  Jean- Jacques.  The  Social  Contract;  or  the  Principles  of  Political 
Rights.     Translated  by  Rose  M.  Harrington.     New  York,  1898. 

Rowe,  L.  S.     Problems  of  City  Government.     New  York,  1908. 

Rowntree,  Benjamin  Seebohn,  and  Kendall,  May.  How  the  Labourer  Lives: 
a  Study  of  the  Rural  Labour  Problem.     London  and  New  York,  19 13. 

Royce,  Josiah.  Herbert  Spencer:  an  Estimate  and  Review;  together  with  a 
chapter  of  personal  reminiscences  by  James  Collier.     New  York,  1904. 

Russell,  Bertrand.  Why  Men  Fight;  a  Method  of  Abolishing  the  Inter- 
national Duel.     New  York,  1917. 


466     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Salmond,  J.  W.     Jurisprudence  or  the  Theory  of  Law.     1907. 

Salter,  William  Mackintire.     Nietzsche,  the  Thinker.     New  York,  19 17. 

Sandburg,  Carl.     The  Chicago  Race  Riots.     New  York,  1919. 

Schapiro,  Jacob   Salwyn.     Social  Reform  and  the  Reformation.     Columbia 

University    Studies    in    History,    Economics    and    Public    Law.     Vol. 

XXXIV.,  No.  2.     New  York,  1909. 
Schmoller,  Gustav.     The  Mercantile  System  and  Its  Historical  Significance, 

illustrated  chiefly  from  Prussian  History.     Translated  by  W.  J.  Ashley. 

New  York,  1906. 
Schouler,  James.     History  of  the  United  States  of  America  under  the  Consti- 
tution.    6  vols.     New  York,  1 894-1 899. 
Schurz,  Carl.     Abraham  Lincoln.     Boston,  1891. 
Seager,  Henry  Rogers.     Principles  of  Economics.     New  York,  1913. 
Seligman,   Edwin  R.  A.     Principles  of  Economics:  with   Special  Reference 

to  American  Conditions.     New  York,  1909. 
Seligman,    Edwin    R.   A.     Progressive   Taxation    in   Theory   and    Practice. 

Princeton,  N.  J.,  American  Economic  Association,  1908. 
Seligman,  Edwin  R.  A.     The  Income  Tax;  a  Study  of  the  History,  Theory 

and  Practice  of  Income  Taxation  at  Home  and  Abroad.     New  York, 

1914. 
Sample,  Ellen  Churchill.     Influences  of  Geographic  Environment  on  the  Basis 

of  Ratzel's  System  of  Anthropo-Geography.     New  York,  191 1. 
Shotwell,  James  T.     The  Religious  Revolution  of  Today.     Boston  and  New 

York,  1913. 
Slater,    Gilbert.     The   English    Peasantry   and    the    Enclosure   of    Common 

Fields.     London,  1907. 
Small,  Albion  W.     The  Cameralists :  The  Pioneers  of  German  Social  Polity. 

Chicago,  1909. 
Smith,  J.  Allen.     The  Spirit  of  American   Government;   a  Study  of  the 

Constitution:  its  Origin,  Influence  and  Relation  to  Democracy.     New 

York,  19 1 9. 
Smith,  S.  C.  Kaines.     Greek  Art  and  National  Life.     New  York,  1914. 
Smith,  Adam.     An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of 

Nations.     2  vols.     London,  1887. 
Smith,  Eugene.     Criminal  Law  in  the  United  States.     New  York,  19 10. 
Smith,  Munroe.     Militarism  and  Statecraft.     New  York,  1918. 
Sombart,  Werner.     Der  Moderne  Kapitalismus.     2  vols.     Leipzig,  1902. 
Sombart,  Werner.     The  Quintessence  of  Capitalism:  a  Study  of  the  History 

and  Psychology  of  the  Modern  Business  Man.     New  York,  1915. 
Sombart,  Werner.     Der  Bourgeois:  Zur  Geistesgeschichte  des  modernen  Wirt- 

schaftsmenschen.     Miinchen  and  Leipzig,  191 3. 
Spedden,  Ernest  R.     The  Trade  Union  Label.    Johns  Hopkins  University 


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Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science,  Series  XXVIII,  No.  2.  Balti- 
more, 1910. 

Spencer,  Baldwin,  and  Gillen,  F.  J.  The  Northern  Tribes  of  Central  Aus- 
tralia.    London  and  New  York,  1904. 

Spencer,  Baldwin,  and  Gillen,  F.  J.  The  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Aus- 
tralia.    London  and  New  York,  1899. 

Spencer,  Herbert.  The  Principles  of  Sociology.  3  vols.  New  York,  1884- 
1897. 

Spencer,  Herbert.     An  Autobiography.     2  vols.     New  York,  1904. 

Spencer,  Herbert.     Social  Statics.     New  York,  1892. 

Stewart,  H.  D.  Nietzsche  and  the  Ideals  of  Modern  Germany.  New  York 
and  London,  19 15. 

Stickney,  A.  B.     The  Railway  Problem.     St.  Paul,  Minn.,  1891. 

Stoddard,  William  Leavitt.     The  Shop  Committee.     New  York,  19 19. 

Stowell,  Ellery  C.     The  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  19 14.     Boston,  1915. 

Stubbs,  William.  The  Constitutional  History  of  England  in  its  Origin  and 
Development.     3  vols.     Oxford,  1891. 

Sumner,  William  Graham.     Folkways.     Boston,   1907. 

Tarbell,  Ida  M.  The  History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company.  2  vols.  New 
York,  1904. 

Tarbell,  Ida  M.     The  Life  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  2  vols.     New  York,  1908. 

Taussig,  F.  W.     Some  Aspects  of  the  Tariff  Question.     Cambridge,  19 15. 

Taussig,  F.  W.     Principles  of  Economics.     2  vols.     New  York,  19 13. 

Taussig,  F.  W.  Inventors  and  Money  Makers:  Lectures  on  Some  Relations 
between  Economics  and  Psychology.     New  York,  19 15. 

Taylor,  Fred  M.     Principles  of  Economics.     Ann  Arbor,  191 3. 

Tead,  Ordway.  Instincts  in  Industry;  a  Study  of  Working  Class  Psychology. 
Boston  and  New  York,  191 8. 

Tead,  Ordway.     The  People's  Part  in  Peace.     New  York,  1919. 

Teggart,  Frederick  J.     The  Processes  of  History.     New  Haven,  1918. 

Thayer,  James  Bradley.     Preliminary  Treatise  of  Evidence.     Boston,  1898. 

Thomas,  William  I.  Source  Book  for  Social  Origins:  Ethnological  Material, 
Psychological  Standpoint,  Classified  and  Annotated  Bibliographies  for  the 
Interpretation  of  Savage  Society.     Chicago,  1909. 

Thomas,  William  I,,  and  Znaniecki,  Florian.  The  Polish  Peasant  in  Europe 
and  America;  Monograph  of  an  Immigrant  Group.  2  vols.  Chicago, 
19 1 8.     Three  other  volumes  are  in  preparation. 

Thompson,  Warren  Simpson.  Population:  A  Study  in  Malthusianism. 
Columbia  University  Studies  in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law. 
New  York,  191 5. 

Thorndike,  Edward  L.  The  Original  Nature  of  Man.  Vol.  I.  of  his 
Educational  Psychology.     New  York,  19 13. 

Thorndike,  Edward  L.     Mental  Work  and  Fatigue;  and  Individual  Differ- 


468      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

ences  and  their  Causes.     Vol.  Ill  of  his  Educational  Psychology.     New 

York,  1914. 
Titchener,  Edward  Bradford.     A  Text-Book  of  Psychology.     New  York, 

1911. 
Treitschke,   Heinrich  von.     Politics.     Translated  by  Blanche  Dugdale  and 

Torben  de  Bille.     With  an  introduction  by  Rt.  Hon,  A.  J.  Balfour,  and 

a  foreword  by  A.  L.  Lowell.     2  vols.      New  York,  1916. 
TroUope,  Anthony.     North  America.     Philadelphia,  1862. 
Trowbridge,  John  Townsend.     My  Own  Story ;  with  Recollections  of  Noted 

Persons.     Boston  and  New  York,  1903. 
True,  Ruth  Smiley.     The  Neglected  Girl.     West  Side  Studies.     New  York, 

1914. 
Turner,  Frederick  Jackson.     The  Rise  of  the  New  West.     New  York,  1906. 
Van  Kleeck,  Mary.     A  Seasonal  Industry;  a  Study  of  the  Millinery  Trade 

in  New  York.     New  York,  191 7. 
Veblen,  Thorstein.     Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution.     New 

York  and  London,  191 5. 
Veblen,  Thorstein.     An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  Peace  and  the  Terms  of 

its  Perpetuation.     New  York  and  London,  191 7. 
Veblen,  Thorstein.     The  Higher  Learning  in  America.     New  York,  19 18. 
Veblen,  Thorstein.     The  Vested  Interests  and  the  State  of  the  Industrial 

Arts.     New  York,  1919. 
Volkelt,  Johannes.     System  der  Asthetik.     3  vols.     Miinchen,   1905,    19 10, 

1914. 
Wagner,  Adolf.     Grundlegung  der  Politischen  Oekonomie.     3  vols.     Leip- 
zig, 1892,  1893,  1894. 
Wallas,  Graham.     Human  Nature  in  Politics.     Boston,  1909. 
Wallas,    Graham.     The    Great    Society:    A    Psychological   Analysis.     New 

York,  19 14. 
Walling,  William  English.     Socialism  as  It  Is.     New  York,  1912. 
Ward,  Harry  F.     The  New  Social  Order;  Principles  and  Programs.     New 

York,  1920. 
Webb,    Sidney   and    Beatrice.     Industrial    Democracy.     London    and    New 

York,  1902. 
Webb,  Sidney.     The  Restoration  of  Trade  Union  Conditions.     New  York, 

1919. 
Westermarck,  Edward.     The  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  Ideas.     2 

vols.     London,  1906. 
Weyl,  Walter  Edward.     The  New  Democracy:  an  Essay  on  Certain  Polit- 
ical and  Economic  Tendencies  in  the  United  States.     New  York,  19 12. 
Weyforth,    William    O.     The    Organizability    of    Labor.     Johns    Hopkins 

University  Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science,  Series  XXXV,  No. 

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White,  Horace.     Money  and  Banking.     New  York. 

Whitney,   Nathaniel  Ruggles.     Jurisdiction   in  American   Building  Trades. 

Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science,  Series 

XXXn,  No.  I.     Baltimore,  1914. 
Wicksteed,  Rev.  Philip  Henry.     The  Common  Sense  of  Political  Economy; 

including  a  Study  of  the  Human  Basis  of  Economic  Law^.     New  York, 

1910. 
Williams,  Bishop  Charles  D.     The  Christian  Ministry  and  Social  Problems. 

New  York,  191 7. 
Williams,  James  Mickel.     An  American  Town.     New  York,  1906. 
Willoughby,   Westel  Woodbury.     An   Examination   of   the  Nature   of   the 

State:  a  Study  in  Political  Philosophy.     New  York,  1896. 
Wilson,  Woodrow.     The  New  Freedom.     Master  Workers'  Book.     New 

York,  19 1 6. 
President  Wilson's   State  Papers  and  Addresses.     Published   by   Review  of 

Reviews  Company.     New  York,  19 18. 
Windleband,  Wilhelm.     A   History  of   Philosophy.     Translated  by  J.   H. 

Tufts.     New  York,  1901. 
Wines,  Frederic  H.,  and  Koren,  John.     The  Liquor  Problem  in  its  Legislative 

Aspects.     Boston,  1897. 
Withers,  Hartley.     The  Meaning  of  Money.     New  York,  191 3. 
Witmer,  Lightner.     The  Nearing  Case.     New  York,  19 15. 
Wolf,  A.     The  Philosophy  of  Nietzsche.     London,  1915. 
Wolfe,  F.  E.     Admission  to  American  Trade  Unions.     Johns  Hopkins  Uni- 
versity Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science.     Series  XXX,  No.  3. 

Baltimore,  19 12. 
Wolman,  Leo.     The  Boycott  in  American  Trade  Unions.     Johns  Hopkins 

University  Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science.     Series  XXXIV, 

No.  I.     Baltimore,  1916. 
Wundt,  Wilhelm.     Elements  of  Folk  Psychology ;  Outlines  of  a  Psychological 

History  of  the  Development  of  Mankind.     Translated  by  Edward  Leroy 

Schaub.     New  York,  19 16. 
Wundt,  Wilhelm.     Ethics.     Translated  by  Gulliver,  J.  H.,  Washburn,  M. 

F.,  Titchener,  E.  B.     3  vols.     New  York. 
Young,  George.     Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East.     Carnegie  En- 
dowment for  International  Peace.     Oxford,  1915. 
Youngman,   Anna.     The   Economic   Causes  of   Great   Fortunes.     Chicago, 

1909. 
Zimmern,  Alfred  Eckhard.     Nationality  and  Government ;  and  other  wartime 

Essays.     New  York,  1918. 


470      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

DOCUMENTS 

Annual  Report  of  the  Federal  Trades  Commission.     Washington,  1916. 
Boas,  Franz.     Handbook  of  American  Indian  Languages.     Bureau  of  Ameri- 
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California  Commission  of  Immigration  and  Housing.     A  Report  on  Large 

Landholders  in  Southern  California.     Sacramento,  19 19. 
Committee  on  Adult  Education:  Interim  Report  on   Industrial  and   Social 

Conditions  in  Relation  to  Adult  Education,  Ministry  of  Reconstruction, 

London,  19 18. 
Congressional  Record,  Sixty-Sixth  Congress,  First  Session,  Vol,  58,  July  23, 

1919;  Second  Session,  Vol.  59,  December  15,  1919,  January  26,  1920. 
(United  States)   Department  of  Labor.     Report  on  the  Mooney  Dynamite 

Cases  in  San  Francisco.     Submitted  by  President  Wilson's  Mediation 

Commission.     Official  Bulletin,  January  28,  19 18. 
(United  States)  Department  of  Labor.     Report  on  the  Bisbee  Deportations. 

Made  by  the  President's  Mediation  Commission  to  the  President  of  the 

United  States,  November  6,  191 7. 
Federal  Trade  Commission.     Report  on  Co-operation  in  American  Export 

Trade.     2  parts  published  separately.     Washington,  19 16. 
Federal  Trade  Commission.     Report  on  Anthracite  and  Bituminous  Coal. 

Washington,  19 17. 
Federal  Trade  Commission.     Report  to  the  President  of  the  United  States 

Senate  on  Profiteering.     Washington,  June  28,  1918. 
Federal  Trade  Commission.     Report  on  the  Meat  Packing  Industry.     Wash- 
ington, 19 1 8. 
Federal  Trade  Commission.     Report  on  the  Meat  Packing  Industry.     3  parts 

published  separately.     Washington,  191 9. 
Federal  Trade  Commission.     Report  on  Leather  and  Shoe  Industries,  19 19. 

Washington,  19 19. 
Federal  Reporter.     Circuit  Courts  of  Appeals.     Circuit  and  District  Courts, 

and  Commerce  Court  of  the  United  States,  October-November,   19 19. 

Parke-Davis  &  Co.  v.  H.  K.  Mulford  Co.,  Vol.  189,  95-115. 
Final   Report   of   the   United   States   Commission   on    Industrial    Relations. 

Washington,  1915. 
J  Fletcher,    Alice    C.     The    Hako:    A    Pawnee    Ceremony.     Twenty-second 

Annual  Report  of  the  Bureau  of  American  Ethnology.     Washington, 

190Q-1901. 
Flexner,   Abraham.     Next   Steps  in   Dealing  with    Prostitution.     American 

Social  Hygiene  Association.     Publication  No.  46. 
Goldmark,  Josephine,   and   Frankfurter,   Felix.     The  Case  for  the  Shorter 

Work  Day.     U.  S.  Supreme  Court.     October  Term,   1915.     Bunting 


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vs.  State  of  Oregon.  Reprinted  by  National  Consumers'  League.  New 
York,  2  vols. 

Grant,  Luke.  The  National  Erectors'  Association  and  the  International 
Association  of  Bridge  and  Structural  Iron  Workers.  United  States 
Commission  on  Industrial  Relations.     Washington,  19 15. 

Hearings  before  a  Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  on  Main- 
tenance of  a  Lobby  to  Influence  Legislation.  63rd  Congress,  ist  Session. 
Washington,  19 13. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  The  New  England  Investigation.  In 
the  Matter  of  Rates,  Classifications,  Regulations,  and  Practices  of  Car- 
riers.    Washington,  19 13. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  In  Re  —  Investigation  of  Accident  on  the 
New  York,  New  Haven  and  Hartford  Railroad  Near  North  Haven, 
Conn.,  on  September  2,  19 13.     Washington,  191 3. 

K.  of  C.  War  Activities  Committee.  Bolshevism  —  the  Remedy.  New 
Haven,  19 19. 

Lenin,  Nikolai.  The  Soviets  at  Work;  the  International  Position  of  the 
Russian  Soviet  Republic  and  the  Fundamental  Problems  of  the  Socialist 
Revolution.     Published  by  the  Rand  School  of  Social  Science,  19 18. 

Lindsey,  Ben  B.  Children's  Courts  in  the  United  States;  their  Origin, 
Development  and  Results.  No.  701,  58th  Congress,  2nd  Session. 
Washington,  1904:  Reports  prepared  for  the  International  Prison  Com- 
mission. 

Massachusetts  Reports,  167.  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachuetts,  1896- 
1897.     Vegelahn  v.  Guntner,  92-109. 

Methodist  Federation  for  Social  Service.  Two  Recent  Strikes  of  Special 
Significance.     Bulletin  for  May,   19 19. 

"  Manifesto  of  the  Spartacus  Group,"  in  Bulletin  of  International  Concilia- 
tion entitled,  The  German  Revolution,  No.  137,  April,  19 19. 

Moore,  John  Bassett.  International  Cooperation.  International  Concilia- 
tion.    Bulletin  No.  100,  March,  191 6. 

National  Lumber  Manufacturers'  Association's  First  American  Lumber  Con- 
gress and  Seventeenth  Annual  Meeting,  Chicago,  April,  19 19. 

National  Women's  Trade  Union  League  of  America.  Women  and  Recon- 
struction.    Chicago,  19 19. 

Neilson,  William  Allan.  Inter  Arma  Veritas.  International  Conciliation. 
Bulletin,  No.  105,  August,  1916. 

Platform  and  Plan  of  Organization  of  American  Labor  Party  of  Greater 
New  York.     New  York,  19 19. 

Platform  of  Illinois  Labor  Party.     The  New  Majority,  Vol.  I,  April  19, 

1919. 
Rand  School  of  Social  Science.     The  Trial  of  Scott  Nearing  and  the  American 
Socialist  Society.     New  York,  1919. 


472      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Reports  of  the  Bullitt  Mission  on  Russia,  The  Nation,  October  4,  1919. 
Report  of  the  Commissioner  of   Corporations  on   the  Petroleum   Industry. 

Washington,  1907. 
Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  the  Steel  Industry.     Wash- 
ington, 191 1. 
Report  of  the  United  States  Industrial  Commission,  19  vols.     Washington, 

1901-1902. 
Report  from  the  Subcommittee  to  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  United 

States  Senate,  64th  Congress,  ist  Session,  on  the  Nomination  of  Louis 

D.  Brandeis  to  be  an  Associate  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 

United  States.     Washington,  19 16. 
Report  of  the  Roosevelt  Public  Lands  Commission.     Senate  Document,  No. 

154)  58th  Congress,  3rd  Session. 
Report  of  the  Committee  Appointed  to  Investigate  the  Concentration  and 

Control  of  Money  and   Credit.     House  of   Rep.,  62nd  Congress,   3rd 

Session,  Report  No.  1593.     Washington,  1913. 
Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly  of  the  State  of 

New  York,  appointed  to  investigate  the  affairs  of  Life  Insurance  com- 
panies.    Albany,  1906. 
vRuyssen,   Theodore.     What  is  a   Nationality?     Translated   by  John    Mez. 

International  Conciliation.     Bulletin,  No.   112.     March,   191 7. 
Smith,  Reginald  Heber.     Justice  and  the  Poor.     The  Carnegie  Foundation 

for  the  Advancement  of  Learning,  Bulletin  No.  13.     New  York,  19 19. 
Snow,  Chauncey  Depew,  and  Krai,  J.  J.     German  Trade  and  the  War; 

Commercial  and   Industrial   Relations   in  War  Time  and   the   Future 

Outlook.     U.   S.   Department  of  Commerce.     Washington,    19 18. 
Testimony  taken  before  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly 

of  the  State  of  New  York  appointed  to  investigate  the  affairs  of  Life 

Insurance  Companies.     9  vols.     Albany,  1906. 
United  States  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Preventable  Death  in  Cotton  Manu- 
facturing Industry,  Bulletin  No.  251. 
United  States  Supreme  Court  Reports: 

Swift  V.  Tyson,  Vol.  41,  1842. 

Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  Co.  v.  Baugh.     Vol.  149,  1893. 

Holden  v.  Hardy.     Vol.  169,  1897. 

United  States  v.  Missouri  Freight  Association,  Vol.  166,  1896. 

Lochner  v.  New  York.     Vol.  198,  1905. 

Otis  V.  Parker.     Vol.  187,  1902. 
(United  States)  Supreme  Court  Reporter: 

Gompers  v.  United  States.     Vol  34,  1913. 

Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Jensen.     Vol.  37,  1917. 

Adair  v.  United  States.     Vol.  28,  1907. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  473 

Standard  Oil  Company  of  New  Jersey  v.  United  States.     Vol.  31,  1910. 

Coppage  V.  Kansas.     Vol.  35,  19 14. 

Eagle  Glass  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Thomas  W.  Rowe.     Reprint  No.  23,  19 17. 

United  States  Supreme  Court.  Jacob  Abrams  v.  United  States.  Decided 
November  10,  19 19.  Text  of  decision  and  dissenting  opinion  in  New 
Republic,  Vol.  XX,  November  26,  1919. 

U.  S.  Department  of  Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Monthly  Labor 
Review,  Vol.  VII,  November,  1918. 

United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Company  of  New  Jersey.  Brief  of  Facts  and 
Argument  for  Petitioner.     2  vols. 

United  States  v.  American  Can  Company.  District  Court  of  Maryland, 
February,  19 16.     Reprint. 

Ward,  Harry  F.  Social  Unrest  in  the  United  States.  Methodist  Federa- 
tion for  Social  Service.     New  York,  191 9. 

West,  George  P.     Report  on  the  Colorado  Strike.     United  States  Commis- 
sion on  Industrial  Relations.     Washington,   19 18. 
/'Wolfe,   A.   B.     Works  Committees   and   Joint   Industrial   Conferences.     A 
report  prepared  for  the  Industrial  Relations  Division  of  United  States 
Shipping  Board.     Philadelphia,  1919. 

ARTICLES 

■  Adams,  George  Burton.  History  and  the  Philosophy  of  History.  Ameri- 
can Historical  Review  (Amer.  Hist.  Rev.)  ^,  Vol.  XIV,  January,  1909. 

Allen,  Arthur  M.  The  Opinions  of  Justice  Hughes.  Columbia  Law  Re- 
view, Vol.  XVI,  November,  19 16. 

Allom,  Sir  Charles  C.  Unionism  as  Foe  of  Labor.  American  Industries, 
Vol.  XIX,  March,  1919. 

Babson,  Roger  W.  The  Creative  Urge.  Current  Affairs,  Vol.  9,  March, 
1919. 

Baldwin,  Simeon  E.  Education  for  the  Bar  in  the  United  States.  Ameri- 
can Political  Science  Review,  Vol  IX,  August,  19 15. 

Barr,  William  H.  Open  Shop  Necessary  for  Country's  Prosperity.  The 
Open  Shop  Review,  Vol.  XV,  December,  1918. 

Beard,  Charles  A.  A  Governmental  Employment  Policy.  Good  Govern- 
ment, Vol.  XXXVI,  January,  1919. 

Beard,  Charles  A.  Propaganda  in  Schools.  The  Dial,  Vol.  LXVI,  June, 
1919. 

Becker,  Carl.  Some  Aspects  of  the  Influence  of  Social  Problems  and  Ideas 
upon  the  Study  and  Writing  of  History.  American  Journal  of  Soci- 
ology, Vol.  XVIII,  March,  1913. 

^  Abbreviation  used  in  text, 


474      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

'^  Bernard,    L,    L.     A   Theory   of    Rural    Attitudes.     American    Journal    of 

Sociology,  Vol.  XXII,  March,  191 7. 
Bosanquet,  B.     Social  Automatism  and  the  Imitation  Theory.     Mind,  New 

Series,  Vol.  VIII,  April,  1899. 
Brailsford,   H.   N.     The  Iron  Age.     New   Republic,   Vol.   V.   November, 

1915,  to  January,  1916. 
Brandeis,    Louis    D.     The    Constitution    and    the    Minimum    Wage.     The 

Survey,  Vol.  XXXIII,  February  6,  1915. 
Breckinridge,    Sophonisba   P.     Social   Control  of   Child   Welfare.     Publica- 
tions of  the  American  Sociological  Society  (Pub.  Amer.  Sociol.  Soc.)  ^, 

Vol.  XII,  December,  191 7. 
Brentano,  Verhandlungen  des  Vereins  fiir  Sozialpolitik.     Schriften  XCVIII, 

September,  1901. 
Brown,  W.  Jethro.     Law  and  Evolution.     Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXIX, 

February,  1920. 
Bruce,  A.  A.     Laissez-faire  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

Green  Bag,  Vol.  XX,  1908. 
V  Buck,  Carl  Darling.     Language  and  the  Sentiment  of  Nationality.     Ameri- 
can Political  Science  Review  (Amer.  Pol.  Sc.  Rev.)  ^,  Vol.  X,  February, 

1916. 
Carver,  T.  N.     The  Behavioristic  Man.     Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 

Vol.  XXXIII,  November,  1918. 
Chaffee,  Zechariah,  Jr.     Freedom  of  Speech  in  War  Time.     Harvard  Law 

Review,  Vol.  XXXII,  June,  1919. 
Cole,    G.    D.    H.     The    National    Guilds    Movement    in    Great    Britain. 

Monthly  Labor  Review,  published  by  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics, 

Vol.  IX,  July,  19 1 9. 
Cole,  G.  D.  H.     A  Building  Guild  for  Great  Britain.     New  Republic,  Vol. 
i  XXI,  March  3,  1920, 

>^  Commons,  John  R.     A  Sociological  View  of  Sovereignty.     American  Journal 

of  Sociology,  Vols.  V-VI,  July,  September,  November,  1899,  January, 

March,  May,  July,  1900. 
Commons,  John  R.     A  Reconstruction  Health  Program.     The  Survey,  Vol. 

XLII,  September  6,  1919. 
Cook,  Walter  Wheeler.     Act,  Intention  and  Motive  in  the  Criminal  Law. 

Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVI,  June,  1917. 
Cook,  Walter  W.     Privileges  of  Labor  Unions  in  the  Struggle  for  Life. 

Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVII,  April,  1918. 
Corbin,  Arthur  Linton.     The  Law  and  the  Judges.     Yale  Law  Review, 

N.  S.,  Vol.  Ill,  January,  1914. 
Croly,  Herbert.     The  Future  of  the  State.     New  Republic,  Vol.  XII,  Sept., 

15,  1917. 
1  Abbreviation  used  in  text. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  475 

Croly,  Herbert.     The  Obstacle  to  Peace.     New  Republic,  Vol.  XVIII,  April, 

1919- 

Croly,  Herbert.  Disordered  Christianity.  New  Republic,  Vol.  XXI,  De- 
cember, 19 19. 

Earl  of  Cromer.  Free  Trade  in  its  Relations  to  Peace  and  War.  Nineteenth 
Century,  Vol.  LXVIII,  July-December,  1910. 

Davenport,  H.  J.  Scope,  Method,  and  Psychology  in  Economics.  Journal 
of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XIV,  November, 

1917- 

Davids,  Prof.  T.  W.  Rhys,  and  Davids,  Mrs.  Rhys.  Religion  as  a  Con- 
solidating and  Separating  Influence.  Papers  on  Inter-Racial  Problems. 
First  Universal  Races  Congress,  University  of  London,  191 1. 

Dennison,  Henry  S.  What  the  Employment  Department  Should  be  in  In- 
dustry. Proceedings  of  Employment  Managers'  Conference,  1917,  U. 
S.  Dept.  of  Labor,  Bulletin,  No.  227. 

Dewey,  Davis  R.  The  Statistics  of  the  Concentration  of  Wealth-Discus- 
sion.    American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  VII,  Supplement,  March,  191 7. 

Dewey,  John.  The  Need  for  Social  Psychology.  Psychological  Review, 
Vol.  XXIV,  July,  1917. 

Dewey,  John.  The  Case  of  the  Professor  and  the  Public  Interest.  The 
Dial,  Vol.  LXIII,  November  8,  191 7. 

Dewey,  John.  Nature  and  Reason  in  Law.  International  Journal  of 
Ethics.     Vol.  XXV,  October,  19 14. 

Dewey,  John.  Progress.  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol.  XXVI, 
April,  19 16. 

Dewey,  John.  Force  and  Coercion.  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol. 
XXVI,  April,  1916. 

Dewey,  John.  A  League  of  Nations  and  Economic  Freedom.  The  Dial, 
Vol.  LXV,  December,  19 18. 

Dewey,  John.  The  Discrediting  of  Idealism.  New  Republic,  Vol.  XX, 
October  8,  19 19. 

Dodd,  William  E.  The  Social  Philosophy  of  the  Old  South.  American 
Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XXIII,  May,  1918. 

Duguit,  Leon.  The  Law  and  the  State.  Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol. 
XXXI,  November,  19 17. 

Duguit,  Leon.  Collective  Acts  as  Distinquished  from  Contracts.  Yale  Law 
Journal,  Vol.  XXVII,  April,  1918. 

Dunning,  William  A.  Truth  in  History.  American  Historical  Review, 
Vol.  XIX,  January,  19 14. 

Eastman,  Crystal.  In  Communist  Hungary.  The  Liberator,  Vol.  II, 
August,  1 9 19. 


476      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Eastman,    Max.     What    Shall    We    do    With    Patriotism?     Survey,    Vol. 
XXXV,  January,  191 6. 
I  Ehrlich,   Eugene.     Montesquieu   and   Sociological   Jurisprudence.     Harvard 
Law  Review,  Vol.  XXIX,  April,  19 16. 

Emery,  James  A.  Class  Legislation  for  Industry,  Address  delivered  be- 
fore National  Association  of  Manufacturers,  May,   191 8.     Reprint. 

Fetter,  Frank  A.  Population  or  Prosperity.  American  Economic  Review. 
Vol.  Ill,  Supplement,  March,  1913. 

Filene,  A.  Lincoln.  The  Key  to  Successful  Industrial  Management.  In  a 
report  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science  entitled 
Modern  Manufacturing,  September,  19 19. 

Filene,  Edward  A.  The  Shop  Committee.  Current  Affairs,  Vol.  9,  March, 
1919. 

Fisher,  Irving.  Health  and  War.  American  Labor  Legislation  Review 
(Amer.  Lab.  Leg.  Rev.)i,  Vol.  VIII,  March,  1918. 

Fisher,  Irving.  The  Need  for  Health  Insurance.  American  Labor  Legis- 
lation Review,  Vol.  VII,  March,  191 7. 

Fisher,  Irving.  Economists  in  Public  Service.  American  Economic 
Review,  Vol.  IX,  Supplement,  March,  1919. 

Fite,  Warner.  Moral  Valuations  and  Economic  Laws.  Journal  of  Philos- 
ophy, Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XIV,  January,  19 17. 

Fitch,  John  A.     Labor  and  Politics.     Survey,  Vol.  XL,  June  8,  191 8. 

Fitch,  John  A.  John  Williams  —  Peace-maker.  Survey,  Vol.  XLI,  Janu- 
ary, 1919. 

Frankfurter,  Felix.  The  Constitutional  Opinions  of  Justice  Holmes. 
Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol.  XXIX,  April,  1916. 

Frankfurter,  Felix.  Hours  of  Labor  and  Realism  in  Constitutional  Law. 
Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol.  XXIX,  February,  19 16. 

Freund,  Ernst.  The  Treaty  and  International  Law.  New  Republic,  Vol. 
XXI,  December  17,  1919. 

Giddings,  Franklin  H.  The  Psychology  of  Society.  Science,  Vol.  IX,  Janu- 
ary, 1899. 

Gierke,  Otto.  Die  Grundbegriffe  des  Staatsrechts  und  die  neuesten  Staats- 
theorien.     Zeitschrift  fur  die  gesammte  Staatswissenschafte,  Vol.  XXX, 

1874. 
Gillette,  John  M.     The  North  Dakota  Harvest  of  the  Nonpartisan  League. 

The  Survey,  Vol.  XLI,  March,  1919. 
GilUn,  J.  L.     The  Origin  of  Democracy.     American  Journal  of  Sociology, 

Vol.  XXIV,  May,  1919. 
Gleason,  Arthur.    The  New  Constitutionalism  in  Industry.    The  Survey, 

Vol.  XLI,  February,  1919. 

^Abbreviation  us^d  in  text 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  477 

Gleason,  Arthur.     British  Labor  and  the   Issues  of  Reconstruction.     The 
Survey,  Vol.  XL,  August,  19 18. 

Gleason,  Arthur.     The  Whitely  Councils.     The  Survey,  Vol.  XLI,  April 
5,  12,  19,  1919- 

Gleason,  Arthur.     The  British  Coal  Commission.     The  Survey,  Vol.  XLII, 
May,  1919. 

Gleason,    Arthur.     The   British    Coal    Commission,    Robert    Smillie.     Vol. 
XLII,  June,  1919. 

Goldenweiser,  A.  A.     Totemism,  an  Analytical  Study.     Journal  of  Ameri- 
can Folklore,  Vol.  XXIII,  April-June,  1910. 

Gompers,  Samuel.     The  Charter  of  Industrial  Freedom.     American  Federa- 
tionist,  Vol.  XXI,  1914. 

Goodnow,  Frank.     The  Relation  of  Economics  to  the  Law.     Survey,  Vol. 
XXV,  March  4,  191 1. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.     The  Court  of  Appeals  Decision.     Survey,  Vol.  XXVI, 
April  29,  191 1. 

Green,  Frederick.     Separation  of  Governmental  Powers.     Yale  Law  Journal, 
Vol.  XXIX,  February,  1920. 

Green,  William.     Trade  Union  Sick  Funds  and  Compulsory  Health  Insur- 
ance.    American  Labor  Legislation  Review,  Vol.  VII,  March,  1917. 

Hadley,  A.  T.     The  Constitutional  Position  of  Property  in  America.     In- 
dependent, Vol.  LXIV,  April,  1908. 

Haines,  Charles  Grove.     The  Law  of  Nature  in  State  and  Federal  Judicial 
Decisions.     Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVI,  June,  19 16. 

Hale,  Swinburne.     The  "  Force  and  Violence  "  Joker,  New  Republic,  Vol. 
XXI,  January  21,  1920. 

Hamilton,    Walton.     The    Institutional    Approach    to    Economic    Theory. 
American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  IX,  Supplement,  March,   19 19. 

Hand,  Learned.     Due  Process  of  Law  and  the  Eight-Hour  Day.     Harvard 
Law  Review,  Vol.  XXI,  May,  1908. 

Hand,    Learned.     The    Speech    of    Justice.     Harvard    Law    Review,    Vol. 
XXIX,  April,  1916. 

Hard,  William.     What  the  Miners  Are  Thinking.     New  Republic,  Vol. 
XX,  November,  19 19. 

Hard,  William.     In  Judge  Anderson's   Court-room.     New  Republic,  Vol. 

XX,  November,  19 19. 
Hart,  Albert  Bushnell.     Imagination  in  History.     American  Historical  Re- 
view, Vol.  XV,  January,  19 10. 
Hart,  Fred.  B.     Power  of  Government  over  Speech  and  Press.     Yale  Law 
Journal,  Vol.  XXIX,  February,  1920. 
yHayden,   Edwin  Andrew.     The  Social  Will.     Psychological  Review,  Vol. 
X,  April,  1909. 


478      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Healy,  William,  and  Bronner,  Augusta  F.  Youthful  Offenders.  American 
Journal  of  Sociology',  Vol.  XXII,  July,  191 6. 

Henry,  E.  F.  A  "  One-Price  "  System  of  Wages.  Industrial  Management, 
Vol.  LIV,  December,  191 7. 

Higgins,  Henry  Bournes.  A  New  Province  for  Law  and  Order.  Harvard 
Law  Review,  Vol.  XXIX,  November,  191 5. 

Higgins,  Henry  Bournes.  A  New  Province  for  Law  and  Order,  II.  Har- 
vard Law  Review,  Vol.  XXXII,  January,  191 9. 

Hocking,  W.  E.  Sovereignty  and  Moral  Obligation.  International  Journal 
of  Ethics,  Vol.  XXVIII,  April,  19 18. 

Hohfeld,  Wesley  Newcomb.  Legal  Conceptions  as  Applied  in  Judicial  Rea- 
soning.    Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVI,  June,  19 17. 

Hollingtonworth,  Leta  S.  Social  Devices  for  Impelling  Women  to  Bear 
Children.     American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XXII,  July,  1916. 

Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell,  Jr.  The  Path  of  the  Law.  Harvard  Law  Re- 
view, Vol.  X,  March,  1897. 

Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell.  Speeches  by  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  Junior. 
Boston,  1 89 1. 
V  Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell,  Jr.  Privilege,  Malice  and  Intent.  Harvard  Law 
Review,  Vol.  VIII,  April,  1894. 
-  Holmes,  William  Henry.  Stone  Implements  of  the  Potomac-Chesapeake 
Tidewater  Province.  Fifteenth  Annual  Report  of  the  Bureau  of 
Ethnology,  1 893-1 894. 

Hubbell,  N.  D.  The  Organization  and  Scope  of  the  Employment  Depart- 
ment, Proceedings  of  the  Employment  Managers'  Conference,  19 17, 
U.  S.  Dept.  of  Labor,  Bulletin,  No.  227. 

Johnson,  C.  R.  Minnesota  and  the  Nonpartisan  League.  New  Republic, 
Vol.  XX,  October  8,  19 19. 

Johnson,  Alvin  S.  Davenport's  Economics  and  the  Present  Problems  of 
Theory.  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  Vol.  XXVIII,  February, 
1914. 

Johnson,  Alvin  S.  Commerce  and  War.  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol. 
XXIX,  March,  1914- 

Johnson,  Alvin  S.  To  Save  Capitalism.  The  New  Republic,  Vol.  XIX, 
June  14,  1919. 

Kallen,  H.  W.  Nietzsche  —  Without  Prejudice.  The  Dial,  September, 
1919. 

Keller,  Albert  G.  Law  in  Evolution,  Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVIII, 
June,  1 91 9. 

Kemmerer,  E.  W.  Seasonal  Variations  in  the  New  York  Money  Market. 
American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  I,  March,  191 1. 

King,  Wilford  I.     Desirable  Additions  to  Statistical  Data  on  Wealth  and 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  479 

Income.     American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  VII,  Supplement,  March, 

1917. 
Laing,  Bertram  M.     The  Origin  of  Nietzsche's  Problem  and  its  Solution. 

International  Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol.  XXVI,  July,  19 16. 
Lane,    Winthrop    D.     The    Buford    Widows.     The    Survey,    Vol.    XLIII, 

January,  1920. 
Lasker,  Bruno.     "  Bolshevik  Cities."     The  Survey,  Vol.  XLII,  June,  1919. 
Laski,   Harold  J.     The  Responsibility  of  the  State  in  England.     Harvard 

Law  Review,  Vol.  XXXII,  March,  1919. 
Laylin,  Clarence  D.     The  Duty  of  a  Director  Purchasing  Shares  of  Stock, 

Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVII,  April,  1918. 
League  of  Free  Nations  Association,  Statement  of  Principles.     New  Republic, 

Vol.  XVII,  November  30,  1918. 
Legislative   Program   of    the   Federal   Employes.     Good    Government,    Vol. 

XXXVI,  January,  1919. 
Lincoln,  Alexander.     The  Relation  of  Judicial  Decisions  to  the  Law.     Har- 
vard Law  Review,  Vol.  XXI,  December,  1907. 
Lindsey,  Ben  B.     The  Boy  and  the  Court.     Charities,  Vol.  XIII,  pp.  350- 

357. 
Lindsey,  Ben  B.     The  Reformation  of  Juvenile  Delinquents  Through  the 

Juvenile  Courts.     Proceedings  of  the  National  Conference  of  Charities 

and  Corrections,  1903. 
Lippmann,  Walter.     Unrest.     New  Republic,  Vol.  XX,  November  12,  19 19. 
I'ippmann,   Walter.     The   Basic   Problem   of   Democracy.     What    Modern 

Liberty  Means.     Atlantic  Monthly,  Vol.  124,  November,  19 19. 
Lippmann,  Walter.     Liberty  and  the  News.     Atlantic  Monthly,  Vol.  124, 

December,  19 19. 
Lippmann,  Walter.     Can  the  Strike  be  Abandoned?     New  Republic,  Vol. 

XXI,  January  21,  1920. 
Litman,  Simon.     Revolutionary  Russia.     American  Political  Science  Review, 

Vol.  XII,  May,  1918. 
Lewie,  Robert  H.     Psychology  and  Sociology.     American  Journal  of  Sociol- 
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Lubin,  Simon  J.,  and  Krysto  Christiana.     The  Menace  of  Americanization. 

The  Survey,  February  21,  1920. 
McLaren,   A.   D.     The  Mind   and   Mood  of  Germany  Today.     Atlantic 

Monthly,  December,  191 7. 
McMurray,  Orrin  K.     Inter-Citizenship :     A  Basis  for  World  Peace.     Yale 

Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVII,  January,  19 18. 
McDougall,  William.     The  Will  of  the  People.     Sociological  Review,  Vol. 

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Margoliouth,  Prof.  D.  S.     Language  as  a  Consolidating  and  Separating  In- 


48o      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

fluence.  Papers  on  Inter-Racial  Problems,  First  Universal  Races  Con- 
gress.    University  of  London,  191 1. 

Mead,  George  H.  The  Psychology  of  Punitive  Justice.  American  Journal 
of  Sociology,  Vol.  XXIII,  March,  1918. 

Meeker,  Royal.  What  is  the  American  Standard  of  Living?  U.  S.  Bureau 
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Mitchell,  Broadus.  The  End  of  Child  Labor.  The  Survey,  Vol.  XLII, 
August,  1919. 

Mitchell,  Wesley  C.  The  Role  of  Money  in  Economic  Theory.  American 
Economic  Review.     Supplement.     Vol.  VI,  March,  19 16. 

Mitchell,  Wesley  C.  Statistics  and  Government.  Reprint  from  Quarterly 
Publications  of  the  American  Statistical  Association,  March,  1919. 

Moore,  John  Bassett.  The  Doctrine  of  Expatriation,  Harper's  Magazine, 
January,  1905. 

Moore,  John  Bassett.  Law  and  Organization.  American  Political  Science 
Review,  Vol.  IX,  February,  1915. 

Mussey,  Henry  Raymond.  Co-operation  at  Chicago.  The  Nation,  March 
6,  1920. 

Newsome,  Albert.  Reconstruction  in  Britain.  The  Dial,  Vol.  LXVII,  July, 
1919. 

Ogburn,  William  Fielding,  and  Peterson,  Delvin.  Political  Thought  of 
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Ogburn,  William  F.  The  Psychological  Basis  for  the  Economic  Interpreta- 
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Orth,  Samuel  P.  Law  and  Force  in  International  Affairs.  International 
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Overstreet,  H.  A.  Ethical  Clarification  through  the  War.  International 
Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol.  XVIII,  April,  1918. 

Perry,  Bliss.  The  Written  Word  —  How  University  Organizations  Can 
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Perry,  R.  B.  Economic  Value  and  Moral  Value.  Quarterly  Journal  of 
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Plumb,  Glenn  E.  Plan  of  Organized  Employes  for  Railroad  Organization. 
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Pollock,  Sir  Frederick.  Sovereignty  in  English  Law.  Harvard  Law  Re- 
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Pollock,  Frederick.  Justice  According  to  Law.  Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol. 
IX,  December,  1895, 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  481 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Do  We  Need  a  Philosophy  of  Law?  Columbia  Law  Re- 
view, Vol.  V,  May,  1905. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Common  Law  and  Legislation.  Harvard  Law  Review, 
Vol.  XXI,  April,  1908. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Liberty  of  Contract.  Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XVIII, 
May,  1909. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Mechanical  Jurisprudence.  Columbia  Law  Review,  Vol. 
VIII,  December,  1908. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Law  in  Books  and  Law  in  Action.  American  Law  Re- 
view, Vol.  XLIV,  January-February,  19 10. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  The  scope  and  Purpose  of  Sociological  Jurisprudence. 
Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol.  XXV,  December,  191 1,  April,  19 12. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Legislation  as  a  Social  Function.  Proceedings  of  the  Seventh 
Annual  Meeting  of  the  American  Sociological  Society.  Publications, 
Vol.  VII,  December,  191 2. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Note  to  Fowler,  the  New  Philosophies  of  Law.  Harvard 
Law  Review,  Vol.  XXVII,  June,  19 14. 

Pound,  Roscoe.     The  End  of  Law  as  Developed  in  Legal  Rules  and  Doc- 
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^    Pound,  Roscoe.     The  End  of  Law  as  Developed  in  Juristic  Thought.     Har- 
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1917- 
Pound,    Roscoe.     Interests    of    Personality.     Harvard    Law    Review,    Vol. 
XXVIII,  February  and  March,  19 15. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Equitable  Relief  Against  Defamation  and  Injuries  to  Per- 
sonality.    Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol.  XXIX,  April,  1916. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  A  Feudal  Principle  in  Modern  Law.  International  Jour- 
nal of  Ethics,  Vol.  XXV,  October,  19 14. 

Pound,    Roscoe.     Legal    Rights.     International    Journal    of    Ethics,    Vol. 
XXVI,  October,  19 15. 
J    Pound,  Roscoe.     The  Limits  of  Effective  Legal  Action.     International  Jour- 
nal of  Ethics,  Vol.  XXVII,  January,  19 17. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Juristic  Problems  of  National  Progress.  American  Jour- 
nal of  Sociology,  Vol.  XXII,  May,  191 7. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  Juristic  Science  and  Law.  Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol. 
XXXI,  June,  1918. 

Powell,  Thomas  Reed.  Collective  Bargaining  before  the  Supreme  Court. 
Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  XXXIH,  September,   1918. 

Reed,  Homer  Blosser.  The  Morals  of  Monopoly  and  Competition.  In- 
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Reeves,  Jesse  S.  The  Justiciability  of  International  Disputes.  American 
Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  X,  February,  19 16. 


482      THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Renold,  C.  G.  Workshop  Committees.  The  Survey,  Vol.  XLI,  October, 
191 8,  supplement. 

Renold,  C.  G.  Shop  Committees  in  Practice.  The  Survey,  Vol.  XLI, 
March,  19 19. 

Ritchie,  David  G.  On  the  Conception  of  Sovereignty.  Annals  of  the 
American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Vol.  I,  January, 
1891. 

Rivers,  W.  H.  R.  Sociology  and  Psychology.  Sociological  Review,  Vol. 
IX,  Autumn,  1916. 

Robinson,  James  Harvey.     The  Threatened  Eclipse  of  Free  Speech.     Atlant. 
Mon.,  December,  19 17. 
J  Ross,  Edward  Alsworth.     Class  and  Caste.     American  Journal  of  Sociol- 
ogy, Vol.  XXIII,  March,  1917. 

Ross,  Edward  Alsworth.  A  Legal  Dismissal  Wage.  American  Economic 
Review,  Vol.  IX,  Supplement,  March,  19 19. 

Sandburg,  Carl.  The  Farmer-Labor  Congress.  Survey,  Vol.  XLIII, 
February  21,  1920. 

SchmoUer,  Gustav.  Reform  der  Gewerbe  —  Ordnung.  Verhandlungen  der 
fiinften  Generalversammlung  des  Vereins  fiir  Socialpolitik,  am.  8,  9, 
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Schofield,  Henry.  Freedom  of  Press  in  the  United  States.  Proceedings  of 
the  Ninth  Annual  Meeting  of  the  American  Sociological  Society.  Pub- 
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Shand,  Alexander  F.     Feeling  and  Thought.     Mind,  New  Series,  Vol.  VII, 
October,  1898. 
V    Shaw,  S.  Adele.     Closed  Towns.     The  Survey,  Vol.  XLII,  November  8, 

1919. 

Shotwell,  James  T.  The  Interpretation  of  History.  American  Historical 
Review,  Vol.  XVIII,  July,  191 3. 

Small,  Albion  W.  The  Present  Outlook  of  Social  Science.  American  Jour- 
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Smith,  Jeremiah.     The  Use  of  Maxims  in  Jurisprudence.     Harvard  Law 
Review,  Vol.  IX,  April,  1895. 
J  Smith,  Jeremiah.     Surviving  Fictions.     Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVII, 
December,  191 7,  and  January,  1918. 

Smith,  Monroe.  Military  Strategy  versus  Diplomacy  in  Bismarck's  Time  and 
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Smyth,  William  H.  Is  the  "  Art  of  Efficiency  "  Efficient?  Industrial  Man- 
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Smyth,  William  H.  Efficiency.  Industrial  Management,  September  and 
December,  19 18. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  483 

Stecker,  Margaret  Loomis.  The  National  Founders'  Association,  Quar- 
terly Journal  of  Economics,  Vol.  XXX,  February,  19 16. 

Stoddard,  William  Leavitt.  The  Shop  Committee  —  Some  Implications. 
The  Dial,  Vol.  LXVII,  July,  1919. 

Stoddard,  William  Leavitt.  The  Boston  Trade  Union  College.  The  Na- 
tion, August,  19 19. 

Swayze,  Francis  J.  The  Growing  Law.  Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXV, 
November,  19 15. 

Tead,  Ordway.  The  Importance  of  Being  a  Foreman.  Industrial  Man- 
agement, June,  19 1 7. 

Tead,  Ordway.  Outline  of  a  National  Labor  Policy.  Proceedings  of  the 
Employment  Managers'  Conference,  191 8,  in  Bulletin  No.  247  of  U.  S. 
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Washington,  1919. 

Tead,  Ordway.  The  Meaning  of  National  Guilds.  The  Dial,  Vol.  LXVII, 
August,  191 9. 

Terry,  Henry  T.  The  Correspondence  of  Rights  and  Duties.  Yale  Law 
Journal,  Vol.  XXV,  January,  19 16. 

Thomas,  William  I.  Race  Psychology;  Standpoint  and  Questionnaire. 
American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XVII,  May,  1912. 

Thomas,  William  I.  The  Province  of  Social  Psychology.  Congress  of  Arts 
and  Sciences.  Universal  Exposition,  St.  Louis,  1904.  Edited  by  How- 
ard J.  Rogers,  Vol.  V. 

Thomas,  William  I.  The  Prussian-Polish  Situation.  American  Journal  of 
Sociology,  Vol.  XIX,  March,  19 14. 

Thompson,  Bertrand  C.  The  Relation  of  Scientific  Management  to  Labor. 
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  Vol.  XXX,  February,  19 16. 

Tucker,  George  E.  Compulsory  Health  Insurance.  American  Industries, 
Vol,  XIX,  February,  1919. 

Tufts,  James  H.  Ethics  and  International  Relations.  International  Jour- 
nal of  Ethics,  Vol.  XXVIII,  April,  191 8. 

Turner,  Edward  Raymond.  The  Causes  of  the  Great  War.  American 
Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  IX,  February,  19 15. 

Turner,  Frederick  J.  The  Significance  of  the  Frontier  in  American  History. 
Proceedings  of  the  Forty-first  Annual  Meeting  of  the  State  Historical 
Society  of  Wisconsin.     Reprint. 

Valentine,  R.  G.,  and  Tead,  Ordway.  Work  and  Pay:  A  Suggestion 
for  Representative  Government  in  Industry.  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  Vol.  XXXI,  February,  1917. 

Veblen,  Thorstein.  The  Modern  Point  of  View  and  the  New  Order.  The 
Dial,  Vol.  XLV,  November  and  December,  191 8. 

Veblen,  Thorstein.  Bolshevism  is  a  Menace  —  to  Whom?  The  Dial,  Vol. 
LXVI,  February,  19 19. 


484     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 

Veblen,  Thorstein.     The  Industrial  System  and  the  Captains  of  Industry. 

The  Dial,  Vol.  LXVI,  May,  1919. 
Veblen,  Thorstein.     The  Captains  of  Finance  and  the  Engineers.     The  Dial, 

Vol.  LXVI,  June,  1919. 
Veblen,  Thorstein.     The  Beginnings  of  Ownership.     American  Journal  of 

Socology,  Vol.  IV. 
Vincent,  George  Edgar.     The  Development  of  Sociology.     Congress  of  Arts 

and  Sciences.     Universal  Exposition,  St.  Louis,  1914.     Edited  by  How- 
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»^  Vincent,  George  Edgar.     The  Rivalry  of  Social  Groups.     American  Journal 

of  Sociology,  Vol.  XVI,  January,  191 1. 
Vincent,  George  Edgar.     Education  in  the  Next  Generation.     Independent, 

June  26,  191 6. 
Wagner,  Adolf.     Rede  iiber  die  Social  Frage.     Gehalten  auf  der  f reien  Kirchl. 

Versammig.  evangel.     Manner  in  der  K.  Garnisonkirche  zu  Berlin,  am 

12  October,  1871. 
Wagner,  Adolf.     Systematische  Nationalokonomie.     Jahrbiicher  fiir  National 

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World  Tomorrow,  Vol.  Ill,  February,  1920. 

V  Warren,  Samuel  D.,  and  Brandeis,  Louis  D.     The  Right  to  Privacy.     Har- 

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^Webster,    Hutton.     The    Influence    of    Superstition    on    Property    Rights. 

American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XV,  May,  19 10. 
Webster,   Hutton.     Primitive  Individual  Ascendancy.     Pub.  Amer.   Sociol. 

Soc,  Vol.  XII,  December,  19 18. 
Wehle,  Louis  B.     Social  Justice  and  Legal  Education.     International  Jour- 
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West,  George  P.     Will  Labor  Lead?     The  Nation,  Vol.   CVIII,   April, 

1919. 
"  Who  Makes  Bolshevism  in  Cincinnati  ?  "     Editorial,  New  Republic,  Vol. 

XVIII,  April,  1919. 
Wigmore,  John  H.     Justice  Holmes  and  the  Law  of  Torts.     Harvard  Law 

Review,  Vol.  XXIX,  April,  1916. 

V  Williams,  James  Mickel.     Outline  of  a  Theory  of  Social  Motives.     Ameri- 

can Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XV,  May,  1910. 

Williams,  John  M.  An  Actual  Account  of  What  we  have  done  to  Reduce 
our  Labor  Turnover.  Proceedings  of  Employment  Managers'  Confer- 
ence, 191 7,  U.  S.  Department  of  Labor,  Bulletin  No.  227. 

Willoughby,  William  F.  The  Philosophy  of  Labor  Legislation.  Ameri- 
can Political  Science  Review,  Vol.,  VIII,  February,  19 14. 

Willoughby,  Westel  Woodbury.  The  Individual  and  the  State.  American 
Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  VIII,  February,  1914. 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  485 

Willoughby,  W.  W.  Budgetary  Procedure  in  its  Relation  to  Representa- 
tive Government.     Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVII,  April,   191 8. 

Willoughby,  W.  W.  The  Juristic  Conception  of  the  State.  American 
Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  XII,  May,  1918. 

Wolf,  Robert  B.  Securing  the  Initative  of  the  Workman;  Industrial  and 
National  Organic  Unity  a  Neccessity  for  Developing  Individual  Inia- 
tive.     American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  IX,  Supplement,  March,  19 19. 

Wolf,  Robert  B.  Individuality  in  Industry.  Proceedings  of  the  Employ- 
ment Managers'  Conference,  191 7,  U.  S.  Dept.  of  Labor,  Bulletin  No. 
227. 

Wolman,  Leo.  The  Extent  of  Labor  Organization  in  the  United  States. 
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  Vol.  XXX,  May,  19 16. 

Wolman,  Leo.  The  Extent  of  Trade  Unionism.  Annals  of  the  American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Publication  No.  1092. 

Wolman,  Leo.  Collective  Bargaining  in  the  Glass  Bottle  Industry.  Ameri- 
can Economic  Review,  Vol.  VI,  September,  19 16. 

Young,  John  E.  The  Law  as  an  Expression  of  Community  Ideals  and  the 
What  They  Are  Commonly  Assumed  to  Mean?  American  Economic 
Review,  Vol.  VII,  Supplement,  March,  19 17. 

Young,  Allyn  A.  Do  the  Statistics  of  the  Concentration  of  Wealth  Mean 
Lawmaking  Functions  of  Courts.  Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  XXVII, 
November,  191 7. 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


Americanization  movement,  diverse 
tendencies  of,  105. 

Banking,  psychological  processes  of,   378. 

Capital,  psychological  aspect  of  problems 
of,   381- 

Church,  Roman  Catholic  theory  of  sov- 
ereignty, 7,  8 ;  relation  of  c.  to  the 
labour  movement,  22-23 ;  as  an  agent 
of  social  control,  66 ;  its  attitude  to 
property,   340-342. 

Class  struggle,  as  related  to  theory  of 
state,  14-16,  19;  in  United  States,  24- 
26 ;  as  related  to  party  government, 
47-52;  its  relation  to  progress,  76-77; 
development  of,  80-81 ;  destructive  of 
national  feeling,  91 ;  results  in  im- 
pulsive conflict,  142-144;  analysis  of, 
requires  intellective  attitude,  146 ;  sec- 
ondary explanations   of,   148,   149. 

Common  law,  43,  241,  242,  280,  282,  283. 

Co-operation,  in  politics,  81 ;  in  industry, 
106,  107,  108,  365 ;  conditions  necessary 
for,  150;  impeded  by  profit  seeking, 
153.  154)  371.  372;  international  co- 
operation, 181-184;  effect  of,  on  de- 
velopment of  law,  216. 

Crime,  causes  of,  230;  reforms  in  criminal 
law  depend  on  progressive  judge,  231; 
motive  and  intention  in  crime,  231,  232. 

Custom,  social  sciences  deal  with  custo- 
mary aspects  of  social  relations,  3 ; 
voters  vote  according  to  c,  20;  cus- 
tomary morality,  22,  26,  28 ;  social  or- 
ganization customary  except  in  a  crisis, 
76,  77;  law  originally  c,  212,  213,  220; 
divergence  of  law  from  c,  214,  215, 
222,  224-226,  327 ;  people  conform  to 
law  as  to  c,  222;  law  regarded  as  an 
evolution  of  c,  223 ;  customary  aspect 
of  law  emphasized  by  judges,  308-312; 
customary  aspect  of  private  property, 
318,  319;  customs  of  private  property 
interfere  with  progress,  333,  334;  law 
may  be  more  conservative  than  c,  337; 
customary  relations  of  workers  to  prop- 
erty determine  ideas  of  ownership, 
337)  338;  religion  a  bulwark  of  custo- 
mary aspect  of  property,  339-341 ;  eco- 
nomic theories  not  to  be  given  undue 
weight  because  in  accord  with  tradi- 
tion, 358;  sociology  studies  customary 
aspect  of   social   organization,   412-417. 


Democracy,  co-operation  of  classes  in,  68 ; 


487 


social  control  in,  65,  145 ;  education  in, 
126 ;  reform  of  press  necessary  for,  194. 
Dispositions,  Introduction ;  essential  in 
political  processes,  160-165;  essential 
in    development   of   law,   231,   273,   274, 

287,  315,  316,  325;  essential  in  economic 
processes,  361,  362,  365,  366,  369,  370, 
371 ;   determine  course  of  thought,  420. 

Dominant  class,  nature  of,  53-56;  de- 
velopment of,  57-59 ;  control  exercised 
by,  26,  63,  65-66,  137-138;  conscious  of 
its  authoritative  position,  68,  191;  ef- 
fect of  its  action  on  functioning  of  gov- 
ernment, 75 ;  its  power  dependent  on  an 
uneducated  electorate,  76,  144,  145 ;  re- 
tards progress,  141 ;  its  influence  over 
development  of  law,  224-228,  233,  235, 

288,  289,  292,  293. 

Economic  motives,  Wagner's  analysis  of, 
345,  346 ;  analysis  of  by  other  German 
economists,  346-350;  analysis  of  by 
English  economists,  350-352;  by  Amer- 
ican economists,  352-353;  analysis  of 
Marshall  and  Wicksteed,  354-356;  an- 
alyses have  been  deductive,  358,  359; 
increasing  use  of  induction,  359,  382- 
385 ;  ec.  m.  as  factors  in  determining 
wages,  359-364;  classification  of,  364- 
370;  reactionary  in  profit-seeking  sys- 
tem, 371,  372;  need  of  governmental 
regulation  of  profit-seeking,  371,  374; 
in  profit-seeking  system,  expert  subor- 
dinated to  business  man,  374-375. 

Education,  necessary  to  social  progress, 
102 ;  denied  lower  classes  by  controlling 
classes,  103 ;  effect  of  lack  of,  on  politi- 
cal behaviour,  102,  149,  150,  156; 
should  emphasize  training  of  intellect, 
109,  115;  industrial  changes  necessary 
for  effective  e.,  110;  should  emphasize 
the  self-expression  of  the  many,  110; 
effect  on,  of  family,  sectarian,  class  and 
national  prejudice,  111,  123;  necessary 
for  unbiased  public  opinion,  112,  113, 
114,  191,  192;  nature  of  determined  by 
political  attitudes,  124-126;  need  of 
legal  education,  251. 

Finance,  psychological  aspects  of  prob- 
lems of  corporation  and  public  f.,  380, 
381. 

Freedom  of  thought  and  speech,  depends 
on  social  conditions,  111;  depends  on 
rational  attitude  in  interpretation  of 
laws    limiting,   271-273,    303-306;    ncc- 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


488 

essary  for  functioning  of  democratic 
government,  306,  307;  its  connection 
with  desire  for  security  of  property, 
307,  308. 
Freedom  of  contract,  judicial  interpreta- 
tions of,  249-251,  258-262;  interpreta- 
tion of  in  England  and  the  United 
States,  301 ;  psychological  basis  of,  333. 

Government,  nature  of  constitutional  gov- 
ernment, 29-31;  distrust  of  govern- 
ment, 36-37;  protection  of  employing 
classes  against  employed  by  g.,  38-40; 
g.  avoids  obvious  subservience  to  a 
class,  66-68 ;  psychological  basis  of  dif- 
ference between  French  and  Anglo- 
Saxon  g.,  70,  118,  119;  political  attitude 
of  former  German  g.,  116,  117,  123, 
124;  obstacles  to  expert  knowledge  in, 
154-156;  effect  of  increase  of  power  of, 
155-160;  private  rights  in  English, 
298,  299;  rivalry  of  governmental  or- 
gans, 310-314;  co-operation  of  govern- 
mental organs,  314-315;  popular  atti- 
tude to  extravagance  of,  333. 

History,  writing  of  influenced  by  group 
rivalry,  387-389,  391;  by  reasoning  by 
analogy,  389,  390,  392,  393 ;  non-intel- 
lectual motives  in  writing  of,  393-395; 
theories  of  state  personality  and  their 
influence  in  writing  of,  395,  396;  Dar- 
winian interpretation  of,  397,  398;  con- 
flict and  survival  of  groups  an 
essential  process  of,  398,  399;  develop- 
ment of  severely  scientific  method  in, 
399;  rivalry  of  historians  in  discovery 
of  new  facts,  399-402;  historical  types 
of  behaviour,  403-405 ;  economic  inter- 
pretation of,  406,  407 ;  relation  of  so- 
cial psychology  to,  407-409. 

Immigration,  psychological  aspect  of 
problems  of,   377. 

Independent  voters,  26. 

Individualism,  characteristic  of  English 
political  attitude,  10;  endorsed  by 
Bentham  and  Spencer,  10;  in  the 
United  States,  81 ;  due  to  economic 
conditions,  134,  139,  140;  effect  of  on 
legal  development,  213,  219,  238,  253, 
302,  332,  333;  effect  of,  on  thinking  of 
economists,  358,  359;  effect  of,  on  his- 
tory, 405. 

Insurance,  health  insurance,  153;  psycho- 
logical aspect  of  problems  of,  379,  380. 

Intellectual  attitude,  112-115,  144,  429, 
430,  451,  452- 

International  relations,  traditionally  ag- 
gressive, 168,  169;  rivalry  for  national 
economic  superiority  in,  169,  170,  172, 
173 ;  struggle  for  national  domination 
in,  170,  172;  international  rivalry  es- 
eentially  economic,  174;  war  a  struggle 


between  property  classes  of  different 
nations  for  profit  and  supremacy,  175- 
177;  international  co-operation  pre- 
vented by  ambitions  and  apprehension 
of  propertied  classes,  181-187;  inter- 
national class  feeling,  188-192;  effect 
of  international  struggle  for  domina- 
tion on  education  and  scholarship,  192; 
remoteness  of  international  situations 
makes  intelligent  public  opinion  diffi- 
cult, 192,  193 ;  adulation  of  lower 
classes  toward  upper  facilitates  their 
control,  198,  199;  rivalry  of  propertied 
classes  of  different  nations  a  constant 
cause   of  international   friction,   204. 

Judicial  attitudes,  in  the  interpretation  of 
law,  40-44,  222,  223,  244-246,  250,  251; 
nature  of,  256-260;  as  related  to  at- 
titude of  individualistic  property 
owner  260,  261,  267-270,  302-304,  334- 
337;  the  rational  attitude,  262-264; 
why  rational  attitude  is  unusual,  265; 
progressive  jurisprudence  a  result  of 
rational  attitude,  265 ;  conditions  fav- 
ourable to  rational  attitude,  266 ;  con- 
ditions unfavourable,  271,  278 ;  con- 
servative attitude,  273 ;  both  attitudes 
consider  public  opinion,  273,  274; 
judicial  attitudes  usually  subconscious, 
275,  276;  rational  attitude  more  apt  to 
be  conscious  than  is  conservative,  276, 
280,  281 ;  conservative  attitude  preju- 
diced for  common  law  and,  against 
statute  law,  281,  282;  the  two  attitudes 
lead  to  different  conceptions  of  law, 
285,  287;  the  two  attitudes  irreconcil- 
able, 288;  analysis  of  judicial  conserv- 
atism, 308-310;  judicial  supported  by 
popular  conservatism,  311-313;  effect 
of  judicial  conservatism  on  develop- 
ment of  jurisprudence,  312;  progressive 
jurisprudence  depends  on  progressive 
judges  and  popular  support  of  them, 
315,  316. 

Justice,  meaning  of,  249-251 ;  justice  ac- 
cording to  law,  277,  292,  309,  310; 
positive  standard  of,  292,  294-297;  j. 
requires  understanding  of  the  motives 
of  individuals   and   nations,  436-438. 

Jurisprudence,  3 ;  see  Laiv. 

Labour  movement,   nature  of,  20-23,  72; 

dependent   on    educated   public   opinion, 

112-113. 
Labour    party,    in    United    States,    25,    26, 

33-  ,        .         , 

Law,  nature  of,  14,  234,  235;  function  of, 
27-30,  44-46,  80,  232,  233 ;  sanction  of, 
32,  229,  233;  sources  of,  40;  causes  of 
sanctity  of,  ii8,  134,  254;  assumptions 
of  international  law,  167,  168;  theories 
of,  209,  210,  223,  251-253;  dependent 
on    psychological    conditiont,    2zo;    de- 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


489 


velopraent  of,  212-219;  codification  of, 
220;  legal  maxims,  221,  222;  diverg- 
ence of  from  custom,  214,  215,  222,  225, 

226,  337;  Roman  versus  German  law, 
225-227 ;    functioning    of    criminal    law, 

227,  229-231;  relation  of,  to  public 
opinion,  236;  social  basis  of,  254-256, 
278-280;  different  opinions  as  to  the 
teaching  of,  283,  284;  compromise 
between  clashing  rights  and  conflicting 
classes,  288-290;  need  of  a  ministry  of 
justice  to  direct  legal  development,  292. 

League  of  Nations,  an  organization  for 
international  economic  co-operation, 
196;  implies  a  "new  international 
psychology,"  197;  an  effective  league 
not  provided  by  Peace  Treaty,  197- 
198;  is  contrary  to  traditional  ambition 
for  national  supremacy,  199,  and  to 
traditional  conception  of  sovereignty, 
200-201 ;  will  internationalize  class 
struggle,  175,  202,  unless  this  is  pre- 
vented by  effective  popular  representa- 
tion and  education,  202-203 !  is  con- 
trary to  unrestricted  increase  of  popu- 
lation^  203 ;  to  traditional  educational, 
ecclesiastical  and  employing  class  atti- 
tudes,   203-204. 

Legal    attitudes,   6,   209-212. 

Liquor  traffic,   reasons  for  prohibition   of, 

228,  229 ;  enforcement  of  prohibitory 
law,   232. 

Militarism,  causes  of,  loo-ioi ;  process  of 
development  of,  101-102 ;'  nature  of, 
116-124;  political  theory  of,  170-172, 
349 ;  socPal  control  under,  177 ;  inter- 
ests served  by,   177. 

Morality,  21-23,  27  44. 

Motives,  definition  of,  3 ;  of  subjects  in 
recognizing  authority,  5,  6;  task  of 
social  psychology  to  analyse  and  in- 
terpret, 427,  428 ;  importance  of  the 
study  of,  428-432 ;  methods  of  analysis 
of,  432-433;  essential  motives  subcon- 
scious, 434,  hence  task  of  social  psy- 
chology difficult,  435;  crises  bring  mo- 
tives to  consciousness.  435-436;  social 
adjustment  requires  discrimination  of, 
436;  m.  of  nations  become  matter  of 
discussion  in  national  crisis,  437-439; 
class  conflict  causes  discussion  of,  439, 
440;  increasing  intimacy  of  social  re- 
lations increases  importance  of  study 
of,  440. 

Natural  law,  9;  justified  divergence  of 
law  from  custom,  224,  236;  Greek  con- 
ception of,  236,  237;  development  of 
conception  of,  237-239;  its  individual- 
istic tendency,  238 ;  used  against 
autocracy,  239,  240;  its  philosophical 
basis,  241 ;  its  relation  to  the  English 
common     law,     241 ;     its     relation     to 


American  political  theory  and  juris- 
prudence, 239,  241-248,  301,  302;  used 
on  behalf  of  propertied  classes  against 
non-propertied,  245,  246 ;  used  to  per- 
petuate the  existing  state  of  affairs,  246 ; 
used  for  the  protection  of  working 
classes,  246;  used  in  opposition  to  the 
law  of  the  land,  246-248 ;  discredited 
by  Kant,  247,  248;  contrasted  with  the 
modern  idea  of  law,  249;  not  important 
in  English  jurisprudence,  307,  308. 
Non-propertied  classes,  difficulty  of  ris- 
ing out  of,  36;  motives  of,  78-79,  80- 
81,   146-148. 

Organized  labour,  its  distrust  of  govern- 
mental regulation  of  industry,  38-40; 
its  unfavourable  position  because  of  un- 
educated public  opinion,  112,  113,  114; 
its  purpose  to  educate  the  masses,   191. 

Patriotism,  nature  of,  177-179;  used  by 
economic  interests  for  private  profit, 
184. 

Political  attitudes,  5-10;  of  Roman  Cath- 
olic church,  7,  8 ;  of  English  people, 
10;  of  farmers,  24,  25;  of  propertied 
classes,  56-57,  302;  of  working  classes, 
72-73,  78;  essential  in  sense  of  na- 
tionality, 92;  autocratic  contrasted  with 
democratic,  92-94;  effect  of  war  on 
consciousness  of,  94-95 ;  effect  of  war 
on  influence  of,  98-99;  conflict  of,  Ch. 
VI;  of  Germany,  116-125;  effect  of  on 
family  relations,  124;  effect  of  on  ed- 
ucation, 124-126;  on  thought,  7-10, 
126-134.  See  Propertied  Classes  and 
Non-propertied  Classes. 

Political  freedom,  as  affected  by  the  form 
of  state,  87-88. 

Political   parties,   25,  47,  48. 

Population,  psychological  aspects  of  the 
problem   of,   376,   377. 

Press,  not  an  educative  influence^,  26 ; 
serves  propertied  interests,  112,  113, 
145 ;  can  instigate  national  animosities, 
179;  its  control  due  to  ignorance  of 
the  masses,  191,  and  to  remoteness  of 
political  situations,  192-193;  reform  of 
necessary    for    progress,    194-195. 

Price  level,  psychological  aspect  of  prob- 
lems  of,   381. 

Private  property,  struggle  for  p.  p.  the 
essential  process  in  development  of  law, 
317.  319.  330,  331;  origin  of,  317,  318; 
attitude  of  community  to,  318,  319;  de- 
velopment of,  319-321;  law  of,  319, 
320;  enclosure  of  common  land  in  Eng- 
land, 321-323 ;  effect  of  enclosure  on 
public  welfare,  323 ;  purpose  of  Eng- 
lish land  law,  323,  324;  effect  of  prop- 
erty ownership,  324,  325 ;  effect  of  in- 
heritance of,  on  class  feeling,  328 ; 
analysis    of    desire    for,    331,    332;    in- 


490 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


dividualistic  versus  social  attitude  to, 
332-334,  338,  339;  relation  of  to  re- 
ligion, 339,  342.  See  Propertied 
Classes. 

Production,  psychological  aspect  of  prob- 
lems of,   382. 

Propertied  classes,  motives  of,  57-59;  at- 
titude of  reactionary  propertied  class, 
33-36,  82,  141-149;  attitude  of  progres- 
sive propertied  class,  32-34,  36;  in- 
fluence of,  61 ;  attitude  to  non-proper- 
tied classes,  79,  141,  328,  329 ;  political 
attitudes  of,  95,  96;  development  of 
relations  between,  135,  141;  draw  to- 
gether before  non-propertied  resistance, 
143,  145,  189,  190;  apprehensive  for 
security  of  property,  179-180;  especially 
protected  by  law,  25,  45,  211,  260,  261, 
267-270,  302-304,  306-308,  330,  331,  334- 
337;  effect  of  apprehension  of,  and 
conservatism  of,  324,  325 ;  political 
rivalry  of,  325 ;  control  of,  over  gov- 
ernment, 326,  327.  See  Private 
Property. 

Sense  of  nationality,  weakened  by  class 
struggle,  91 ;  strengthened  by  a  com- 
mon language,  92 ;  strengthened  by 
consciousness  of  a  political  attitude 
different  from  that  of  rival  nations,  94, 
95;  intensified  by  national  persecution, 
97,  98 ;  national  self-esteem  intensified 
by  victory  in  war,  98,  99;  national 
self-esteem  unfavourable  to  develop- 
ment of  democrac}',  99 ;  nature  of,  in 
early  America,  104,  135;  nature  of 
generally,  109-110,  177-178;  should  be 
educated,   110;    nature  of,   in  Germany, 

121-122. 

Social  adjustment,  theory  of  relativity  of, 
293-296. 

Social  class^  conception  of,  23-24.  See 
Propertied  Classes  and  Non-propertied 
Classes. 

Sociology,  originally  social  philosophy, 
410,  which  differentiated  into  sociology, 
412,  and  social  psychology,  411;  distinc- 
tion between  psychological  sociology 
and  social  psychology,  413-415;  rela- 
tion of  biological  sociology  to  social 
psychology,  415,  416;  relation  of 
ethnology  to  social  psychology,  416, 
417 ;  sociology  and  social  psychology 
combine   in   studies   of  the   family,   art. 


and  religion,  417,  418;  relation  of 
eugenics  to  social  psychology,  418,  419. 
Social  philosophy,  meaning  of  word  phil- 
osophy as  here  used,  420,  421 ;  knowl- 
edge of  s.  p.  necessary  for  officials, 
421 ;  discretionary  power  of  officials, 
287,  421-423 ;  wise  use  of  power  re- 
quires that  officials  act  according  to 
principles  of  social  philosophy,  not 
from    partisanship    or    class    prejudice, 

423- 

Social  psychology,  purpose  of,  Introduc- 
tion ;  definition  of,  3 ;  field  of,  4,  441 ; 
related  to  political  science,  5,  6,  17,  19, 
23,  24,  28,  50,  56,  60,  75,  86,  87,  91, 
92,  109,  152,  154,  156,  189-191 ;  related 
to  jurisprudence,  37,  211,  212,  231,  232, 
254.  279,  280,  298,  299,  306,  307,  315, 
339;  related  to  economics,  345-348,  351, 
356-359,  363.-366,  375,  376,  Ch.  XX; 
related  to  history,  386,  389,  392,  399, 
401,  403,  407,  408 ;  related  to  sociology, 
410-418;  related  to  eugenics,  418-419; 
social  psychology  a  further  stage  in  in- 
tensive analysis  of  social  relations,  4, 
385,  420;  task  of  social  psychology, 
427 ;  attempts  intensive  analysis  of  mo- 
tives, 428,  441 ;  methods  of,  441-451 ; 
not  deductive,  with  preconceived  theory 
of  social  mind,  441-442;  social  mind 
not  existent  outside  of  individual  mind 
but  has  dominant  influence  over  it, 
442-443 ;  documentary  sources  of,  446- 
449 ;  use  of  statistical  method  by,  449- 
450;  reason  for  exactness  of  method 
in,  450-451;  studies  variations  in  be- 
haviour, 452. 

Sovereignty,  nature  of,  5,  6,  15-17,  63, 
64;  theories  of,  6-14;  popular  s.,  ro; 
legal  theory  of,  14,  18;  organismic  the- 
ories of,  16-17;  relation  to  public  opin- 
ion, 18;  relation  to  class  struggle,  71- 
75 ;  change  in  method  of  study  of,  89, 
90;  does  not  involve  complete  inde- 
pendence  of   state,    166,    167. 

Speculation,   57-60,    139,   378. 

State,  4;  possible  changes  in  form  of, 
85-88;  function  of,  89.  See  Sover- 
eignty. 

Taxation,  psychological  aspects  of  prob- 
lems   of,    380. 

Trade  unionism,  psychological  processes 
of,   377.  378,  384,  385- 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Adams,  B.,  219,  288,  320,  321,  337. 

Adams,  G.  B.,  407. 

Addams,  62. 

Alexander,    129,    143. 

Allen,  275,   276. 

Ames,  418. 

Angell,  81,  95,  168,  177,  183,  184,  204. 

Aristotle,  4. 

Ashley,  79,   328,   346,   388. 

Austin,   II,  12,  166,  234,  240. 

Bagehot,  352. 
Baldwin,  284. 
Bancroft,  387. 
Beard,   3,    5,   11,   31,  32,  60,  74,   80,  m, 

138,   141,   155,  213.  233.  242.  243,  250, 

327,   330,   337.   338- 
Becker,  308,  326,  351,  388,  403. 
Bentham,   11. 
Bentley,   422. 
Bernard,  L.,  98. 
Bernard,  L.  L,  25,  213. 
Bismarck,  94,  116,  179. 
Blackstone,   240,   310. 
Boas,  212,  412,  443,  444. 
Bodin,   8,   237. 
Bosanquet,    396. 
Bowley,  449,  450. 
Brace,  379,  445. 
Bradford,   414. 
Brailsford,    176,   204. 

Brandeis,  53,  222,  227,  256,  266,  336,  366. 
Breasted,  418. 
Brent,  418. 
Brentano,   350. 
Brissenden,  78,  83,  367. 
Bristol,   441. 
Brooke,   132. 
Brown,  H.  G.,  378. 
Brown,  J.,  229,  257,  271,  414. 
Bruce,    132. 
Bryant,  79. 

Bryce,  32,  47,  62,  63,  99,  139. 
Buck,  92. 
Bullitt,   148,   193. 
Burgess,  53. 

Cabot,  444. 
Campbell,    379. 
Carter,  223,  257. 
Carver,   363,  433. 
Chafee,   304. 
Cherington,    382,   445. 
Clark,  263. 

Coker,  17,  395,  396,  397. 
Colcord,  24. 


Cole,  72,  86. 

Collier,    116,   124. 

Commons,    12,    20,    39,    68^  89,    153,    154, 

156,  262,  362,  377,  385,  422. 
Comte,  410. 

Cook,    232,   264,   266,   267,   268,   271,   285. 
Cooley,  C.  H.,  441. 
Cooley,   Judge,    50. 
Corbin,   284. 
Crane,   14. 
Croly,   13,  20,  21,  22,  23,  26,  36,  45,  46 

57.  58,  59,  66,  81,  83,  87,  95,  no,  134, 

135,    138,    142,   150,   152,   155,   157.   173. 

197,  292,  296,  328,  422,  423. 

Darwin,  413. 

Davenport,  H.  J.,  53,  339,  353,  364. 

Davids,   92. 

Demolins,   125. 

Dennison,   185. 

De  Tocqueville,  32,  99 

Dewey,  D.  R.,  357. 

Dewey,  J.,   53,   89,  95,  98,  115,   126,  134, 

175.    197,   198,   199.  246,  255,  391,  394, 

397,  4".  415,  441,  446- 
Dibble,   124. 
Dicey,    12,    132,   216,   240,   252,   257,   308, 

309,  310,  312. 
Dodd,  247. 
Duguit,  5,  9,   16,   17,  23s,  251,  252,  253, 

254. 
Dunning,  4,  7,  8,  237,  238,  254,  387,  399, 

400,  401,  402,  403,  443. 
Durkheim,  411. 

Eastman,  179. 

Edgeworth,    352. 

Ehrlich,  90,  223. 

Ely,  260,  288,  332,  335,  353,  420. 


Fairchild,   377. 

Farrand,  138. 

Fetter,  201,  353,  359,  376. 

Filene,    20,    33. 

Fish,   139. 

Fisher,   108,   134,   153,  186,   328,   334,   353. 

366,  378,  379,  380,  381. 
Fiske,  421. 

Fitch,  40,  47,  113,  368. 
Fite,  53,  365. 
Fletcher,  443. 
Flint,  139. 
Follett,  86. 
Ford,   16,  60. 
Foulke,  47. 


401 


492 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Frankfurter,  245,  250,  259,  261,  264,  287, 

288,  380. 
Freud,    433. 
Freund,    196,    335. 

Gantt,  84,  186,  373. 

Gaston,    56. 

Gerber,  5. 

Gersternberg,  379. 

Gibbon,  379,  380. 

Gibbons,  i68. 

Giddings,   5,  412. 

Gierke,   5,   7,   17. 

Gillin,   77. 

Gleason,    89,    95,    151,    152. 

Goldmark,  231,   250,  380. 

Goldenweiser,   412. 

Gorapers,  78. 

Goodnow,  10,  22,  29,  31,  90,  117,  13  s, 
137,  167,  242,  243,  244,  245,  246,  251, 
288,  299,  300,  301,  302,  303,  308,  309, 
311,   314,   316,   332,   334,   335,   336. 

Grant,    337,    339. 

Gray,    257. 

Green,   F.,  421,  422. 

Green,  J.  R.,  27. 

Green,   W.,   314. 

Gumplowicz,    131,  413. 


Hadley,  327. 

Haines,  243,  244,  246. 

Hale,   158,    305. 

Hall,  212. 

Hamilton,  4,  353. 

Hammond,  322,  323,  341. 

Hand,  42,  43,  277,  278,  304. 

Hapgood,  79,  157,  158,  247. 

Hard,  28,  88,  273. 

Harlan,  52,  244. 

Harrington,   53,   137. 

Hart,   A.   B.,   399,  407. 

Hart,   F.  B.,   273,   303,   306. 

Hauser,  124. 

Hay,   247. 

Hayden,   287. 

Healy,  231,  445. 

Hegel,  s,  391. 

Henderson,  227. 

Higgins,   76,   229,   288,   289,    374. 

Hill,  13s,  139,  338. 

Hobbes,  8,  237. 

Hobson,   363. 

Hocking,    7,    89,    182,    293,    294,    451. 

Hohfeld,   281. 

Hollander,    382. 

Holmes,  Introduction,  143,  244,  245,  253, 
257»  258,  259,  260,  261,  262,  263,  264, 
274,  276,  280,  282,  283,  286,  287,   339. 

Hosmer,   247. 

Howard,   369. 

Hoxie,  24,  286,  359,  378,  445. 

Huntington,  412. 

Huxley,    397. 


Ihering,  5,  6,  11,  78,  294. 

Jackson,  66,  436. 
James,  420. 
Jastrow,  J.,  433,  434- 
Jastrow,  M.,  227. 
Jellinek,  5,  6. 
Jenks,  E.,  320. 
Jenks,  J.,  24,  435. 
Jephson,    132,   303. 
Jevons,  352. 
Johnson,  A.  H.,  321. 
Johnson,  A.  S.,  184,  353. 
Jones,    235. 

Kallen,  96,  99,  127,  167,  173,  174,  175,  200, 

203,  204. 
Kant,    5,    9. 

Keller,  205,  223,  412,  414,  416,  427. 
Kellogg,  95. 
Kemmerer,  378. 
Kerchensteiner,   126. 
Keynes,   196,  295. 
King,  I.,  332,  418. 
King,    W.    I.,    52,    xos,    338,   357. 
Knies,    349. 
Kocourek,    339,    340. 
Korkunov,  278. 
Kruger,  ii6. 

La  Follette,  49. 

Laing,   127,   128. 

Lambert,  380. 

Lamprecht,  392. 

Lane,  305. 

Laski,    5,    8,    11,   14,   18,   27,   53,   93,    115, 

117,   160,   235,   252,  253,  256,   314. 
Lasker,   348,  349. 
Le  Bon,  411. 
Lenin,  148,   188. 
Levine,  8i. 
Liebknecht,   119,  121. 
Lincoln,  40,  41,  42,  213,  282. 
Lindsay,   62. 

Lindsey,  15,  28,  47,  231,  290. 
Link,  432,  445. 

Lippmann,  75,  95,  177,  192,  194,  195. 
Locke,   9,   137,  238,  340. 
Lowell,  4,  60,  n6,  117,  156,  240,  312,  313. 
Lowie,  416. 
Lubin,  105. 

Maitland,    326. 

Margoliouth,   92. 

Marot,  73. 

Marshall,   350,   354,   355. 

Maude,    340,    341. 

McCarthy,   156.  ]' 

McDougall,    96,   441. 

McLaren,   121,   125. 

McMurray,  200. 

Mead,   232. 

Meeker,  356,  363. 

Merrlam,  8,  12,  239,  240,  242,  243,  247. 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


493 


Merz,  69,  73. 

Meyer,  433, 

Michel,   9,   239. 

Mill,   326,   352. 

Mitchell,  B.,  260. 

Mitchell,  W.  C,  3,   53,  77,  351,  352,  359, 

366,  374,  375,  383,  384. 
Montesquieu,  90. 

Moore,  H.  L.,  361,  378,  382,  384. 
Moore,  J.  B.,  118,  167,  169,  210,  246,  247, 

291,  404,  405. 
Morgan,   317.  ^ 

Morley,  435. 
Morse,    104. 
Moulton,   53,   366. 
Mussey,  56,  168,  170,   173,  182. 
Myers,  60,  140. 

Neilson,  192. 

Newsome,   60. 

Nicolay,  247. 

Nicholls,  323. 

Nietzsche,   127,   128,   129,   130. 

Ogburn,  60,  406. 
Ogg,   14?- 

Oppenheimer,   30,   328. 
Orth,  102,  183,  188,  222. 
Ostrogorski,  47,  61,  139. 
Overstreet,   204. 

Page,   53. 

Perry,  B.,  62. 

Perry,  R.  B.,  91,  103,  119,  130,  441. 

Pigou,  356,  357,  368,  382. 

Pillsbury,  27,  91,  92,  96,  97,  102,  183,  428, 

435.  442.  443- 

Plato,  4. 

Plehn,  381. 

Plumb,  72. 

Podmore,  362. 

Pollock,  212,  240,  257,  281,  310,  319,  324. 

Popenoe,  418. 

Porter,  10. 

Pound,  II,  37,  44,  45,  50,  52,  76,  137,  156, 
213,  215,  216,  217,  218,  219,  222,  223, 
236,  241,  242,  244,  245,  248,  254,  255, 
256,  273,  283,  284,  286,  289,  291,  292, 
302,  314,  330. 

Ratzenhofer,  411. 

Rauschenbusch,  340. 

Reckitt,  87. 

Reed,  47,   333. 

Reeves,  202. 

Reichauer,   128. 

Renold,  151. 

Richmond,  444,  446. 

Ritchie,  12,  63,  166. 

Rivers,  414,   417. 

Robinson,    386,    387,    389,    390,    391,    431, 

437,  441- 
Roosevelt,  251. 
Ross,  20,   203,   328,  377. 


Rousseau,  9,  239. 

Rowe,  155. 

Rowntree,  323. 

Royce,  133. 

Russell,   96,    97,    in,    120,    157,    159,   200, 

203,  204. 
Ruyssen,   92,   395. 

Salmond,  231. 

Salter,  127,  128,  129,  130. 

Sandburg,   56,   82,   150. 

Schapiro,   137,   225,  226,  227,   341. 

Schmoller,   169,  346,  347,  348. 

Schofield,  303. 

Schouler,   141. 

Schurz,  438. 

Seager,   353,  420. 

Seligman,    353,   380. 

Semple,  412. 

Shand,  434. 

Shaw,  28,  88,  146. 

Shotwell,  392,  406,  418. 

Slater,  321. 

Small,    169. 

Smith,  A.,  168,  326. 

Smith,  E.,  227. 

Smith,    J.,    220,    221,    222,    254,    258,    263, 

281. 
Smith,  J.  A.,   52,  338. 
Smith,  M.,  438. 
Smith,  R.  H.,  29,  295. 
Smith,   S.   C.  K.,  418. 
Smyth,    84,   340. 
Sombart,    123,    350. 
Speeden,   385. 
Spencer,   B.,   212,    317. 
Spencer,  H.,  lo,  133,  134,  410,  411,  413. 
Stecker,  83. 
Stewart,  129,   131. 
Stickney,  47. 

Stoddard,   73,   74,   148,   151. 
Stowell,    438. 

Summer,  220,  222,  325,  326,  412. 
Swayze,  286. 

Tannenbaum,  20,  21,   55. 

Tarbell,  47,   52,  428. 

Taussig,   361,  431,   452. 

Taylor,    183. 

Tead,  20,    54,   69,   70,   84,   86,   152,   20X. 

Teggart,  77,  101,  102,  398,  399,  408,  412. 

Terry,  255. 

Thayer,  222. 

Thomas,    92,    97,    98,    123,   377,   415,   417. 

442,  444. 
Thompson,   B.   C,    359,    360. 
Thompson,    W.    S.,    376. 
Thorndike,    163,    164,    331,    367,   419,   441. 
Titchener,  441. 
Treitschke,    124,    171,    172. 
Trollope,  139. 
Trowbridge,  79. 
True,   231,  444. 
Tucker,  153. 


494 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Tufts,  154,  255.  418. 

Turner,    E.    R,    120. 

Turner,  F.  J.,  139,  403,  405,  408. 

Valentine,   152. 

Van  Kleeck,  445. 

Veblen,  19,  53,  62,  84,  92,  93,  95^  96,  103, 
III,  118,  120,  123,  143,  168,  172,  176, 
178,  179.  192.  327,  339.  365.  366. 

Vincent,  410,  413. 

Volkelt,  418. 

Wagner,  345,  346. 

Wallas,  5. 

Warbasse,  72. 

Ward,  72,  84. 

Warren,  256. 

Webb,   20,   40,   147,   373. 

Webster,  212,  319. 

Wehle,   261,   264. 

West,  15,  28,  47,  78,  328,  375. 

Westermarck,  137,  212,  214,  215,  227,  232, 

317,  318,  319,  332,  337,  340,  412,  419. 
Weyforth,  368. 
Weyl,  139,   334- 


White,  140. 

Whitney,  384. 

Wicksteed,   355. 

Wigmore,   287,   339,   340,   390,  439. 

Williams,  Bishop  C.  D.,  340,  341. 

Williams,  J.  M.,  28,  44,  57,  104,  135  ,136, 

138,   139,    140,    163,   164,  213,   219,   369, 

379,  384,  404,  441,  448,  450. 
Willoughby,  W.   F.,   37. 
Willoughby,  W.  W.,  5.  ^3.  i4.  18,  28,  37. 

381. 
Wilson,   181,   187,  374,  397. 
Withers,   378. 
Witmer,  436. 
Windelband,  236. 
Wines,  232. 

Wolf,   84,   106-108,   i86,   364,   366. 
Wolfe,  377. 
Wolman,  368,  445. 
Wundt,  248,  392. 

Young,   A.   A.,    357. 
Young,  G.,  159,  278,  279. 
Youngman,  339. 

Zimmern,  92. 


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